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This thesis is a study of close air support within 
the historical context of World War II, with the 
analysis focusing upon the use of tactical air 
power by British and American forces during the 
campaigns in North-West Europe and Italy in 1943- 
45. The thesis addresses the fundamental questions 
of whether the employment of air resources in the 
close support role provided sufficient advantage at 
the battlefront to justify the associated 
expenditure of effort and the risk to aircraft and 
pilots, and whether air support proved to be of 
more value, and more cost effective, when directed 
upon interdiction targets beyond the immediate 
battlefront, such as German communications, 
transport, and supplies. 
The principal sources consulted were contemporary 
Army and Air Force formation and unit records and 
reports, and contemporary Allied Operational 
Research (OR) material. The thesis examines the 
nature of Operational Research in the period, the 
joint Air Force/Army systems established by both 
the British and Americans for providing and 
controlling air support, the characteristics of 
fighter-bomber aircraft, and the organisation and 
tactics of fighter-bomber units. This precedes an 
analysis of close air support for mobile and 
airborne operations, the employment of fighter- 
bombers against German armoured forces, the 
employment of heavy and medium bombers in the close 
support role, the comparative effectiveness of 
fighter-bombers and ground artillery, and the 
effectiveness of fighter-bombers in the 
interdiction role. 
The thesis argues that close air support did 
undoubtedly provide certain advantages. However, 
these became apparent as a result of the Allies 
possessing air superiority and, had Allied air 
resources been fewer, they would not have been in 
themselves sufficient justification for diminishing 
the tactical air offensive against interdiction 
targets, or the strategic air offensive against 
Germany. 
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This study of close air support during World Var II 
was made possible by my having been engaged as a 
researcher on the staff of the Department of War 
Studies, King's College London, contracted to provide 
historical data on the effect of air attack on ground 
forces for analysis by the Defence Operational 
Analysis Centre (D. O. A. C. ) at Vest Byfleet in Surrey. 
Therefore I should like to express my gratitude to 
Professor Lawrence Freedman, Head of the Department of 
War Studies, Professor Brian Bond of the Department, 
and Xr. David Rowland of D. O. A. C. , for this 
opportunity, and also to my tutor at King's, 
Dr. Philip Sabin, for his guidance throughout the 
years of study. Due appreciation is also extended to 
the Journal of Strategic Studies for publishing the 
material contained in Chapters Five and Six in the 
June 1991 and September 1992 editions respectively. 
All judgements and opinions concerning the effects and 
utility of close air support in the period are my own, 
and should not be construed as reflecting in any way 
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AACC Army Air Control Centre (British). Joint 
---- RAF/British Army Control Centre for 
controlling air support. 
AEAF Allied Expeditionary Air Force. 
AGRA Army Groups Royal Artillery (British). 
---- Separate groupings of field, medium and 
heavy artillery usually under Corps 
control. 
ALO Air Liaison Officer (British). Army 
--- officer attached to RAF formation or 
unit for liaison duties. 
AOP Air Observation Post (British). Name given 
--- to squadrons of light aircraft piloted by 
the Royal Artillery, serviced by the 
RAF and employed in observing for the 
guns. 
ASPO Air Support Party Officer (USAAF). 
---- Pilot attached to U. S. Army Corps, 
Division, and Armoured Combat Command 
Headquarters as a liaison officer. (See 
TALO and TAPO below). 
ASSU Air Support Signals Unit (British). 
---- Communications units attached to Army and 
RAF formations for relaying air support 
requests and intelligence. 
BAU Bombing Analysis Unit. 
CRA Commander Royal Artillery. 
DAF Desert Air Force (RAF) 
FAC Forward Air Controller. RAF or 
--- USAAF officer, usually a pilot, 
attached to ground formations with the 
role of contacting aircraft and directing 
airstrikes from the ground. 
-? - 
FCP Forward Control 





Post (British). An air 
post manned by RAF and 
situated near the 
responsible for 
support in a particular 
FOO Forward Observation Officer (British). 
--- Artillery officer attached to an Infantry 
or Armoured battalion with a 
communications link to his artillery 
regiment or battery and able to call for 
and direct supporting fire. 
GLO Ground Liaison Officer (U. S. Army). Army 
--- officer attached to a USAAF unit as a 
liaison officer; the equivalent of the 
British ALO (see above). 
10 Intelligence Officer. 
MATAF Mediterranean Allied Tactical Air Force. 
MEW Microwave Early Warning (Radar). 
MET Mechanised Enemy Transport. Pilots' 
(or MT) description of non-armoured enemy 
------- vehicles. 
XORU (i) Military Operational Research Unit 
---- (British). (ii) Mobile Operations Room 
Unit (British), an RAF operations 
centre responsible for co-ordinating the 
activities of bomber, fighter, and 
fighter-bomber Wings and allocating units 
for air support tasks. Employed by the RAF 
Desert Air Force in Italy, 1944/45. 
NCO Non Commissioned Officer. 
OA Operational Analysis. (US) 
OP Observation Post. 
OR Operational Research (British). 
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ORB Operations Record Book (British). Daily 
--- record of operations maintained by RAF 
Commands, Groups, Wings and Squadrons. 
Those relating to World War II are held 
at the Public Record Office, Kew. 
ORS Operational Research Section. 
ORG Operational Research Group (British). 
PRO Public Record Office (Kew). 
RAF Royal Air Force. 
RP Rocket Projectile (British). Refers 
(or R/P) to 3-inch rockets carried by Typhoon 
-------- fighter-bombers. 
RSD Radial Standard Deviation. Measure of the 
--- scatter of bombs within a bomb pattern. 
SA (OR) Scientific Advisor (Operational Research). 
SHAEF Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary 
----- Forces. 
SOP Special Observer Party. Operational 
--- Research Party set up to investigate the 
effects of various forms of Allied fire 
support upon the German coastal defences 
in Normandy. 
TAC Tactical Air Command (US). 
TAF Tactical Air Force (British). 
TALO or Tactical Air Liaison Officer or 
TAPO Tactical Air Party Officer (US), same as 
------- for ASPO above. 
VCP Visual Control Post (British). Control 
--- posts at the battlefront intended to 
direct aircraft from a point commanding a 
view of the battle area. See also FCP. 
VHF Very High Frequency. 
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In 1946, shortly after the end of World War II, the 
British Army's Military Operational Research Unit 
(MORU) initiated a Battle Study with the object of 
determining the effectiveness of what had been an 
important feature of operations during the European 
war: close air support. While restricted to the 
campaign in North-West Europe in 1944-45, their study 
was intended to be comprehensive, embracing operations 
by the three aircraft types that had been employed to 
support Allied troops - heavy bombers, medium bombers 
and fighter-bombers. Whatever their initial hopes 
regarding the benefits of such a study, the MORU 
clearly found their task difficult and frustrating, 
for in the introduction to their eventual report they 
left the following warning for any future historian of 
close air support: 
.. there will be no records of 
the help it gave to 
the solders, no enemy documents to prove what it 
cost them In men and equipment, nothing, In fact, to 
fudge the value of it all- He will, of course have 
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glowing testimonies to plenty from Army Commanders, 
endless mention of the use of air support, and 
statements of enemy prisoners from Private to Field 
Marshal Indicating how overwhelming and decisive was 
the air support. But if he is impartial he will 
remember, too, the tremendous bombings around Caen 
where It seemed that nothing could survive, and yet 
where the SS and parachute troops fought on as 
bitterly as ever. He will remember, too, bow the 
Germans managed to stage an Army Group counter- 
attack in the Ardennes, almost without air support 
of their own, and he will remember those Germans, 
among them Rommel, who claimed that our air 
superiority was by no means the decisive factor In 
the North West European Campaign. He will find a 
surprising lack of concrete factual evidence with 
which to test the validity of these conflicting 
statements. He will be able to sum up only by 
saying, at greater or lesser length, that air 
support was immensely important, perhaps vital, but 
that sometimes it seemed signally to have failed, 
and that some people held that it was important 
perhaps, but not particularly so. I 
This statement, from a team of professional military 
analysts tasked with evaluating the utility and 
effectiveness of close air support, might suggest that 
the conclusion to any study of air support is certain 
to be equivocal. In his recent comprehensive history 
of battlefield air attack in the period 1911-1945, 
Richard Hallion echoed somewhat the MORU of 1946 when 
he wrote that, 
Too often two equally fallacious viewpoints 
concerning battlefield air support have reigned: 
that air support has not been of significance to the 
land battle and that air support has been decisive 
in land warfare. The actual answer, of course, Is in 
the middle. 2 
As Hallion suggests, close air support has always 
been, and remains, a contentious subject, and 
objective conclusions about its advantages and 
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disadvantages are rare. Valuable studies have been 
produced, such as Hallion's and more recently by Peter 
C. Smith and that edited by Benjamin F. Cooling, 3 
tracing the evolution of air support theory and 
practice and developments in aircraft and weapons, but 
there has been relatively little attempt to determine 
precisely the advantages conferred upon troops in 
combat by the provision of close air support. 
The purpose of this thesis is to correct this, from 
a historical standpoint, by addressing two fundamental 
questions within the context of the close air support 
provided for the Allied armies in the campaigns in 
Italy and North-West Europe in the period 1943-45. One 
is whether the employment of aircraft in the close 
support role provided sufficient military advantage at 
the battlefront to justify the associated expenditure 
of effort and the risk to aircraft and pilots other 
than in an emergency. Another is whether air support 
proved to be of more value when directed against 
targets beyond the battlefront, such as enemy 
communications, headquarters, and supplies. As this 
suggests, the question of close air support is 
essentially one of cost effectiveness. 
- 12 - 
An evaluation of close air support during World War II 
must begin with a definition of the term in the 
context of its contemporary usage. The term 'Close Air 
Support' was in use during World War II, and in 1944 
the RAF defined this type of air support as the 
immediate availability of aircraft, 
.. to attack and destroy, at the request of the army, 
targets engaging or being engaged by our front line 
troops, thus improving the tactical situation of the 
moment. 
This was in contrast to 'General Air Support', which 
was defined as, 
the attacking of targets, not in close proximity 
to our own troops, but immediately behind the enemy 
lines, so as to hamper, In due course of time, the 
fighting capabilities of the enemy front line 
troops. Road and rail blocking, demolition of 
bridges and tunnels, and the attacking of transport 
supplying the front line, would be Included here. 4 
A third use of airpower is known as 'Interdiction' -a 
World War II term remaining in use - which is defined 
as air operations intended to isolate the battlefront 
by destroying, disrupting, and delaying enemy forces, 
communications and supplies, often in areas far 
removed from the battle area. 5 The 1944 concept of 
'General Air Support' can be seen as interdiction in 
the tactical area, a mission approximating to, though 
somewhat wider than, the present concept of 
'Battlefield Air Interdiction' (BAI). 6 The subject of 
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this thesis is close air support, the meaning of which 
is the same today as it was in 1944,7 though for the 
purpose of comparative analysis attention is also 
given to what was identified in 1944 as 'General Air 
Support'. 
The reason for selecting such a limited time scale 
as the campaigns in North-West Europe and Italy in 
1943-45 was the need to be concise. Close air support 
became an important feature not only of Allied 
operations in Europe but also of those in the Middle 
and Far East and Pacific theatres. There is a plethora 
of close air support examples, and an abundance of 
data regarding the various methods developed for 
controlling and applying air support, and the 
aircraft, weapons and tactics employed. For the thesis 
to address in detail the questions necessary to arrive 
at firm conclusions, involving a comparison of the 
effectiveness of aircraft in alternative roles to 
close air support and also a comparison with 
artillery, a line must be drawn. 
Moreover, the campaigns in Italy and North-West 
Europe offer several advantages to the historian. One 
is that they saw the culmination of air support theory 
and practice in the period, with the British and 
American forces employing the machinery and methods of 
air support that had evolved as the direct result of 
earlier experience and trial and error in previous 
- 14 - 
campaigns. Both campaigns also saw important 
innovations in the forward control of aircraft and in 
close air support tactics. 
From the analytical point of view, these campaigns 
are important for two reasons. One is that air 
superiority enabled the Allies to employ their vast 
air resources, including heavy bombers of the 
'strategic' air forces along with medium bombers and 
fighter-bombers, to influence the land campaigns 
without the complication of contending with major 
German air opposition. The importance of this was 
later expressed by Air Chief Xarshal Sir John Slessor: 
I remember my astonishment when I first arrived in 
Italy early in 1944 and realised the almost 
complete disregard in which the German Air Force 
was held: one hardly gave it a thought. In France 
and Germany the chaps on the ground were able to 
press on virtually regardless of enemy air 
activity, and with far fewer casualties than they 
had any right to expect. 8 
Thus air support can be evaluated within the context 
of its employment on an unprecedented scale against an 
army which almost totally lacked air cover. The same 
could be said regarding the latter stages of the Far 
Eastern and Pacific campaigns after the demise of 
Japanese air power over the battlefronts and its 
concentration, like that of Germany, to protect the 
national homeland from strategic air attack. But in 
these theatres, while close air support was extensive, 
its effects could be dissipated by terrain and its 
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results are far harder to evaluate than on European 
battlefields. 
The second reason relates to the problem of data 
availability regarding the effect of air attack. The 
campaigns in North-West Europe and- Italy offer an 
advantage lacking in earlier Allied operations and, to 
a great extent, those in the Far East - or for that 
matter Axis close air support examples - and that is 
that by 1943-45 the scientific discipline of 
Operational Research, or Operational Analysis as it 
was styled by the Americans, had become an important 
feature of Allied warfare. The importance of 
Operational Research (OR) data to an analysis of close 
air support effectiveness cannot be overstated, and 
the overriding factor in selecting Italy and North- 
Vest Europe for analysis was the extent of OR 
conducted in these campaigns and its availability. 
Operational Research Sections (ORS), composed of 
civilian scientists in uniform attached to Air Force 
and Army formations, investigated some of the most 
significant air support operations (including those in 
'close air support', 'general air support' and 
'interdiction') shortly after they had occurred. Their 
battlefield examinations and subsequent reports, 
compiled with the intention of assessing the 
effectiveness of weapons and tactics and containing 
interviews with Allied troops who had taken part and 
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%I,, 
also their German prisoners, are especially valuable. 
They do not provide ready-made answers to the 
fundamental questions regarding close air support that 
I have outlined - the MORU of 1946, who had access to 
this OR data, still found it difficult to arrive at 
definite conclusions, as the above quote reveals - but 
they do offer an alternative to the glib 
generalisations regarding air support which are to be 
found both in contemporary operational records and 
much subsequent post war historiography. 
Although OR forms the bedrock of the material used in 
this thesis, a study of close air support requires 
that the operational records of both Army and Air 
Force formations be consulted also. In addition to 
this primary source material, reference was made to a 
great deal of secondary literature. 
It must be stressed at the outset that the thesis is 
based upon British records and such USAAF material as 
is available in the UK at the Public Record office 
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(PRO) at Kew. Research committments and the time 
available have not allowed for an opportunity to 
examine the extensive data available to researchers 
in the United States, most notably the contemporary 
USAAF formation, unit and headquarters records which 
are held at the US Air Force Historical Research 
Center (USAFHRC) at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. 
However, the extensive amount of British data, taken 
in conjunction with the considerable amount of USAAF 
material that is available at the PRO, enables this 
thesis to be an effective survey of close air support 
in the period. 9 
An important input to the thesis has been data from 
the German side. While, for the reasons given above, 
German archives have not been consulted, there is 
nevertheless much useful material available in the UK. ' 
The Imperial War Museum holds copies, some in 
translation, of the War Diaries and message logs of 
some of the principal German formations that fought in 
North-West Europe. Many of these are incomplete, but 
they yield useful information. In the post-war years 
the Air Historical Branch also compiled translations 
of contemporary German documents, some of the most 
useful being the weekly situation reports issued by 
German Army Headquarters (such as the Seventh Army in 
Normandy). In addition, Prisoner of War interrogation 
reports, many of them intrinsic to Allied ORS studies, 
- 18 - 
were consulted. Recent years have seen the publication 
of a number of detailed German unit histories, which 
provide an interesting, and often revealing, 
alternative perspective on many actions. All these 
sources have been helpful in providing an indication 
both of what it was like to be on the receiving end of 
Allied air attack and what such attack achieved, and 
they have been referenced throughout the thesis. 
Extensive use has been made of the operational 
records of British Army and RAF formations now 
accessible to researchers at the Public Record Office. 
The War Diaries of British Army Divisions, Brigades, 
Infantry Battalions, Artillery and Armoured Regiments 
are to be found in the WO 171 files for North-West 
Europe and WO 170 for Italy. They contain a daily 
narrative of operations, though the amount of detail 
provided can vary considerably. However, these sources 
confront the researcher with a major stumbling-block 
in that, with relatively few exceptions, War Diaries 
at Battalion and Regimental level generally make 
little or no reference to how useful air support had 
been during particular operations. In fact War Diaries 
at this level often make little or no reference to air 
support at all. This can be frustrating, particularly 
when it is known that close air support was an 
important feature of the operation being researched. 
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War Diaries at Brigade and Divisional level are more 
useful. Daily Intelligence Summaries detailing each 
day's operations, usually compiled at Divisional level 
but occasionally also at Brigade level, invariably 
mention air support, and may give some indication of 
how useful it had been. Message Logs, usually 
contained in the War Diaries at Corps and Divisional 
level, can include messages from battalions reporting 
airstrikes on their front, sometimes indicating any 
noticeable effects but more often simply reporting 
that the bombs or rockets had been seen to fall in the 
target area. They can also be useful for giving an 
indication of timings, with the message requesting air 
support and that reporting the airstrike usually being 
recorded. 
Useful sources of data to supplement material 
contained in War Diaries are published regimental 
histories. These also vary in the amount of detail 
provided, but the best of them are extremely detailed, 
describing events affecting the unit almost day by 
day. They have obviously used the War Diary as their 
principal source, but they often contain additional 
details and can be valuable for references to air 
support, and general comments as to how useful it had 
been, that may be lacking in a War Diary. 
The operational records of the RAF are contained in 
the Operations Record Books (ORBs) maintained by RAF 
- 20 - 
formations at the following levels: Commands (AIR 23 & 
24 files); Groups (AIR 25 files); Wings (AIR 26 
files>; and Squadrons (AIR 27 files). All contain a 
daily narrative of operations, an example being that 
compiled by RAF Desert Air Force in Italy, which 
provides detailed summaries of each day's activities 
and which is an essential source for a study of its 
operations (this is to be found in AIR 24). The ORBs 
of RAF Groups, and in particular the daily 
Intelligence Summaries to be found in the appendices 
to Group ORBs, can be quite detailed with regard to 
air support operations and usually record the number 
of sorties and aircraft losses. 
The most detailed air accounts of particular close 
support operations are to be found in the ORBs of the 
squadrons concerned. These not only list the number of 
aircraft involved and any losses incurred but also 
contain the observations of the pilots who carried out 
the attacks and their assessment of damage and 
casualties inflicted upon the enemy - though often 
they were able to report only that their bombs or 
rockets had fallen in the target area. The amount of 
detail in squadron ORBs varies. In general those of 
squadrons which served in Italy are far more detailed 
than those of squadrons which served in North-West 
Europe. In addition, both Group and Squadron ORBs may 
include messages from Army formations expressing 
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gratitude for particularly successful air support 
missions, and these sometimes give an indication of 
the effect of the air attacks by recording the number 
of enemy dead and amount of destroyed or damaged 
equipment subsequently found by the troops. 
Major operations, and some*of lesser scale but which 
were particularly successful, were often the subject 
of separate Army and/or RAF reports. Most such 
operations involved close air support, and the reports 
are now to be found among the Headquarters papers of 
the Army and Air Force concerned. The reports are 
either straightforward narratives, or analyses. The 
latter are more useful, as some attempt was made to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the air support, and 
these were often carried out by Operational Research 
Sections. One example from North-West Europe of an 
operation given extensive coverage is Operation 
VERITABLE, which was the subject of separate reports 
by British 21st Army Group, the ORS of RAF 2nd 
Tactical Air Force, and No. 84 Group RAF. 
Contemporary RAF and British Army tactical memoranda 
and reports are an important source for how close air 
support operations were conducted. Numerous reports on 
the tactics employed by aircraft when attacking ground 
targets were compiled by the RAF in Italy and North- 
Vest Europe, and those compiled by the USAAF that are 
available at the Public Record office have also been 
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consulted. In addition, there are studies by both the 
RAF and British Army detailing the organisation and 
method of operation of the systems for providing and 
controlling close air support employed in both 
theatres. 
Comments on the campaigns and the air operations 
involved are contained in the Despatches of senior 
commanders, most notably the Notes for General 
Eisenhower's Despatch and the Despatch on air 
operations in North-West Europe by Air Chief Marshal 
Leigh-Mallory, both to be found in PRO CAB 106/980, 
and Air Marshal Coningham's Report on 2nd Tactical Air 
Force Operations from D-Day to VE Day to be found in 
PRO AIR 37/876. Also referred to was Field Marshal 
Alexander's Despatch on the Italian Campaign, a copy 
of which is to be found in PRO AIR 8/1790. 
Data can also be extracted from the published memoirs 
of former fighter-bomber pilots. These provide useful 
descriptions of tactics employed on close support 
missions, which are often a revealing contrast to the 
contemporary official RAF tactical studies mentioned 
above, and for their first-hand accounts of the 
hazards inherent in the low-level attack role. Those 
particularly useful regarding RAF operations in North- 
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West Europe were Firebirds: Flying the Typhoon in 
Action by Charles Demoulin, 10 Typhoon Pilot by Desmond 
Scott, 11 and John Galley' s The Day of The Typhoon. 12 A 
valuable compilation of Typhoon pilot memoirs is 
provided in Typhoon Attack by Norman Franks, -13 while 
Christopher Shores in his book Ground Attack Aircraft 
of World War II includes an interesting synopsis of 
Typhoon tactics by the distinguished Belgian Typhoon 
pilot Colonel R. A. Lallement. 14 Not surprisingly, these 
can give a somewhat biased view of the amount of 
destruction inflicted by Typhoon attacks. Bill 
Colgan's World War II Fighter Bomber Pilot provides an 
American perspective and is somewhat more balanced. It 
is especially valuable in being concerned with the 
Italian campaign, and Colgan includes a useful chapter 
relating his experience as a Forward Air Controller 
in Italy. IS 
For the chapter on the use of heavy bombers in the 
close support role an important source was the memoirs 
of the British Army's Liaison Officer at RAF Bomber 
Command Headquarters - Soldier at Bomber Command by 
Charles Carrington. 16 This in turn indicated a number 
of contemporary reports on the subject compiled by 
Lieutenant-Colonel Carrington when serving in this 
capacity and which are now accessible at the Public 
Record Office. The autobiography of the Commander-in- 
Chief of RAF Bomber Command, Bomber Offensive by Air 
- 24 - 
Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, was also consulted, 
as was that of Sir Solly Zuckerman. 17 An important 
source detailing British Air Observation Post (AOP) 
operations, referred to in the chapter comparing 
fighter-bombers and artillery, was Unarmed Into 
Battle, the history of the AOP by Major-General H. J. 
Parham and E. M. G. Belfield, originally published in 
1956 but reissued in 1986.18 
References to the employment of air support in 
North-West Europe are also to be found in the memoirs 
of senior commanders, examples being Eisenhower's 
Crusade in Europe, Montgomery's Normandy to the 
Baltic, and De Guingand's Operation Victory. 19 
Literature specifically on the subject of close air 
support in North-Vest Europe and Italy is scant, and 
the most useful overviews are those by Richard 
Hallion, who discusses support by heavy, medium and 
fighter-bombers in both campaigns in the relevant 
chapters of Strike from the Sky, and the work edited 
by Cooling, both referred to above. Two other 
extensive studies are invaluable sources for American 
air support operations in North-Vest Europe, and 
fortunately copies of both are available in the UK. 
One covers the Effect of Air Power on Ni1iterry 
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Operations, Western Europe and was compiled by General 
Omar Bradley's Air Effects Committee of the US 12th 
Army Group in 1945. The other is The Effectiveness of 
Third Phase Tactical Air Operations in the European 
Theater, 5 May 1944 -8 May 1945 compiled by the US 
Army Air Force's Evaluation Board in 1946. 
This Board was one of five such separate groups of 
officers assigned to the major theatres by the US War 
Department during the summer of 1944, tasked with 
preparing reports enabling assessments to be made of 
the effectiveness of USAAF training, doctrine, and 
organisation. After the creation of the Strategic 
Bombing Survey later that year, these boards 
concentrated upon tactical air operations. The board 
assigned to the European Theatre of Operations (ETO) 
was requested, in February 1945, by the USAAF 
Headquarters in Europe, to carry out an analysis of 
close air support or 'Third Phase' operations as this 
was styled. The result was the above report, completed 
in the summer of 1945, which drew upon data provided 
by US air and ground forces but which mainly reflected 
the experience of the US Ninth Air Force. 
Both the above reports outline the air support 
system employed to support the US armies and also give 
detailed summaries of operations along with comments 
from US Army formations and also from German 
prisoners. These are contemporary historical documents 
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and could be described as primary source material; I 
have listed them as secondary sources because, as 
their titles suggest, they were attempts to analyse 
the effectiveness of air support. Copies of both are 
held at the Public Record Office. 20 
Detailed narratives of both campaigns were compiled 
in Britain after the war by the Cabinet Historical 
Section and the Air Historical Branch of the Air 
Ministry. 21 The former are mainly narratives of ground 
operations and the latter of air operations, though 
both give details of air support. Recourse was also 
made to the British, Canadian, and American Official 
Histories of both campaigns. 22 In addition, a number of 
relevant campaign histories were consulted. A major 
source for operations in North-West Europe is Chester 
Wilmot's The Struggle for Europe, while another is 
Milton Shulman's Defeat In the West. 23 
Sources used for Normandy included Overlord by Max 
Hastings, Six Armies In Normandy by John Keegan, and 
Decision -in 
Normandy by Carlo D'Este. 24 Max Hastings' 
Das Reicb and Ralph Bennett's Ultra In the West give 
useful indications of the effect of air attack on 
German movement, the former detailing the experience 
of the 2nd SS Panzer Division during its move to the 
Normandy battlefront and the latter relating 
intercepted German signals traffic-26 Sources used for 
the latter part of the campaign in North-West Europe 
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included The Long Left Flank by Jeffery Williams, 
which one might describe as a semi-official history of 
the operations of First Canadian Army, and Major- 
General Essame' s The Battle for Germany. 26 Both are 
written from the point of view of the soldier, and 
refer with acerbity to occasions when, in Army 
opinion, the Air Forces declined to provide a 
sufficient scale of air support. 
The role of the Air Forces involved in both 
campaigns is well described in John Terraine's The 
Right of the Line, Roderic Owen's The Desert Air 
Force, and Christopher Shores' Second Tactical Air 
Force. 27 A greater level of analysis is provided in an 
immediate post-war study of the US 9th Air Force in 
North-Vest Europe - Condensed Analysis of the Ninth 
Air Force in the European Theater of Operations 
compiled by the Office of the Assistant Chief of the 
Air Staff in Washington in 1946. A copy is held at the 
Public Record Ofiice. 28 For the chapter examining heavy 
bomber operations two sources giving statistical data 
on a daily basis for RAF Bomber Command and the US 8th 
Air Force were The Bomber Command War Diaries edited 
by Martin Middlebrook and Chris Everitt, and The 
Nighty Eighth Var Diary edited by Roger Freeman, Vic 
Maslen, and Alan Crouchman. 29 
An important overview of the air war as a whole is 
Professor Overy's The Air War 1939-1945, while a 
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recently published (1990) general study of air 
bombardment in World War II is Bombing 1939-45 by Karl 
Hecks. 30 The latter covers tactical as well as 
strategic air operations, and summarises the 
developments in close support weapons and tactics by 
all the belligerents. Among the sources referred to 
for the fighter-bombers and artillery chapter two were 
particularly useful - Gunners At War by Shelford 
Bidwell, for its detailing of the evolution and 
employment of the method of fire control employed by 
British artillery in 1943-45, and Fire-Power by 
Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham for its 
discussion of the British air support system. 31 
The thesis is organised into chapters addressing the 
following aspects of close air support. 
The first chapter is a discussion of Operational 
Research material, and focuses upon the Operational 
Research Sections that carried out the most 
significant work on close air support - No. 2 ORS of 
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British 21st Army Group and the Operational Research 
Section attached to RAF 2nd Tactical Air Force, both 
in North-West Europe. The nature of operational 
research work is described, mainly by reference to the 
history of No. 2 ORS compiled by its members shortly 
after the end of the war in Europe, and the chapter 
examines the limitations of OR data and its 
reliability. 
The second chapter outlines the systems of command and 
control of close air support developed by the RAF and 
USAAF in Italy and North-West Europe. The most 
important theme is the extent to which air and ground 
forces co-operated despite both the RAF and USAAF 
having been opposed to the principle of close air 
support before World War II and during its early 
stages. The chapter examines just how smoothly this 
co-operation worked. 
This chapter is mainly descriptive, intended to chart 
briefly the development of fighter-bombing as employed 
by the RAF and USAAF. The organisation of fighter- 
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bomber units, tactics, weapons and accuracy are 
discussed. 
The fourth chapter assesses the effectiveness of 
aircraft in the role of 'flying artillery' by focusing 
on operations in which Allied troops had limited 
ground based firepower support. This embraces mobile 
and airborne operations. Regarding the former, the 
chapter discusses to what extent close air support by 
fighter-bombers contributed to maintaining the 
momentum of armoured thrusts. The American innovation 
of 'Armored Column Cover' and the British system of 
'Cab-Rank' are discussed, and two British mobile 
operations, the initial stages of MARKET-GARDEN in 
North-West Europe and CYGNET in Italy, are examined in 
detail with the object of assessing the effectiveness 
of fighter-bomber support when closely integrated 
with an armoured thrust on a narrow axis of advance. 
and a broad axis of advance respectively. A parallel 
is drawn with similar advances attempted when air 
cover was not available, such as the later' stages of 
MARKET-GARDEN, and the chapter addresses the question 
of whether Armoured Column Cover and Cab-Rank 
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operations, even when successful, could justify the 
required committment of air resources. 
With regard to airborne operations, the problem of 
providing air support for airborne landings is 
discussed with reference to operations in Normandy and 
at Arnhem, and comparison drawn with the later 
crossing of the Rhine. 
This chapter provides a historical perspective on a 
question which remains pertinent, namely whether it is 
cost effective to risk such high value assets as 
aircraft and pilots in attempts to destroy tanks at 
the battlefront. The chapter focuses principally upon 
the anti-armour operations by the Allied Air Forces in 
North-West Europe, and makes extensive use of 
contemporary ORS material in order to determine 
precisely how effective air attack was against armour. 
In particular, the chapter addresses such questions as 
whether the historically accepted view that large 
numbers of German tanks were destroyed by Allied 
fighter-bombers is accurate or largely a myth, and 
whether the value of air attack lay in its disruptive 
and morale effect rather than in the amount of 
destruction achieved. 
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An important feature of Allied close air support in 
Italy and North-West Europe was the employment of 
heavy and medium bombers in the role. This chapter 
analyses the heavy and medium bomber support 
operations, drawing on the contemporary operational 
research by No. 2 ORS in North-West Europe for data 
regarding ground surveys and comments by Allied 
troops. The effectiveness of these aircraft against 
various types of target is compared and the problems 
and risks inherent in employing the strategic bomber 
weapon in a tactical role are discussed. The chapter 
discusses whether senior Allied airmen were justified 
in their view that heavy bombers were not suited to 
the tactical role, and whether lack of success in some 
of the principal operations was the result of the 
military command lacking a clear appreciation of what 
heavy bombers could achieve and what was required of 
them - destruction or temporary neutralization of the 
target. 
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This chapter assesses the respective merits of 
fighter-bombers and artillery in close support, the 
comparisons being drawn with regard to responsiveness 
and cost-effectiveness. The chapter shows how the 
results of both comparisons favour artillery, and 
examines the reasons why, nevertheless, Allied troops 
often preferred fighter-bomber support. The methods 
developed for supporting ground attacks by artillery 
and fighter-bombers in Italy and North-West Europe are 
described. 
The advantages of fighter-bomber attacks as they 
were perceived by Allied troops are examined, and the 
chapter also discusses the effectiveness of the 
methods pioneered in Italy of integrating air and 
artillery firepower upon specific targets. and what 
advantages were gained by this process. 
Chap ter VIII The Cost Effectiveness of Close Air 
Support! A Comparison with Armed Reconnaissance. 
This chapter examines the proportion of effort 
accorded by Allied fighter-bombers to their principal 
task other than close air support, that of Armed 
Reconnaissance. When flying such missions pilots were 
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directed to seek out and destroy targets of 
opportunity beyond the battlefront and at the same 
time to report any possible information with regard to 
the enemy ground situation. This was a highly 
offensive use of tactical air power and one of the 
most frequent tasks allotted to fighter-bomber 
squadrons. In the light of this, the chapter compares 
the effectiveness of fighter-bombers in this role with 
that of close air support, and also the losses 
incurred in both roles. The chapter discusses whether 
armed reconnaissance missions enabled the Allied Air 
Forces to exploit their resources to maximum advantage 
in support of ground forces by delaying and disrupting 
German movement and deployment. 
The thesis concludes by summarising the contents of 
the individual chapters, and providing an overall 
answer to the questions raised earlier, namely whether 
the results achieved by aircraft flying close support 
missions justified the necessary expenditure of air 
effort and the risk to aircraft and pilots, and 
whether air support was of more value when directed 
upon targets beyond the immediate battle area. 
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Operational Research is a scientific approach to the 
problems of determining the likely effects of weapons 
and tactics and of deciding between varying courses of 
action, the main object being, according to Professor 
P. M. S. Blackett, to '. find a scientific explanation of 
the . facts' .1 
As a prelude to a fuller discussion of 
the OR material consulted for the thesis, it is useful 
to sketch briefly the wartime development of British 
Operational Research. 
OR had proven of value during World War I, an 
example being the substantial amount of research 
conducted by Viscount Tiverton for the Royal Naval Air 
Service and the Air Department, 2 and its potential 
was appreciated from early in World War II. In 
September 1940 Professor Blackett, Scientific Advisor 
to the Army's Anti Aircraft Command, formed a small 
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group of civilian scientists to study the technical 
problems of anti-aircraft defences, particularly that 
of introducing Radar gun-laying. In March 1941 
Blackett left to conduct OR for RAF Coastal Command, 
and he eventually became the Admiralty's Director of 
Naval Operational Research. His departure left the 
future of Army OR uncertain, as there was no mandate 
for expanding the work of his group. 3 
This changed after May 1941, when the distinguished 
physicist Sir Charles Darwin was appointed as 
Scientific Advisor to the Army Council. Darwin was 
committed to OR, but had to counter opposition from 
directors of the Army's various branches to what they 
saw as scientific interference in operational 
=natters. 4 However, by August 1941 an enlarged Army 
Operational Research Group (AORG) had been created 
under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Basil 
Schonland, the South African physicist. This was 
intended to serve both the Ministry of Supply and the 
War Office, the former with regard to research in the 
UK, and the latter for research overseas. 
It was also intended that Operational Research 
Sections should be formed for service overseas, though 
this question was not raised until the summer of 1942. 
Finally, on November 26th 1942, a decision was gnade to 
establish ORS for overseas theatres and an 
establishment for a pool of 36 officers - on the basis 
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of 6 for an estimated six theatres of war - was 
planned. It is interesting that at this stage there 
was considerable War Office concern about whether a 
total of 36 suitably qualified officers could be 
found, whereas by 1945 a total of no less than 120 
officers had served with Army ORS. 5 
The first ORS sent overseas was posted to the Middle 
East in the summer of 1942 and attached to General 
Headquarters in Cairo. It encountered the problem 
that all subsequent ORS were to contend with - the 
reluctance of operational commands to allow civilian 
scientists - even if they were in uniform - to conduct 
work in the battle zone. When it was suggested that 
the section investigate the effectiveness of anti-tank 
guns, the response from Eighth Army was that this 
would necessitate study in the battle area, and that 
'.. no officer from GHQ, except the Commander-in-Cbief, 
could visit the battle area. '6 
Nevertheless, ORS continued to be prepared for 
service overseas and on May 24th 1943 No. 1 ORS was 
established and mobilised the following month, 
eventually serving in Italy. On August 14th 1943 No. 2 
ORS was formed, for eventual service with 21st Army 
Group in North-West Europe. These ORS attached to 
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,.. r 
armies in the field were intended to provide 
scientific assistance to the Commander in four 
respects as follows: 
a) Advice and assistance in the solving of technical 
problems arising during operations and advice as to 
the best use of available equipment. 
b) Analysis of the performance of weapons and 
equipment in battle. 
c) Assistance in, and analysis of, trials of British 
and captured enemy weapons and equipment. 
d) Assistance with any problems which arose requiring 
a scientific approach to their solution. 
The composition of ORS varied according to theatre, 
but there were important common features. One was that 
an ORS was led by a Deputy Director of Scientific 
Research. The leader had to be a scientist to fully 
appreciate the scientific potential of the ORS and the 
nature of the problems with which it had to deal. He 
was also accorded the rank of Colonel so that he had 
the necessary status to tender advice in the absence 
of a Scientific Adviser. Another common feature was 
that an ORS usually contained at least one competent 
statistician and, when manpower permitted, a number of 
NCO's (Sergeants) for the task of data collection and 
an adequate clerical staff. Finally, a basic - far 
from lavish - scale of transport was allocated to 
enable the ORS to operate as a self-contained unit. 7 
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The RAF appears to have a more positive attitude 
than the Army to the utility of OR, and ORS were 
attached to all the operational RAF Commands. The ORS 
attached to RAF 2nd Tactical Air Force in North-West 
Europe originated in a decision taken in 1942 to 
create an ORS for Army Co-operation Command, at that 
time the only RAF formation responsible for practising 
the weapons and methods of close air support. The ORS 
consisted of two scientific officers and six junior 
scientific officers - all of whom had been recruited 
from ORS Fighter Command - with Mr. Graham, another 
physicist, appointed as officer-in-charge. Close 
contact with the AORG, particularly those concerned 
with air support problems, was maintained from the 
outset. 8 In June 1943, Army Co-operation Command was 
redesignated the Tactical Air Force (TAF), and by the 
and of the year ORS TAF - as the ORS had become known 
- became absorbed by the new ORS Allied Expeditionary 
Air Force (AEAF) created in December under the 
direction of Mr. Larnder of ORS Fighter Command who 
was appointed Scientific Adviser (Operational 
Research) or SACOR). 
ORS AEAF was a self-contained branch of the Air 
Staff at Headquarters AEAF and had two main functions: 
to advise the Air Commander-in-Chief on scientific 
matters affecting operations, and to carry out 
investigations and analyses for the various 
i 
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Headquarters branches. 9 Anxious to maintain the 
identity of an ORS TAF which would be concerned with 
problems affecting air-to-ground operations, Mr. 
Larnder formed a section which became known as ORS 2nd 
TAF composed of the original ORS TAP members and which 
remained under the control of Mr. Graham. Two members 
of ORS 2nd TAF were attached to each of the composite 
groups of the Tactical Air Force, while Mr. Graham 
with one assistant spent most of their time at 
Headquarters 2nd TAF. Scientists attached to ORS AEAF 
were granted honorary commissions, Larnder being 
accorded the rank of Group Captain and Graham, 
commanding ORS 2nd TAF, that of Wing Commander. ORS 
personnel serving overseas wore RAF uniform. 10 
The OR material referred to in the thesis is, for the 
most part, that compiled in North-West Europe by the 
British Army's No. 2 ORS attached to 21st Army Group 
and the ORS attached to RAF 2nd Tactical Air Force 
(ORS 2nd TAF). To a lesser extent, reference is also 
made to reports compiled by the British Army's No. 1 
ORS in Italy and the ORS attached to RAF Desert Air 
Force in that campaign. Reports compiled by the ORS 
of the US 9th Air Force in North-West Europe have also 
been consulted. The predominance of data from No. 2 ORS 
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and ORS 2nd TAF reflects the fact that they were 
responsible for the most important work on close air 
support. In contrast, of the fifteen reports compiled 
for Eighth Army by No. 1 ORS in Italy, no less than 
twelve were concerned with problems regarding the 
accuracy and effectiveness of artillery fire. 
That No. 2 ORS carried out work on close air support at 
all was the result of accident rather than design. To 
make full use of the data compiled by No. 2 ORS, and to 
understand its value and its limitations, it is 
necessary to have an idea of how the Section worked. 
There are two important factors to consider. First, 
the size of the ORS throughout the campaign was always 
a limiting factor to the amount of work that could be 
done. Before D-Day the Section consisted of five 
officers, three drivers, a clerk, one jeep and two 15 
cwt trucks. When provision was made to increase the 
Section, this only amounted to three more officers, an 
extra Jeep, a staff car, and a few more other ranks. 
Second, 
, 
the work carried out by the ORS was not 
systematic - it had no clear brief of what aspects of 
warfare to investigate. As will be seen, the ORS 
exercised remarkable iniative regarding the selection 
of problems to be investigated. 
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The Section did not go to Normandy as a unit but in 
instalments. One member, Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson, 
went to France on D-Day as Radar Adviser to the Anti- 
Aircraft Brigade, with which he spent the following 
three weeks evaluating the performance of equipment. 
Next to reach Normandy was Major Fairlie (Royal 
Canadian Artillery) who was attached to the Special 
Observer Party (SOP), a group formed shortly before 
the assault to study the effects of different forms of 
attack on the German coastal defences. The SOP spent 
two weeks working among the beach defences, and it was 
at this time that the first indication of an important 
aspect of OR work was given. It was found that, 
Whatever Induced the Germans to give in, it was not 
physical destruction of their fortifications, for of 
this there was little or none, despite the Buge 
naval and air bombardments. 11 
This suggested that the 'morale effect' of 
bombardment had been the decisive factor, and as this 
is a vitally significant aspect in the evaluation of 
the effects of close air support it is important to 
define it. It is a term used rather loosely in 
contemporary OR to refer to troops under air or 
artillery bombardment being prevented from manning 
their weapons, moving, and functioning effectively not 
only during the bombardment but for varying periods of 
time afterwards. It was a phenomenon never fully 
understood and impossible to quantify. The SOP made no 
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attempt to evaluate it, being concerned only with the 
physical effects of bombardment, and No. 2 ORS did not 
address the problem until August 1944, the history of 
the Section observing that: 
To assess the morale effect of a bombardment 
was... to attempt an utterly new analysis; though 
there were many who had suggested doing It, there 
was no one who had ever tried. 12 
No. 2 ORS took shape in Normandy towards the end of 
June when the advance party of two officers (Majors 
Swann and Sargeaunt), a truck, a jeep, and two drivers 
landed. This was a week later than intended due to an 
inauspicious start - the Landing Craft transporting 
them to France had become separated from its convoy, 
wandered far off course, and was only saved from 
entering the Atlantic by taking a line from a passing 
German V1. After landing in the American sector, the 
Section moved to Cruelly, the location of British 
Second Army Headquarters. The staff of Second Army 
clearly had little idea of how to employ the ORS or 
how it could be useful - an enquiry by the Section 
regarding what was required of them, 
.. though it met with every courtesy, gave us no more 
Idea of what we might do nor where we might start-13 
On their own initiative the Section members began to 
visit the front line to view combat at close range -a 
task for which their few jeeps proved invaluable. From 
these visits a number of projects suggested 
themselves: the need to find a method of locating 
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German mortars which were causing heavy casualties and 
which were proving very difficult for the Army to deal 
with; the distribution of hits and penetrations in 
British and German tank casualties and their influence 
on tactics; the best method of using the PIAT 
(Projector Infantry Anti Tank) infantry anti-tank 
weapon - which although often fired rarely hit a tank 
- and the problem of the Normandy dust which was 
rapidly wearing out fighter aero engines at the 
forward airstrips. 
The somewhat haphazard nature of OR at this stage is 
shown in that the Section initiated work on these 
problems without directives from above, but shortly 
afterwards the problem of dust became the 
responsibility of the RAF, and the PIAT that of the 
Army's Weapons Technical Staff. Nevertheless, the 
Section proved its worth with the mortar location and 
tank casualty surveys. Both required the collation of 
much data and were not completed until August, but the 
former (Report No. 11) became the basis of a counter- 
mortar organisation in 21st Army Group and the latter 
(Report No. 12) proved to be the first study to provide 
accurate data on how armour should be distributed on 
tanks fighting in close terrain. 
In the meantime, the Section had embarked, equally 
by chance, upon its extensive work on close air 
support - initially regarding that by heavy bombers. 
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On July 7th 1944, for Operation CHARNWOOD, RAF Bomber 
Command attacked the Northern outskirts of Caen, and 
nothing shows the spirit of OR and the iniative 
exercised by the Section better than their own 
decision to investigate this operation: 
.. it occurred to us to wonder what this immense 
effort had... achieved. Conflicting stories abounded, 
and neither the RAF nor the Army seemed to have any 
clear idea. Without any directive from above and, 
with the object more than anything else of 
satisfying our own curiosity, we set to work to find 
out what had really happened. 14 
Three members of the Section spent several days amid 
the ruins of Caen., interviewing troops who had taken 
part and civilians. Their Report (No. 5) was forwarded 
to 21st Army Group Headquarters, but the OR team were 
far from proud of it and only too aware of its 
limitations: 
... to our minds it was not satisfactory, since its 
conclusions were... indefinite and negative... we had 
. made no serious attempt 
to study morale effects, we 
bad not considered the possibilities of prisoner-of- 
war interrogation and we had paid quite insufficient 
attention to its effect on the progress of our own 
troops. The report was... little better than a study 
of the plain physical effects of the bombing-15 
Nevertheless, the report was received with interest 
at 21st Army Group, particularly by Brigadier 
Schonland, by then its Scientific Adviser. Some two 
weeks later, at the start of Operation GOODWOOD, 
Schonland sent an urgent telegram to the ORS asking 
them to report on that and all subsequent heavy 
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bombing operations. Report No. 6, on GOODWOOD, was 
equally unsatisfactory in the opinion of the ORS, 
. we started too late, the battle was too big for 
the small numbers of the section, and many of the 
bombed areas were still in enemy bands at the end. 16 
In the analyses conducted after GOODWOOD, the ORS 
tried to ensure that work started in good time, that 
Operation Orders were examined, and that the course of 
the battle was closely monitored. It was this work on 
heavy bombing that set the pattern for most of the 
Section's subsequent work in the campaign: 
., our work developed into the search for means to 
reconstruct and analyse particular battles. Once the 
missing elements of the battle had been supplied, 
suggestions for Improvement followed; once, for 
instance, the real value of a particular air attack 
had been determined, it was not difficult to say 
whether another type of attack would have been 
better. 17 
Between July 30th and August 20th 1944 No. 2 ORS 
completed five reports on heavy bombing, the first 
concerning Operation BLUECOAT for which the planning 
and course of the battle were studied in detail, 
casualties analysed, and interviews held with troops 
who had taken part. In the opinion of the ORS this 
report (No. 7) was the first to indicate clearly the 
value of the bombing, though it still lacked prisoner 
interrogation. It was followed by No. 8, on TOTALISE, 
and No-9 on the effects of short bombing of friendly 
troops. An idea of the work and method involved in the 
compiling of these reports, particularly in that the 
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ORS had to commute considerable distances to the front 
line from where they' were based, is given in the 
Section's history: 
Studying these Heavy Bombing attacks was a laborious 
and depressing affair, and at the time we prayed 
that we should never have to do any more of it. The 
dust and the appalling quantities of traffic... made 
travelling to and fro an exhausting business. Having 
arrived at the front, we had to probe about in the 
desolation of one French village after another, 
often uncomfortably close to mortaring, shelling, 
and the front line, and search out from their biding 
places units who had taken part in the battle. When 
we returned there were air photographs to be pored 
over, and a thousand and one fragments of 
information to be assembled. 18 
By this time the Section's work regarding air 
support had been extended. Shortly after GOODWOOD, and 
as a result of an arrangement made by Brigadier 
Schonland with the Air Branch at Headquarters 21st 
Army Group and ORS 2nd TAF, Major Pike, who had been 
recalled from No. 1 ORS in Italy, arrived from England 
with a further jeep and driver. His task was to study 
the effects of fighter and fighter-bomber support 
attacks. As the history of the Section points out, 
.. it was lack of knowledge which prompted the work, 
and indeed, so great was the lack of knowledge of 
the effects of air attack, that a very large 
proportion of the Section's efforts, possibly an 
undue portion, was devoted to this one subject. 19 
In fact the question of fighter and fighter-bomber 
support was causing considerable rancour between the 
RAP and Army. Claims for the destruction of ground 
targets were being submitted by pilots which the Army 
regarded with disdain. Schonland, and particularly 
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Montgomery's Chief of Staff, De Guingand, needed to 
know the truth. 20 
Major Pike's first report (No. 3) analysed an attack 
by RAF Typhoons on a German column, and was the first 
case of its kind ever to be fully examined and 
documented. His next report (No. 4) was far more 
extensive and concerned the effect of attacks by RAF 
rocket-firing Typhoons against the German armoured 
counter-attack at Mortain. Both reports and their 
conclusions are discussed in Chapter V concerning air 
attack upon armour, but in the context of the work 
compiled by No. 2 ORS the Mortain report amounted to 
the first occasion when attention was drawn to the 
discrepancy between air force claims of destruction 
and the evidence found on the ground. Consequently the 
report caused much controversy, and though ORS 2nd TAF 
also examined the battle area and found the same 
evidence, Pike's report was rejected by Headquarters 
2nd TAF. 
This was only the start of the analyses of fighter- 
bomber attacks by No. 2 ORS. Shortly after the closure 
of the Falaise 'Pocket' the Section was directed to 
the area in order to discover precisely what the Air 
Forces had achieved during the German retreat. This 
resulted in the most momentous work of the Section, 
and it is worth quoting from the Section's history 
which observes that: 
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From the historical point of view, Report 15 'Enemy 
Casual ties in Vehicles and Equipment during the 
retreat from Normandy to the Seine' deserves to be 
considered as our best work. Into the making of it 
went the effort of six of us for three weeks, and of 
one or two for many weeks more. We examined vehicles 
individually, we counted them In bulk, we 
interrogated the local French population, we 
interrogated prisoners of war, we used the reports 
of aircraft reconnaissance and we examined air 
photographs. Accepting the limitations of time, 
there was probably little more we could have done in 
assessing physical destruction; but we often wished 
that we had done more on the effect of the Air 
Forces In causing panic and confusion amongst the 
enemy. 21 
The result was further controversy with the RAF, as 
the Section concluded that the Air Forces, despite the 
destruction that they had inflicted, had failed to 
achieve effective interdiction and should have been 
more systematic in their attacks. This is further 
discussed in Chapter V. 
In September 1944 the Section had the opportunity to 
assess the effects of heavy bomber, medium bomber, and 
fighter-bomber attack all within the context of one 
operation - the assault on Boulogne. The Section 
arrived outside Boulogne some days before the assault 
and so, for the first time, were able to prepare their 
investigation in detail beforehand using maps and 
plans. They observed the assault as it progressed, 
interrogated prisoners as they were brought in and, 
after the assault, discussed the operation in detail 
with the Canadian battalions involved. The resulting 
report (No. 16) was the most complete attempt at 
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assessing a battle achieved by the Section during the 
campaign, though the analysis of the effect of 
artillery and tanks was acknowledged to be far less 
detailed than that of air attack due to lack of time. 
Indeed, the extensive coverage accorded Boulogne 
prevented the Section from covering - except for a 
cursory look at the effects of air attack on gun 
positions - the subsequent assault on Calais. 
For much of the autumn and winter of 1944-45 the 
Section, based in Brussels, was employed in addressing 
problems related to artillery. Their most important 
work in this field, regarding the morale and 
destructive effect of artillery bombardment, was 
achieved at this time (see Chapter VII below). 
However, in January 1945 the Section was once again 
called upon to investigate air matters as a result of 
the German Ardennes offensive. As in Normandy, Allied 
fighter-bomber pilots were submitting claims for the 
destruction of German armour which were described by 
Army Headquarters as 'extraordinary' and, as at that 
time the US First and Ninth Armies were under the 
command of 21st Army Group, No. 2 ORS was directed to 
'find out what was really happening' as a high 
priority task-22 In order to avoid the differences of 
opinion with the RAF that had occurred in Normandy, 
the Section was this time directed to work jointly 
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with ORS 2nd TAF. The history of the Section observes 
that, 
Joint efforts are usually difficult, and ours were 
no exception. But by having members of the Air Force 
O. R. S. to live with us, and by thrashing out reports 
together, we always reached agreement In the end. 23 
Consequently a combined team of eight, including 
Wing Commander Graham and Squadron Leader Abel of ORS 
2nd TAF, was based at Aywaille in the Ardennes salient 
from where they carried out an extensive ground search 
for destroyed tanks claimed by the Air Forces. In 
contrast to their earlier work in Normandy, the ORS 
were hampered by adverse weather, extreme cold and 
occasional blizzards, and the fact that much of the 
ground was covered in snow which prevented tanks from 
being seen from more than a few yards away. The 
investigation was therefore slower, and was 
acknowledged to be less thorough. There was little 
opportunity to assess RAF attacks as the RAF had not 
carried out much anti-tank activity, but with regard 
to the activities of US fighter-bombers the same 
problem that had been first discovered in Normandy was 
found: overclaiming. The ORS reported that, 
For every hundred claims, we could only find one 
tank indubitably destroyed by air: and, though a 
few cases turned up where perhaps tanks had been 
abandoned because of air attack, they were doubtful 
and went only a very little way to making good the 
discrepancy. 24 
This investigation resulted in the first Army/RAF 
ORS joint report, which in turn suggested the need 
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for a fuller study of the role of the Air Forces in 
defeating the German counter-offensive. A few days 
after the completion of Joint Report No. 1 on aircraft 
versus tanks, members of both ORS began to investigate 
the result of air attacks against the major 
communications centres in the salient. By ground 
examination, and extensive interviews with the local 
Belgian population, a detailed analysis was compiled 
of the delay and dislocation caused to the Germans by 
air attack - the result being a comprehensive report 
by ORS 2nd TAF on the role of the Allied Air Forces in 
stemming the German thrust. Further joint reports 
consisted of a valuable assessment of the 
effectiveness of rocket-Typhoons in the close support 
role, for which many German prisoners were 
interrogated and extensive interviews conducted with 
British and Canadian troops, and an analysis of the 
effectivenes of German flak and Allied counter-flak 
measures during Operation VARSITY, the airborne 
assault across the Rhine. All these reports have been 
consulted for this thesis. 
As No. 2 ORS and ORS 2nd TAF collaborated very closely 
in the final months of the campaign, it is important 
to sketch the activities of the latter. 
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Unlike their Army equivalent, ORS 2nd TAF was never 
a compact body. Before D-Day the commander of RAF 2nd 
TAF, Air Marshal Coningham, refused to allow 
scientists as members of his Headquarters staff and 
only eventually was he persuaded to allow Wing 
Commander Graham and his assistant to accompany his 
Headquarters to France. Although ORS members arrived 
at 2nd TAF Headquarters at Le Tronquay on August 4th 
1944, it was only after AEAF ceased to exist in 
October 1944, with the consequent disbanding and 
relocation of personnel of ORS AEAF, that ORS 2nd TAF 
came into its own. On October 22nd ORS 2nd TAF, 
located in Brussels, was reorganised as a team of 15 
scientific officers but these were widely distributed 
throughout 2nd TAF: two were attached to Headquarters, 
one each to No. 2 Group and No. 34 Photographic 
Reconnaissance Wing, two each to No. 84 Group and No. 6 
Film Processing Unit, four to No. 85 Group, and one 
each to Armament Practice Camps. Two further officers 
were attached to the Bombing Analysis Unit (BAU) 
recently formed under SHAEF. 25 
Such dispersion made it difficult for ORS 2nd TAF to 
carry out investigations in the manner of No. 2 ORS 
because they simply could not concentrate officers to 
deal with a single problem. Had it not been for the 
centralised organisation of No. 2 ORS, the later joint 
investigations would have been impossible. It was for 
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this reason that the most important work on air 
support - for example the investigation of the Falaise 
'Pocket' - had to be left to the Army. Nevertheless, 
ORS 2nd TAF managed to conduct some valuable analyses 
of close support operations, most notably the effect 
of air attacks on gun positions and strongpoints, and 
to accumulate much data on fighter-bomber tactics and 
accuracy. 
While the value of wartime ORS material to the 
historian is unquestionable, it is interesting to 
discover the extent to which it was acted upon at the 
time by those for whom the reports were compiled. In 
fact the evidence suggests that the impact of OR at 
the operational level was slight. 
Army and Air Force staffs appear to have held their 
OR Sections useful for answering questions considered 
relevant to the sphere of scientific advice, an 
example being the question submitted to No. 2 ORS by 
the staff of 21st Army Group during the planning of 
Operation VERITABLE enquiring whether the use of 
aircraft bombs in the battle area would crater the wet 
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ground and render it impassable for tanks. Moreover, 
as the experience of No. 2 ORS shows, they could also 
be employed to resolve questions such as the accuracy 
of fighter-bomber pilot claims of German tank 
destruction. Such problems were obviously appropriate 
for the ORS to deal with, but the broad analysis of 
battles conducted by the ORS also led to conclusions 
as to the best use of weapons and appropriate tactics. 
When this type of data, and suggestions, were 
submitted they were often either unwelcome, or simply 
not acted upon. 
There were two reasons for this. One was that senior 
Military and Air Force commanders did not appreciate 
being told how to conduct their operations - as No. 2 
ORS discovered. After their extensive field work 
investigating the heavy bomber operations the Section 
decided to compile a general report (No. 14) on the use 
of heavy bombers to support the Army which was duly 
forwarded to 21st Army Group. Their history records 
that, 
It bad been intended as a simple guide, but was 
vetoed as being too contentious and outspoken. 26 
Clearly, as far as 21st Army Group was concerned, the 
ORS had exceeded its brief. 
The second reason was that there was simply no 
mechanism for ensuring that senior commanders, or 
their subordinates, were made aware of the results of 
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ORS studies. Thus the potential usefulness of ORS 
material was often not realised even when it was 
circulated. The outspoken history of No. 2 ORS 
describes how this situation arose: 
... often we felt infuriated and frustrated to find 
our ideas not adopted because reports had never been 
circulated, or because they had never been read. 
Much of the trouble lies in the fundamental paradox 
of the military system: although at the highest 
formation there is most likely to be the time and 
temperament to appreciate O. R. S. reports, the 
opportunity to not on them is in fact least. 
Although the last say always rests with the top, as 
regards ways and means of fighting, their influence 
is remote and their control far less than they may 
care to admit. The lower formations have the power 
to act, but less time and less Inclination to think, 
so that O. R. S. reports tend to be regarded as yet 
more paper from above, and are treated 
accordingly... 
... we came up against the inescapable fact that the 
Introduction of new Ideas rests solely with a 
commander... We thus found ourselves trafficking in 
ideas far above our rank, with report-writing as the 
only ready means... of conveying them... Xany of the 
ideas that emerged from our reports were never 
adopted, often never even considered, because they 
were only Ideas buried in reports that were never 
read. 27 
A contributary factor may also have been the extent to 
which the ORS themselves decided what should be 
investigated, as they lacked specific instructions as 
to what was required. To quote once again from the 
history of No. 2 ORS, 
.. often we were given no directive at all. "See what 
you can make of air attack in the Falaise pocket". 
"Have a look at the Assault on Boulogne" or "Follow 
the armoured drive" were all the direction we ever 
received for some of the most successful of our 
reports. 28 
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Such a method permitted great freedom of action, and 
fostered an independence of spirit. This is seen in an 
example from towards the end of the Normandy campaign, 
when the Commander of No. 2 ORS suggested to the 21st 
Army Group staff that a member of the Section should 
accompany the armoured drive through Northern France 
and Belgium. When asked by the staff what it was 
proposed that this officer should do, 
.. the Commander replied that It would be up to the 
officer to find out what would be best for bim to do 
when be got tbere. 29 
The detachment was authorised, and some valuable work 
resulted, but this shows how, in a sense, the ORS were 
responsible for identifying the need for their own 
work - it was very easy for such work to be 
unappreciated by those for whom it was carried out if 
the latter did not comprehend the need for it in the 
first place. The example also shows how iniative and 
practicality were vital characteristics of the OR 
worker, and illustrates the point made in the post-war 
history of OR in the RAF - that while scientific 
training was necessary (some of the best OR members 
being engineers or physicists), not all scientists 
could grasp the principles of operational research. 30 
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An important question concerning OR field work is the 
extent to which the conclusions reached by the ORS 
could be be regarded as reliable, either by military 
commanders then or by historians now. Regarding close 
air support investigations a salutary warning, based 
on the experience of ORS 2nd TAF, is given in the 
post-war history of wartime OR in the RAF: 
The assessment of air attacks in close support of 
the Army was not easy. Relevant information was 
gathered from a variety of sources - Interrogation 
of prisoners of war, study and analysis of 
intelligence reports, discussions with Army and Air 
Force officers, and ground surveys of battlefields 
after capture. Although much interesting and useful 
Information was gathered, this was not available in 
sufficient detail and did not cover a sufficiently 
wide range of operations to form the basis for 
quantitative study.. 31 
Most OR data was certainly based upon particular 
examples, and this is true of the work of both No. 2 
ORS and ORS 2nd TAF. Moreover, the few ORS and the 
small number of scientists in each could not cover a 
wide range of operations in detail and, as related 
above, when an attempt was made by No. 2 ORS to cover a 
particular operation in depth some aspect had to be 
skimmed or neglected altogether due to the volume of 
work and the pressure of time. Attempts to cover one 
operation meant that other similar ones could not be 
studied except in the lost cursory sense. Nor, in the 
experience of No. 2 ORS, was OR field work very 
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systematic. As they were attempting much that was 
unprecedented, there was little direction from higher 
authority as to what to look at and what to look for; 
it was a continuous process of discovery determined 
largely by the initiative of the ORS members 
themselves. The danger here was that the theoretical 
aspect of OR work may have been compromised by the 
ORS, necessarily examining problems at very close 
range and being unable to cover many such operations 
in detail, here failing to perceive a larger 
perspective. 
Nevertheless, in a practical sense the OR reports 
hold much that is of value - particularly the ground 
surveys conducted shortly after operations, during 
which the ORS examined destroyed and damaged vehicles 
and equipment, and recorded the number of shell, bomb 
and rocket craters in the area and their position. In 
the case of anti-armour operations by Allied fighter- 
bombers, these provide physical evidence to set 
against what otherwise would be misleading claims of 
destruction. These reports can be considered reliable 
in the attribution of causes of destruction and 
damage, for it was not difficult to determine whether 
tanks and vehicles were destroyed by air or ground 
weapons, and where there was doubt this was indicated 
by the ORS. The same is true for the reports examining 
attacks by fighter-bombers against gun positions and 
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strongpoints, the damage by air weapons being 
sufficiently obvious to leave little room for doubt. 
The investigations of the heavy bomber operations 
were more complicated. Assessments of the destruction 
of targets in fixed defence positions, such as gun 
positions, can be considered accurate - particularly 
at Boulogne where No. 2 ORS, instead of appearing 
shortly after the operation, were on hand to witness 
it. It was far harder to evaluate the effect of the 
bombing in field operations after the ground bad been 
much fought over, and when some of the bombed areas 
remained in enemy hands. To a greater extent in these 
operations than in those of fighter-bombers against 
armour the amount of destroyed equipment and the 
number of enemy casualties found is more likely to 
reflect precisely that - the amount found rather than 
that inflicted. In particular the level of casualties 
caused to German troops as a result of heavy bombing 
remains, to some extent, questionable. 
No. 2 ORS found very few German dead after some of 
the heavy bomber support operations in Normandy, and 
concluded that such bombing against troops well dug-in 
did not produce heavy casualties. Taken all round the 
evidence from such operations supported this view, but 
the ORS also acknowledged that during one of these 
investigations a captured German medical officer told 
them that the Germans always removed their dead before 
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the arrival of Allied troops. They were disinclined to 
believe him, not only because they thought him an 
arrogant type whose information was considered 
unreliable, but also because they felt such a step 
would normally be impracticable. 
Yet in this they were wrong for, when possible, 
German troops did follow a policy of taking their dead 
with them when falling back from positions in order to 
prevent their discovery by the Allies. It seems odd 
that the ORS were not made aware of this, for the 
practice should have been known to Military 
Intelligence as it had been discovered in earlier 
campaigns. For example, towards the end of the 
fighting in Tunisia, the British 26th Armoured Brigade 
captured a number of German troops of the Herman 
Göring Division, one of whom remarked to his captors 
that: 
That stupid order to carry back all our dead with 
us had a very bad effect on the morale .... you can't 
beep cheerful and sing with a lot of bodies piled 
on the gun carriage. 32 
Thus there are pitfalls to drawing conclusions from 
the evidence discovered by the ORS in the battle area, 
and when using ORS data it must be remembered that the 
theoretical aspect of their reports, such as the level 
of casualties inflicted by various methods of attack 
against different targets and suggestions as to the 
best method of employing heavy bombers and fighter- 
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bombers in the close support role, were based on 
deductions made from the evidence available to them. 
The historian should not regard this evidence as 
incontrovertible, any more than could the ORS 
investigator of 1944, 
This does not detract from the great value or OR 
material in that, despite its limitations, some 
attempt was made at the time to find out what happened 
and why amid the chaos of battle. The ORS were on the 
scene shortly after the conclusion of operations, and 
sometimes while they were still taking place, and were 
able to talk to the troops that had taken part while 
memory and experience remained fresh. Few historians 
can doubt the worth of having such data as the 
comments of the British and Canadian infantry 
officers, given soon after the operation, as to why 
the heavy bombing during CHARNVOOD was of little use 
to them, the comments of the British tank crews 
regarding the difficulties of their advance during 
GOODWOOD, or the descriptions given to an ORS officer 
by the commanders of American infantry regiments of 
how fighter-bombers had assisted them at Mortain. 
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Close air support requires aircraft to become 
battlefield weapons, but their success in this role 
depends upon the solution of a considerable command 
and control problem. There has to be a system 
enabling troops to request air support, for processing 
such requests and forwarding them to the air force, 
for allocating air units in response, and for 
directing them to the required area of the 
battlefront. Aerial firepower, when directed at 
battlefield targets, must be integrated with the fire 
and movement of friendly ground forces. Finally, this 
entire process must be carried out as quickly as 
possible if the air support is to be of use to those 
requesting it. Close air support thus requires the 
creation of an extensive and elaborate joint army/air 
force machinery for carrying out these various 
functions, employing considerable manpower and 
equipment resources. 
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The purpose of this chapter is to determine the 
success of the British and American ground and air 
forces in solving this problem in Europe in 1943-45. 
While largely descriptive, the chapter shows how 
effective air support ultimately depended upon the 
constant acquisition and rapid dissemination of data 
and of instructions based upon it, and on the extent 
of cooperation achieved between ground and air forces. 
A study of historical data suggests that with regard 
to the former the Allied air support systems were 
generally successful, but that deficiencies in the 
latter significantly reduced their potential 
effectiveness. 
Having firmly rejected the concept of close air 
support during the interwar period, in 1939 the RAF 
possessed no close air support doctrine, no aircraft 
suitable for the task, and there was no joint 
RAF/British Army system of air support. Only in August 
1940, after defeat in Norway, France and the Low 
Countries and with Britain under threat of invasion, 
was the first step taken to create such a system. The 
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War Office sanctioned a number of air support 
experiments that were conducted the following month in 
Northern Ireland under the direction of Group Captain 
Wann and Colonel Woodall. The resulting 'Wann-Woodall 
Report' had clearly absorbed the lessons of the 
Blitzkrieg by identifying the need for a tactical air 
force - an RAF formation equipped and trained both to 
obtain air superiority by offensive air action and to 
attack battlefield targets in close coordination with 
ground operations. 1 For the latter task the 
experiments in Ireland saw the birth of the system 
which, when refined, was that employed by British 
forces in 1943-45. It was, as Charles Carrington 
describes, 
.. a signals network which sent out what Voodall 
called 'Tentacles', army officers in light cars, who 
went forward to the leading troops and signalled 
back requests for air support, by wireless links 
that avoided the normal channels, directly to a 
control centre, where they were monitored by Army 
and Air Force Staff Officers, sitting togetber. 2 
The system was adopted in principle by both the RAF 
and Army and was set up for trials. The outstanding 
feature was its extensive communications network, the 
most vital factor in any air support system, and which 
even in the experimental stage was found to cut by 
hours the time hitherto required to arrange air 
support. 3 The emphasis was placed on joint RAF/Army 
planning and decision making; Army and RAF Group 
headquarters were located together and the joint 
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control centre, known as the Army Air Control Centre 
(AACC) with its own updated battle situation maps and 
charts of aircraft readiness, was situated as a 
quadrangle of caravans each connected by telephone. 
Each headquarters within the Army had an an outstation 
manned by Royal Corps of Signals operators and an Army 
Air Liaison Officer (ALO) - this was a 'tentacle'. 
All tentacles with a division were on the same 
frequency, and each division also maintained a 
tentacle at Corps headquarters. Thus all command 
levels could monitor support requests emanating from 
the front line, and if necessary cut in and object on 
the grounds of duplication or danger to friendly 
troops. This also permitted simultaneous reception of 
RAF tactical reconnaissance reports, and as adjacent 
army corps were also 'on net' this data along with the 
details of the close support strikes was immediately 
circulated throughout the Army. 
The sanctioning of airstrikes was intended to be the 
responsibility of' the Army Chief of Staff and RAF 
Senior Staff Officer, but practice proved that the 
control centre was capable of handling this 
responsibility. The procedure was for the joint staff 
at the control centre to evaluate air support requests 
as they came in, checking the proposed targets in 
relation to the 'bomb-line' -a line, projected 
forward of friendly troops and where possible based on 
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physical features easily identifiable from the air, 
beyond which aircraft were permitted to attack 
targets. If the target was accepted the squadron 
designated for the task was then contacted via the 
direct communications to the airfields, where the 
ALO's attached to the squadrons were alerted to brief 
the pilots, who were to identify their targets by 
means of photographic maps with grid references. 4 The 
principal features of the air support system are 
described below. 
The tentacles were grouped into special units which 
were at first called 'Close Support Bomber Control' - 
reflecting the early (1940/41) assumption that air 
support would be the responsibility of RAF Bomber 
Command - and later 'Army Air Support Control'. In 
1944 they became the full responsibility of the Royal 
Corps of Signals and were renamed Air Support Signals 
Units, or ASSU's. They enabled army formations down to 
Brigade level to request air support via the combined 
Army/RAF control centre, and they were standardised to 
allow their deployment to Corps, Division, or Brigade 
headquarters. They were also attached to RAF 
headquarters at Wing and Group Control Centre. Each 
ASSU tentacle consisted of a vehicle, usually an 
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armoured half-track, a driver /mechanic, and a crew of 
three operators to an the powerful wireless 
(VS Cdn. 9) working on the tentacle net and the remote 
receiver for reception of RAF tactical reconnaissance 
broadcasts. 5 
The most important principle regarding the ASSU's 
was that they remain rigidly independent of the 
control of the formations to which they were attached. 
This prevented wireless sets and their operators being 
misappropriated by 'on the spot' commanders and 
diverted from their task of relaying air support 
requests and data. Deployed ASSU's came under the 
command of the formation to which they were attached, 
but were under the direct control of the 'G' 
(Operations) staff and never under the jurisdiction of 
the Signals staff. Tentacle wireless traffic was 
likewise delivered direct to the 'G' staff, and never 
passed through ordinary Signals channels where its 
priority may have been compromised. The formation to 
which an ASSU tentacle was attached became responsible 
for its administration, but technical supervision was 
exercised by mobile servicing detachments sent by a 
main ASSU headquarters. 6 
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The British air support system proved very successful 
in processing pre-planned air support strikes, but the 
test was really how quickly air support could be 
provided in response to impromptu requests from the 
forward troops, where speed was vitally important. In 
this respect, both in Italy and in the early stages of 
the campaign in North-West Europe, the process was 
simply not fast enough. A British Army report on air 
support in late 1944 identified where the problem lay 
by observing that, 
This failure cannot be laid at the door of air 
support communications, but must be attributed to 
the number of links in the chain, and particularly 
to time spent at Army/Group HQ in the discussions 
wbicb took place between Army and Air Staffs before 
orders were issued for the engagement of the 
target. 7 
The solution was to modify the existing machinery 
and procedure, though ironically this amounted to 
another link in the air support chain. The original 
system had envisaged the provision of Visual Control 
Posts (VCP's) at the battlefront which, as the name 
implies, were intended for the visual control of 
aircraft from a position on the ground commanding a 
view of the battle area. Experience proved that such 
ground was rarely found# so the VCP's were modified to 
become small forward air support controls. They became 
known as Forward Control Posts CFCP's) and were most 
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significant in the operational development of the 
ASSU's as they were intended to decrease the time 
factor in the provision of immediate close air 
support. 
An FCP was an advanced headquarters, staffed by a 
senior RAF Controller (often a Wing Commander) and a 
staff officer from the Army Air Liaison Group, and 
equipped with ASSU communications enabling them to 
intercept traffic on the tentacle net and to speak to 
the tentacles deployed with the forward troops, the 
RAF/Army Control Centre, and to airborne aircraft by 
means of VHF. Tentacles with the forward troops could 
at any time talk direct to the FCP, which could 
quickly determine the urgency of targets submitted. 
For a target where speed was not essential the air 
support system would function in the usual way, with 
the FCP monitoring but not intervening. However, when 
it was clear that a target needed to be engaged 
rapidly the RAF Controller at the FCP could 'step in' 
and handle the request. In this case the RAF/Army 
Control Centre was informed by telephone or R/T link 
that the FCP would deal with that particular target 
and the requesting army formation contacted by R/T to 
arrange target details. Strike aircraft, either at 
airfield readiness or possibly already in or near the 
battle area were then contacted and briefed in the 
air. In this way the FCP relieved the main Army/RAF 
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Control Centre of much of the urgent air support 
workload. 8 
Each FCP was designed to fulfil the requirements of 
one army corps and was normally sited alongside corps 
headquarters. When FCP's were required to support more 
than one corps they were sited to the best wireless 
advantage at the expense of proximity to any 
particular headquarters - adequate communications 
making close physical proximity unnecessary. 9 The 
FCP's originated with British forces in Italy, where 
due to their ability to be switched between 
headquarters without disrupting normal air support 
communications they were known as ROVER. FCP's 
operating in support of British Eighth Army were ROVER 
PADDY and ROVER DAVID. Each FCP required a sizeable 
committment of manpower and equipment. In North-West 
Europe a typical FCP consisted of three 3-ton lorries, 
an army transmitter vehicle containing the three 
necessary tentacle sets, an RAF transmitter vehicle 
and a receiver coach and office. 10 When operating in 
support of Fifth Army in Italy during late 1944 ROVER 
PADDY consisted of six officers (two senior Army Air 
Liaison Officers, two Royal Artillery Liaison 
Officers, and two RAF Air Controllers) and 34 other 
ranks. Transport consisted of five deeps with 
trailers, two 15-cwt trucks, two armoured cars, and 
two White scout cars - most fitted with W/T, R/T and 
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VHF communications equipment - in addition to several 
vehicles equipped with W/T sets specifically for 
communicating with Air Observation Post (AOP) light 
spotter aircraft. 11 
The FCP's depended upon information sent back from the 
battle area, but operational experience still proved 
the need for a means of controlling aircraft at the 
battlefront, particularly during mobile operations. 
The solution was further decentralisation of control - 
the creation of a modified form of tentacle known as 
the Contact Car. This consisted either of a White 
scout car or half-track which, in addition to the 
normal tentacle wireless (VS Cdn. 9), was equipped 
with two VHF sets (TR. 1143) for ground/air 
communication and another wireless set (WS No. 22) for 
the dual purpose of receiving air reconnaissance 
broadcasts and Intercepting the air support control 
network. Contact Cars were RAF units, and their normal 
tentacle crew was supplemented by an RAF Wireless 
Operator/Mechanic whose responsibility was to maintain 
the VHF equipment. They could function as normal 
tentacles, but their task was really to enable an RAF 
Forward Air Controller (FAC) to communicate with 
aircraft overhead at the battlefront. 
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Contact Cars were used both to control aircraft 
obtaining air reconnaissance data for forward troops 
and to control strike aircraft. In the case of the 
former task, an RAF reconnaissance pilot was attached 
to the Contact Car. A request for a reconnaissance 
sortie was relayed by the Contact Car to the G 
(Intelligence) (Air Reconnaissance) at Army 
headquarters who signalled back to the Contact Car the 
estimated time of arrival of the aircraft. On arrival 
over the forward area the pilot was briefed by his 
fellow pilot attached to the Contact Car, to whom he 
reported the results of his mission. This was then 
circulated over the tentacle net to be received 
simultaneously by all formations listening in. For 
controlling airstrikes the procedure was slightly 
different in that the FAC attached to the Contact Car 
was usually an experienced ground attack pilot, often 
a Squadron Leader or Flight Lieutenant, able to give 
the pilots a target briefing and to advise them during 
the attack using the terms that one pilot would use to 
another. 12 
During 1944-45 some variations of the Contact Car 
were developed to meet particular operational 
requirements. Jeeps equipped with VHF and VS Cdn. 9 
sets compressed the Contact Car facilities into a 
small vehicle, and were successfully employed during 
the crossing of the Rhine in 1945. For the amphibious 
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assault on Walcheren in November 1944 a Weasel 
amphibian was fitted out as a tentacle and manned by 
an ASSU crew. However, in contrast to the Americans, 
use of contact tanks in offensive operations was never 
fully developed by British forces. In North-West 
Europe tanks fitted out as ASSU's were little more 
than armoured shelters for the controllers to operate 
their ground/air communications, 13 while in Italy 
contact tanks as employed by US forces were used for 
the first time by the British as late as March 1945, 
when modified Shermans with the North Irish Horse 
successfully directed airstrikes closely coordinated 
with the assault on the Comacchio Spit. 14 
Arm Air Liaison Officers (ALO's). 
The ALO's assigned to RAF units and the joint Army/RAF 
Control Centre were the chief agents in linking the 
RAF and Army for close air support operations. This 
was acknowledged by the RAF, a history of air support 
in North-West Europe compiled by 2nd TAF observing 
that the Air Liaison Sections attached to fighter- 
bomber wings were '.. the focal point of the Wing's 
operations'. IS Within 2nd TAF in 1944, the air support 
system as it affected the ALO's with a fighter-bomber 
Wing functioned as follows. 
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Throughout the day and night Situation Reports 
('SitReps') were received from the battle area via 
ASSU and teleprinter, while any special information 
was received from the joint RAF/Army Control Centre by 
telephone. This data flow enabled the ALO's 
constantly to update their situation and bombline 
maps. Target details were also received by ASSU or 
telephone from the Control Centre. When the 
battlefront was ststic, an overnight list of likely 
targets for the following day came through by 
teleprinter, allowing the ALO's to collect briefing 
material and thus save some time by anticipation. 
Executive orders for airstrikes came through RAF 
channels, and on their receipt the ALO's arranged 
briefing material (maps and any available photographs) 
and obtained details as to the estimated time over 
target from the Wing Commander or flight leader as 
soon as possible and relayed this immediately to the 
Control Centre and ASSU's. Pilots were then briefed, 
it being the ALO's chief responsibility to ensure that 
pilots were aware of the position of the bombline and 
that of friendly troops near the target area. 16 On the 
return of the pilots the ALO's took part in their 
debriefing, and a flash report was sent over the ASSU 
net containing all information of interest to the 
Army. Details of the mission were also issued in an 
RAF operations flash. 17 
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There were weaknesses in the British air support 
system, and a consequent inefficiency that can be seen 
in several spheres of the air support procedure. One 
weakness was acknowledged in 2nd TAF's immediate post- 
war history of air support in North-West Europe. This 
observed that Contact Cars controlled airstrikes 
usually as a result of being delegated the task by the 
FCP controlling that sector, but that the FCP staff 
did not always delegate despite the obvious advantage 
of having the airstrike controlled by an observer with 
the forward troops. This was because, 
Individual performance by Air Liaison Officers and 
pilots in contact cars varied considerably, and 
there was a natural reluctance to authorise local 
control where the standard of performance did not 
appear to offer reasonable prospects of successful 
prosecution. 18 
In late 1944 the British Army produced an outspoken 
report on air support based on the experience gained 
thus far in North-West Europe. 19 This highlighted 
another, persistent, problem in the system - that of 
the correct use of codes and cyphers in air support 
communications. It was acknowledged that this was an 
extremely confusing aspect of the system and the 
report noted that, 
The balance between security and speed has to be 
struck constantly, and as constantly adjusted in the 
light of changing operational conditions. '20 
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During that campaign the Germans had been able to set 
up a warning system against air attack based on the 
interception of support requests from British Army 
units. When this was realised at RAF/Army staff level 
it created a security scare with, in the opinion of 
the Army report, '.. tbe result that many unnecessary 
restrictions were recommended. '21 Investigation proved 
that the Germans had been able to intercept ASSU 
traffic not as a result of a failure in the system, 
but because army formations had been misusing it. It 
was found that some units were using the immediate 
support request procedure, when messages could be sent 
in clear, to request air action as much as 24 hours 
ahead, while all too often units were relaying 
bombline details which revealed the intentions of the 
army units in clear rather than in cypher. 22 
Insufficient training, failure to properly 
understand the procedure, or simply carelessness were 
all likely to have been contributory factors to this, 
but another may have been that the ASSU's themselves 
were being worked to the limit. During both static and 
mobile operations the volume of signals traffic was 
immense, yet the number of trained ASSU personnel was 
limited. In 1944 the Army noted that ASSU tentacle 
NCO's carried far more responsibility than their 
ordinary Signals equivalents and that their task was 
far more demanding. It observed that, 
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A Corporal operator with a British tentacle does a 
job similar in many respects to a Canadian Tentacle 
Officer or a US Major with an Air Support Party. 23 
A characteristic of the British system appears to have 
been the provision of manpower barely adequate to 
fulfil assigned tasks, and this was seen in the Army 
Air Liaison Sections. To carry out the tasks related 
above, an Air Liaison Section attached to an RAF 
fighter-bomber wing of several squadrons normally 
consisted of only four ALO's supported by two clerks, 
the senior officer being a GSO. 2 who also acted as 
military advisor to the RAF Group Captain commanding 
the Wing and the Wing Commander (Flying) who planned 
the Wing's operations. Not surprisingly, the Army 
firmly resisted RAF attempts to have the task of 
dealing with cypher traffic at tentacles assigned to 
the Wing added to the already heavy burden of ALO 
responsibilities. 24 
More serious incompetence in the system had been 
exposed during operations by late 1944, namely with 
regard to air/ground recognition and bombline 
discipline, both of which were poor. 
Correctly identifying friendly troops and vehicles in 
any terrain from a fighter or fighter-bomber aircraft 
moving at speed over a battle area obscured by smoke 
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was no easy task, and a great deal of awareness of the 
problem and the taking of adequate safety measures by 
both the Army and RAF were required. In both Italy and 
North-West Europe (but particularly in the latter) 
this was often lacking. * In Normandy the problem was 
acute, largely because training in air/ground 
recognition procedure had been severely handicapped 
before the invasion by delay in the promulgation of 
agreed methods. The basic principles and 
recommendations were worked out after extensive trials 
in Britain some 18 months before D-Day, but final 
instructions were not issued until shortly before the 
invasion. As a result, as the Army later acknowledged, 
.. no issue of apparatus or painting of vehicle signs 
were possible, and.. no worthwhile training between 
the two Services could take place. 25 
Moreover, there had been a dispute within the Army as 
to whether identification signs should be painted or 
carried on vehicles at all - one argument being that 
if Allied pilots could see them, so could German - and 
the Armoured Corps at first refused to have any such 
markings applied. Given that the degree of air 
superiority attained by the Allied air forces could 
not be forseen before D-Day this argument seems 
reasonable, but it exacerbated an already confused 
situation. 
- 83 - 
Poor air/ground recognition procedure inevitably 
resulted in aircraft attacking friendly troops and, 
particularly in Normandy, there were frequent 
occasions when British and Canadian troops were 
attacked in error by their supporting aircraft both 
during static and mobile operations. Analysis by the 
Army in 1944 found that the number of such incidents 
peaked during the transition from semi-static to 
mobile warfare, when Allied forces were advancing and 
when bomb lines became very fluid. For the most part 
the offending aircraft were flying free-ranging armed 
reconnaissance missions as opposed to being detailed 
for specific close support strikes, and had obviously 
either failed to identify correctly columns of 
friendly troops and vehicles or had misjudged the bomb 
line - though in such operations ground forces often 
penetrated beyond the bomb line. 26 
Both in Italy and North-West Europe Allied troops 
were supplied with canisters of yellow smoke with 
which to identify themselves to friendly aircraft, and 
it is sobering to read of many instances when air 
attacks were pressed home against friendly troops 
carrying out the correct recognition drill by 
releasing such smoke. On August 20th 1944 in Normandy 
First Canadian Army produced a report listing 52 
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separate instances of attacks by fighter bombers - 
Spitfires, Typhoons, Mustangs, and USAAF Lightnings - 
against its forward troops that had occurred between 
August 16th-18th and which had killed 72 and wounded 
191 officers and men and destroyed or damaged 12 
vehicles. Some of these attacks had been made despite 
yellow smoke being released, and in one case despite 
an Air Observation Post (AOP) artillery spotter plane 
attempting to ward off the offending Typhoons. Not 
surprisingly, First Canadian Army called for all 
possible steps to be taken to reduce such occurrences, 
warning that if not, 
.. this powerful weapon in [support] of the army will 
constitute a deterrent to ground [operations] rather 
than the stimulant of which it is potentially 
capable. 27 
This is precisely what happened, the Army report of 
late 1944 on air support observing that 
.. the moral effect on our own troops 1s great and 
out of proportion to the material damage inflicted, 
and has a hangover which lasts some time, during 
which, units become cautious and less ready to call 
for air support. 28 
Such attacks, though not on such an alarming scale, 
persisted and the troops developed an acute awareness 
of the threat. When Beauvais was liberated its French 
citizens were perplexed to see the passing British 
Grenadier Guards anxiously glancing skywards, and one 
of them asked why, when the Allies had air 
superiority, the British troops should fear air 
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attack. According to the Regimental History, 
The reason was simple. Bitter experience had taught 
the Battalions that friendly planes, especially in 
forward areas and during swift advances, were often 
to be feared more than those of the enemy. 29 
Bombtine Diseihtine 
Accurate data regarding the exact location of 
bomblines was a recurrent problem. Army formations 
often set bomblines too far ahead of friendly troops. 
This was erring on the safe side, but had operational 
disadvantages. One was that many German positions were 
left within the bombline. Because of an RAF ruling 
that no target was to be engaged within the bombline 
unless marked by coloured artillery smoke 
(a precaution against air attack on friendly troops), 
these positions could not be attacked by air when 
smoke was unavailable. Even when smoke was available 
responsiveness of air support could be reduced, for 
if a target was to be marked by artillery firing red 
smoke this alone could sometimes take up to 30 minutes 
to arrange. 30 Another disadvantage was that, as the 
Army report of late 1944 admitted, 
.. the RAF lost confidence in the bombline as a 
reasonably reliable Indication of the position of 
forward troops, and were prepared to argue over the 
position of the bombline In relation to those 
troops. 31 
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Such disputes threatened to throw the entire air 
support machinery out of gear by making nonsense of 
the basic information relayed by the ASSU's and 
distributed by the ALO's upon which airstrikes were 
planned. The result was confusion and, in extreme 
cases, attacks on friendly troops as related above. 
From a historical perspective it is surprising that 
there were such problems inherent in the British air 
support system, for the RAF had successfully provided 
close support to the Army during World War I. Indeed, 
in 1917/18 the RFC/RAF pioneered many of the later 
techniques of tactical air support. British aircraft 
operated with tanks during the Cambrai offensive of 
191?, and by 1918, in contrast to 1943-45, air/tank 
integration for offensive operations was highly 
developed. Squadrons were attached to the Tank Corps 
for the specific purpose of dealing with German anti- 
tank defences, and a system of rotation was introduced 
whereby Tank Corps officers were assigned to air duty 
and aircrew to serve in tanks for familiarisation. 32 
Experiments in wireless communication between tanks 
and aircraft were also conducted, largely by the 
commander of No. 8 Squadron, Trafford Leigh-Mallory - 
later Air Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory and 
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overall commander of the Allied Tactical Air Forces in 
1944.33 The utility of a communications centre linking 
air and ground units was realised, and in August 1918 
the RAF established a wireless information centre near 
the battlefront which, working from air reconnaissance 
data and reports from the front line, was able to 
contact airborne aircraft and direct them to ground 
targets. 34 
Yet during World War II senior airmen were 
determined to avoid a commitment to support the Army. 
This was not only due to concern that such a 
commitment would lead to the loss of the RAF's 
independent status, but because close support had come 
to be recognised as a misuse of air power. In May 
1941, after experience of the German use of tactical 
air power, the War Office demanded that the RAF be 
prepared and equipped to provide similar support to 
the British Army, particularly against German tanks. 
This was bitterly resisted by the Air Ministry, and 
the Vice Chief of the Air Staff, Air Vice-Marshal 
Slessor, condemned what he saw as the Army's 
'.. tendency... to turn round and ask the Air Force to 
do what it should be doing itself', adding that, 
It Is Zto± the job of the Air Force to stop 
deployed tanks. That Is the fob of the anti-tank 
weapon on the ground... The job of the air is to 
make It impossible for the tank to go on owing to 
shortage of fuel, food and ammunition... In other 
words, I do not believe In close support at all 
except in the very rare occasions when you have to 
throw in everything to avert a disaster (and that 
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disaster should not threaten if you have used your 
air properly from the beginning). 35 
Moreover, close support was considered likely to be 
very costly. Group Captain Basil Embry, who had led 
airstrikes against German troops in France in 1940, 
warned the Air Ministry in May 1941 that, 
With the scale and intensity of the German A. A. 
Defence low bombing in close support of land 
operations is likely to bring about a casualty rate 
amongst our bombers out of all proportion to the 
results acbieved. 36 
It is against the background of RAF hostility to the 
concept of close support that the British air support 
system of 1943-45 must be assessed. The air support 
machinery was set up and manned by two independent 
services and could only operate smoothly and 
efficiently as a result of a genuine spirit of 
cooperation. As a result of the dichotomy which 
occurred after 1918 neither service had any worthwhile 
experience of cooperating closely with the other until 
after 1941-42. By 1943-45 Allied air superiority and 
the large number of tactical aircraft available made 
close support possible and a workable machinery was in 
place. But it was manned by an air force whose high 
command was fundamentally opposed to the role and an 
army unused to utilising air support, and whose 
General Staff was, for the most part, too unfamiliar 
with air power to fully appreciate its potential, and 
its drawbacks, when applied to the battlefield. There 
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was too little RAF/Army commonality, and too much 
bitterness and recrimination, for the air support 
machinery to function at its full potential 
effectiveness. 
That this was likely to be a problem in North-West 
Europe was foreseen, by none other than Field Marshal 
Montgomery. In North Africa Montgomery had been a firm 
. 
believer in close Army/RAF relations, and one of his 
first steps after assuming command of Eighth Army in 
August 1942 had been to ensure that the Army 
Headquarters and that of RAF Desert Air Force were 
located together and that the senior air staff 
officers shared his mess, a move welcomed by Air 
, 
Marshal Coningham, commanding Desert Air Force, and 
Air Marshal Tedder, Air C-in-C Middle East. 37After his 
return from Italy in January 1944 Montgomery found a 
, very 
different situation prevailing in the forces 
preparing for OVERLORD, and on May 4th he expressed 
his concern in a letter to the Army Commanders who 
were to serve under him in Normandy: 
.. it has been gradually brought home to me that 
there Is a definite gulf in England between the 
Armies and their supporting Air Forces.. 
Formation and unit commanders, and the regimental 
officers and men, must be taught to realise that 
without the help of the air they cannot win the 
land battle... 
I feel very strongly on the whole matter, and I 
know that we can achieve no real success unless 
each Army and its accompanying Air Force can weld 
itself into one entity. 38 
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Yet by this time both Coningham, who was to command 
RAF 2nd Tactical Air Force in North-West Europe, and 
Tedder, Eisenhower's Deputy, were greatly 
disillusioned with Montgomery. They had resented the 
prestige and popularity accorded him after Alamein 
while the air forces had received little recognition; 
they had also been critical of what they saw as his 
. over cautious pursuit of 
Axis forces after Alamein and 
his failure to take sufficient note in his plans of 
the need to secure airfields -a criticism that would 
also be levelled at him in Normandy. 
Despite his protestations on the need for close 
Army/Air Force liaison, Montgomery appears to have 
done little to remedy the situation in early 1944 
whereby the various Headquarters were situated far 
apart; 21st Army Group near Portsmouth, the Air C-in-C 
at Stanmore, and Coningham at Uxbridge. There was also 
much RAF resentment that, at this period, Montgomery 
embarked upon a morale-raising tour of camps and 
factories, leaving his Chief of Staff, De Guingand, to 
deal with the senior airmen. In short, there was much 
ill-feeling on the part of. senior airmen towards the 
Army in general and Montgomery in particular, an 
unpromising atmosphere in which close air/ground 
integration could hardly flourish and which would 
worsen during the campaign. 39 
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There was also much bitterness on the part of the 
Army, many of whose senior staff in 1944 believed 
that there was little genuine RAF desire to make air 
support work, though the Army report of late 1944 on 
the subject admitted that at the operational level 
relations were good: 
.. the difficulties are usually greatest at the 
higher levels, and decrease at the lower end of the 
scale. At the first point where practical executive 
action has to be taken, the difficulties begin to 
disappear, and from there downwards, In nine cases 
out of ten, there is no problem. 40 
One example of the tenuous RAF/Army relationship 
occurred in Normandy, when the Army felt particularly 
aggrieved by what was seen as a successful attempt by 
the RAF to deal the authority and influence of the Air 
Liaison Sections a damaging blow. As a result of an 
RAF reorganisation of its command structure, the RAF 
requested that the rank of the senior ALO in an Air 
Liaison Section be reduced from GSO. 2 to GSO. 3 in 
order to be kept in line with the RAF senior Wing 
Intelligence Officer. This was reluctantly agreed to, 
but resulted in the senior ALO being equivalent only 
to a Flight Lieutenant. Not only did this severely 
reduce prospects of promotion, a move hardly 
calculated to attract the best talents to the air 
support sphere, it was seen by the Army as 
unjustified. The Army report of late 1944 complained 
that, 
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.. the work of the senior ALO at a wing of 
five 
fighter or fighter bomber [squadrons] carries 
considerable responsibility, and is of an importance 
which justifies a second grade appointment. 41 
This was regarded as one manifestation of RAF 
hostility to Army involvement in air operationst 
another Army grievance was the experience of the 
sections of the 'G' (Operations) staff within British 
Army formations responsible for coordinating plans for 
air support. These sections were known as 'G' (Air) 
and by late 1944 were considered to be functioning 
effectively, though it was felt that their existence 
had been resented by the RAF: 
.. the Air Forces were left with the wrong impression 
of G (Air) whom they were inclined to regard as 
pseudo experts in what they considered purely air 
matters, and as an unwelcome barrier between 
themselves and the General Staff. This attitude has 
subsided during the course of operations, but it did 
not make the task of G (Air. ) any easier in the early 
days. 42 
The Army's principal grievance, however, was that the 
soldiers had been firmly excluded from any role in 
decision making as to the weapons and tactics employed 
in close support. The Army report of 1944 condemned 
the RAF's, 
.. apparent disapproval of any attempt on the Army's 
part to become too familiar wi tb, or too expert In, 
their business, and their jealous interpretation of 
the creed that the Army should confine itself to 
stating the problem, and the Air Forces decide the 
method, with no crossing of the lines. 43 
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Certainly the Army had had no influence in the 
type of aircraft employed in close support. After the 






the same support as enjoyed by German 
in particular dive-bombers. This was 
resisted by the RAF and Air Ministry, 
i such as Slessor pointing out that the 
of the German 'Stuka' dive bomber was 
illusory and its success due only to German air 
superiority and the weakness of its opponents' anti- 
aircraft defences. 44 There is a general consensus 
among historians that the rejection of dive-bombers 
was the correct course, but at the time this appeared 
to the Army to be one of many instances of the RAF 
being unwilling to provide air support, and fuelled 
demands for a separate Army air arm. 45 
The result of this decision was that in 1943-45 none 
of the aircraft providing close support to British 
troops had been originally developed for the task, 
being swing-role fighter-bombers as opposed to 
dedicated ground attack aircraft, and carrying bombs 
or rockets in addition to their fixed gun armament. 
Their effectiveness in this role is discussed in 
subsequent chapters, but from the Army point of view 
the fact that they had been designed as interceptor 
fighters for the defence of Britain meant that they 
had one major drawback - lack of range. The late 1944 
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Army report on air support complained, in view of 
experience in North-West Europe, that, 
.. the available British fighter and figbter-bomber 
effort has been of short range type, and this 
characteristic has proved a handicap throughout the 
operations... it has been found necessary on frequent 
occasions to employ the longer range US aircraft on 
the British front to cover vital areas and targets, 
with all the consequent difficulties of recognition, 
communications and briefing... When the break out 
from the bridgehead had been achieved and mobile 
battle conditions had set in, the RAF ability to 
support a rapidly moving Army was seriously 
curtailed by the lack of range of their aircraft, 
whose bases would go out of action just at a time 
when air support was most needed to maintain the 
momentum of the advance.. 46 
The Army also resented a what was perceived to be 
the lack of RAF interest in developing and improving 
the techniques of operating with ground forces. The 
RAF's knowledge of the Army remained 'depressingly 
low' with '.. little sign of recognition of the fact, 
let alone any desire to bring about improvement. ' Only 
one joint school of instruction in air support had 
been set up and was in the Army's view unsatisfactory, 
as 
.. the object of the course has been confined almost 
entirely to teaching the soldier about the Air 
Force, a statement wbicb might be qualified by 
substituting - to teach the Army what the Air Force 
thinks the Army ought to know about the Air Force. 47 
This was clearly resentment against what was seen 
as a patronising RAF attitude towards the Army, but it 
must also be borne in mind that there was a great lack 
of comprehension of the entire subject of air support 
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within the Army itself, which can be seen as the 
result of the Army having little or no experience of 
utilising it. As the 1944 report admitted, when the G 
(Air) staffs were created, 
.. there was an inevitable tendency to treat G (Air) 
as a new and separate branch of the Staff, and for 
the General Staff at almost all levels to regard air 
support as the specialised business of this new 
branch rather than their own. 48 
Many senior General Staff officers, lacking 
operational experience of air support, either left all 
air support problems to their G (Air) sections, 
thereby giving them little direction as to what was 
needed, or controlled their activites too rigidly, 
thereby stultifying what expertise they possessed. The 
1944 report identified what was needed to correct this 
situation, and in doing so highlighted a fundamental 
weakness in the British Army's conception of air 
support - that most senior officers shared with the 
senior airmen the tacit assumption that air support 
was something other than what they should be concerned 
with: 
.. improvement can only come from a recognition of 
air action as an Integral part of Army operations 
and from experience and study. If this recognition 
is to take practical form a reorientation of our 
training will be necessary so that at all stages and 
In all staff colleges and schools, supporting air 
action 1s taught and studied in the same way and 
with the same priorities as other operational 
subjects. 49 
The British Army of 1943-45 was doctrinally 
unprepared for such a step, nor would it have been 
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tolerated by the RAF. In 1941 the latter Service had 
successfully resisted Army attempts to subordinate air 
operations to those on the ground, and had been 
vindicated in North Africa. But in 1943-45 the RAF 
still, as Chester Wilmot observed, 
.. suffered from a 'Junior service' complex, and was 
forever eager to assert its right to equality and 
independence. 50 
This attitude emanated from the top, and subordinate 
RAF tactical air commanders who proved willing to 
closely co-operate with the soldiers in 1943-45, such 
as Air Vice-Marshal Broadhurst who had commanded RAF 
Desert Air Force after Coningham and later 2nd TAF"s 
No. 83 Group in North-West Europe, were sometimes 
censured for this by their seniors. 51 By early 1945 
there was also a hardening attitude on the part of the 
Army. Its report of late 1944 condemned the 
continuing deference to RAF wishes and, with an eye to 
the future, advocated a firmer stance: 
.. in matters of high policy affecting the two 
Services the Army has deferred to the Air Force in 
almost every instance.. This may have been a question 
of polI cy, and was certainly not unconnected 
with... the advantages conferred on a Service fully 
engaged operationally at a time when a large 
proportion of the Army was inactive. The situation 
has now changed and the Army has come into its own 
as a war winning factor, but our approach to joint 
problems does not seem to have been affected, and 
the policy of appeasement still governs much of our 
dealings with the Air Force. Whether a policy of 
appeasement was ever profitable is a matter of 
opinion... In any case it is difficult to believe in 
it under the present circumstances where, 
superficial affability and goodwill on the one hand, 
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and behind the scenes criticisms and backbiting on 
the other... constitute a poor substitute for genuine 
cooperation. 52 
The system of air support employed by the USAAF and 
Army in North-West Europe and Italy was broadly 
similar to that of the British. In some respects it 
was more innovative and flexible, though the same 
problems that dogged the British system were also 
evident and appear to have been the result of the same 
underlying cause - inadequate air/ground cooperation. 
A US Tactical Air Force consisted of several Tactical 
Air Commands (TAC's) composed of fighter, fighter- 
bomber and reconnaissance squadrons and which 
approximated to an RAF Group. Thus in early 1945 the 
Ninth Air Force in North-West Europe comprised the IX, 
XIX, and XXIX Tactical Air Commands. Each TAC 
supported a particular Army within the Army Group. As 
far as possible, Tactical Air Force and Army Group, 
and TAC and Army, headquarters were located together. 
When this was not possible, the TAC's maintained a 
small mobile command echelon at the advanced 
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headquarters of the corresponding Army. Air Force 
headquarters planned the deployment of the TAC's and 
medium bomber units, controlled the movement of air 
units, and prepared long range logistical plans. Air 
Force headquarters also co-ordinated the planning of 
large scale air operations involving the operations of 
more than one TAC. 
Each TAC planned and coordinated the day to day air 
support of its corresponding Army. This planning, 
including the selection of targets and allocation of 
air effort, was conducted from a 'Combined Operations 
Center' at TAC/Army headquarters which was manned by 
joint Air Force and Army staff. Each evening a 
briefing, known in the Ninth Air Force as the 'Evening 
Target Conference', was held during which the day's 
operations and the programme for the following day 
were outlined. Normal procedure was for the Army G-2 
(Intelligence) to summarise ground operations of the 
day and the Army G-3 (Operations) to describe those 
planned for the next day and submit a list of request 
missions. The Air Intelligence Officer (A-2) would 
then present new items of air intelligence and the A-2 
Target Officer outline potential targets for 
consideration. A weather report would also be given. 
After the briefing the Air Combat Operations Officer 
(A-3) would announce air units available for 
operations, first deducting units required for special 
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targets ordered by the Tactical Air Force Headquarters 
and those needed for bomber escort. He would then 
allocate units for armed reconnaissance missions 
beyond the enemy front line and attacks upon air- 
designated targets. The balance, less units undergoing 
maintenance, were allotted to pre-arranged air support 
missions. This priority accorded to armed 
reconnaissance was normal during periods when the 
battlefront was mainly static with few offensive 
operations by ground forces, a post-war US study 
observing that, 
In a stable situation, the major portion of the air 
effort was allotted to armed reconnaissance and 
escort.. 
.. Air effort was seldom allotted to close-in 
missions unless the Ground Forces were attempting an 
advance at that point. 53 
Orders were then issued assigning tasks to Groups (the 
equivalent to RAF Wings), which in turn designated 
squadrons for particular missions. Plans for major air 
support operations were drafted at TAC level and 
submitted to the headquarters of the Tactical Air 
Force where they were finalised by the joint Army and 
`Air staff. 54 
Air support requests submitted after 2400 hrs for 
execution on the same day were evaluated by the Army 
G-3 according to urgency and the importance of the 
role of the ground unit making the request in the Army 
plan. The mission was plotted on a constantly updated 
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situation map and the bomb line *checked. This 
procedure took about 15 minutes, and requests were 
processed in turn. After checking and approval by the 
Army G-3, the request was submitted to the Air Combat 
Operations Officer at an adjacent desk. If it was 
approved and aircraft were available the A-3 would 
assign a squadron or group for the task, notifying the 
group headquarters by telephone or teleprinter. The 
ground unit making the request was notified of either 
acceptance or refusal; in the former case the 
estimated time of arrival of the aircraft was given 
and in the event of a refusal the reason was stated. 
Requests for immediate support were also decided upon 
by the Combat Operations Officer, who. could divert 
aircraft from pre-arranged missions, but mostly such 
requests, if accepted, were answered by diverting 
fighter-bombers from armed reconnaissance missions. 55 
Liaison with -ground formations was effected by 
Tactical Air Party Officers (TAPO's) - also known as 
Tactical Air Liaison Officers (TALO's) or Air Support 
Party Officers (ASPO's) depending upon which TAC they 
represented - pilots whose combat tour had expired and 
who were attached to the headquarters of Corps, 
Divisions, and armoured Combat Commands for a period 
of 90 days in rotation to advise the military 
commanders on air matters and, in particular, to 
evaluate the air support targets submitted by the army 
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G-3 (Air) - the staff officer responsible for air 
support matters. TAPO's were provided with 
communications personnel and UHF and VHF radio 
equipment for relaying the air support requests to the 
TAC headquarters. The TAPO's also acted as Forward Air 
Controllers for directing airstrikes, army formations 
being accorded additional TAPO's for this purpose. 56 
In Italy the XII TAC adopted the British ROVER FCP 
system for controlling airstrikes in support of the 
. -Fifth Army, assigning 
the FCP the codename ROVER 
JOE. 57 
Army representation with air units was by army staff 
officers G-3 (Air) and G-2 (Air), the latter 
responsible for intelligence, being attached to the 
,. ". TAG headquarters. 
In addition, Ground Liaison Officers 
(GLO's) were attached to groups and squadrons. Their 
task was effectively the same as their British ALO 
counterparts - to keep the air units informed of the 
situation in the battle area and to maintain the group 
... and squadron 
battle situation maps. They also played a 
key role in the pre-mission briefing of aircrew, 
ensuring that pilots were familiar with the bomb-line, 
,.. and also 
took part in their debriefing. 58 
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In some respects the US system of air support 
reflected a greater spirit of commonality between air 
and ground forces than seen between the RAF and 
British Army, and a consequent mutual willingness to 
experiment and adopt innovations to improve the 
system. 
This can be seen with regard to the provision f or 
the forward control of aircraft. Although this had 
been pioneered by the British in the Mediterranean, in 
North-West Europe they were slow to adopt the Visual 
Control Post method. Before D-Day it had been outlined 
in an AEAF memorandum that such control of aircraft 
was most appropriate as part of a prearranged plan, 
and would only be employed at the discretion of Air 
Marshal Coningham. As a result, provision of VCP's was 
scant, amounting to one per Corps, and the British 
Army report of late 1944 observed that, 
The machinery to control a small 
reconnaissance/striking force over the advancing 
columns was not Included in any of the pre-D Day 
organisation, and as a result bad to be met by 
improvisation. 59 
In contrast, each US Air Support Party could function 
as a forward VCP, and they were allotted on a scale of 
one per infantry division, and sometimes two or three 
per armoured division. 
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Another US innovation, instituted in Italy, was the 
use of light artillery observation aircraft (Piper L-5 
'Grasshoppers') to direct fighter-bombers to close 
support targets. By June 1944 the XII TAC was 
employing L-5 aircraft equipped with SCR-522 radios 
and flown by fighter-bomber pilots operating as 
airborne Forward Air Controllers. This innovation was 
known as 'Horsefly' and the usual practice was for two 
L-5's to be assigned to each Corps. They were given 
distinctive markings for pilots to distinguish them 
from L-5's operating as conventional artillery 
spotters and, in addition to the FAC, carried an 
infantry observer for the purpose of identifying 
friendly troops; operating with US armour they carried 
an observer trained to distinguish US from German 
tanks. Usually flying at 3,000-4,000 feet, Horseflys 
used smoke bombs to mark targets and were of 
, particular value 
when artillery was unavailable to 
mark targets. They provided an easily located orbit 
-point for the fighter-bombers, while the L-5 observer 
could rapidly ascertain the results of the airstrike. 
Horseflys were also successfully employed beyond the 
battlefront, sometimes roving up to 20 miles behind 
German lines to direct fighter-bombers against targets 
of opportunity. 60 
The employment of airborne FAC's was not fully 
adopted by the British despite the necessary machinery 
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being in place - the Air Observation Post (AOP) 
artillery observation squadrons manned jointly by the 
RAF and Army and equipped with Auster light 
observation aircraft (which had been set up despite 
strong initial RAF/Air Ministry opposition), 61 Towards 
the end of the campaign in Italy AOP aircraft were 
used occasionally, with some effect, to direct RAF 
fighter-bombers, but were never so employed in North- 
West Europe. A sense of missed opportunities and 
unrealised potential lends pathos to a reading of the 
history of the AOP, which describes how 'by a 
coincidence' during the crossing of the Rhine a 
squadron of Typhoons found itself to be on the same 
wireless net as the British artillery below and their 
attached AOP flight: 
Some completely unofficial briefings were given to 
the Typhoon Flight Commanders whose pilots destroyed 
a Tiger tank only 300 yards ahead of our troops, 
after an Air D. P. pilot had pointed It out by R/T. 62 
However, although the XII TAC took the Horsefly system 
to Western Europe after the invasion of Southern 
France and employed it successfully, it never found 
favour with other US forces in that theatre - this 
being one of several indications that Allied forces in 
Italy showed more enterprise in the control and 
application of air support than their counterparts in 
North-West Europe. 
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The American system also provided a solution, which 
originated with XII TAC in Italy, to the problem of 
German positions being left within the bomb line. In 
Italy the latter was usually fixed between 5 and 10 
miles ahead of friendly ground forces, and never 
closer than a distance estimated as 10 minutes away by 
infantry advance from the front line. This permitted 
significant German forces to operate in an area immune 
from air attack and, in order to prevent this, an 
additional line known as the 'close cooperation line' 
was introduced. This was designated immediately in 
front of friendly troops by the G-3 (Air) at Corps 
headquarters, who based his positional details on data 
received from the forward troops. As their positions 
changed the necessary map references were sent to the 
senior air controller at Corps whose task was to 
ensure that airstrikes did not occur within the close 
cooperation line but remained between the latter and 
the bombline. This demanded constant updates as to the 
position of the close cooperation line, which were 
passed on to the AAF Wings and Groups by the senior 
air controller at Corps, while the Army G-3 (Air) had 
the responsibility of informing' Army headquarters. 
Conducting airstrikes close to friendly troops 
demanded the utmost efficiency in the flow and 
processing of data from the front line, for it was 
found that during intensive operations the position of 
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the close cooperation line could change up to ten 
times in a day. 63 
The US air support system was also more flexible in 
the utilization of radar. The British Army report on 
air support of late 1944 lamented the fact that 2nd 
TAF had not been able to make use of the SCR-584 
precision radar, demonstrated before D-Day, for the 
navigational guidance of aircraft and for 'blind 
bombing' in close support whereas it had been 
successfully employed by the US Ninth Air Force 
throughout the campaign. 64 British use of radar was 
mainly defensive, and it was, not employed for 'blind 
bombing' until 1945. In the US system each TAC had a 
Tactical Control Center (TCC) sited near the Combined 
Operations Center. This was a radar control group 
centred upon a Microwave Early Warning radar (MEW) 
which was situated 10-30 miles from the battlefront. 
The MEW was supported by Forward Director Posts 
(usually three) and three or four SCR-584 Close 
Control Units. Originally designed for air defence, 
this network was extensively employed to guide strike 
aircraft responding to close 
'support requests to the 
target area, and sometimes to the target itself, with 
great precision, and proved of particular value during 
periods of adverse weather. 65 
The most significant example of the flexibility of 
the US air support system compared to that of the 
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British was the close integration of air and armour in 
order to provide continuous air support during mobile 
operations. This was effected by assigning flights of 
fighter-bombers to cooperate closely with spearhead 
armoured units at each stage of an advance, controlled 
by a FAC riding in a VHF equipped tank. This was known 
as 'Armored Column Cover' and was introduced by IX TAC 
(of Ninth Air Force) for the breakout from Normandy. 
Armored Column Cover is examined in Chapter IV. 
For the most part the advantages of the US system were 
innovations made as a result of operational 
experience. Yet that same operational experience also 
.. revealed serious weaknesses. 
One was that, as in the British system, insufficient 
manning 'levels at times threatened efficiency. In 
:, North-West 
Europe, during September/ October 1944, a 
staff officer (G-3) of US 12th Army Group was detailed 
to conduct an investigation into the efficiency of the 
air support system and in that period visited seven 
corps and thirteen divisions of the US First, Third, 
and Ninth Armies and their supporting TAC's. His 
investigation revealed considerable variations in 
available manpower at Army level. The First Army's G-3 
Section consisted of four officers, that of the Ninth 
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Army seven, while the Third Army Section had nine. 
This meant that while the G-3s' (Air) of the Seventh 
and Ninth Armies were able to spend considerable time 
at Army headquarters and be involved in the planning 
of operations, that of the First Army was compelled to 
be almost constantly at the TAC combined operations 
room and was consequently less familiar with the 
overall operational plan. In Ninth Army it was found 
that a minimum of 5 officers was essential to handle 
the routine functions of a G-3 section in a 24-hour 
period, while the four extra officers made possible 
visits to GLO sections, consultation with higher and 
lower echelons, and the filling of unexpected 
vacancies in the G-3 or GLO sections. 66 
At corps level manning was adequate, but at 
divisional level there were problems. Armoured 
divisions in the US Army had been recently 
reorganised, with some still functioning under the old 
table of organisation. These had full time G-3 (Air) 
officers in addition to a normal G-3 but, 
surprisingly given the extent to which close air 
support was employed, divisions with the new 
organisation had no such allotment, the normal G-3 
having to act as a G-3 (Air) in addition to his 
regular duties. A similar situation prevailed in the 
infantry divisions, and for the most part the soldiers 
were of the opinion that this was detrimental, 
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pointing out that a full time G-3 (Air) had the 
opportunity to become thoroughly familiar with air 
support technique and procedure as well as relieving 
an already under-staffed G-3 section of a considerable 
workload. 67 
Considerable differences in air support procedure 
existed among Army formations, and the relative amount 
of responsibility assumed by the G-3 (Air) sections 
and the Air Support Party Officers (ASPO's) varied 
widely. This meant that some G-3 (Air) sections and 
ASPO's were very much in touch with the air operations 
taking place in their sector of the battlefront, while 
others could hardly have been less so. The 1944 
investigation described how, 
Some corps ASFOs virtually run a miniature forward 
fighter control and supervise the employment of all 
aircraft operating In the corps area. At the other 
extreme, one corps does not use Its VHF radios 
except in connection with some special operation. 68 
To a great extent this came back to the question of 
manpower, it being found that in most infantry 
divisions the lack of a full time G-3 (Air) 
necessitated the ASPO engaging in staff work to the 
detriment of operational duties. 69 
Inadequate staffing and a lack of uniform procedure 
threatened to produce inefficiency and poor 
performance, and there were frequent examples of this. 
One was that Army divisions complained that they were 
not receiving sufficient notification of the number of 
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aircraft allotted to them and their 'time over target' 
during pre-planned close support operations. 
This was a serious problem, threatening the 
fundamental utility of air support, for without timely 
notification of these details the army were not well 
placed to exploit the air support, and air support if 
not exploited on the ground was wasted. This was 
really due to inefficient use of the communications 
network, but the problem reduced army confidence in 
pre-planned air support - the 1944 investigation 
observing that, 
Divisions point out... that It Is extremely 
difficult to integrate air attacks into the 
following day's operations unless a division is 
notified prior to midnight what air support it is 
to get. This is one of the principal reasons for 
the virtually unanimous preference of ground force 
units for support by armed reconnaissance flights 
which check in with the ASPO and can be used 
Instantly as the situation demands. 70 
Similarly, Army units complained of an excessive time 
lapse in notifying them that air support had been 
denied or cancelled; the elapsed time varied from four 
to six hours, and in one instance a unit was told that 
its air support was cancelled nine hours after the 
original request. 71 
As in British experience, many of the problems in 
the system were the result of poor performance on the 
part of individuals. There is evidence to suggest that 
the US Army was less than satisfied with the 
efficiency of the GLO's attached to AAF units. In a 
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post-war USAAF study of air support 'operations in 
North-West Europe which invited ground force comments, 
the VI Corps noted that, 
.. It has sometimes happened that ground officers 
with air units have not kept these units properly 
informed as to the significance of ground operations 
as pertains to their currently assigned mission, 
while the XII Corps considered the GLO's, 
.. too cut off, from the ground picture, to be of any 
real aid to the fighter-group, insofar as giving 
them any reasonably accurate picture as to present 
location, and plans and intentions of the ground 
troops wi tb which they are working. 
The 2nd Armored Division staff suggested that it was 
the GLO's themselves, rather than the system, which 
was at fault and pointed out that, 
Too many GLO's lack combat experience, are not well 
grounded in the activities of various branches of 
the service, and lack initiative in that they do not 
make contacts with the combat divisions to keep 
abreast of tactical demands. 72 
Such blanket criticism of the GLO's may not have 
been justified. The 1944 investigation highlighted the 
problem that the army machinery for disseminating 
information from the battlefront was itself too slow 
and did not keep up with the pace of battle, and that, 
GLO sections do not have the latest information on 
the ground situation because, In spite of the 
efforts of the army G-3 air section, the situation 
often has changed by the time army has received 
and disseminated the . information. GLO personnel 
feel that G-3s air of divisions and corps should 
be encouraged to send ground information direct to 
them whenever feasible. 73 
Yet some individuals lacking aptitude or commitment 
undoubtedly constituted 'weak links' in the US air 
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support chain. Less than two weeks after D-Day three 
of the four US Corps Commanders in Normandy had sacked 
their G-3 (Air), despite there being a shortage of 
suitably qualified officers to take their place. The 
best replacements, it was found, proved to be officers 
drawn from the GLO sections attached to IX TAC 
airfields. 74 
As with the British system, experience proved that 
the air support machinery was often not fast enough to 
respond adequately to calls for immediate support. In 
all US divisions the ASPO, whose party was equipped 
with SCR-522 and SCR-399 VHF radios, submitted air 
support requests to the G-3 (Air) section at Army 
headquarters. 'Request missions', those required on 
the same day but not immediately needed, and 'planned 
missions', those to be flown on subsequent days, were 
sent through the G-3 (Air) at Corps to the G-3 (Air) 
at Army. 'Immediate requests', when air support was 
required as soon as possible, could be sent direct 
using the SCR-399. However, as the 1944 investigation 
discovered, 
.. communication to army over the SCR 399 is not 
satisfactory where time is a factor, because of the 
slowness, of the coding and processing procedures. 
Even In emergencies when transmission in the clear 
is authorized, divisions often find it more 
practicable to call corps and have the request 
forwarded by tel etype. 75 
The solution proved to be regular armed 
reconnaissance flights, either requested by divisions 
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or allotted without request, 'checking in' with the 
divisional ASPO's for possible close support targets 
before proceeding with their armed reconnaissance 
mission. That it was necessary to bypass the air 
, support machinery reveals the inability of the latter 
to solve the problem of responsiveness, yet the 
-procedure of employing armed reconnaissance patrols 
. worked. 
It resulted in a sharp reduction in the number 
, of immediate support requests and 
was, according to 
the 1944 investigation, 
. the outstanding contribution of 
the campaign to 
effective close air support. 76 
:A serious problem, shared with the British, was the 
-propensity of 
tactical aircraft to attack friendly 
troops. Air/ground recognition procedure was often 
. poor, and 
General Bradley describes an incident in 
;. Sicily when a flight of 
A-36 dive bombers persisted in 
attacking a column of US tanks that were releasing 
their yellow smoke recognition signal. In self defence 
the tanks fired on the aircraft, hitting one and 
compelling the pilot to bale out. On his landing the 
soldiers realised that they had been wasting their 
time releasing the smoke for the pilot had had no idea 
what it was-77 On another occasion in Sicily A-36's 
bombed the headquarters of British XXX Corps, 
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mistaking it for a German strongpoint they were to 
bomb in close support of US troops attacking near 
Troina. 78 
Such occurrences persisted both in Italy and North- 
West Europe. Richard Hallion refers to one 
particularly nasty' incident in Italy when strafing 
P. 40 fighter-bombers inflicted over 100 friendly 
casualties during the advance on Rome. 79 The problem 
was acute during the early stages in Normandy, and 
between June 8th-17th 1944 aircraft of IX TAC attacked 
US troops on nine separate occasions. 80 Predictably, 
ground units became wary of air support and troops 
soon began to fire at anything in the air. This was 
bad enough, but the problem worsened when troops, in 
order to avert friendly attack, displayed their 
coloured air recognition; panels when they were not in 
front line positions. Pilots may or may not have been 
given adequate briefing as to where the bombline was, 
but it was inevitable that in many cases pilots seeing 
such panels displayed assumed that troops seen ahead 
of these positions were enemy, - one US First Army 
report noted that a pilot had seen panels all the way 
back to a corps headquarters. 81 
There was also some concern regarding the execution 
of close support strikes. In Italy in October 1944 an 
outspoken memorandum compiled by XXII TAC revealed 
several problems in operating the ROVER system, most 
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likely when fighter squadrons unused to close support 
work were being employed. Flights were often late in 
engaging their targets and on many occasions flight 
leaders did not know their assigned mission number and 
even lacked maps of the target area. Some had not been 
given alternative targets before take-off and their 
tactics were inadequate, with bombing runs too shallow 
and there obviously being no plan of attack. Radio 
discipline was also poor, with much unnecessary 
'chatter' clogging the Rover channels. 82 
Many of these problems resulted from inadequate air 
support training of both ground and air forces. For 
example, the US air and ground forces that fought in 
Normandy had had little opportunity to train together 
. 
in England before D-Day. The Ninth Air Force was 
. committed 
to supporting operations of the Eighth 
(strategic) Air Force until a very late stage and 
. when, 
in May 1944, it became available for such 
training it was too late - the ground forces had been 
sealed into their pre-embarkation marshalling areas 
and were no longer available for exercises. Few large- 
scale regimental or divisional exercises involving 
aircraft had taken place, thus troops were unused to 
working with aircraft while the fighter-bomber pilots 
remained unfamiliar with working with troops and 
, 
largely untrained in dive-bombing and strafing 
. battlefield 
targets. 83 
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Very little priority and too little thought had been 
given to close air support, and this was seen not only 
in the major weaknesses of the system but also in the 
comparatively minor problems - but which could have 
far reaching effects. Communications equipment caused 
problems. The standard VHF radio, the SCR 522, 
originally developed for aircraft, proved unreliable 
and unable to stand the rigours of ground force use. 
It was eventually replaced by the sturdier SCR 624, 
but radios of the period were vulnerable to 
overheating, dust, and vibration, while spare parts 
were very difficult to obtain. 84 
A further problem was that confusion resulted in 
corps and divisions during air support missions as a 
result of the channels on ground and aircraft VHF 
radio sets being lettered differently. Yet another was 
that both GLO's and ASPO's in 1944 reported difficulty 
in obtaining adequate equipment from their parent 
formations to enable them to function properly, in 
particular tables, maps, and acetate. It was also 
discovered during the 1944 investigation in North-West 
Europe that the number of VHF radios allotted to 
divisions varied considerably and affected efficiency. 
One armoured division had as many as fourteen, 
enabling it to furnish one to each infantry and 
armoured battalion, while another had only two, 
permitting one to each of its two Combat Commands but 
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allowing for no Air Support Party (ASP) at division 
headquarters. 85 
As with that of the British, the US air support system 
must be judged in the light of existing Army/Air 
relations. In World War II the USAAF was no more 
committed to the principle of close air support than 
the RAF. During the 1930's and throughout World War II 
the AAF leadership pressed for the maximum possible 
autonomy within the War Department as a step towards 
eventual independent status for the Air Force. 86 The 
AAF Tactical School in the pre-war period favoured the 
strategic bombardment theory, and by 1935 regarded the 
gaining of air superiority as the single most 
important air mission. Tactical operations were not 
favoured, though it was acknowledged that after 
gaining air superiority pursuit (fighter) aircraft 
=night be employed to isolate the ground battle area by 
attacking enemy supplies and reinforcements. However, 
the idea of air units being in any way subordinate to 
ground forces, or under the control of a ground 
commander, was firmly resisted. Even the installation 
of bomb, racks on new fighter aircraft was prohibited 
between 1936 and 1938, and as late as 1941 the Plans 
Division of the Air Corps remained opposed to any 
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modification of such aircraft for ground support 
work. 87 
There were also very few aircraft available 
specifically for close support. Like their 
counterparts in the RAF, and for the same reasons, 
senior airmen rejected US Army calls for the adoption 
of dive bombers after the outbreak of war in Europe. 
This decision was sound, but the fact remains that in 
1941 the USAAF possessed no doctrine and no aircraft 
for co-operation with ground forces. 88 By May 1943, 
after experience in the North African theatre since 
November 1942, the former situation was changed when 
The War Department published Field Manual 100-20, 
Command and Employment of Air Power. 
Attempts to distribute air assets and subordinate 
them to ground force operations proved unsatisfactory 
in North Africa, and this gave the AAF the opportunity 
to declare its independence from such control. FM 100- 
20 declared air power a co-equal and independent 
force, the command of which was to be centralized in 
the hands of a senior air commander responsible only 
to the overall theatre commander. Mission types were 
clearly prioritized. First was the need to secure air 
superiority, while second priority was accorded to 
attacks on enemy troop concentrations, supplies and 
communications outside of the battle area. Close air 
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support was accorded third priority, but was clearly 
frowned upon, FM 100-20 warning that, 
in the zone of contact, missions against hostile 
units are most difficult to control, are most 
expensive, and In general least effective... Cn17 at 
critical times are contact missions prom tabl e. 89 
Thus the close air support system of 1943-45 was 
manned by an air force whose senior command felt 
little commitment to the role. Indeed in 1945 the very 
term 'support' was declared to be objectionable within 
-. Ninth Air Force, and the term 'cooperation' 
substituted. 90 
This is not to suggest that there were serious 
problems in the Army/Air relationship at the 
operational level. In fact there was a greater degree 
. of commonality 
than in the British system, at least 
partly due to the fact that the USAAF and Army were 
-separate arms of the same service. One feature of 
'this, seen in both Italy and North-West Europe, was an 
extensive programme of exchanging air and ground 
personnel for short periods of time: In the Ninth Air 
Force alone thousands of air and ground officers, and 
enlisted men, were attached to parallel ground and air 
units for familiarisation. The intention was for 
pilots to see ground combat at first hand and for army 
personnel to participate in air operations. According 
to a post war analysis of the Ninth Air Force this 
policy brought dividends: 
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Air crews developed a keener sense of their 
responsibility and the capabilities of their weapons 
in combined air ground warfare and ground forces 
personnel learned first-hand the extent, power and 
limitations of the air effort. The entire program 
improved morale In both services and increased good 
will and understanding. 91 
In Italy in 1944 the 42nd Bomb Wing, whose medium 
bombers provided close support during the fighting at 
Anzio, thereafter instituted an exchange programme and 
subsequently reported that, 
There is a great difference in the mental attitude 
of aerial crews when "close-in" Army targets are 
attacked as opposed to the normal strategical 
target. Crews will fly through intense flak to a 
"close-in" target and do an excellent piece of 
work. Ten days later the same crews will fly into 
just as intense flak to attack a bridge or supply 
dump and do only a fair job. 92 
Such familiarisation was necessary, as much for the 
soldiers as the airmen. Ground force commanders often 
failed to appreciate that air support, to be 
effective, had to be an integral part of an operation 
rather than simply appended to it. The 1944 
investigation of air support in North-West Europe 
noted that, 
Some air personnel feel that maximum effectiveness 
of air support sometimes Is not obtained because of 
the commander's failure to call in 0-3 air until 
after a plan has been adopted, rather than during 
the planning stage. 93 
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Given the opposition of both the RAF and USAAF to the 
principle of close air support it is remarkable that 
the British and US air support systems were broadly 
successful in welding together air and ground forces 
and integrating air and ground operations. This was 
largely due to a determination to make air support 
work on the part of some of the more junior air 
commanders, such as Air Marshal Broadhurst of No. 83 
Group of 2nd TAF and Major-General Quesada of IX TAC, 
both of whom were willing to cooperate with the 
soldiers. 
I Yet the Allies were also fortunate in 1943-45 in 
that their air forces had already achieved air 
superiority over the Luftwaffe, and had an abundance 
of. aircraft available for close support work. Thus the 
weaknesses in the system could easily be masked by 
quantitative superiority. The highly critical British 
Army report of late 1944 on air support observed that 
it was necessary, 
.. to guard against confusion 
between quantity and 
quality and any tendency to allow overwhelming 
weight to slur over weaknesses In technique and 
performance which otherwise would be self evident. 94 
And this warning is as valid for the historian now as 
it was for the soldiers and airmen then. 
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In Europe in 1943-45 most close air support for 
Allied troops was provided by fighter-bombers, 
fighter aircraft which, in addition to their fixed 
gun armament, were fitted with bombs or rockets for 
engaging ground targets. Consequently the following 
chapters are primarily concerned with operations 
carried out by these aircraft, and the purpose of this 
chapter is to provide a preliminary discussion of the 
fighter-bomber weapon. 
The Germans were the first in World War II to employ 
their fighter aircraft as bombers. In the late summer 
of 1940, after excessive losses had compelled the 
withdrawal of medium and dive-bomber 'units from 
daylight operations over Britain, Bf. 109E fighters 
were equipped to carry bombs. By the autumn each 
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fighter group had formed a fighter-bomber squadron 
(Jabo Staffel) equipped with Bf. 109E-4/B aircraft 
capable of carrying either one 551-lb or four 110-lb 
bombs. ) These were employed on 'hit and run' raids 
across the Channel which caused only limited damage 
but which were extremely difficult to counter, No. 11 
Group RAF eventually resorting to the provision of 
} standing patrols to guard against them. 2 While this 
employment may be seen as 'strategic', the Bf. 109E- 
4/B's were later used in the Balkan, Mediterranean, 
and Russian theatres in the close support role. 
Tactics were fairly crude, the usual method of attack 
being a 45' dive with the bomb being aimed by means of 
the standard Revi reflector gunsight. 3 
After the RAF/Air Ministry rejection of dive-bombers 
no dedicated ground attack aircraft were employed 
operationally by the RAF in Europe or the Middle East 
and in early 1941 no fighter aircraft were equipped to 
carry bombs. 4 However, the desirability of providing 
fighter aircraft with a measure of striking power 
against ground targets was acknowledged and 
feasibility tests conducted with the Hurricane IIA, 
later versions of which were equipped with underwing 
attachments for external fuel tanks which could also 
house 250-lb general purpose (GP) bombs. Meanwhile in 
North Africa, during the successful First Libyan 
Campaign against Italian forces in December 1940- 
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January 1941, machine-gun ground strafing attacks had 
already been carried out, Hurricane pilots being 
ordered to use their remaining ammunition against any 
likely ground target when returning from patrols-5 
In the UK later in 1941 the Hurricane marks IIA and 
IIB appeared, the former fitted with twelve . 3031n 
machine guns and the latter with four 20mm cannon. 
These were now designed as bomb carriers with 
strengthened wing attachments, the IIC being employed 
by Nos. 1 and 3 Squadrons on low altitude intruder 
missions ('Rhubarbs') across the Channel. By the 
autumn two squadrons equipped with the IIB were 
conducting cross-Channel fighter-bombing raids using 
tactics developed during the summer by the Air 
Fighting Development Unit. The RAF's first fighter- 
bombing attack in Europe was carried out on October 
30th 1941 when No. 607 Squadron bombed a transformer at 
Tingry. Other targets included airfields and enemy 
occupied buildings. These were usually attacked in a 
low level approach by pairs of Hurricanes releasing 
their bombs and pulling up at the last moments 
allowing the bombs to continue towards the target. As 
such attacks increased so did German anti-aircraft 
(flak) defences, necessitating a change of tactics and 
a recourse to dive-bombing. Targets were then attacked 
from slightly different directions at once, in order 
4 
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to split the flak concentrations, in a 65/70' dive 
with bombs released between 12,000 and 5,000 feet. 6 
By this time thought had also been given to the use 
of fighter-bombing and strafing attacks in support of 
troops, with senior Army officers quite enthusiastic. 
In late 1941 General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff, was greatly impressed by an 
RAF demonstration of cannon-equipped fighters 
attacking lorried infantry and guns, and noted in his 
diary that, 
There is no doubt that the single-seater multiple 
machine-gun fighter is destined to play a serious 
part in ground attacks. ] 
In November 1941 the first RAF fighter-bombers became 
operational in North Africa, No-80 Squadron with 
obsolescent Hurricane Is fitted with eight underwing 
40-lb fragmentation bombs. They made bombing and 
strafing attacks upon Axis mechanised transport 
columns and tank concentrations in support of 
Operation CRUSADER, with strafing proving more 
effective, but their losses to flak were prohibitive. 
On November 27th the squadron ceased strafing attacks, 
and by mid January 1942 had reverted to the fighter 
role on re-equipment with Hurricane IICs. 8 
They were superseded in the fighter-bomber role by a 
series of US built Curtiss P-40 aircraft, known in the 
RAF as Kittyhawks, which combined a bombload of up to 
three 500-lb bombs and the firepower of six . 50in 
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machine guns. In May 1942 No. 112 Squadron became the 
first of many operational Kittybombers to see service 
with RAF Desert Air Force in North Africa and later in 
Sicily and Italy. 9 At this stage fighter-bombers were 
not employed in close support, and when not attacking 
lines of communication often reverted to fighter 
duties. The first significant use of fighter-bombers 
in a close support role in North Africa occurred on 
March 26th 1943 in Tunisia, when eighteen Allied 
squadrons attacking in waves directly ahead of 
advancing New Zealand troops successfully silenced 
German gun positions in the Tebaga Gap. 10 
There was little opportunity to employ fighter- 
bombers in close support in Western Europe at this 
time, but on August 19th 1942, in support of the raid 
on Dieppe (Operation JUBILEE), Hurricanes of No-174 
Squadron carried out fighter-bombing attacks while 
those of Nos. 3 and 43 Squadrons strafed German 
positions. In the face of effective flak defences the 
cost was high, No. 174 Squadron alone losing 5 
aircraft. 11 
In 1943 the RAF moved to what was to become its 
close support workhorse in North West Europe and its 
most successful fighter-bomber of the war. Hawker 
Typhoon fighters, designed as high speed interceptors, 
became operational in the UK in 1942. Their rate of 
climb and bigb level performance proved disappointing 
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in this role and, initially, a premature operational 
debut resulted in the aircraft being dogged by an 
unreliable engine and an alarming tendency for the 
tail section to fall off in flight. 12 However, the 
aircraft had a robustness ideal for fighter-bombing 
and in 1943 was cleared to carry two 500-1b, and later 
two 1,000-lb, bombs. Many Typhoon squadrons converted 
to fighter-bombers after the first German V-1 sites 
were discovered in the Pas de Calais in the Autumn of 
1943, and for some months were directed against them. 
In view of German flak this was quite hazardous, but a 
2nd TAF study later observed that it provided, 
.. very fine training in map reading and pin pointing 
small targets, and in the technique of dive bombing 
so that when the time came for real tactical work 
with the Army the squadrons were already experienced 
in work of a very similar nature. 13 
It was also in 1943 that Typhoons were fitted to carry 
the 3-inch rocket projectile (RP). 14 
The Mediterranean theatre had by then seen the first 
employment of Spitfire fighter-bombers (in Tunisia); 
various marks of Spitfire thereafter served in this 
role with RAF Desert Air Force until the end of the 
campaign in Italy, and also in North West Europe with 
2nd TAF. 15 
The USAAF followed the British in rejecting the 
dive-bomber in March 1943, when a conference held at 
Wright Field to decide upon fighter-bombers or dive- 
bombers for air support of ground forces chose the 
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former on the grounds that their fighter 
characteristics enabled them to protect themselves 
against hostile fighter action. 16 Only one dive-bomber 
type was employed operationally by the USAAF in 
Europe, the North American A-36A Invader which 
equipped two USAAF Groups in the Mediterranean theatre 
between July 1943 and mid 1944. This aircraft derived 
from the North American P-51A Mustang fighter. and was 
essentially that aircraft fitted with dive brakes. 
Most aviation historians agree that these brakes 
proved unsatisfactory and that they were usually wired 
shut on operations, the Invaders actually functioning 
as fighter-bombers. 17 As in the RAF, responsibility for 
close support and much other ground attack duty fell 
primarily upon the fighter types of the USAAF, all of 
which had fighter-bomber derivatives. 
The first operational USAAF fighter-bomber squadrons 
were those equipped with Curtiss P-40 single-seat, 
single engined fighters which arrived in North Africa 
in late 1942. While as a fighter the P-40 was never an 
equal match for the German Bf. 109, it had already 
proven its value as a fighter-bomber in service with 
the RAF and Commonwealth air forces, who styled it the 
Kittyhawk. To the USAAF it was the Warhawk, and these 
aircraft, and the later improved P-40M (Kittyhawk III) 
and P-40N (Kittybawk IV) variants, became the 
principal USAAF fighter-bomber in the Mediterranean 
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theatre until replaced by the P-47 Thunderbolt in 
1944. Like their RAF counterparts, the USAAF Warhawks 
usually carried three 500-lb bombs or occasionally one 
1,000-lb bomb in addition to their fixed armament of 
six 0.50 calibre machine guns. 18 By September 1943 
there were no less than thirteen USAAF squadrons 
equipped with Warhawks serving in the Mediterranean. 19 
The first USAAF Republic P-47 Thunderbolt squadrons 
arrived in the UK in late 1942, and by the end of 1943 
those of the Eighth Air Force returning from bomber 
escort missions at low level had -begun strafing 
targets of opportunity with their remaining 
ammunition. Their success led to the adoption of the 
-P-47 as a fighter-bomber. 20 
The Thunderbolt was the 
largest and heaviest single-engined single-seat 
fighter of World War II, but it was capable of a 
maximum speed of 433 mph and, unlike the P-40, proved 
a highly successful air combat dogfighter. 21 
Yet, of all the Allied fighter types pressed into 
service as fighter-bombers, the Thunderbolt was one of 
. the most suited 
to the role. Its phenomenally rugged 
, construction and air-cooled radial engine enabled it 
to absorb considerable punishment from ground fire, 
while it possessed the formidable firepower of eight 
wing-mounted 0.50 calibre machine guns and the ability 
to carry up to three 500-1b, or two 1,000-lb bombs, or 
up to 10'underwing rockets. 22 By June 1944 the Ninth 
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Air Force, preparing to support the US armies during 
OVERLORD, possessed twelve groups of P-47s, each of 
three squadrons, in its IX and XIX Tactical Air 
Commands. 23 In Italy, USAAF fighter-bomber squadrons 
began to exchange their Warhawks for Thunderbolts in 
late 1943, there eventually being nine squadrons 
equipped with Thunderbolts serving in Italy with the 
Desert Air Force and XXII Tactical Air Command by May 
1945.24 
Another USAAF fighter type that saw service as a 
fighter-bomber in the Mediterranean and North-West 
Europe was the Lockheed P-38 Lightning, a single-seat, 
twin-engined and twin-boomed fighter originally 
intended as a high altitude interceptor. The first to 
see action were P-38Fs which equipped some USAAF 
squadrons sent to North Africa in November 1942, and 
they took a heavy toll of the German air transports 
ferrying supplies to Rom- l's forces from Italy-25 An 
important attribute of the P-38 was its range, and 
Lightnings were the first USAAF fighters to accompany 
bombers from UK bases to Berlin. 26 They were 
effective in the air combat role, though in German 
skies they proved to lack the necessary 
manoeuvrability to tackle on equal terms the German 
Focke-Wulf 190 fighters and the later types of Bf. 109 
except at the highest altitudes. 27 
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Lightnings began fighter-bombing in late 1943, the 
P-38 variants then operational being able to carry 
either two 500-1b, two 1,000-lb or two 1,600-lb bombs 
or a battery of ten rockets. Their armament of one 
20mm cannon and four 0.50 calibre machine guns 
concentrated in the nose made them potent ground 
strafers, and both in Italy and North-Vest Europe 
German troops came to fear' Der Gabelschwanz Teufel 
(the fork-tailed Devil), not least because its 
comparatively low engine noise gave little warning of 
I 
its approach. 28 In June 1944 the Ninth Air Force 
possessed nine squadrons of P-38 fighter-bombers (all 
were in IX TAC), but in both Italy and North West 
Europe by early 1945 the Lightnings had been almost 
61 entirely replaced in the ground attack role by single- 
engined P-47s or P-51x. 2$ 
The North American P-51 Mustang is widely considered 
the best US single-seat, single-engine fighter of 
World War II. It possessed the range, with drop tanks, 
to escort bombers from UK bases all the way to Berlin 
and the ability to outfight the German Bf. 109s and 
Fw. 190s. 30 The aircraft was a remarkably successful 
combination of an American airframe with 
the British 
Merlin engine, and the first Merlin-engined P-51B and 
C Mustangs joined the Eighth Air Force in the UK in 
December 1943, followed in 1944 
by the P-51D with an 
even more powerful 
Merlin engine. In early 1944 P-51B 
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and Cs entered service with the US 15th (Strategic) 
Air Force in Italy, and also with the RAF who styled 
these variants Mustang IIIs. A limited number of P- 
51Ds were also supplied to the RAF as Mustang IVs. 31 
In March 1944 Mustang IIIs entered service with the 
RAF Desert Air Force in Italy as fighter-bombers, and 
by June 1944 there were also two wings (six squadrons) 
of Mustang IIIs in RAF Second Tactical Air Force, and 
a similar number in the US Ninth Air Force. 32 As a 
fighter-bomber the Mustang was able to carry either 
two 500-lb or two 1,000-lb bombs or ten rockets in 
addition to its six 0.50 calibre machine guns, but it 
lacked the robustness of the Thunderbolt for ground 
attack. Hence, the Mustang was regarded as primarily 
a long-range escort fighter by both the USAAF and RAF. 
In the USAAF it was the Thunderbolt that became the 
ground attack workhorse, while in September 1944 the 
Mustangs of RAF Second Tactical Air Force were 
withdrawn from fighter-bombing in order to provide the 
escorts for Bomber Command's return to a daylight 
offensive. 33 
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T 
The fighter-bomber was a versatile weapon, able to 
accomplish a wide range of tasks. Both in North-West 
Europe and Italy these included, in addition to close 
support, short and long range fighter sweeps, deep and 
shallow interdiction missions, escort for light/medium 
bombers, and anti-shipping strikes. In the ground 
attack role the fighter-bomber also possessed a 
tactical versatilty denied the dive-bomber, that of 
being able to deliver bombs and rockets in high-speed 
low-level passes, which could give a measure of 
protection from anti-aircraft fire, as well as in 
steep dive attacks. 
Flexibility was also an important characteristic. 
Fighter-bomber squadrons were not limited to the 
attack of particular targets, and it was not uncommon 
for a squadron to carry out, for example, an 
interdiction mission and follow this with a close air 
support strike. They could also adapt to last-minute 
changes of target due to developments in the battle 
area with a minimum of re-briefing, sometimes by radio 
while in flight, and they could respond rapidly to 
target data supplied by tactical reconnaissance 
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(Tac/R) flights. This can be contrasted with 
light/medium bombers, which were unable to adapt to 
rapid changes of target due to the length of time 
needed to re-brief the large number of aircrew and to 
prepare aircraft and bomb loads. 34 
The critical drawback with fighter-bombers, 
affecting both versatility and flexibility, was combat 
radius. Table I shows this for the US fighter types 
employed in North-West Europe: 
TYPE 
TABLE I. COM 
BOMB LOAD 
BAT RADIUS OF US FIG 
INTERNAL FUEL 





COMBAT RADIUS (MILES) 
(at 10,000 ft. ) 
P-38L 
Lightning None 410 None 290 
---- None 410 330 (2 tanks) 600 
2x 5001b 410 None 260 
2x 10001b 410 None 250 
P-410 
Thunderbolt None 370 None 280 
--- - None 370 188 (1 tank) 400 
2x 5001b 370 None 260 
2x 10001b 370 None 230 
P-51B/C/D 
Mustang None 269 None 350 
--------- None 269 216 (2 tanks) 750 
2x 5001b 269 None 325 
Table I reveals the difference' between the potential 
long-range fighter and the fighter-bomber, in that 
carrying bombs and/or rockets considerably reduced 
combat radius. This table is based on the experience 
of the US Ninth Air Force in North-West Europe, but 
Table II is based on an ORS study of Desert Air Force 
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operations in Italy during early 1945 and indicates an 
even greater limitation. Maximum combat radius with 
ordnance load is given, taking into account the need 
for the aircraft to return to base on internal fuel 
after an operation and loiter time in the target area: 
TABLE II. FIGHTER-BOMBER COMBAT RADIUS ITALY 1915 (36) 
TYPE BOMB LOAD COMBAT RADIUS IN MILES 
Spitfire VIII Ix 5001b 
------ ------- (occasionally 2x 5001b) 130 
Spitfire IX Ix 5001b 
----------- (occasionally 2x 5001b) 95 
P-51B/C 2x 10001b 200 
Mustang 2x 5001b 250 
Kittyhawk IV 2x 5001b 1t0 
(US P-40N) 
P-47 Thunderbolt 2x 5001b plus rockets 165 
2x 10001b 165 
2x 110 gal, Napalm fire bombs 165 
Particularly apparent is the limitation of the British 
Spitfire compared to the US fighter types. As shown in 
Chapter II, lack of range was a major British Army 
criticism of the tactical aircraft with which the RAF 
provided air support. The Spitfires of Desert Air 
Force were largely restricted to immediate battle area 
missions as their range precluded anything else. 37 The 
Typhoon could do better, with a maximum range of 510 
miles with bombs, but in terms of combat radius this 
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would have been effectively halved. 38 With regard to 
close support, the necessity of airfields not too far 
removed from the battlefront is obvious for all the 
above Allied types. 
Also apparent from Table II is the low ordnance load 
of the Spitfires, those with Desert Air Force rarely 
carrying more than one bomb. By late 1944 those 
serving with 2nd TAF were carrying a 1,000-lb bomb 
load (typically one 500-lb centreline and a 250-lb 
under each wing) but this was really beyond their 
capability, it being found that 60% of all accidents 
were caused by burst tyres due to the excessive 
weight. 39 Here again the Typhoon did better, its 
sturdier construction enabling it to carry up to 2000- 
lb of bombs or eight underwing rockets. 40 
As the above tables show, Allied fighter-bombers 
possessed impressive firepower. In Italy during 1944 
the Operations Staff of RAF Desert Air Force outlined 
the firepower and economy of effort of fighter-bombers 
in comparison with the other aircraft type employed 
against ground targets (though, in comparison with 
fighter-bombers, infrequently in the close support 
role) - light/medium bombers. This was by reference 
to the Load/Personnel Factor, whereby the load is 
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expressed as weight of bombs dropped by a Squadron in 
one day of intensive operations, and the personnel the 
number of aircrew and groundcrew required to make this 
effort possible. The results, shown in Table III, 
indicate how fighter-bombers compared favourably 
regarding the number of missions that could be flown, 
the weight of bombs that could be delivered, and the 
number of personnel required. 
FIGHTER-BOMBERS, 
Kittyhawk (at 1,500lbs per aircraft) at 3 squadron missions per day = 54,0001bs 
Total Personnel Required = 243. UP Factor: 222 
Mustang (at 2,0001bs per aircraft) at 3 squadron missions per day = 72,0001bs 
Total Personnel Required = 243, LIP Factor: 297 
LIGHT/MEDIUM BOMBERS. 
Baltimore (at 1,500lbs per aircraft) at 2 squadron missions per day a 35,000lbs 
Total Personnel Required - 349, LIP Factor: 104 
Marauder (at 4,000lbs per aircraft) at 2 squadron missions per day   96,000lbs 
Total Personnel Required = 521, LIP Factor: 184 
This question was also investigated by ORS 
Mediterranean Allied Air Forces, and Table IV shows 
their breakdown of the manpower backing required for 
the aircraft types employed by Desert Air Force. 41 
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_TABLF 
IV. MANPOUER PER SQUADRON, DESERT AIR FORCE NOVEMBER 1914 
AIRCRAFT TYPE AIRCREW (OFFICERS i NCOs) GROUND OFFICERS GROUND PERSONNEL TOTAL 
Kittyhawk ) 
Mustang ) 30 6 208 244 
Spitfire ) 
Mosquito ) 48 7 334 389 
Beaufighter l 
Marauder 156 13 336 505 
Baltimore 132 7 249 388 
Boston 118 5 256 379 
Against most targets, fighter-bombers offered a more 
profitable return in terms of damage inflicted for 
effort expended. Although fighter-bombers had their 
problems with regard to accuracy (see below), they 
were nevertheless able to tackle most targets with 
more precision. For example, in the same report Desert 
Air Force observed that, 
The ability to strike a bridge with medium altitude 
bombers Is extremely difficult to achieve in view of 
the narrow target It presents and recent experience 
has shown that one Squadron of Ki t tyha wars can 
succeed where large formations of medium bombers 
have . failed. 42 
Moreover, fighter-bombers did not present such good 
targets to heavy flak batteries as 'formations of 
mediums bombing in daylight, the chief threat to 
fighter-bombers being light automatic flak (see below 
and Chapter VIII). Only targets that requiring 
pattern, or area, bombing, such as extensive defended 
positions or gun areas, were more suited to attack by 
light/medium bombers. 
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Fighter-bomber squadrons required little more 
maintenance than those of fighters. A larger armament 
staff was needed for the fusing and maintenance of 
bombs, but bomb racks, fusing and release mechanisms 
needed only routine maintenance from squadron 
armourers. Moreover, fighter-bombers could be handled 
and taxied much easier and faster than light/medium 
bombers, particularly on rapidly constructed forward 
airstrips with narrow taxiways and dispersals. It was 
mainly this which enabled fighter-bomber squadrons to 
carry out three, and sometimes more, missions per day 
as opposed to the usual two of light/medium bomber 
squadrons. 43 
Fi gh -er-Bomber 
Organisation. 
In 1944 RAF fighter-bomber units were organised into 
Wings comprising a headquarters and between three and 
six squadrons. In late 1944 two of the three Typhoon 
wings serving in No. 84 Group of RAF 2nd TAF each had 
four squadrons while the third comprised three. The 
same situation prevailed in No. 83 Group. 44 In Italy at 
this time, No-239 (Fighter-Bomber) Wing consisted of 
six squadrons. According to Desert Air Force this 
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enabled, 
.. the wing to maintain Intensive operations as a 
whole or If split into two for any reason. 
However, maintaining such a large strike force under 
the administrative and operational control of a single 
headquarters brought problems. The DAF study observed 
that, 
The chief disadvantage (and a big one, on 
occasions) is accomodation (sic) both for aircraft 
and personnel... a considerable amount of ground is 
required to accomodate (sic) approximately 96 
aircraft and 1600 personnel. 45 
In fact there was a serious problem of airfield 
congestion in Italy in the winter of 1944-45 which 
adversely affected fighter-bomber operations, 
particularly at Fano, where six British and three US 
squadrons were based, and Forli from where six British 
squadrons operated. The usual airfield procedure was 
for aircraft to take off and land in both directions, 
in order to bring aircraft as close to their 
dispersals as possible and minimise the distance over 
which they had to taxi. 
Usually a single taxi strip would be used for two 
squadrons, over which there was an alternating flow of 
aircraft to and from the main runway. It normally took 
some 6 minutes for each flight to leave dispersal, 
taxi to the runway, and take off. The problem in 1944- 
45 was that the taxi strips were too narrow, and in 
winter (and spring) aircraft were confined to them due 
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to mud. The taxi strips were thus packed, delaying 
take off times, while squadrons returning from 
operations often had to orbit for up to 40 minutes 
before they could land. This obviously affected air 
support timings, as aircraft could not take off on 
schedule nor arrive in the battle area when expected, 
and it was estimated that pre-arranged support 
missions were delayed by at least one hour. Moreover, 
as an airfield was expected to handle between 200-220 
sorties in a ten hour day, it was estimated that this 
congestion reduced the number of missions flown by 20 
per cent. 46 
Command of a fighter-bomber wing was exercised by a 
Wing Commander (often holding the RAF rank of Group 
Captain) who was responsible for the wing's 
administrative and operational efficiency. The running 
of the Wing Operations Room and flying operations were 
the responsibility of his second in command, the Wing 
Commander (Flying). There was also a Squadron Leader 
attached to assist in administration duties and an 
Intelligence Officer, usually a Flight Lieutenant, 
responsible for obtaining and disseminating all 
information regarding enemy movements, positions, 
tactics, and the location of flak positions in the 
battle area and for maintaining a stock of maps. 
Operations Officers, usually three with the rank of 
Flying Officer or Flight Lieutenant, panned the Wing 
-146- 
Operations Room on a 24 hour basis. Their task was to 
maintain details of squadron states (serviceability of 
aircraft and states of readiness) and to take details 
of impending operations and to warn the squadrons 
concerned. They also 
whose squadrons were 
support, worked close 
Liaison Officers. The 
wing headquaters was 
Diagram I. 47 
briefed pilots and, in wings 
frequently employed in close 
ly with the attached Army Air 
total personnel strength of a 




Squadron Leader (Administrative) Wing Commander (Flying) 
Wing Headquarters (Signals, Wing Operations Room 
Medical, Store, Cyphers A3 Operations Officers (1 Flying 
Motor Transport Sections) Control) 
Intelligence Officer b Clerk 
Army Air Liaison Officers A Clerk 
Squadron Headquarters -"--------------_. _____ý_. _-_ 
Squadrons 
A fighter-bomber squadron consisted of a 
headquarters and two flights of aircraft with 
approximately 12 pilots to each flight. A squadron 
could be expected to keep 12 aircraft available for 
operations with 4 more as an immnediate reserve, though 
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during operations the number of aircraft and pilots 
available varied considerably from day to day. 
Operations of squadron strength were usually carried 
out by a maximum of 12 aircraft, an RAF study 
-observing that, 
.. experience has shown that this number makes an 
efficient and manoeuvreable formation. Anything 
larger would be un wi el dl y. 48 
-. Apart from the pilots, most of the other squadron 
personnel were responsible for servicing aircraft and 
loading weapons and ammunition total personnel . 
-amounting to approximately 240. The organisation of a 
typical squadron headquarters is shown in Diagram II. 
DIAGRAM II. RAF FIGHTER-BOHRER SQUADRON HEADQUARTERS. 
Squadron Cossander 
` (Adeinistrative side) 
(Operational side) 
Squadron Adjutant 
Squadron Headquarters Squadron Operations Roos 
Medical, stores & Orderly Room Intelligence Officer I Clerk 
Motor Transport Sections 
Operation of two flights 
Adeinistration of two flights 
Command was exercised 
responsible for both the 
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operational running of his squadron, though his duties 
were primarily leading his pilots and keeping them up 
to the mark in tactics and operational efficiency. He 
would have had a senior Flight Commander as second in 
command, usually a Flight Lieutenant, whose duties 
were predominantly flying, the burden of 
administrative work falling upon the Squadron Adjutant 
who was generally also a Flight Lieutenant. Each 
squadron also had an Intelligence Officer, usually 
with the rank of Flying Officer, responsible for 
running the squadron's own operations room and for 
taking details of operations from Wing and for 
briefing pilots. His primary duty was the debriefing 
of pilots on their return from operations and the 
compiling of operations reports to be forwarded to the 
Wing Intelligence Officer. In squadrons engaged in 
close support he worked closely with the attached Army 
ALOs in maintaining maps of the battle area and 
updating bombline data. 49 
As in the RAF, the basic operational unit of the 
USAAF was the squadron. However, US fighter-bomber 
squadrons had an authorised establishment of 25 
aircraft plus five in reserve, and a personnel 
establishment of some 57 officers and 245 men; both 
varied considerably during operations. Squadrons were 
organised into Groups of, usually, three squadrons 
(the equivalent of RAF Wings) and the number of 
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personnel in a Group was some 200 officers and 800 
enlisted men. 50 
Close support missions were usually carried out by 
the RAF with flights of between 6 and 8 aircraft, 
{ 
whereas the USAAF favoured the four-plane flight as 
the basic fighter-bomber unit. 51 Larger formations of 
Wing (RAF) and Group (USAAF) strength, involving a 
number of squadrons, were employed to attack 
particularly formidable or important targets, 
especially in support of major ground operations. 
Infantry and gun positions, strongpoints, tanks, and 
defended buildings were engaged either in dive or low- 
level attacks depending upon weather and visibility 
conditions, and the amount of flak in the target area. 
, For attacks 
to be effective, visibility had to be at 
least 2,000 yards and the cloud base no lower than 
5,000 feet for bombing or 3,000 for strafing. During 
bombing or rocket-firing a strong wind would dictate 
the direction of approach, often preventing pilots 
from taking advantage of such factors as the position 
of the sun and of friendly troops, and could also 
adversely affect accuracy. 52 
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The chief danger confronting fighter-bomber pilots 
in 1943-45 was not the Luftwaffe, which was rarely 
seen over the battlefront in daylight, but German 
anti-aircraft firepower - flak - the presence and 
variations of which determined tactics both during the 
flight to the target and the attack. Ground attack 
pilots often had to contend with formidable 
concentrations of small calibre flak that was very 
effective up to 3,000 feet and the fire of which was 
not visible to them; therefore they were briefed to 
come below 3,000 feet only when carrying out their 
attacks. Heavy calibre automatic flak (20mm-40mm) was 
effective up to 6,000 feet and its explosions easily 
seen by pilots; fighter-bomber formations usually flew 
at 7%-8,000 feet which was just out of its range, yet 
where the heavier non-automatic flak (such as 88mm) 
tended to be inaccurate. 53 The effective range of 
German guns, and particularly that of automatic flak, 
was often the subject of controversy between pilots 
and their Intelligence Officers. Bill Colgan, who 
served as a fighter-bomber pilot with the US 79th 
Group in Italy, remembers that, 
.. if pilots were told the 'effective range' of 
certain of the guns was 5000 feet, and then saw 
rounds from those guns at 9000 feet or so, many of 
them said to hell with whether they are 
'scientifically effective' up here; more important 
was the simple fact that they could shoot this high. 
Other pilots discounted the entire business of 
studying facts and figures on flak guns, their 
theory being that where we flew much of the time, a 
kid could throw a rock and reach us. 54 
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As fighter-bomber pilots were primarily trained as 
day fighter pilots, they flew fighter formations. RAF 
formations flew in sections of four aircraft flying 
nearly line . abreast, with 
50-75 yards between 
aircraft, and with each section of four stepped up or 
down 500-1,000 feet depending on the position of the 
sun. 55 In a 16-plane USAAF squadron the four flights 
flew in two sections, one flying 300 yards behind the 
other and from 500 to 1,000 feet higher. In a 12-plane 
USAAF squadron the flights usually flew in a loose, 
" 
shallow V, with 200-300 yards between them. 56 
Dive bombing attacks were made by both British and 
US fighter-bombers at steep angles, usually between 
. 45' and 60', with the pilots following their leader 
into the attack and releasing their bombs between 2- 
3,000 feet. With single-engined aircraft, as the RAF 
discovered particularly with the Typhoon, it was very 
difficult for the pilot to see straight down to the 
ground without tipping up the wing. In Typhoon 
'squadrons the usual procedure was for the pilot flying 
as the leader's No. 2 to be briefed to fly a little 
further away in order to enable the leader to tip his 
wing when over the target so that he could judge the 
, exact moment at which to roll over for the dive. 
Correctly identifying targets was crucial but rarely 
easy, and it was common for the leader to give a quick 
final briefing to his pilots by R/T, such as 'The 
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target is the white building with the red roof just 
North of the river bank'. Sometimes extraordinary 
measures were taken by troops to indicate targets for 
their supporting aircraft - in Italy in April 1945 
No. 87 (Spitfire) Squadron reported a dive-bombing 
attack on seven German tanks laagered near Felice 
which were '.. Indicated by a worthy wearing a white 
shirt standing 200 paces to the E. of their 
position. '57 
When satisfied that the target was correctly 
identified, the leader would warn his pilots when he 
was about to dive by announcing 'Bomb switches on' 
followed by 'Going down in 10 seconds' and 'Going down 
now'. A 2nd TAF report on tactics stated that a steep 
dive was essential for accuracy, and that, 
.. It was best not to. roll over Into the dive too 
fast, but to run up to the target in a gentle dive 
and then pull up gradually, thus losing speed before 
finally rolling over; otherwise too much speed was 
gained early on in the dive and sufficient time was 
not given to line up the aircraft and take off 
skid. 58 
Diagram III shows an example of a dive bombing 
attack as carried out by bomb carrying Typhoons or 
Spitfires against a lightly defended target from 
12,000-7,000 feet or below. In such an attack, when in 
the target area, the fighter-bombers would have 
changed from their approach formation into echelon 
starboard. When over the target, the leader would have 
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wing as shown in Phase 2 of the diagram. As the target 
reappeared at the trailing edge, the leader would have 
executed a semi-stalled turn to port, followed by the 
others of the section. This allowed for a line astern 
attack at a steep angle on the reciprocal of the 
original course, as shown in Phase 3. After releasing 
bombs, all aircraft would have made a violent evasive 
turn in a pre-arranged direction before reforming in 
line abreast. Diagram IV shows a heavier scale of 
attack from 12,000-7,000 feet by two sections against 
a heavily defended target. In this case an attempt 
would have been made to reduce flak effectiveness by 
attacking from out of the sun and from two directions 
in order to split concentrations of flak fire. 59 
Low level attacks were usually carried out in a 
dive of about 30' with the bombs released at about 800 
feet and the aircraft flying at high speed in order to 
escape small calibre and light flak and the burst and 
debris from their own bombs. Typhoons usually attacked 
in pairs, using bombs fitted with short delay fuses so 
that each pair attacked just after the previous pair's 
bombs had exploded. However, such tactics could be 
hazardous against targets heavily defended by flak, 
and an RAF report warned that in such circumstances, 
.. four aircraft going down In two pairs was all that 
could reasonably get away with this type of attack. 60 
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Against targets such as strongpoints in buildings or 
headquarters, mixed tactics of low level and dive 
bombing attacks were employed. The usual procedure was 
to commence with low level bombing against the most 
prominent buildings, followed by dive bombing 
immediately the low level aircraft were clear. The RAF 
found that rocket-firing aircraft, which could also 
attack either in steep dives or at low level, were 
particularly successful when employed in such mixed 
attacks due to the incendiary effect of their 
rockets. 61 
Fitting Typhoons with underwing rails, enabling each 
aircraft to carry eight 3-inch rockets, each with a 
60-lb high-explosive warhead, gave them tremendous 
firepower. The rockets also had several advantages, as 
described by a former New Zealand Typhoon pilot: 
Since they were self-propelled their velocity on 
impact was much greater. Also, a rocket motor 
created no recoil as it left its carrier, and its 
warhead could therefore be many times heavier and of 
greater calibre than any orthodox shell that could 
possibly be fired from an airborne cannon. 62 
The rocket was crude in its simplicity, consisting of 
a cast iron pipe with a 3-inch diameter motor and with 
the 60-lb warhead screwed on the front. Four cruciform 
stabilising fins were attached to the rear and the 
rocket was connected by lugs to the Typhoon's 
launching rails. On firing the rocket left the 
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aircraft with a velocity of about 150 feet per second, 
its cordite propellant burning for 1% seconds during 
which time the rocket could accelerate to over 1,000 
feet per second over a distance of 500 yards, 
thereafter gradually slowing over the next 500 yards 
as it approached its target. 63 
As with bombing, rocket-firing tactics were 
determined by weather and by the amount of flak. 
Against heavily defended targets pilots were usually 
instructed to make a steep 60' dive from between 7- 
8,000 feet and fire all eight rockets in a salvo at 
about 4,000 feet at a range of some 1,700 yards. If 
the target was lightly defended, pilots were 
encouraged to make a shallow dive of 20' or 30' from 
between 3-4,000 feet and to fire their rockets by 
'rippling' them in pairs from 1,500 feet at a range of 
about 1,000 yards. 64 However, such procedures were 
often disregarded on operations and squadrons soon 
evolved their own tactics, as a former Typhoon pilot 
recalls: 
The common practice was to fly down on the deck, or 
in a shallow dive; aim at 600 or 700 yards, then let 
go at close range, sometimes 250 yards, with cannon 
and rockets togetber. 65 
If a target was heavily protected by flak, only one 
attack could be attempted. Another former Typhoon 
pilot recalls of such targets that, 
.. we were al ways 
briefed never to attack twice. %f you 
did have to attack twice, then do it from a different 
direction.. because . 1f you started to circle with six 
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to eight aircraft, they could wait for you and pick 
you off as you came back. 66 
US fighter-bombers were also equipped with air-to- 
ground rockets both in Italy and in North-West Europe. 
In the latter theatre the first P-47 Thunderbolts 
equipped with rockets became operational in July 
1944. They lacked the firepower of the Typhoons, each 
aircraft carrying only four 5-inch HVAR (High Velocity 
Aircraft Rocket) projectiles. 67 This was later 
increased, P-47s being fitted with rails for up to ten 
rockets, but in fact US fighter-bombers in Europe 
never employed rockets on a large scale. Those of 
Ninth Air Force fired only 13,959 during the war as 
opposed to the 222,515 fired by fighter-bombers of RAF 
2nd TAF. 68 In Italy during late 1944 some P-47s were 
fitted with underwing infantry-type bazooka tubes to 
house 4.5-inch rockets (a cluster of three under each 
wing). These missiles, equivalent to a 105mm howitzer 
shell, proved extremely effective in attacks on 
buildings, but the rocket was not a popular fighter- 
bomber weapon in this theatre even with the RAF. The 
only RAF fighter-bombers of Desert Air Force equipped 
with rockets in 1945 were the Mustangs of No. 260 
Squadron, but each aircraft carried only four 3-inch 
rockets, two under each wing on special rails enabling 
one rocket to be housed underneath the other. 69 
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Napalm fire-bombs, often auxiliary fuel tanks filled 
with petroleum jelly and fitted with a fused igniter, 
were extensively used by US fighter-bombers in both 
campaigns. Their delivery demanded special tactics, 
the object being to tumble the napalm tanks onto the 
target. In hilly terrain the tanks were usually 
delivered in shallow dives, while against targets on 
fairly flat terrain they were dropped in level flight 
from minimum altitude - creating long swathes of fire 
that edged towards and engulfed the target area. 70 
While fighter-bomber pilots frequently fired their 
machine-gun and/or cannon armament during bombing or 
rocket-firing, they were also called upon to carry out 
specific 'strafing' attacks. These too demanded 
appropriate tactics, and speed and co-ordination were 
essential as the aircraft were coming down to low 
level where they were perilously vulnerable to flak. 
RAF fighter-bombers usually approached their target 
from a wide turn and with a loss of height that 
ensured they were at average speed and not higher than 
1,500 feet when levelling out for the attack. After 
steadying their aircraft and getting the target in the 
sights, pilots would open fire at a height of 700 feet 
at a range of about 500 yards and at an angle of 250- 
3o'. 71 
The guns of fighter aircraft were harmonized for the 
rounds to converge at a point ahead of the aircraft. 
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This was an air-to-air combat consideration and in 
1943-45, for both the RAF and USAAF, the distance was 
some 250 yards. At this range the rounds fired would 
impact the target together, and when pilots were 
strafing individual targets, such as tanks or vehicles 
along a road, this was desirable. Low-level strafing 
of such targets, however, could be perilous for 
fighter-bomber pilots. Apart from the risk of flak, a 
slight misjudgement or target-fixation on the part of 
the pilot could send the fighter-bomber hurtling into 
the target or into nearby trees and obstructions. 
Should the pilot have selected a lorry or railway 
waggon as his target which proved to be carrying 
ammunition or explosives, this could literally blow up 
in the pilot's face, hurling debris such as slabs of 
roadway, lorry or waggon parts, or unexploded 
ammunition, into the path of his aircraft. Strafing 
area targets was less hazardous, for then close-in 
firing was a disadvantage and pilots opened fire at 
wider ranges in order to cover the target area. 72 
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The free-fall bombs and air-to-ground rockets of 1943- 
45 were highly inaccurate and barely adequate for use 
against precision targets. This was suspected at the 
tine, and eventually proven in a series of Army and 
RAF ORS investigations. 
The British 3-inch rocket was very difficult to place 
accurately, and delivering it with a fair chance of 
hitting its target demanded considerable skill. Due to 
their weight, and how it was distributed, the rockets 
had a curved trajectory which meant that they needed 
to be fired within a range of 1-2,000 yards - beyond 
that range the trajectory curve was so severe as to 
make accurate firing almost impossible. The relatively 
low launching speed also meant that if the aircraft 
skidded slightly or turned at the moment of release a 
considerable error could result. 
Typhoon pilots of 2nd TAF were given initially a 
three-week course in rocket-firing, followed by 
regular refresher periods at Armament Practice camps 
in the UK. During attendance at the latter it was 
found that pilots consistently tended to undershoot 
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f 
the target either as a result of releasing the rockets 
at too long a range or through flying too slowly at 
the lower dive angles. In particular pilots had to 
learn to calculate accurately the effect of wind 
before firing, it being discovered that, for example, 
a 10 mph wind could result in a5 yard shift in line 
and a3 yard shift in range at the Mean Point of 
Impact (MPI) - which could easily mean the difference 
between a hit and a near miss if the target was 
relatively small, such as a tank or single gun 
position. 73 
Pilot accuracy showed significant improvement after 
a session at Armament Camp, but could never compensate 
adequately for the weapon's inherent inaccuracy or the 
lack of an effective sight through which to aim the 
rockets. The modified Mk. IID gyroscopic sight, which 
allowed for the initial gravity drop of the rockets as 
well as for the effect of wind and movement of the 
target, was not available until late 1944.74 Average 
Typhoon pilots in trials, firing all eight rockets in 
a salvo, had roughly a4 per-cent chance of hitting a 
target the size of a German tank. 75 On operations, with 
targets camouflaged and difficult to identify, and 
with pilots under anti-aircraft fire, accuracy could 
be even further reduced. 
In 1945 a joint British Army/RAF' ORS study of the 
effectiveness of rocket-firing Typhoons in the close 
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air support role, outlined the scale of Typhoon attack 
necessary to obtain hits on typical targets. This was 
based on operational data and is shown in Table V: 
TABLE Y. TYPHOON S CALE OF EFFORT NECES SARY AGAINST TYPICAL TARGETS. (76) 
TARGET SIZE HORIZONTAL I SHOTS FOR 501 CHANCE OF HIT 
PROJECTED HITTING -------------- ------- 
-- ---- ------ - ------ - --- 
AREA (45' DIVE) 
- 
TARGET ROCKETS NEEDED SORTIES 
Small gun 5 yards 
--- -- -- -- 
19 square 




position diameter yards 
Panther 22' 6' x 10' 9' 50 square ,5 140 18 tank x 9' 10' yards 
Large gun 10 yards 80 square .8 88 11 position diameter yards 
Army but 60' x 30' x 20' 270 square 2,8 24 3 
yards 
Large 1000 square 10,0 7 1 
building 120' x 54' x 50' yards 
Very apparent is the high number of sorties and 
rockets considered necessary to secure a reasonable 
chance of hitting such relatively small targets as 
tanks and gun positions. Yet these were, as the report 
indicated, characteristic of many close support 
targets. 
The advent of the improved sight made some 
difference. In 1945 ORS 2nd TAF compared the accuracy 
of rocket-Typhoon attacks against two German-occupied 
Churches during the fighting at Orloo and Venray in 
- 164 - 
Holland in October 1944 with eight attacks against 
defended buildings in Germany during March 1945. The 
results of the comparison are shown in Table VI. This 
shows that accuracy still left much to be desired, but 
also that the later attacks in Germany during the 
spring of 1945 were more accurate than those in 
Holland: 
TABLE VI, ROCKET-TYPHOON ACCURACY, (77) 
AVERAGE RADIAL ERROR AVERAGE RADIAL ERROR DISTANCE OF MEAN POINT OF 
ABOUT TARGET ABOUT MEAN POINT OF IMPACT IMPACT FROM AIMING POINT 
-- ---- ----- - ----- - ------ -- -- - ------- - 
Venray Church tower 111 yards 97,5 yards 64 yards 
Orloo Church tower 99 yards 73 yards 62,5 yards 
Buildings 
(March-April 1945) 81 yards 75 yards 43 yards 
Despite their inaccuracy, rockets could be placed with 
more precision than free-fall bombs. Table VII shows 
the number of instances during attacks by Spitfires 
and Typhoons upon gun positions and strongpoints in 
1945 where rockets and bombs actually landed within 
150 yards of their target. The targets were all field 
positions and were attacked at the request of British 
troops during mobile operations in Germany. The 
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results reflect the difficulty of landing a bomb on or 
i 
near a pinpoint target. 78 
TABLE VII. BOMBING AND ROCKET ACCURACY. 
ROCKETS BOMBS 
NUMBER OF ATTACKS 37 11 
NUMBER OF CASES WHERE SHOT WITHIN 150 YARDS 33 (89%) 5 (45%) 
Also in 1945 ORS 2nd TAF examined the accuracy of 
Typhoon bombers in operations between October 1944 and 
April 1945, nine pinpoint bombing targets were 
analysed by plotting bomb distributions from air 
reconnaissance photographs and by ground examination. 
The results are shown in Table VIII. The average 
radial error for these attacks was 158 yards, with 
only 50 per-cent of the bombs falling within 130 yards 
of the target. For the same investigation seventeen 
railway line targets were examined, for which a total 
TARGET 
1) Road/rail crossing 
2) Road/rail crossing 
3) Road/rail crossing 
4) Road/rail crossing 
5) Road/rail crossing 
6) Road bridge over river 
7) Road bridge over river 
8) Building 
9) Building 
RLE VIII. ROMRING ACCURACY- 
No, OF BOMBS PLOTTED AVERAGE RADIAL ERROR (YARDS) 
10 145 yds 
30 125 yds 
24 185 yds 
13 198 yds 
31 120 yds 
20 160 yds 
39 190 yds 
14 124 yds 
IS 178 yds 
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of 320 bombs dropped by Typhoons and Spitfires were 
plotted. It was found that the average line error was 
69 yards, with only 50% of the bombs falling within 
fifty yards either side of the target. 79 At least 
targets such as bridges and road/rail crossings could 
be seen by pilots, whereas many of the close support 
targets, being small and camouflaged, could not - the 
pilots being able to aim only at the coloured smoke 
fired by friendly artillery to indicate the target. 
The most accurate weapons possessed by fighter-bombers 
were their cannon and machine gun armament. This was 
illustrated by the British Army's Operational Research 
Group in 1945, when they compared 20mm aircraft cannon 
with the 3-inch rocket and outlined the number of 
rounds that could be fired per attack per aircraft 
against ground targets and the probable number of hits 
secured: 
lIFAPýil. @OSIýIlý. ATTACK & AIRCRAFT hI? 3 OL 11 EELL UWE @OBNAL Ia 
LIlL QE. FLIGHT ATTACK UIL AIRCRAFT 
20.. Cannon 120 32 
3-inch Rocket 8 0,045 
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This suggests that the greater number of rounds fired 
by machine-guns and/or cannon ensured that some were 
likely to strike the target. 80 However, the question 
remained whether such rounds were powerful enough to 
inflict serious damage or destruction, and this 
problem is discussed in the following chapters. 
By 1944-45 fighter-bombers were, for the most part, 
the largest component in the Allied Tactical Air 
Forces operational in Italy and North-West Europe. 
This is shown in Table X. Squadrons designated as day 
fighter have been bracketed with those of fighter- 
bombers because operational roles were not always 
clearly defined but depended upon circumstances. 8$ 
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TABLE X. FIGHTER & FIGHTER-BOMBER COMPONENT 
------- - -- - --- - ------ - ------ - -- 
OF THE ALLIED TACTICAL AIR FORCES 
----- 
ITALY 
------- ---- - --- -- - ----- - ------ - 
RAF DESERT AIR FORCE (1945) 
------ --------- 
NUMBER OF SQUADRONS 
Fighter/Fighter-Bombers: 22 (52.3%) including 3 US P-47 
Squadrons attached 
Light/Medium Bombers: 7 (16,6%) 
Night Bombers A Night Fighters: 6 (14,2%) 
Air Observation Post: 5 (11,9%) 
Reconnaissance: 2 ( 4.7%) 
US III AIR SUPPORT COMMAND (JANUARY 1944) 
Fighter/Fighter-Bombers: 23 (57,5%) 
Fighter/Dive-Bombers (A36A): 6 (15%) 
Light/Medium Bombers: 4 (10%) 
Night Fighters: 3 ( 7,5%) 
Reconnaissance: 3 ( 7,5%) 
Radio Counter Measures : 1 ( 2,5%) 
NORTH-WEST EUROPE 
RAF 2nd TACTICAL AIR FORCE (1945) 
Fighter/Fighter-Bombers: 49 (61,2%) 
Light/Medium Bombers: 13 (16.2%) 
Reconnaissance: 9 (11.2%) 
Air Observation Post: 9 (11,2%) 
US 9th AIR FORCE (1945) 
Fighter/Fighter-Bombers: 45 (42.8%) 
Light/Medium Bombers: 45 (42.8%) 
Night Fighter: 2(1.9%) 
Reconnaissance: 13 (12,3%) 
US Ist TACTICAL AIR FORCE (1945) 
Fighter/Fighter-Boobers: 24 (509) 
light/Medium Bombers: 14 (29.1%) 
Reconnaissance: 8 (16.6%) 
Night Fighter: 2(4.1%) 
Day fighters frequently flew armed reconnaissance 
missions and carried out ground strafing attacks in 
the battle area, particularly during German 
withdrawals, such as at Falaise, and large scale 
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interdiction operations such as STRANGLE (May 1944) in 
Italy and CLARION (February 1945) in North-West 
Europe. Moreover, as the campaigns progressed and the 
likelihood of encountering the Luftwaffe decreased, 
many fighter squadrons were converted to fighter- 
bombers. Specific fighter-bomber squadrons were 
similarly often required to fly fighter missions, by 
acting as escort for medium bombers or by providing 
fighter patrols. To sum up, by 1944 the fighter 
aircraft fitted with bombs or rockets constituted the 
principal tactical air weapon. Its effectiveness in 
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I 
This chapter focuses upon close air support by 
fi8hter-bombers during operations when Allied troops 
possessed limited firepower; namely armoured thrusts 
and airborne operations. Such operations saw artillery 
relegated to a secondary role in favour of airpower. 
In the case of armoured thrusts this was because the 
tanks, if they succeeded in breaking through German 
defensive positions, would penetrate beyond the range 
of their supporting artillery, the bulk of which would 
also be outpaced by the advance. 
The solution to this problem was the provision of 
continuous close air support for armoured spearheads 
during daylight. Particularly by the Americans in 
, 
North-West Europe, the fighter-bomber and the tank 
were welded into an effective offensive combination 
that exceeded even the German developments in air/tank 
integration during 1940-42. 
- 176 - 
Regarding airborne operations conducted beyond the 
range of positioned friendly artillery, artillery 
support was limited to those pieces which could be 
transported to the dropping zone; in 1944 these were 
few and of relatively light calibre. ] This was in line 
with the nature of airborne operations, which were 
essentially coup de main tasks demanding the rapid 
seizure of limited but important objectives and their 
retention until early relief. Once landed, however, 
lightly equipped airborne units were extremely 
vulnerable to counterattack by conventional troops 
supported by heavy weapons. Close air support was then 
the only means of delivering essential fire support 
for these forces. 
Successful deep penetration by armour depended upon 
maintaining the momentum of the attack after the 
initial breakthrough. Beyond the range of friendly 
artillery, armoured units depended upon speed and 
their intrinsic firepower to (preferably) bypass or, 
if necessary, overcome resistance. During 1940-42 the 
Germans demonstrated that this firepower could be 
successfully augmented by close air support, aircraft 
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A 
I 
acting as 'flying artillery' to strike at targets in 
the path of the advance. Luftwaffe liaison officers in 
radio-equipped armoured cars accompanied the panzer 
columns, and were able to call upon Ju. 87 'Stuka' 
dive-bombers that were already over the battle area or 
-waiting at readiness on the hastily occupied airstrips 
that leap-frogged in the wake of the advance. 2 The 
invasion of Russia in June 1941 saw the panzer units 
accompanied by Luftwaffe tank liaison officers, riding 
in their own UHF-equipped tanks and in contact with 
air units. 3 This enabled targets to be bombed shortly 
after being encountered, and in 1942 RAF Intelligence 
'estimated that Stuka attacks could be carried out 
within 15/20 minutes of the original support request, 
though this was considered 'exceptional'. 4 
The campaigns in Italy and North-West Europe in 
1943-45 were characterised by the need to break a 
-stubborn German 
defence through a lengthy and costly 
process of attrition. 5 However, there were occasions 
-when, after German defence zones had been broken, 
mobile operations were possible. The problem then was 
how to sustain an advance before German forces could 
seal the breach. During the breakout from Normandy in 
-, July/August 1944, when 
US armour had to penetrate 
through and beyond the hedgerow-lined roads of the 
Bocage, which were ideally suited to defence, success 
was largely due to an innovation in air support 
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carried out by the US 9th Air Force and which became 
known as 'Armored Column Cover'. 
Armored Column Cover was the provision of continuous 
air support for the US armour. Flights of four P-47 
Thunderbolts, relieved by another flight approximately 
every 30 minutes, were maintained over the armoured 
spearheads during daylight. Controllers in the lead 
tanks communicated with the flight leaders by VHF 
radio and could thus call down strikes when required 
or request searches of the roads ahead of the column. 
The usual procedure was for the arriving fighter- 
bomber flight to check in by radio with the ground 
controller and, when relieving another flight, with 
the leader of the flight already present. This allowed 
any targets encountered to be attacked at once, and 
enabled the incoming pilots to be warned of likely 
areas of German resistance. During periods of rapid 
advance and little German ground opposition, the 
flight leaders often patrolled ahead of the column, 
sometimes at a distance of up to 30 miles along the 
axis of advance, searching for any German troops, 
tanks or gun positions. 6 
Armored Column Cover was put into effect on July 
26th 1944, the second day of Operation COBRA, and 
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immediately proved effective in overcoming the ad hoc 
German defensive positions and strongpoints hastily 
thrown together to halt the US advance. The fighter- 
bombers literally cleared the roads ahead of the US 
tanks, a typical example being the air support 
provided for Combat Command A of the US 3rd Armored 
Division on July 31st. A task force commanded by 
" Colonel Doan had succeeded in cutting the Villedieu - 
Granville road late in the afternoon when a message 
was received from VII Corps ordering Doan to proceed a 
" further 12 miles to the final objective, Hill 242 near 
" Brecy. When his force approached a defended rail 
embankment Doan requested his column cover P-47's to 
strafe the tracks, their last mission for the day as 
light was fading. As the US tanks crossed the 
embankment unopposed their crews saw several unmanned 
German anti-tank guns. The morale effect of air attack 
coupled with the shock of an immediate armoured 
follow-up had induced their crews to remain in cover - 
though they subsequently returned to man their guns 
against the following US infantry. 7 
The main problem with Armored Column Cover was that 
implementing it required the commitment of 
considerable air effort. On July 28th 1944, the third 
day of its employment, column cover absorbed 22 per 
cent of the' IX TAC's total available air resources, 
which in turn amounted to 61 per cent of the total of 
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those resources allocated to close air support. 8 
Further use of column cover on occasions in North 
West Europe saw these totals increase. A post-war 
USAAF study noted that the air effort that a TAC could 
snake available for column cover rarely exceeded the 
requirements of three armoured columns, and that, 
In general, this committznent absorbed between 3OZ 
and 60% of the available air strength of a TAC, or 
approximately one [fighter] group per armored 
division. 9 
Nevertheless, in Army opinion, this air effort was 
both necessary and worthwhile, a post-war report 
observing that, 
The decision of the Ninth Air Force to give high 
priority to armored column cover In a fast-moving or 
fluid situation from the break-out in NORMANDY to 
the final drive across Central Europe shade a 
successful contribution to the success of the ground 
units In breaking through and encircling the various 
elements of the German armies. ... This effort 
permitted our armor far greater freedom of action 
than would have been otherwise possible. 10 
Such regular close integration with aircraft was 
never enjoyed by British armoured forces, but on 
occasions they received similar air support when 
provided on CABRANK. This was a method of providing 
continuous close air support during intensive, mostly 
large-scale, operations and was first employed in 
Italy during the assault to clear the line of the 
River Sangro in November 1943. It was devised by the 
(then) commander of the Desert Air Force, Air Vice 
Marshal Broadhurst. Flights of fighter-bombers were 
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-detailed to proceed to an area of the battlefront 
likely to require air support. This area was called 
the CABRANK and on arrival the aircraft reported to 
the ROVER controlling that sector. They then orbited 
the area awaiting a call from the ROVER giving then a 
target. When this occurred, the pilots were able to 
attack after a short target briefing had been given by 
the ROVER, and often after the target had been 
indicated by coloured smoke rounds. It was usually 
possible for targets to be attacked within 10 minutes 
of the original request and for repeat attacks, if 
required, to be made within 30 minutes by subsequent 
flights arriving in the battle area. 11 
That British armour was capable of successfully 
, exploiting 
fighter-bomber support when provided on 
CABRANK can be seen in two operations, one in North- 
West Europe and the other in Italy. 
QPFRATION "GARDRN". 
This was the offensive launched by British Second Army 
as part of MARKET GARDEN in Holland on the afternoon 
of September 17th 1944, for which the Guards Armoured 
Division was to spearhead the XXX Corps advance along 
the single road leading to Eindhoven and ultimately to 
Arnhem. In order to facilitate an armoured breakout 
along a single axis of advance, lined on each side by 
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streams and marshy ground preventing the deployment of 
armour and by woods concealing German anti-tank guns 
and infantry, the Corps commander, General Horrocks, 
decided to employ an extensive artillery programme 
supplemented by close air support by rocket-firing 
Typhoons. 12 One Typhoon squadron was to attack along 
the road immediately after the barrage ended, while a 
further ten squadrons were thereafter to maintain 
CABRANK for the armour. The 2nd Irish Guards (tanks) 
were to spearhead the attack along the road, while the 
flanks were to be cleared by infantry of 2nd Devons. 13 
At 2.15 pm the artillery barrage began, a belt of 
fire one mile wide and five miles deep timed to work 
its way across the German positions ahead of the 
Guards' tanks and their supporting infantry, fired by 
ten field regiments, three medium regiments, one heavy 
battery of 8-inch guns and a regiment of heavy anti- 
aircraft guns employed in the ground role. 14 This fire 
was impressive, a witness later recalling that, 
... the missiles screamed over us unceasingly, the 
fountains of their bursts clearly visible to the 
leading troops straight up the road beyond the start 
line. 15 
Then followed the arrival of the Typhoons, flights 
arriving approximately every five minutes to rocket 
and strafe each side of the road. At 2.35 pm the Irish 
Guards began the advance, their lead tanks following 
the barrage closely. For the first ten minutes the 
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advance went smoothly, the tanks gaining over 1,000 
yards and the German defences apparently subdued by 
the combined weight of artillery and airborne 
firepower. 16 However, shortly afterwards the crews of 
the lead tanks heard the thump and clanging of anti- 
,.; tank action behind them. 
The Germans had concentrated a battle group under 
the command of Oberst (Colonel) Walther to block the 
approaches to Eindhoven. (Kampfgruppe Walther) 
consisted of some ten weak infantry battalions, 
. supported by self-propelled guns and 88mm anti-tank 
guns, but the defence of the road leading to 
F__Valkenswaard along which the British tanks were 
advancing had been entrusted to Major Kerrut. Kerrut 
had immediately to hand a battalion of infantry with 
heavy weapons and supported by a battery of howitzers. 
On September 13th he had been reinforced by a troop of 
88mm guns, and also some triple-barrelled 20mm anti- 
aircraft guns. Kerrut's troops were well dug-in and 
camouflaged in trenches cut into the verges on both 
sides of the road and along the fringes of the woods, 
., with 
their fields of fire crossing in enfilade. 17 
On the afternoon of the 17th they had held their 
fire until the barrage and the leading British tanks 
had passed them, and then proceeded to knock out nine 
of the following tanks within two minutes. The 
situation for the Irish Guards was at once radically 
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transformed. A half-mile gap littered with burning 
tanks lay between the lead tanks and the following 
squadrons, the latter being unable to deploy off the 
road due to the marshy ground and dense woodland and 
unable to advance due to the wrecks blocking the road 
and the waiting German guns. The armoured thrust had 
been stopped cold, and artillery fire could not be 
brought down on the German positions due to the 
proximity of the British tanks. 13 
This was precisely the situation in which prompt 
close air support could make the difference between 
success and failure. The RAF controller in the contact 
car with the Irish Guards immediately called down the 
Typhoons waiting above on CABRANK. Within a few 
minutes, as the Guards' tanks began firing red smoke 
rounds to indicate the German positions, the Typhoons 
started to dive. The Irish Guards' War Diary describes 
what followed: 
Typhoons were called for and answered immediately. 
In the next bour.. very low and accurate attacks 
(were] made on the enemy. Our tanks burnt yellow 
smoke abundantly and though the rockets landed 
within 100 yds of them, there was never any 
likelihood of a mistake, so sure was the pilots' 
aim. It 1s only true to say that but for the Typhoon 
Squadrons' support, our advance could not have 
continued. 19 
The Typhoon attacks quickly and utterly demoralised 
the German troops. The Irish Guards War Diary recorded 
that the effect of the rockets, 
... was almost instantaneous. Enemy came running out 
of the trenches trembling with fright and were sent 
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doubling down the road in very quick time. All were 
still running when they passed Div HQ a mile the 
other side of the bri dge. 20 
The 2nd Devons started to comb the woods and verges in 
the wake of the Typhoon attacks, and found many dazed 
and frightened German troops still crouching at the 
bottom of their slit trenches. They also found a self- 
propelled gun abandoned in such haste that its engine 
had been left running. 21 The Typhoons were clearly 
more effective than supporting artillery -fire could 
have been under the circumstances, and their morale 
effect more marked. By 3.30 pm, within an hour of the 
start of the advance, the Irish Guards and 2nd Devons 
t 
had taken 250 prisoners. This was a remarkable turn of 
fortune in what had been a very doubtful situation. 
However, the advance was not immediately resumed due 
to the Guards requesting a further medium artillery 
barrage and, as they were within 200 yards of its 
intended start line, they pulled back 500 yards. This 
barrage, of 20 minutes duration, was not put down 
-until 
5.39 pm, the tanks resuming the advance only at 
about 6 pm. 22 Typhoons remained in support, but were 
now streaking above the road well ahead of the Guards 
engaging. any targets they could see, clearing the 
. route ahead 
in the same manner as with US Armored 
Column Cover. As they advanced the Irish Guards 
witnessed the effect of the Typhoon attacks on the 
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morale of the German troops as the prisoners began to 
come in: 
One Warrant Officer from an anti-tank Coy. said he 
had owned 10 7.62 Russian guns before the battle 
but none were now left working and very few of bis 
crews alive. He could not decide which was worse, 
the rockets or the Browning and was sent weeping 
down the road. 23 
Four German 88mm guns and their towing vehicles were 
also captured intact: 
They were from 602 Heavyy AA Bn, and the crews were 
in a great state of fear. 24 
This demoralisation was achieved, in some cases, 
without rockets or cannon being fired, as the 
Typhoons stayed with the Guards even though they had 
expended their rockets and cannon ammunition, making 
dummy attacks on the German positions that proved 
equally effective in subduing them. That this was 
appreciated by the Guards is recalled by a former 
Typhoon pilot who remembers that, 
We received a very nice signal from the Division, 
saying thanks for staying with them even though we'd 
run out of ammunition. 25 
The German force defending the road to Valkenswaard 
had been overwhelmed by the combined air and ground 
assault. In the early afternoon the headquarters of 
Kampfgruppe Walther reported unusually heavy Allied 
fighter-bomber activity in Major Kerrut's sector. All 
vehicle movement as far as Eindhoven came to halt as a 
result of their presence, and Oberst Walther's own 
combat headquarters near Valkenswaard was attacked 
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several times from the air. Further reports came of a 
very heavy British artillery barrage falling on the 
defence positions along the road, and soon afterwards 
telephone communication with Kerrut was lost. At 2.30 
pm a staff officer sent forward from Walther's 
headquarters reported that British tanks had broken 
through on both sides of the road and had overrun one 
of Kerrut's infantry companies. They were being 
engaged by Kerrut's supporting anti-tank guns, with 
the German guns coming under heavy fire. 
By 5 pm it was known at Walther's headquarters that 
a further company of Kerrut's infantry had been 
overrun and that his 88mm guns, lacking the mobility 
to change positions under fire, had been lost and 
their commanders killed. British artillery fire was 
now falling close to Valkanswaard and Major Kerrut, 
with the remains of two infantry companies and a few 
of his howitzers and 20mm guns that had been 
extricated, was attempting to organise new positions. 
At about 7 pm Walther's headquarters reported to their 
parent formation, First Parachute Army, that the 
remaining forces near Valkenswaard were too weak to 
sustain any defence. 26 
By 7.30 pm the Irish Guards reached Valkenswaard, 
where they were to halt for the night - though 
Eindhoven had been the day's intended objective. They 
had lost nine tanks destroyed at the outset of the 
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attack, with eight men killed and several wounded. The 
2nd Devons had lost twelve men killed and twenty-two 
wounded. 27 Typhoons had ceased to operate on the XXX 
Corps front at 7.26 pm, as dusk was falling; No-83 
Group had flown 233 close support sorties. 28 
September 17th showed what the air-tank combination 
could achieve, and can be contrasted with subsequent 
days when air support was unavailable. On September 
21st at 11 am the Irish Guards were ordered to advance 
North along the main road from Nijmegen to Arnhem. 
Once again they were confronted by a road defended by 
German infantry dug-in with anti-tank guns. According 
to the British narrative, 
At 1330 hours the advance started and at 1350 hours 
it finished, when the 3 . leading tanks were knocked 
out, as they came Into view of the.. enemy position. 29 
Only one regiment of field guns was available to 
support this attack, and its fire was ineffective. 
Inexplicably, no artillery FOO able to direct fire 
appears to have been with the Irish Guards. 30 
Moreover, while Typhoons were above on CABRANK, they 
could not be called down because at first the VCP 
control set broke down, then later in the afternoon 
the fly-in of Polish airborne reinforcements to the 
Arnhem area automatically banned the use of close 
support aircraft. 31 Infantry of 3rd Irish Guards, who 
had been riding on the tanks, tried to advance but 
were repulsed, as was an attempted right flanking 
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movement. Finally, at 6.30 pm the Irish Guards drew 
back 1,000 yards to harbour for the night. 32 
'GARDEN' was an operation largely compromised by the 
fact that XXX Corps had to advance for a considerable 
distance (some 46 miles) along a single axis. When air 
support was not available due to the complication of 
airborne drops, poor weather, or simply bad luck as on 




An operation in Italy in early 1945 was more 
successful due to its limited objective. By early 
January 1945 the British V Corps of Eighth Army had 
closed up to the line of the River Senio except where 
a pocket of German , resistance remained around 
Alfonsine, just North of Faenza. This pocket, roughly 
box shaped with sides about 4,000 yards long, was held 
by some four battalions of infantry of the German 
278th Infantry Division supported by about 6 tanks and 
self-propelled guns. From North to South, the pocket 
was contained by the 1st Canadian, British 56th, and 
2nd New Zealand Divisions-34 
Despite the importance of eliminating the pocket, V 
Corps could not mount an assault due to a severe 
shortage of artillery ammunition in Eighth Army. For 
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this reason a planned full-scale attack involving the 
Canadians and New Zealanders had been cancelled. 
Moreover, due to a shortage of replacements, V Corps 
ordered that 56th Division - which consisted of only 
two infantry brigades - should not itself attempt a 
major effort. After 56th Division had mounted a series 
of 'nibbling' attacks, which the Germans stubbornly 
and successfully resisted, its commander, Major- 
General Whitfield, was directed to prepare a plan for 
eliminating the pocket using the only reinforcements 
that could be spared - an armoured brigade and, for 
their first employment in Italy, sufficient Kangaroos 
(armoured personnel carriers) to carry a battalion of 
infantry. 35 
The result was Operation 'CYGNET', an armoured sweep 
through the pocket by 7th Armoured Brigade with two 
armoured regiments, 10th Royal Hussars on the right 
and 2nd Royal Tank Regiment on the left, and a 
battalion of infantry, 2/6th Queens Royal Regiment, 
following the tanks in Kangaroos and prepared to debus 
rapidly to mop up points of resistance. Success 
depended upon two factors. The first was surprise. A 
series of heavy frosts permitted the employment of 
tanks cross-country but the Germans, who had mined the 
main routes, did not expect such a weight of armour to 
be deployed against them and remained unaware of 7th 
Armoured Brigade's concentration. The second factor 
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was a heavy scale of close air support. To compensate 
for the lack of artillery the Desert Air Force 
provided extensive fighter-bomber cover, commencing 
with a heavy strike on the German positions at the 
outset of the armoured advance and following this with 
CABRANKS of Spitfires continuously on call, through 
the ROVER tentacle at 7th Armoured Brigade 
Headquarters, to bomb and strafe just ahead of the 
leading tanks. 36 
'CYGNET' started at first light on January 4th and 
proved highly successful, a subsequent Royal Armoured 
Corps study noting that, 
The enemy were paralysed with surprise by this 
weight of armour suddenly sweeping through them from 
an unexpected direction.. 37 
The German defence was thrown off balance by the 
combined air and armoured assault, and those German 
troops who attempted resistance were soon overcome 
either by the tanks or the waiting fighter-bombers. 
(( 
The History of 2nd Royal Tank Regiment indicates the 
extent to which the air support was relied upon during 
the attack, and how close to the British armour the 
fighter-bombers engaged targets: 
We.. called down air support on practically every 
house as we reached it. A cab-rank was kept overhead 
throughout the day and we used every sortie that the 
R. A. F. were able to lay on. We got first-class 
support, usually a hundred or two hundred yards 
ahead of our tanks. 38 
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In an operation lasting some 10 hours the Desert Air 
Force had flown 116 fighter-bomber sorties in support 
of the British armour, which had secured 12,000 
square yards of territory and taken over 300 
prisoners. Casualties to the attackers were extremely 
light; 3 tanks bogged and 6 men slightly wounded in 
10th Hussars, 5 tanks (3 later recovered) and 10 men 
wounded (one of whom later died) in 2nd RTR, and ? 
infantrymen of 2/6th Queens wounded. 39 The most 
important factor in preventing any organised German 
resistance, and thereby maintaining the momentum of 
the advance, had undoubtedly been the airstrikes made 
in immediate response to potential or actual 
opposition. The subsequent Royal Armoured Corps study 
of 'CYGNET' observed that, 
Whenever air support was given it caused a temporary 
disorganisation of the enemy in the houses and 
enabled the tanks to close in without casualties-40 
Armored Column Cover and both 'GARDEN' and 'CYGNET' 
indicate that in mobile operations close air support 
was more appropriate and effective than artillery 
because fighter-bombers were able to deliver fire 
support with greater accuracy in close proximity to 
friendly troops under fluid battle conditions. They 
could also keep pace with a rapid advance whereas 
artillery often could not, not least because of 
transport and maintenance difficulties. In North-West 
Europe, during the pursuit after the crossing of the 
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River Seine, British Second Army covered 250 miles in 
six days but to make sufficient transport available an 
entire Corps (the 8th) and most of the army artillery 
had to be left behind around the Seine for some 
weeks. 41 
An obvious question is whether self-propelled (SP) 
artillery offered an alternative solution to the 
problem of fire support for mobile operations. US 
armoured divisions were equipped with three battalions 
of SP guns, each with eighteen X. 7 105mm howitzers on 
Sherman chassis. Their British counterparts had only 
one regiment of twenty-four Sextons, self-propelled 
t 
25-pounders on the chassis of the Canadian Ram tank, 
the other regiment being of conventional towed guns. 42 
SP guns offered important advantages over towed 
pieces. One was that they combined mobility and 
firepower with protection for the gunners, enabling 
the guns to provide close-in support from hull-down 
positions without the delay caused by unlimbering and 
digging gunpits. They could deploy quickly, and change 
position rapidly in action if necessary, while on the 
move they took up less road space. However, on 
occasions when speed was essential they still took 
time to deploy and register targets, and there was 
_,,, always 
the factor of the limited supply of ammunition 
carried on board and the frequent need to replenish. 
In North-West Europe, as the numbers of available US 
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tanks increased, US armoured divisions relied 
increasingly on the armament of their tanks, with 
artillery required only in set piece operations. Hence 
their reliance on Armored Column Cover when tanks 
could not generate sufficient firepower. 43 
In British experience, the principal drawback with 
SP guns was the level of maintenance required to keep 
them roadworthy. Tracked vehicles were susceptible to 
mechanical breakdown, and the guns were usually either 
in action or on the move a high proportion of the 
time. Moreover, breakdown meant shortage of a gun, 
whereas with towed pieces another tractor was simply 
hooked to the gun. Another problem was that SP guns 
had a high profile and were difficult to conceal. 44 
To sum up, SP artillery did not obviate the need for 
close air support during mobile operations. Had SP 25- 
pounders been present with the forward tanks of Guards 
Armoured on September 17th they would not have been 
able to extricate them as had the Typhoons, not least 
because of the limited traverse of their guns, and, 
like the tanks, they would have been unable to deploy 
off the road. They would also have been as vulnerable, 
indeed more so, to the German anti-tank fire. During 
'CYGNET' they might have provided close-in support for 
the tanks as strongpoints were encountered, but in 
fact would have been subject to the severe shortage of 
25-pounder ammunition that had dictated the nature of 
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the operation. There were also different morale and 
proximity characteristics between artillery and close 
air support, and these are considered in Chapter VII 
below. 
A 
The defining characteristic of airborne operations was 
that their execution was dependent upon air 
capabilities; delivery to the drop/landing zone, 
sustaining of the landed airborne forces with supplies 
and reinforcements, and the augmenting of firepower by 
air support all depended upon the air forces. 
Experience in North-West Europe indicated that with 
regard to the latter task Allied airborne forces were 
poorly served. However, this must be qualified by some 
general observations with regard to airborne 
operations. 
First, it was impossible to provide close air 
. support 
for airborne troops when they most needed it - 
when they were at their most vulnerable while dropping 
out of the sky. Air attacks upon enemy defensive 
positions could immediately precede a drop, but the 
. risk to the airborne 
troops was too great to permit 
airstrikes either during the drop or immediately 
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afterwards, when the scattered airborne troops were 
organising. Thus if the defending troops had been 
unaffected by the preliminary air bombardment, or had 
recovered from its effects, those paratroops 
unfortunate enough to land among them stood little 
chance of survival. This was a lesson learnt by all 
combatants who employed airborne forces. 45 
Second, even once paratroops and/or glider-borne 
troops had landed, had organised as far as possible, 
and were attempting to take their assigned objective, 
it was still by no means straightforward to provide 
close air support. This was because pilots could not 
be expected easily to distinguish friend from foe on 
the ground in a battle taking place beyond the 
established front lines, and were reliant upon the 
airborne troops indicating their own and the enemy's 
positions by pre-arranged signals or radio 
communication. However, this was a process fraught 
with danger; during the German airborne invasion of 
Crete in May 1941 British and Commonwealth troops soon 
learnt that to engage the German paratroops closely 
meant that German aircraft, ever overhead in daylight, 
could not intervene in the fighting for fear of 
hitting their own men. -It was even sometimes possible 
to imitate the paratroops' Very light signals to their 
supporting aircraft, and on at least one occasion in 
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Crete the Luftwaffe was induced to attack German 
troops. 46 
Third, whereas the German airborne troops had relied 
on a series of light signals for contacting aircraft, 
Allied airborne forces by 1944-45 relied on radio 
equipment manned by air contact teams landed with the 
airborne troops. Here too was a risk, for airborne 
forces had to anticipate casualties as a result of 
jumping accidents or glider mishaps before coning into 
contact with the enemy, while losses to strength due 
} to scattered drops - often miles away from the 
intended landing zone as had occurred in Sicily - were 
another hazard. A misplaced air contact team, or radio 
equipment lost or damaged in the drop, could mean no 
communication with aircraft and no air support. 
The first major Allied use of airborne forces in North 
West Europe indicated that little consideration had 
been given to the provision of close air support. A 
frank post war US study observed of the airborne 
landings in Normandy that, 
It is fortunate that a link-up was made on 8 June 
between airborne troops and the beachhead, since 
both fighter bomber cooperation, and aerial 
reconnaissance information were insufficient for 
those lightly armed isolated units. 47 
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Most missions flown in support of the airborne forces 
were in the nature of pre-planned strikes against 
bridges and lines of communication leading to the 
airborne landing areas, in effect battlefield air 
interdiction. This no doubt reduced the potential 
number of German troops and their supporting armour to 
be confronted, but had small effect upon those German 
forces already in position in the landing area. There 
was little close support, not because the aircraft 
were lacking, but because the command and control 
machinery was not in place. As the same US study 
pointed out, 
Request missions on critical close targets were 
practically non-existent; those effective were 
"stolen" from the air by circumventing the unwieldly 
procedure and channel set up, and by "talking the 
pilot" into the target... More help might have been 
requested but casualties to TALO's and equipment in 
the drop reduced their potential 
effectiveness... Losses to airborne units on the 
ground through lack of close support by fighter 
bombers were out of proportion considering the 
number of fighter bombers over the Invasion area. 48 
Operation 'MARKET'. 
That little had been done to solve the problem of 
command and control of close air support for airborne 
forces became apparent during Operation MARKET in 
September 1944. It seems remarkable that the airborne 
forces remained unfamiliar with the air support system 
by then in regular use by Allied troops on the 
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Continent. The most likely explanation for this is, as 
Shelford Bidwell and Dominick Graham suggest, that the 
airborne divisions remained isolated from the 
mainstream of military experience. 49 In any event, as 
late as September 1944 First Allied Airborne Army had 
no Air Support Signals Unit (ASSU) or training in 
air/ground cooperation, and although a staff officer 
from 1st British Airborne Division had been sent to 
Normandy to learn at first hand how air support was 
arranged, nothing had resulted. 50 
At the outset of the operation, each airborne 
division was allocated two US air support parties, 
while one was allocated to First Airborne Corps 
Headquarters. This was much in the nature of an 
afterthought. These parties had no experience of 
working with the troops they were to accompany, and 
the operators were even unfamiliar with their radio 
sets. Those that accompanied 1st Airborne Division to 
Arnhem proved a failure; neither ever succeeded in 
contacting aircraft by radio and both were put out of 
action by German mortar fire. 51 This alone would have 
been enough to rule out effective close support for, 
as a US study later pointed out, 
Without ground control of the aircraft, to talk it 
into a target, the bomb line becomes a restriction 
denying the close support which the airborne units 
needed and didn't get. 52 
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Apart from the inability of the airborne troops to 
communicate with aircraft, there was another major 
factor in the lack of close air support. This was the 
fact that the experienced Allied tactical air forces 
already established on the Continent, in particular 
No. 83 Group of RAF 2nd TAF and the IX TAC of US 9th 
Air Force, were prevented from intervening at crucial 
periods during the operation. This was because of a 
ruling that prohibited them from operating in the 
battle area when troops or supplies were being landed 
or dropped - the aim being to prevent close support 
aircraft of the tactical air forces becoming mixed up 
with the fighter escort from England, with unfortunate 
result. 53 
Responsibility for the preliminary bombardment of 
German flak batteries en route to and in the landing 
areas, and for the escort of the transport and supply 
aircraft, was assigned to the US Eighth (Strategic) 
Air Force, whose UK-based fighter groups had no 
experience of ground support operations. In effect, 
tactical air force operations were controlled from 
England, and when adverse weather prevented the take- 
off of transports there, or during the frequent 
changes in planned programmes for airdrops and 
landings, the close support aircraft remained grounded 
too. The result was that close air support for the 
Airborne Corps during the operation between 17th-25th 
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September was scant and irregular, being provided on 
only five days. On the 18th, close support sorties 
flown for the US 82nd Airborne Division around 
Nijmegen totalled 97, while on the 22nd some 119 
sorties were flown in close support of the US 101st 
Airborne Division fighting near Eindhoven. British 
airborne troops at Arnhem saw supporting Typhoons for 
the first time on the 23rd, when a few sorties were 
provided by No. 83 Group, but they received their first 
significant close support only on the following day, 
the 24th (a week after the start of the operation), 
when 22 sorties were provided. A further 81 Typhoon 
sorties were provided on the 25th. 54 
No. 83 Group was well aware of the plight of Ist 
Airborne at Arnhem, fighting for its life against the 
troops and tanks of 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions, 
through the 'Y' army radio intercept service, but its 
repeated pleas to be able to release the Typhoons 
standing armed and ready on its forward airfields were 
disregarded. 55 However, given that the German 
infantry and their supporting tanks were closely 
engaging the British airborne troops in the town, it 
is unlikely that the Typhoons could have identified 
their targets adequately enough for them to intervene 
directly in the fighting - particularly in view of the 
lamentable state of 1st Airborne's communications. 56 
Nevertheless, they could have initially assisted the 
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paratroops to seize their objectives, and afterwards 
struck at the German tank and troop concentrations in 
and around the town, harassing movement. This had been 
expected by the commander of 1st Airborne, Major- 
General Urquhart, who later wrote that, 
The lack of close air support was a surprise to us. 
In the first two or three days before the flak 
started to build up, low-flying rocket aircraft 
would have been invaluable... rooftop attacks by 
Allied fighters on tanks In the streets would have 
made a lot of difference. 57 
As it was, the Germans destroyed 1st Airborne 
largely unmolested from the air. Appearing over Arnhem 
in any strength only on September 24th, the Typhoons 
were too late to affect the ultimate outcome of the 
battle. Moreover, in the absence of direct ground-air 
communications, support requests had to be channelled 
from First Airborne Division through 64th Medium 
Regiment Royal Artillery (of XXX Corps whose guns were 
then in range), to Airborne Corps, thence to Second 
Army, then to Headquarters 2nd TAF and finally to 
No. 83 Group. Even under these circumstances their 
morale effect was remarkable. A witness later recalled 
that, 
.. the presence of these aircraft over the 
battlefield was still of Inestimable value. Not only 
were the German mortarmen and gunners reluctant to 
man their weapons when the aircraft - fearsome- 
looking, with shark's bead and Jaws painted on the 
machine's nose - were overhead, but the effect on 
the morale of the airborne soldiers, given even a 
temporary respite from bombardment, was 
tremendous.. 58 
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On March 24th 1945 the Allied assault across the River 
Rhine was spearheaded by the landing of the British 
6th and US 17th Airborne Divisions. On this occasion, 
the last large-scale use of airborne forces in North- 
West Europe, the lessons of previous operations appear 
I to have been learned. 
Three Forward VCP's were landed by glider with 6th 
Airborne Division, one being in operation controlling 
air support from 2nd TAF within two hours of 
landing. 59 Although this was a vast improvement on 
Arnhem, communications still -left something to be 
desired and air support did not function without some 
I difficulty, as seen in an example from March 25th. The 
6th Airborne Division tentacle requested aircraft on 
CABRANK to attack some German tanks positioned in an 
orchard. Two air attacks were unsuccessful because the 
ground controller was unable to describe exactly the 
position of the target. The FCP staff eventually 
decided to deal with 6th Air Landing Brigade direct, 
as the German tanks were only 250 yards from its 
positions, but the latter had no ground to air 
communications. In the event the FCP Controller used a 
reconnaissance photograph of the area as a guide to 
his briefing of the aircraft, and he was kept informed 
of the result of the attacks by means of a running 
- 204 - 
commentary from the forward tentacle. After seven 
attacks directed in this cumbrous manner the German 
I -- 
tanks eventually dispersed. 60 
The US airborne units had also been better equipped 
with ground-air communications for the Rhine 
operation, an air support party with 17th Airborne 
Division being operational on the afternoon of March 
24th, while on the next day several close support 
strikes were directed, one within 10 minutes of the 
original request. 61 
Experience in 1944-45 suggested that close air 
support was a prerequisite for successful armoured 
thrusts, particularly when the axis -of advance was 
narrow and when any significant opposition was likely. 
The main value of fighter-bomber attack appears to 
have been in its morale effect, the neutralization of 
German defences, albeit temporary, rather than actual 
destruction or casualties caused. By being able to 
engage targets closely, sometimes to within 100 yards 
of friendly tanks, fighter-bombers could offer greater 
opportunity to exploit this neutralization than 
permitted by artillery fire. Moreover, they offered 
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the only means of providing continuous support 
throughout an advance. 
Similarly, close air support offered the only means 
i of augmenting the firepower of airborne troops 
operating beyond the range of friendly artillery. Yet 
It the importance of air support for such troops does not 
seem to have been sufficiently realised by Allied air 
and ground commanders in 1943-45. While there were 
command and control problems with providing close air 
support for troops operating far beyond the 
battlefront, these could be solved, mainly by the 
provision of adequate ground-air communications - as 
the Rhine crossing proved. Without such support, or a 
very rapid link up with friendly ground formations, 
airborne troops were likely to be destroyed - perhaps 
the most obvious lesson from the Arnhem debacle. 
c 
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A widely accepted historical view of the campaign in 
North-West Europe in 1944-45 is that Allied fighter- 
bombers inflicted heavy losses upon German armour. A 
former RAF Typhoon pilot has recorded that by August 
1944 his squadron alone was credited with the 
destruction of 112 tanks and the damaging of a further 
215; not surprisingly he suggests that the Typhoon 
'.. was decisive in beating the panzers. '1 
Yet an unquestioning acceptance of such levels of 
destruction by historians can distort perceptions of 
the effectiveness of fighter-bomber attack upon 
armour. This is because, in terms of numbers of 
tanks actually destroyed, the Allied fighter-bombers 
were far from being effective tank-killers. The most 
significant, large-scale, anti-armour operations 
conducted during the campaign by the Allied tactical 
air forces were each the subject of investigations 
carried out shortly afterwards by Allied operational 
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Research Sections. Their battlefield examinations 
suggest that, while great destruction was inflicted 
upon German 'soft-skin' motor transport (MT) by air 
attack, the traditional image of fighter-bombers 
inflicting heavy losses upon German armoured columns, 
even under ideal attack conditions when the columns 
were caught vulnerable to air attack along the roads 
and unable to deploy, is open to revision. 
There was a wide discrepancy between the level of 
armour destruction claimed by fighter-bomber pilots 
and the level of destruction that could be attributed 
to air action discovered on the ground. Often, high 
claims of tank 'kills' were made which could not be 
upheld, and the evidence suggests that even a heavy 
scale of fighter-bomber attack upon armour in the 
period 1944-45 was likely to result in only a low 
level of destruction. 
This is not to suggest that such attacks were 
ineffective, but that their effectiveness should not 
be measured in terms of the amount of destruction 
alone. The contemporary operational research suggests 
it was not necessary for the fighter-bombers to 
achieve a large number of tank 'kills' - that the 
level of firepower that they were able to concentrate 
upon their targets and the consequent disruption and 
demoralization their particular form of attack could 
cause were often sufficient to obtain decisive 
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results. The object of this chapter is to determine 
what fighter-bomber attack upon armour actually 
achieved by examining in detail a number of case 
studies. First, some general points regarding the 
Allied use of aircraft against tanks. 
The Allied fighter-bombers of 1944-45 were not 
equipped with specially designed anti-armour 
munitions. However, possession of the 3-inch rocket 
ensured that the Typhoons of 2nd TAF gained the 
reputation of being the principal Allied 'tank- 
buster'. A major drawback with the rocket was its 
inaccuracy (see Chapter III), but it did not lack 
hitting power. Its ability to destroy or seriously 
damage even the heavier type of German tank was proven 
in a trial conducted by the RAF in 1944. 
A Panther tank, captured intact in Normandy, was set 
up as a stationary target for two separate attacks 
each by four rocket-firing Typhoons. A total of 64 
rockets were fired, the aircraft making steep dive 
attacks and releasing their rockets between 3,000 and 
2,500 feet. On the first shoot of 32 rockets only one 
hit was obtained but this penetrated the tank's engine 
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cover and exploded inside, igniting the remains of oil 
and petrol. On the second shoot two hits were obtained 
- one rocket struck the side of the turret and 
exploded, the other struck the tank's gun barrel. 
These hits showed that the rocket could penetrate all 
but the frontal armour of the Panther hull or turret, 
the thickness of which was 80-100mm, but it was 
thought a hit on either of these points would render 
the tank inoperative by causing casualties to the 
crew, while a hit on the tracks would immobilise the 
tank. The rocket had no near-miss value, with blast 
and splinters of nearby ground strikes causing no 
damage. 2 
The trial, with only three hits scored on a 
stationary and easily identifiable target, emphasised 
how difficult it must have been for Typhoon pilots to 
hit individual tanks on the battlefield which were 
camouflaged, often protected by flak, and whose crews 
would have been seeking to get their tank under cover 
as soon as the aircraft appeared. Concentrations of 
tanks offered better targets, and against these the 
Typhoon pilots usually made vertical dives, releasing 
their rockets in salvo to saturate the area; their 
20mm cannon ammunition was generally reserved for MT 
targets. When armoured columns were caught moving 
along a road, attempts were made to block the road and 
seal off any escape route by attacking the front and 
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rear of the column, thereby trapping those vehicles in 
between. 3 
Given its inaccuracy, the 3-inch rocket appears to 
have been a totally inadequate weapon for engaging 
tanks. Admittedly this was not the rocket's only or 
even primary role, but that it was the best the RAF 
had for the job in 1944-45 is nevertheless surprising, 
for despite its doctrinal opposition to aircraft 
intervening on the battlefield the RAF had earlier in 
the war acknowledged the need for air action against 
German armour and had employed a much more potent 
specific anti-tank weapons system. 
In June 1942 Hurricane III) aircraft arrived in North 
Africa, nine of them becoming operational with No. 6 
Squadron. These Hurricanes were each fitted with two 
40mm Vickers 'S' cannon guns in underwing fairings. 
That they were very effective against German armour 
was confirmed by German tank crewmen taken prisoner 
during the Gazala battles later in 1942. One told his 
British captors that the tank-busters '.. caused panic 
whenever they appeared', while another told of an 
occasion when twelve tanks had been attacked by them 
and six knocked out by cannon hits on their engines, 
ammunition stowage areas, or fuel tanks. 4 Field 
Marshal Rommel certainly took them seriously; when 
illness compelled his return to Germany after the 
battle of Alam Halfa in September 1942 he took with 
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him a sample of the armour-piercing shells that the 
Hurricane IID's had been firing at his tanks, though 
his concern was ignored by the German High Command, 
including Reichsinarshal Göring. 5 
Despite their undoubted effectiveness, due largely 
to the accuracy of the cannon and the penetration 
capability of the 40mm rounds, the Hurricane IID's 
found little favour with the RAF. Only two units, No. 6 
and No. 7 (South African Air Force) Squadrons were 
equipped with them but operations proved prohibitively 
expensive. The Hurricanes had to attack at low level, 
yet the weight of the cannon packs reduced speed and 
armour plate was sacrificed to compensate for this. 
The result was an aircraft perilously vulnerable to 
groundfire, and losses were high. After the second 
battle of Alamein in October 1942 losses were such 
that both squadrons were withdrawn but No. 6 Squadron, 
with the remaining aircraft, reappeared in Tunisia in 
early 1943. Yet between March 21st and 25th 1943 the 
squadron lost 16 aircraft to groundfire, six of them 
on one mission on the 25th. Fortunately, due to the 
less hazardous nature of force-landing in desert 
conditions, pilot losses were not high, but in April 
the Squadron was withdrawn - it was the end of the 
Hurricane IID's operational service against German 
tanks. 6 
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Thereafter British attention turned to the 
development of rockets, and no further tactical 
aircraft with a heavy cannon armament suitable for the 
anti-tank role appeared in the RAF. This was a cause 
of some regret in Army circles, but there could have 
been no question of employing such a vulnerable 
aircraft as the IID or any similar type in the flak- 
intensive environment anticipated, and encountered, 
in North-West Europe. 
While the 3-inch rocket gave the RAF something 
specific to use against enemy tanks, in 1944/45 the 
Americans had to rely mainly upon the general purpose 
high explosive bombs and heavy machine guns of their 
fighter-bombers for attacking armour. Thunderbolt 
pilots generally employed a 45' attack dive against 
such targets, but dive-bombing or low-level bombing of 
individual tanks or even groups of armoured vehicles 
demanded a higher level of accuracy than could 
normally be expected with free-fall bombs. Strafing 
armoured vehicles with his six wing mounted . 50 inch 
calibre machine guns offered the Thunderbolt pilot a 
greater chance of scoring hits. Yet, while this 
firepower could prove devastating to soft-skin or 
lightly armoured vehicles, especially when incendiary 
ammunition was used, its effect upon tanks was less 
certain. A former US fighter-bomber pilot observed 
that, 
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Just area spraying of medium tanks (such as German 
PzKw IVs) and heavy tanks (such as Panthers and 
Tigers) with 'fifties' might not even faze the 
things. . 
and described how pilots strafing tanks needed to hit 
them with the simultaneous fire of all their guns, 
aiming for vulnerable points such as engine louvres 
and air vents. When tanks were caught on a hard road 
surface, attempts were made to ricochet rounds up into 
the tanks' more lightly armoured bellies. 7 
In July 1944 the first US P-47 squadron equipped 
with air-to-ground rockets became operational in Ninth 
Air Force, each P-47 carrying four 5-inch High 
Velocity Aircraft Rockets (HVAR) of a type originally 
developed by the California Institute of Technology 
for air-to-air combat. These were usually delivered in 
either low-level attacks, releasing the rockets at a 
range of 600-1,000 yards, or in a 30' dive in which 
the rockets were released at a range of 1,000 yards or 
over. By September this unit had flown 323 sorties and 
fired 1,117 rockets at ground targets, many of which 
had been German tanks for the squadron's claims 
included: 
TARLF I. P-17 SQUADRON CLAIMS- 
DESTROYED DAMAGED TOTALS 
Tanks 85 29 114 
Armoured Cars 15 1 16 
Motor Vehicles 164 23 187 
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Although these P-47's carried only half the number 
of rockets carried by a Typhoon, and their pilots 
lacked the same degree of rocket training as their RAF 
counterparts, the unit was regarded as successful. A 
Ninth Air Force study reported that the rockets could 
be fired from longer range than the . 50 calibre guns 
which reduced the danger from flak. They also had more 
penetration capability than bullets or the general 
purpose bombs that tended to break up on contact with 
targets, and they proved more accurate than dive- 
bombing. 8 Despite this study, advocating further 
rocket use, the Ninth Air Force never employed rockets 
on a large scale. 9 
Later in the campaign, Ninth Air Force made 
increasing use of napalm fire bombs. Napalm could be 
effective against even heavy tanks, burning them out 
by very near misses as well as by direct hits, but its 
use against targets close to friendly troops involved 
considerable risk. Certainly in Normandy, it would 
appear Ninth Air Force felt the lack of an airborne 
anti-armour weapon of more precision that could be 
employed against German tanks in close proximity to 
friendly troops. On occasions when heavy 
concentrations of German armour were encountered by 
American forces, recourse was made to the RAF for 
rocket-Typhoons to operate in the American sector and 
engage them. 
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In the wake of the Allied breakout from Normandy, 
Operation COBRA which began on July 25th 1944, large 
German forces in the Cotentin peninsula were forced to 
risk air attack by moving in daylight to avoid being 
encircled by the American armour. Just South of 
Coutances, near Roncey, some six German divisions were 
cut off in what became known as the Roncey 'Pocket'. 
Choking the roads, the German columns became ideal 
targets for attacks by Allied fighter-bombers whose 
attacks succeeded in preventing any organised 
breakout. On the afternoon of July 29th P-47's of the 
American 405th Fighter Group observed this dense mass 
of German transport, including tanks, on the roads 
near Coutances and on the road between St. Denis le 
Vetu and Roncey they saw a column extending for over 
three miles blocked by American armour to the East 
and West. Between 15.10 and 21.40 the P-47's of the 
405th Group systematically bombed and strafed this 
column, returning to their base to rearm and refuel 
before returning to the attack. Two days later 
American ground forces found the road impassable, and 
discovered 66 German tanks, 204 vehicles, and 11 guns 
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destroyed, and 56 tanks and 55 vehicles damaged. This 
destruction, though, was the result of the combined 
firepower of P-47's and the artillery and tanks of 
nearby American ground units. 10 
Some indication of the destruction caused 
specifically by air weapons is provided by an RAF 
anti-armour operation on the same day. Rocket Typhoons 
of 2nd TAF were requested by US forces to attack a 
concentration of some 50 German tanks observed in the 
Roncey area, near Gavray. Consequently Typhoons of 
No. 121 Wing of No. 83 Group flew 99 sorties in the area 
between late afternoon and dusk, and claimed the 
destruction of 17 tanks and a further 27 damaged. The 
pilots reported that there was little sign of life or 
movement during their attacks and the area was 
littered with damaged and burning tanks, making 
target selection difficult. There was no flak, and 
pilots were able to attack at very low level. Only one 
Typhoon was lost, hit by flying debris and forced to 
crash-land. 1 
The Typhoon effort had been concentrated mainly 
against a German column near the village of la 
Baleine, and shortly after the air attacks this area 
was investigated by the British Army's No. 2 ORS. The 
column had been a formidable mix of armour and 
transport, including Panther tanks, and after 
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examining the tanks and vehicles the ORS outlined the 
causes of destruction, and this is shown in Table II: 
TABLE 11. LA BALEINE - LOSSES AND CAUS ES_ (12) 
Destroyed By 
Rockets Possibly Unknown Unknown Crew Abandoned Totals 
Rockets Shells Causes 
Panthers 1- 1- 33 8 
PZ Nk IV 
Special 1- -- -- 1 
Armoured 
Cars -I -- -- 1 
Arad. troop 
carriers 5- -- -- S 
75"" 
SP guns -- -1 -1 2 
50, ' Anti- 
Tank buns -- -- I1 2 
Howitzers -1 -- -1 2 
Rocket 
launchers -- -- -I 














The surrounding terrain was heavily wooded and 
dissected by deep, narrow, valleys and the column had 
used a side road which descended to la Baleine where a 
bridge crossed the river Sienne. On one side of this 
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road was a steep wooded cliff and on the other a sheer 
drop to the river; caught by fighter-bombers at this 
point the vehicles had been unable to pull off the 
road. P-47's had attacked the area with 5001b bombs 
before Typhoons had been called for, and the bridge 
over the river had been sufficiently damaged by their 
bombs to prevent heavy vehicles from crossing. 
The motor transport was so mangled that 
identification of the cause of destruction was 
impossible and the ORS acknowledged their 'unknown 
causes' table to be unduly loaded. They suggested that 
a more accurate picture would be provided by the motor 
transport being spread over the table in the same 
proportion as the other losses. Although rockets 
appear as the biggest single known cause of 
destruction, the amount attributed to them is small 
compared to the relatively high number of Panthers 
destroyed by their crews or abandoned intact. How they 
had been left suggested abandonment in haste, almost 
certainly as a result of air attack or the threat of 
such attack, and possibly even before the arrival of 
the Typhoons. Craters of 500lb bombs were found in an 
orchard within 50 yards of two Panthers; neither tank 
had been hit but the crews obviously baled out and 
later set fire to the tanks, one of the guns being 
destroyed by a high-explosive round left in the 
chamber. 
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Although lack of fuel in a retreat could be expected 
to result in the abandonment or destruction of tanks 
by their crews, this was not the case at la Baleine - 
near similar bomb craters two Panthers were found 
completely undamaged, their fighting ability 
unimpaired with full complements of petrol and 
ammunition. One of the 75mm self-propelled guns, its 
armour reinforced with concrete, was found abandoned 
undamaged 35 yards from a bomb crater; as it bad not 
been set on fire by its crew it was considered more 
likely to have been abandoned in haste rather than 
left as a deliberate roadblock. 
Possibly the tanks had been abandoned or destroyed 
by their crews because they could not negotiate the 
damaged bridge. The ORS noted that the German crews 
could have forded the river further downstream, as 
American Sherman tanks later succeeded in doing, but 
this ignores the fact that in their hurry to escape 
encirclement the Germans probably had little time to 
reconnoitre the area. That all the troop carriers 
discovered had been destroyed by rockets suggests the 
possibility that other similar types may have escaped 
over the bridge, not needing to be abandoned like the 
heavier tanks. At la Baleine the most significant 
evidence of demoralisation was that there were no 
German graves. Only one German corpse was found and 
local civilians, many of whom were interviewed, 
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confirmed that it was of a sniper killed after the air 
attacks, while no evidence could be found that 
American forces had removed bodies for burial. This 
suggests that the German troops may have dispersed 
from the column when it became obvious air attack was 
imminent, which squares with the Typhoon pilots 
observing little German activity during their attacks. 
La Baleine was the first ORS investigation of its 
type, and certainly reflects the shortcomings of air- 
to-ground weapons against tanks. Despite the craters 
none of the tanks or self-propelled guns had been 
knocked out by bombs, and the number destroyed by 
rockets is unimpressive. Nevertheless, there was a 
good deal of evidence discovered by the ORS at la 
Baleine to suggest that air attack was responsible, 
even if indirectly, for the disruption and abandonment 
of the column, and that the German crews preferred to 
abandon or destroy their armour rather than invite 
further air attack by attempting to salvage combat- 
worthy tanks. 13 
The Mortain Offensive. 
Similar evidence of German tanks being abandoned under 
air attack is seen in the example of the only large- 
scale German armoured offensive mounted in Normandy. 
Early on the morning of 7th August 1944, the strike 
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force of XLVII Panzer Corps, the ist SS, 2nd SS, and 
2nd Panzer divisions, attacked positions held by the 
" 
US 30th and 9th Infantry divisions near Mortain with 
the ultimate objective of reaching the Cotentin coast 
at Avranches and cutting off American armoured 
spearheads from their supplies. Although tank strength 
was depleted after weeks of heavy fighting the Germans 
mustered 70 Panthers, 75 Mk IVs, and 32 self-propelled 
guns for the attack. 14 By noon on 7th August they were 
within nine miles of Avranches after penetrating the 
front of 30th Division to a depth of about three 
miles. Having arrived in Mortain only the day before, 
30th Division had nothing but its 57mm towed anti-tank 
guns and 3-inch gun tank destroyers with which to 
engage the German tanks at close range. Despite its 
determined defence, the credit for bringing the German 
" attack to a decisive halt on the afternoon of 7th 
August is generally regarded as belonging to Allied 
fighter-bombers, particularly the RAF Typhoons, which 
were called to intervene. 
The response of the Allied tactical air forces to 
the German attack was swift. The Typhoons of No. 83 
Group RAF were made available, and plans co-ordinated 
directly between the headquarters of No. 83 Group and 
IX Tactical Air Command. Rocket Typhoons were to 
engage the German tanks, while American fighter- 
bombers were to attack transport moving to and from 
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the battle area. The Ninth Air Force was also to 
provide a fighter screen to intercept German aircraft, 
a vital task as the Luftwaffe had planned to make an 
all-out effort to support the attack with some 300 
planes. 15 The German command had relied upon fog, 
prevalent on previous days and which had been forecast 
for 7th August, to protect their armoured spearheads 
from air observation and attack, but at about 11 am 
that day the fog over the battle area began to clear. 
At about midday the first Typhoons took off for the 
American sector from their advanced landing grounds, 
and went into action just before 1 pm against a 
concentration of some 60 tanks and 200 vehicles 
observed along a hedge-lined road near Mortain. The 
tanks, some heavily camouflaged, were grouped closely 
together as if unprepared for the rapid lifting of the 
fog. 16 After overf lying at low level to confirm them as 
German, the Typhoons commenced dive attacks upon the 
front and rear of the column, which was immediately 
brought to a halt. The pilots observed that their 
attacks caused great confusion, and saw German tank 
crews baling out and running for cover regardless of 
whether or not their tanks were left blocking the 
road. 17 Also at this time the first American fighter- 
bombers arrived in the area, with P-47's, including 
the squadron equipped with rockets, attacking German 
transport. 18 
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The weather remained clear and between 2 pm and 8 pm 
flights of five or six Typhoons were taking off 
roughly every 20 minutes to attack, returning to 
refuel and rearm before setting off again for Mortain. 
As the afternoon wore on the pilots found the task of 
locating the German tanks increasingly difficult due 
to their dispersion and to clouds of dust and smoke in 
the battle area, but the forward movement of the 
German attack had been halted. By the end of the day 
No. 83 Group had flown 294 sorties and IX Tactical Air 
Command 200 sorties in the Mortain area. Three 
Typhoons and pilots had been lost. Though the level of 
flak had initially been light, it had increased during 
the day with box-like patterns being put up over the 
tanks, and many of the Typhoons were found to have 
suffered damage from this and small-arms fire. 19 
German accounts clearly attribute the failure of 
their attack on 7th August to the fighter-bombers. The 
commander of 2nd Panzer Division, von Luttwitz, later 
recalled that his tanks had made a swift advance of 
about ten miles when suddenly the fighter-bombers 
appeared: 
They came in hundreds, firing their rockets at the 
concentrated tanks and vehicles. We could do nothing 
against them and we could make no further progress. 20 
Hans Speidel, then the Chief of Staff of the German 
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Army Group B, later wrote of Mortain that, 
.. it was possible for the Allied air forces alone to 
wreck this Panzer operation with the help of a well 
co-ordinated ground-to-air communications system-21 
The German troops received no air support on 7th 
August - their aircraft attempting to reach the battle 
area were intercepted by strong American fighter 
patrols and none reached within 40 miles of Mortain. 22 
Although fighting continued in the area for several 
days, with Mortain being recaptured by American forces 
on 12th August, the Germans made no further attempt to 
reach Avranches after 7th August. Typhoons took no 
part in the battle after that date, with 
responsibility for air support reverting to the IX 
Tactical Air Command. The claims made by the Allied 
fighter-bomber pilots for the period 7th-10th August 
are impressive, and are shown in Table III below. 
ARMOUR, Destroyed Probably Destroyed Damaged Total 
2nd TAF 84 35 21 140 
9th AF 69 8 35 112 
2nd TAF 54 19 39 112 
9th AF 94 1 21 116 
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Yet these claims are misleading and cannot be 
substantiated. During 12th-20th August the Mortain 
battle area was examined by two separate British ORS 
teams; No. 2 ORS and ORS 2nd TAF. No German vehicles 
were missed by the investigation as the area was not 
extensive; moreover the area was examined from an 
observation aircraft at low level with no further 
vehicles discovered. The destruction attributed to 
various weapons can be tabulated as shown in Table IV, 
which is a compilation of both the RAF and Army 
reports. This shows that a total of only forty-six 
German tanks and self-propelled guns were actually 
found in the battle area, and of these only nine were 
considered to have been destroyed by air weapons. 
It was not possible to discriminate between victims 
of British and American aircraft as the latter had 
also fired some 600 rockets. Many of the 'unknown 
causes' were found some distance from any sign of air 
attack - such as cannon and machine gun strikes on the 
ground and rocket or bomb craters - and could not be 
considered as possible air victims. An obvious 
question is whether the Germans had been able to 
recover any of their tanks. The presence of a German 
tank recovery vehicle would seem to confirm they had 
but, while it is likely that some tanks were 
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14 3 33 
Mk IV 2 -I i- 5 1 10 
SP Guns - -- -- 1 2 3 
Arid Troop 
Carriers 7 4- I- 3 8 23 
Arend Cars 1 -- 1- 5 1 8 
Arid 
recov, veh, - -- -- 1 - 1 
8801 Guns - -- -- 1 1 2 
75m. Buns - -- -- 1 - 1 
50Nm Guns - -- 1- - - 1 
Cars 2 2- -- 4 3 11 
Lorries - 6- 11 2 20 30 
Ambulances - 2- 2- - I 5 
Motor Cycles - -- 1- 1 2 4 
Totals 17 14 2 14 5 38 42 132 
for the discrepancy between -air claims and the 
destruction found. Armoured and motor vehicles 
destroyed by air weapons were invariably burnt out, 
and for recovery purposes damaged and' abandoned 
vehicles had priority over such. German prisoners, 
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many of whom were questioned on this subject, 
consistently stated that burnt out tanks were never 
salvaged. 23 In effect, a tank hit by a rocket or bomb 
was not worth recovering and the ORS should have found 
what was left of it. 
Another question is whether German accounts of the 
fighting can shed more light on the number of tanks 
and vehicles destroyed by air attack. The histories 
of the German divisions that fought at Mortain, 
compiled post-war, stress how decisive the 
intervention of the fighter-bombers had been, but are 
ambiguous with regard to the question of losses. That 
of the 2nd Panzer Division states of the Typhoons that 
they, 
... maintained an almost impossible accuracy and had 
succeeded in knocking out even the most powerful 
tanks. 
However, the number of tanks actually lost in this way 
is not given. 24 The history of -the 1st SS Panzer 
Division (Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler) is similarly 
unclear as to the the actual number of tanks knocked 
out from the air, though it implies that the number 
was considerable and quotes the following description 
of the air attacks by a panzer grenadier: 
The figbter-bombers circle above our tanks. Tben one 
breaks out of the circle, seeks out its prey and the 
rockets zoom into their target. While the -first one 
rejoins the circle of about 20 aircraft, the next 
breaks away and fires. So it goes on, until they 
have all fired and leave the stage of horror. . 
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.. Everywhere there rise black oil clouds, which 
indicate the corpses of tanks. There are dozens of 
smoke clouds In our area alone. Finally, the 
Typhoons find no more tank targets, they dive on us 
and hunt us mercilessly. 25 
Also quoted is an account by a panzer grenadier 
officer who, after describing how a fighter-bomber 
shot down by flak crashed onto a tank and put it out 
of action, adds that, 
most of the other tanks and armoured personnel 
carriers also fell victim to these extremely 
intense, hour-long low-flying attacks. 26 
Yet such German accounts attributing heavy tank and 
vehicle losses to air attack are misleading. They take 
little cognizance of the losses inflicted by US ground 
forces which, though almost certainly overestimated at 
the time in the confusion of battle, were none the 
less considerable. American accounts of the fighting 
indicate that, on August 7th, the forward troops of 
the US 30th and 9th Divisions claimed the destruction 
of at least eighteen German tanks, fourteen of them by 
the 30th Division's attached 823rd Tank Destoyer 
Battalion alone. 27 Moreover, the ORS confirmed that US 
troops accounted for more heavy German armour than the 
fighter-bombers, the destruction of twenty of the 
total of forty-six tanks and SP guns found being 
attributed to US ground weapons. 
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The principal reason why such German accounts should 
be regarded with caution, however, is that they 
provide no explanation as to what had become of the 
tanks and vehicles destroyed by the fighter-bombers by 
the time the ORS examined the battle area. Nor do they 
explain the not inconsiderable number of tanks found 
abandoned or destroyed by their own crews. To some 
extent, German attribution of tank losses to air 
attack may stem from the confusion of battle, but it 
may also suggest both a reluctance to acknowledge the 
morale effect of such attack, and a desire to ascribe 
the halting of the armoured thrust, which was much in 
the nature of a forlorn hope, to Allied air power 
rather than to defeat at the hands of US ground 
forces. 28 
Despite the toll taken of the German armour by US 
ground weapons, the commanders of the US units engaged 
on August 7th later confirmed that it was the fighter- 
bombers that brought the German thrust to a halt. At 
the time of the ground survey, a member of ORS 2nd TAF 
visited the headquarters of the US 9th Division's 39th 
Infantry Regiment. He was told by the Commander how 
the German attack had out off part of his regiment 
from its headquarters and how his anti-tank guns had 
been insufficient to halt such a large number of 
tanks. He also told how he had remained 'vulnerable 
and anxious' until Typhoons arrived to attack the 
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German spearhead. A visit was also made to the the 
Commander of the 
, 
30th Division's 117th Infantry 
Regiment, which had been in the path of the 2nd Panzer 
and 1st SS Panzer Divisions on August 7th. He recalled 
that when the mist lifted at about 1230, 
Thunderbolt aircraft and Typhoon aircraft came in 
immediately and attacked. Typhoons attacked for what 
seemed to him to be about two hours. This, added to 
the resistance of the ground forces, stopped the 
thrust. 29 
Such appreciation of the close air support on 7th 
August is significant in view of the tendency of 
Allied aircraft to attack friendly positions 
inadvertently in what was a very fluid ground battle. 
The US 30th Division recorded that the Typhoons and 
P-4? 's often attacked its positions, the 120th 
Regiment alone receiving ten such attacks during the 
day. 30 
Given the lack of tank destruction by air weapons, 
the undoubted effectiveness of the sustained fighter- 
bomber assault on 7th August must have been largely 
the result of completely disrupting the German attack 
by compelling tanks to seek cover or their crews to 
abandon them. The level of destruction attributed to 
air weapons by the ORS is too insignificant to have 
been decisive, and even if the unknown causes for 
both armour and motor transport were added to the air 
totals the number would only be a quarter of those 
claimed. Yet no fewer than ten of the 33 Panthers 
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found, or 30 per cent, had been abandoned or 
destroyed by their. own crews. This was an important 
discovery at the time, and a contemporary RAF 
tactical study stressing the demoralising effect of 
the 3-inch rocket projectile - or RP as it was 
generally called - offered this explanation for the 
German abandonment of tanks and vehicles at Mortain: 
Interrogation of prisoners has shown without 
question that German tank crews are extremely 
frightened of attacks by RP... Crews are very aware 
that if an RP does bit a tank, their chance of 
survival is small. It is admitted that the chances 
of a direct hit are slight; nevertheless, this would 
hardly be appreciated by a crew whose first thought 
would be of the disastrous results If a hit was 
obtained. 31 
Prisoner of war data further confirmed the 
demoralising effect of air attack upon tank crews. 
tank crewmen questioned for the German later joint 
RAF/British Army study of Typhoon effectiveness 
indicated an irrational compulsion among inexperienced 
} men to leave the relative safety of their tank and 
seek alternative cover during air attack: 
The experienced crews stated that when attacked from 
the air they remained in their tanks which had no 
more than superficial damage (cannon strikes or near 
misses from bombs). They had great difficulty in 
preventing the inexperienced men from baling out 
when our aircraft attacked-32 
It is certainly plausible that tank crews under a 
heavy scale of air attack would be induced to bale 
out, despite the interior of the tank being possibly 
the safest place to be, and in this way the bombs and 
-236- 
rockets did not need to strike the tanks to be 
effective. When asked for an opinion by the ORS on the 
number of abandoned tanks in the Mortain battle area, 
an experienced NCO of a US anti-tank unit replied, 
There is notbang but air attack that would make a 
crack Panzer crew do that. '33 
The retreat of the German army towards the River Seine 
in order to escape encirclement in the Falaise 
'Pocket' in August 1944 provided the Allied tactical 
air forces with an abundance of targets, and great 
claims of destruction were made. On 18th August RAF 
2nd TAF alone claimed 1,159 vehicles destroyed and 
1,700 damaged together with 124 tanks destroyed and 
100 damaged. 34 On the same day the Ninth Air Force 
claimed 400 vehicles destroyed. 35 The total number of 
sorties flown during the period of the German retreat 
and the claims made are shown in Table V. 
TARLE V. SORTIES I CLAIMS ; FALA ISE 'POCKE T' AUGUST I9dd_ (36) 
Z IBE. : iýL 8E. IQial 
Sorties 9896 2891 12787 
Claims for MT destroyed 3340 2520 5860 
Claims for areour destroyed 257 134 391 
Total claims 3597 2654 6251 
Claims per sortie 0,36 0.83 0.49 
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Shortly after the 'Pocket' had been closed No. 2 ORS 
conducted an extensive investigation in the area to 
determine the German losses caused by air attack and 
the effectiveness of air-to-ground weapons. 37 The 
principal roads taken by the Germans were. patrolled in 
three areas; the 'Pocket' itself around Falaise, the 
area at the mouth of the pocket near Chambois and 
referred to as the 'Shambles'. and the area known as 
the 'Chase' which led to the Seine crossings. In the 
'Pocket' the destruction of armoured and motor 
vehicles was attributed as in Table VI. The 
effectiveness of cannon and machine-guns against soft- 
skin vehicles is apparent. Also apparent is the number 
of tanks and armoured vehicles abandoned or destroyed 
by their crews, some ? 5% of the total: 
" TAA F Vr AFRMAN ARMOURED & MnmR VEHICLE LOSS ES IN FALAISE 'P CC)FT' AREA. 
TYPE Rockets Boobs Cannon/M8 'Air' total Abandoned/destroyed by crew Total 
Tanks, SP guns 5 
AFVs: 11 4 18 33 100 133 
Lorries, cars & 
motor cycles: 4 43 278 325 376 701 
Guns: - 1 1 50 51 
Totals: 15 47 297 359 526 885 
Percentages; 1.7 5,3 33,5 40,5 59.5 
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The large number of armoured and motor vehicles 
abandoned or destroyed by their crews is hardly 
surprising in such a retreat, and it was thought many 
of those destroyed by air weapons had already been 
abandoned. Air attack, though, was considered 
responsible for much of the abandonment as a result of 
causing disorganisation; moreover, destroyed vehicles 
had completely blocked roads. Cannon and machine gun 
attacks had proved to be extremely effective against 
the densely-packed motor transport. Such vehicles hit 
by cannon or machine gun rounds were invariably burnt 
out and the report notes that it was, 
.. almost a rule that where pock marks of strikes 
appeared In the roads, there a burnt vehicle was to 
be found. 38 
In the 'Shambles' so many German vehicles were found 
that it was impossible to examine each in detail; they 
were classed either as burnt or unburnt as an 
indication of whether they had been hit by air weapons 
or abandoned. A total of 3,043 tanks, vehicles, and 
guns was found, initially classified by the ORS as in 
Table VII: 
TARLF VT1. GERMAN ARMOURED LM OTOR VEHICLE LDSSFS1 'SHA MRLES' AREA_ 
Tanks/SP guns Lightly arod, AFVs Lorries Cars Guns 
Burnt: 112 64 1011 224 - 
Unburnt: 75 93 767 445 - 
Totals: 187 151 1778 669 252 
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Of the 187 tanks and SP guns found, 82 were examined 
in detail and the destruction attributed as in Table 
VIII below: 
TAB F VIII GFRMAN ARMOUR LOSSES IN THE 'SHAMBLES' AREA 
I 






Tiger -- 9 3 - 12 
Panther 3- 8 11 - 22 
Mk IV 22 12 6 - 22 
Mk III 2- 1 1 15 
SP Guns 1- 8 12 - 21 
Totals: 82 38 33 1 82 
The 38 tanks and SP guns destroyed by their crews had 
all been set on fire, and it was thought the majority 
of those tanks and SP guns that were burnt had been 
destroyed in this way and those unburnt abandoned. 
There was no evidence - such as rocket craters - to 
suggest that any appreciable number of those burnt 
tanks and SP guns not examined bad been destroyed by 
air weapons. 
A sample of 330 of the lorries and cars, and 31 of 
the lightly armoured vehicles, found in the 'Shambles' 
were also examined in detail with the result shown in 
Table IX. The effectiveness of strafing against soft- 
skin and light ar3noured vehicles was confirmed, this 
being the greatest known cause of destruction, but the 
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highest totals in both cases were the number found 
abandoned intact: 
TABLF II. CAUSES OF LOSS OF LORRIES & LIGHT ARMOUR, 'SHAMBLES' AREA. 
Cannon/MB Fire Rockets Bombs Shellfire Crew Unknown Abandoned Mines or Total 
Cause Intact Accident 
Lorries 
A Cars 99 29 15 7 52 135 11 330 
Light 
AFV's 51-237 13 - 31 
The 'Chase' area yielded a count of 3,648 vehicles 
and guns as shown in Table X: 
TABLE 1. GERMAN LOSSES IN THE 'CHASE' AREA. 
Tanks/SP Guns Lightly gyred, vehicles Lorries/Cars/Motor Cycles Guns 
Burnt: 114 115 2275 - 
Unburnt: 36 39 903 - 
Totals: 150 154 3178 166 
The ORS were unable to cover every road in such an 
extensive area, so the absolute number of vehicles and 
guns was unknown but thought to be less than twice 
that recorded. Of the 150 tanks and self-propelled 
guns 98 were examined. None were found to have been 
destroyed by rockets, nor were there any craters to 
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suggest rocket attacks had been made in the area. 
Most, amounting to some 81 per cent, had been 
destroyed by their crews or abandoned: 
TABLE 11. GERMAN ARMOURED LOSSES IN 'CHASE' AREA. 
TYPE Armour- Crew Abandoned Other/Unknown Cause Total 
Piercing 
Shot 
Tiger - 7 4 - 11 
Panther 2 23 1 2 28 
Mk IV 3 16 7 2 28 
Other Tanks - - 2 1 3 
SP Guns 3 9 12 4 28 
Totals: 8 55 26 9 98 
To allow for the possibility of German vehicles and 
guns being missed in wooded terrain or along unchecked 
roads, No. 2 ORS estimated that the Germans had lost 
some 10,000 vehicles and guns during the retreat, a 
figure not thought to be in error by more than 2,000 
either way. This was broken down as 1,500 in the 
'Pocket' area, 3,500 in the 'Shambles' s and 5,000 in 
the 'Chase'. As it was estimated that the Germans must 
have had a total of some 30,000 vehicles it was 
considered that two thirds, including about 250 tanks 
and SP guns, had. escaped across the Seine-39 This was 
regarded as the result of the air forces attempting 
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general destruction rather than trying to achieve 
interdiction by attacking key 'choke' points, a charge 
strongly refuted by 2nd TAF as taking no account of 
weather, flak levels, or bomb-lines set by friendly 
ground forces. 40 In fact No. 2 ORS overestimated the 
number of German tanks that had escaped, as on 22nd- 
23rd August the German Army Group B, reporting on the 
state of its eight surviving Panzer divisions, listed 
only some 72 tanks. 41 
The retreat to the Seine clearly reveals the 
limitations of Allied air-to-ground weapons against 
tanks, particularly the 3-inch rocket. Only ten out of 
301 tanks and SP guns examined, and three out of 87 
armoured troop carriers examined, were found to have 
been destroyed by this weapon - these figures must be 
compared with the 222 claims of armour destruction 
made by Typhoon pilots alone. In contrast is the 
marked effectiveness of cannon and machine guns, and 
to a lesser extent bombs, against soft-skin transport 
vehicles. By destroying large numbers of these, thus 
blocking roads and increasing congestion, the fighter- 
bombers indirectly caused the abandonement of many 
tanks. 
Moreover, many of the tanks and SP guns were found 
abandoned without petrol, not least because trucks 
carrying their fuel had been shot up from the air. 
German prisoners described how the threat of air 
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attack restricted movement to the hours of darkness 
until congestion and haste compelled movement by day; 
they also told how whenever aircraft appeared crews 
stopped to take cover and vehicles were driven off the 
main roads into side roads which in turn became 
blocked. 42 In effect, the almost continuous fighter- 
bomber attacks in daylight, within a restricted area 
upon retreating troops, caused a great deal of 
demoralisation and delay which prevented many tanks 
and vehicles escaping. 
The influence of Allied tactical air power upon German 
ability to carry out large-scale armoured operations 
was such that the timing of the German Ardennes 
offensive was dictated by the occurrence of bad 
weather. In the early stages of the offensive, which 
began on 16th December 1944, fog and low cloud 
protected the tank spearheads from aerial observation 
and attack. But when the weather cleared Allied 
fighter-bomber pilots were presented with targets such 
as they had not seen since Normandy and, as in 
Normandy, they made large claims for the destruction 
of armour. Between 17th December 1944 and 16th January 
1945 the IX and XIX Tactical Air Commands of Ninth Air 
Force and RAF 2nd TAF claimed a total of 413 German 
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armoured vehicles destroyed in the Ardennes salient, 
324 of which were claimed as tanks. In early January 
No. 2 ORS began an investigation of these claims, in 
the middle of the month they were joined by an ORS 
from 2nd TAF and a joint report was produced. 43 
Although hampered by thick snow which prevented the 
discovery of rocket craters and burnt patches caused 
by napalm bombs, the ORS were able to examine 101 
armoured vehicles - the practice being to search an 
area within 2-3 kilometres of each claim. The claims 
for destruction within the salient are shown in Table 
XII: 
TABLE TIT. ALL IED AIR CLAIMS F OR GERMA N ARMOUR DESTRO YED IN THE ARDEN NES SALIENT. 
IN AREA EXAMINED BY ORS IN WHOLE SALIENT 
Tanks Arad, Total Tanks Arad. Total 
Vehicles Vehicles 
IX TAC 62 23 85 140 69 209 
XIX TAC 2 0 2 176 19 195 
2nd TAF 2 1 3 8 19 
Totals 66 24 90 324 89 413 
The air weapons used were general purpose high- 
explosive bombs, fragmentation bombs, napalm fire 
bombs, and rockets. Many of the tanks claimed by Ninth 
Air Force had also been engaged by machine guns, BOMB 
only by this means. The breakdown of weapons used was: 
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APONS USED BY AIR FORCES, ARDENNES OFFENSIV 
BOMBS ROCKETS 
General- Fragmentation Napalm -------- 
Purpose 
-------- ------------- ------- 
IX TAC 1110 34 54 98 
XIX TAC 530 132 111 134 
2nd TAF --- 340 
Totals 1640 166 165 572 
For the 101 tanks and armoured vehicles examined, 
damage was attributed as in Table IV: 
TARIF TU ATTRIRUTARLF DAMABE TO SAMPLE OF 101 TANKS s ARMOURFU VEHICLFR- ARD NN S SALIENT 
Tiger II Panther Mk IV SP Gun Light Armour Total 
AM: 
Bomb 1----1 
Possibly air attack -3- 2* 1 6t 
ßHflUND: 
Armour-Piercing Shot I 16 1 lot 8 36t 
High-Explosive Shell - 3- 1 4 8 
Desolition 2 10 I - 4 17 
Abandoned 1 10 - 4 7 22 
Other Cause - -I 1 - 2 
Unknown Cause - 52 1 2 10 
TOTAL: 5 47 5 18 26 101 
t One SP Gun had amour-piercing penetrations and also a possible rocket strike so was 
included under both counts, 
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Considering that this represents the investigation 
of claims for the destruction of 66 tanks and 24 
armoured vehicles the effect of air attack seems 
unimpressive; a maximum of seven out of 101 vehicles 
examined, some six per cent. It was found that 
fighter-bomber attack had also involved some wastage, 
with bombs dropped among tanks already knocked out by 
American troops, and it is revealing that even when 
these bombs landed within 15 yards of the tanks no 
additional damage was done. 44 Not surprisingly, the 
report concluded that, while the contribution of the 
air forces to stemming the German offensive had been 
considerable, this, 
.. was not by the direct destruction of armour, wbicb 
appears to have been insignificant; but rather by 
the strafing and bombing of supply routes, wbicb 
prevented essential supplies from reaching the 
front. 45 
While the lack of destruction of armour in these 
examples from Normandy and the Ardennes may be 
explained by the shortcomings of the air-to-ground 
weapons employed, something must also be said about 
the high number of claims made by the air forces. This 
was almost certainly the result of the difficulties 
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experienced by pilots engaged in the ground attack 
role. One reason is that pilots were very likely to 
misinterpret the results of their attacks. Flashes 
from exploding cannon shells, ricochet sparks, and 
smoke emitted from the exhausts of revving tanks could 
all be mistaken for evidence of tank kills. 41 A former 
Typhoon pilot, describing an attack on a German column 
in the Falaise 'Pocket', writes that, 
. within seconds the whole stretch of road was 
bursting and blazing under streams of rocket and 
cannon fire. 46 
Such conditions could not have made accurate damage 
assessment very easy, and pilots regularly reported 
their claims as 'smokers' or 'flamers' - it seems fair 
to assume that much of the smoke and flame was not 
actually the result of tanks being hit. There was also 
the problem of accurate target identification by 
pilots hurtling at low level over a mass of vehicles 
obscured by smoke and flames. Under such conditions 
all types of armoured vehicles, and perhaps even some 
soft-skin vehicles, could be mistaken for tanks. In 
the snows of the Ardennes it was found that even small 
buildings such as huts which stood out against the 
white background could be mistaken by pilots for tanks 
and vehicles. 47 Moreover, what constituted a tank was 
often loosely defined by pilots, as a former American 
fighter-bomber pilot admitted: 
In our reports of attacking tanks, we were probably 
actually attacking more assault guns, armored 
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artillery, and tank destroyers than tanks, but from 
a pilot's view they usually were all identified as 
tanks. 48 
Another most important reason for the number of 
claims was duplication. Unless a tank or armoured 
vehicle was burning, smoking, or an obvious wreck, 
pilots had no way of knowing whether it had been the 
target of a previous attack. When conducting its 
ground survey of the Falaise area, No. 2 ORS discovered 
an armoured troop carrier abandoned in a particularly 
prominent position and were told by local civilians it 
had been the target of twelve separate strafing 
attacks; it very likely figured in twelve separate 
claims. 
As regards the reliability of the ORS ground 
surveys, one may wonder if tanks attributed to 
destruction by ground weapons had in fact been knocked 
out by aircraft and subsequently used as target 
practice by Allied troops. However, such mistakes were 
very unlikely. Bombs and rockets were hardly ever, if 
at all, used singly, and near vehicles destroyed by 
such weapons were always found the craters of near 
misses. Moreover, rocket craters were distinctive, 
oval in shape and usually with part of the rocket tube 
or fins in or near them. Parts of the rocket were also 
often found in tanks or vehicles destroyed by the 
weapon. In or near tanks and vehicles destroyed by 
their crews were often found the metal cases that had 
- 249 - 
contained German demolition charges, these being 
placed in a specific part of the tank, such as under 
engine hatches. Pock marks on roads or holes roughly 
six inched in diameter in the ground indicated machine 
gun or cannon attacks, and tanks and vehicles that had 
been strafed bore holes or dents on upper surfaces. It 
is possible that tanks abandoned intact were 
subsequently used for target practice, and attributed 
to a particular ground weapon, but this has little 
relevance to the effectiveness of air weapons. 49 
The ORS investigations help to set the achievements 
of the Allied fighter-bombers into perspective. By 
attacking soft-skin supply vehicles they were able to lip 
choke the arteries feeding fuel and ammunition to the 
Panzer divisions and, although their weapons were 
inadequate for engaging tanks directly, their rockets 
and bombs could strike at a more vulnerable part of a 
tank than its armour plate - the morale and will to 
fight of its crew. At Falaise the fighter-bombers 
proved a tank is so much scrap without fuel or 
ammunition, or if abandoned along a hopelessly blocked 
road. At Mortain, in an example of rapidly 
concentrated aerial firepower, the fighter-bombers 
proved a tank to be' equally useless in battle even if 
fully armed and fuelled if its crew were sheltering in 
a ditch, or desperately trying to get the tank into 
cover, as a result of air attack. 
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In March 1944 General Eisenhower, as Supreme Allied 
Commander, obtained direction of the Allied heavy 
bomber forces, RAF Bomber Command and the US Eighth 
Air Force, for Operation OVERLORD. He later recalled 
that 
Bye had no intention of using the Strategic Air Forces 
as a mere adjunct to the Tactical Air Command. 
But he also recalled that, by the time of the breakout 
by the Allied armies from the Normandy beachhead in 
late July 1944, 
... the emergency intervention of the entire bomber 
force in the land battle had come to be accepted 
almost as a matter of course. 1 
Little critical analysis has been accorded to this 
diversion of the Allied heavy bomber forces from the 
strategic air campaign against Germany in World War 
II. Yet their employment against battlefield targets 
in close proximity to friendly ground forces was the 
most audacious form of air support provided for Allied 
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troops in the Mediterranean and in North-West Europe, 
and also the most controversial. Equipped and trained 
for the bombing of large area targets by night or, in 
the USAAF case, for the mass bombing of strategic 
targets in daylight, the heavy bombers had become 
committed to providing tactical close air support, the 
antithesis of their intended role. In Normandy they 
supported no less than six major attacks by Allied 
troops, and later supported operations to clear the 
Channel Ports, to clear the Scheldt Estuary, to cross 
the Rhine, and to breach the Siegfried Line. 
This was not without determined opposition from 
senior airmen and, before examining the effectiveness 
of close support bombing, it is necessary to sketch 
briefly the strategic commitments of the heavy bomber 
forces and the command set-up whereby they could be 
called upon to operate in the tactical role. 
The Combined Chiefs of Staff directive of March 1944 
gave Eisenhower 'strategic direction' of the heavy 
bomber forces, not outright command. Both RAF Bomber 
Command, commanded by Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur 
Harris, and the United States-Strategic Air Forces in 
Europe (USSTAF) commanded by Lieutenant-General Carl 
, 
Spaatz, who also had operational control over the 
heavy bombers of the US Fifteenth Air Force in Italy, 
remained effectively independent. Eisenhower's 
, 
principal link with these Headquarters was his 
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deputy, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder. While 
Tedder could represent Eisenhower's wishes with 
respect to the employment of the strategic forces, he 
was not an overall air commander and firmly rejected 
the notion that he was an 'Air Commander in Chief'. 2 
In fact there was no such post, nor was there an 
overall air headquarters to control and co-ordinate 
the tactical and strategic air forces. The two Allied 
tactical air forces supporting OVERLORD, the US Ninth 
commanded by Major-General Lewis Brereton and Air 
Marshal Sir Arthur Coningham's 2nd TAF, were under the 
direction of Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh- 
Mallory's Allied Expeditionary Air Force (AEAF) 
Headquarters. Leigh-Mallory could meet demands for air 
support from their resources, but had no authority 
over the strategic air forces and his requests for 
their support had in practice to be endorsed by 
Tedder. 3 
Thus no effective command machinery existed for 
employing the strategic forces in tactical operations 
and, while both Harris and Spaatz were obliged to 
support OVERLORD, neither wished to see their forces 
diverted from what they saw as their decisive bombing 
offensives against Germany. An earlier Combined 
Chiefs of Staff directive, POINTBLANK, issued in June 
1943, had given them the priority task of attacking 
the Luftwaffe and those industries supporting it. This 
-255- 
campaign was waged by the Americans with conviction, 
while Harris paid lip-service to the directive while 
continuing his attacks on major German cities. 4 Both 
Harris and Spaatz believed that bombing by itself 
could defeat Germany, and that the landing of Allied 
armies on the Continent was unnecessary. Both had 
unsuccessfully resisted any subordination of their 
forces to Eisenhower for operations in support of 
OVERLORD. 5 
In April and May 1944 RAF Bomber Command was 
increasingly committed to attacking communications 
targets in France and the Low Countries as part of the 
'Transport Plan' to sever communications to the 
projected OVERLORD battle area. The US Eighth Air 
Force was involved on a lesser scale as its daylight 
offensive against the Luftwaffe was maintained. 
Moreover, by this time the Americans believed that 
they had found the critical target upon which to 
concentrate the bomber offensive - Germany's synthetic 
oil plants. Spaatz's staff had prepared plans for 
their systematic destruction, and in April Eisenhower 
sanctioned experimental attacks. With the Allied 
armies established in France the attacks on oil 
refineries gathered pace, and as early as June 8th 
Spaatz Informed the Eighth and Fifteenth Air Forces 
that their primary strategic aim was the denial of 
Germany's oil supplies. Bomber Command too was 
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committed to this task, with the ten synthetic. oil 
plants in the Ruhr being given as targets. 6 
While the airmen prepared to resume their strategic 
offensives after the OVERLORD aberration, the soldiers 
had been thinking on very different lines. 
Montgomery's Chief of Staff, Major-General Sir Francis 
De Guingand, later recalled that in early 1944 the 
Army in England preparing for OVERLORD was giving 'a 
great deal of tbougbt' to the subject of how the heavy 
bombers could be used in close support: 
We fully appreciated the primary role of the strategic 
air forces, but nevertheless we considered that we 
should on occasions harness their great power to the 
immediate support of the land battle.? 
A study was made of the problems involved, and two 
senior soldiers at the War Office, General Rowell, the 
Director of Tactical Investigation, and General 
Crawford, Director of Air, were involved in 
discussions with the Air Ministry. They met with 
little enthusiasm, but it is interesting that well 
before D-Day the Army was considering such questions 
as accuracy, levels of destruction, appropriate bomb 
fuses, safety precautions, and the risks of craters 
causing obstruction to friendly troops. $ 
In Italy, heavy bombers had already appeared over 
the battlefield in direct support of Allied troops. On 
February 15th, in support of an attack by 4th Indian 
Division, they had reduced the Monastery at Monte 
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Cassino. Their assistance had been requested again and 
on March 15th, in close support of New Zealand troops, 
they had returned to bomb Cassino town (see below). 
Events in Italy indicated that when confronted with 
stubborn and formidable German defences Allied 
soldiers would request heavy bomber support in order 
to overcome them. This is what occurred in North-West 
Europe, where such support was not provided without 
bitter recriminations being made by senior airmen 
against the Army and its willingness to fight and, 
particularly in Normandy, against Montgomery's 
competence. This theme underlies the following 
analysis of how effective heavy bombing was in close 
support of troops. 
The principal tactical advantage derived from 
employing heavy bombers against targets within the 
range of friendly artillery, or beyond it, was the 
tremendous weight of high explosive they could deliver 
in a comparatively short period of time. The Avro 
Lancaster, by 1944 the principal RAF four engined 
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heavy bomber, and its US counterpart the B-1? Flying 
Fortress, had normal individual bomb loads of 14,000- 
lb and 6,000-lb respectively. 9 According to a British 
Army ORS study in 1945, a heavy bomber formation had 
an immediate barrage capacity 
.. out of all comparison with that attainable by any 
artillery concentration that can at present be 
con templ a ted. 10 
Twin-engined medium bombers provided a similar 
advantage, but lacked the capacity of the heavy 
bombers. The B-26 Marauder and B-25 Mitchell, two 
medium types extensively used by both the USAAF and 
RAF, -both had individual bomb loads of 4,000-1b. 11 
Unlike heavy bombing, medium bombing was a form of air 
support used from early in the war and large numbers 
of mediums were included in the Allied tactical air 
forces. Their principal role was to bring under attack 
targets beyond fighter-bomber range, such as 
headquarters and supply and ammunition dumps, and 
targets in the battle area which required pattern 
bombing, such as gun areas and troop concentrations. 12 
Mediums bombed in small formations, usually of six 
aircraft, releasing their bombs simultaneously with 
the formation leader. They flew tighter formations 
than heavy bombers and usually bombed from a lower 
altitude, though in the presence of flak this was 
rarely lower than 10,000 feet. Heavy bombers usually 
bombed in greater numbers and in looser formation, 
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creating larger bomb patterns. They often flew at an 
altitude of 20-25,000 feet but for some close support 
missions bombed from 12,000 feet or lower. On such 
missions RAF 'heavies' carried 500-lb and 1,000-lb 
bombs. Each bomber had a carrying capacity of 5% tons 
and had 14 bomb hooks, a typical load being ten 1,000- 
lb and four 500-lb bombs. Each of the USAAF heavy 
bombers had a bomb load of some 2 tons but they had 40 
bomb hooks, and in addition to 500-lb and 1,000-lb 
bombs could carry 250-lb, 260-1b, and 100-lb bombs as 
well as 90-lb or clusters of 20-lb fragmentation 
bombs. A B-17 could thus deliver over two hundred 20- 
lb fragmentation bombs as an alternative load. 13 
For close support both heavy and medium bombers were 
employed tactically either to bomb German 'Fortress' 
positions with the aim of destroying fixed defences 
and gun batteries in preparation for Allied assaults, 
or to support breakthrough operations in the field. 
The latter took the form of saturation or 'carpet' 
bombing on the frontage of Allied attacks with the aim 
of destroying or paralysing the German forward 
defences to a depth of some 2,000 yards, or of bombing 
specific areas behind the forward German line in order 
to neutralise gun areas, sever communications, and 
isolate the forward German troops from their 
headquarters and rear echelons. German defence 
localities on the flanks of a proposed Allied advance 
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were also bombed with the aim of isolating the German 
troops on the attack frontage and preventing their 
reinforcement and supply. 14 
There was a significant difference between Allied 
heavy bombing techniques. The RAF bombed in succession 
with each bomber aiming individually, usually at a 
Target Indicator previously laid by a specialist 
'Pathfinder' aircraft, and with an airborne 'Master 
Bomber' directing the crews by radio-telephone. The 
USAAF bombed in fixed formations, or boxes, of varying 
size, with only the formation leader aiming his bombs 
while the rest of the box released at the same time as 
the leader. The RAF method was slightly more accurate. 
Operational research proved that an RAF attack 
resulted in a pattern of bomb strikes much more dense 
at the centre of an objective than at the periphery, 
while a single US bomber box achieved a fairly even 
density of strikes - to achieve the cumulative ground 
pattern of an RAF attack several boxes of US bombers 
had to have the same aiming point. 15 
Against pinpoint military targets, such as gun 
positions, heavy bombing proved too inaccurate to be 
relied upon to achieve destruction. Assessments of 
bombing accuracy against such targets were made by 
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estimating the displacement in yards of the mean point 
of impact of the bombs from the aiming point, and the 
radial standard deviation -a measure of the scatter 
of bombs within a bomb pattern. The smaller the radial 
standard deviation, the more concentrated were the 
bombs around the mean point of impact. Table I shows 
the accuracy achieved by RAF heavy bombers on ten 
targets in three close support operations in Normandy. 
For these attacks the average radial standard 
deviation of the bomb pattern was 620 yards, and was 
found to be of a similar order for USAAF attacks. With 
this order of accuracy, bomb density at the assigned 
aiming point and over the whole bomb pattern simply 
depended upon the number and calibre of the bombs 
employed. 16 
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Operational research found that 100 RAF heavy bombers 
achieved a density of some 10 bombs per acre at the 
centre of their bomb pattern but that only 30% of the 
ground at the centre of the pattern was cratered. In 
view of the fact that the destructive effect of a 
high-explosive crater bomb extended little beyond the 
crater this seems unimpressive. Despite their greater 
number of bombs US bombers achieved even less. 17 
The accuracy of medium bombing depended upon the aim 
of the formation leader and the tightness of the 
formation's bomb pattern. This varied considerably. 
Between June and August 1943 mediums of RAF Desert Air 
Force were bombing point targets with an overall 
probable radial error of 330 yards, whereas in June 
1944 the mediums of the Mediterranean Allied Tactical 
Air Force (MATAF) were found to be bombing point 
targets with an overall probable radial error of 170 
yards. 18 In fact the radial error of medium bombing was 
roughly two-thirds that of heavy bombers and, for a 
given number of bombs, the bomb density on point 
targets achieved by mediums was generally 2% times 
greater than that of heavy bombers. But bomb density 
in the target area did not necessarily mean the target 
was likely to be hit. From operational data compiled 
in the Mediterranean theatre it was calculated that to 
ensure a 95% chance of a hit on a bridge target 
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occupying 6,000 square feet the mediums of MATAF 
needed to drop 600 bombs; those of the RAF Desert Air 
Force were required to drop 2,400 bombs. 19 
It was evidently difficult for mediums to hit such 
targets as small gun positions, occupying an area of 
little over 1,000 square feet, and attempts to bomb 
such targets were wasteful. In North-West Europe the 
US 9th Bombardment Division reported that medium 
I 
bombardment was inappropriate for small targets 
because, 
.. to guarantee a reasonable probability of 
destruction, eighteen aircraft will normally have to 
be assigned, resulting at best in wasting the major 
part of the bomb load. 20 
That mediums were considered 2% times more effective 
than heavy bombers against such targets indicates that 
neither form of bombing could have been relied upon to 
destroy them. 
The Cassino bombings, particularly that of the town, 
offered valuable lessons for those contemplating 
:, further such employment of 
heavy bombers. Between 8.30 
an and noon on March 15th 1944 278 heavies and 177 
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mediums of the Allied Mediterranean strategic and 
tactical air forces delivered 992 tons of high 
explosive bombs on the town, where the Allied advance 
was being held by stubborn German resistance. This was 
followed by an 8-hour artillery programme for which 
890 guns of all calibres fired 195,969 rounds at 
preselected targets. 21 The heaviest concentration of 
air power and artillery yet seen in Italy, it was in 
close support of General Freyberg's New Zealand Corps, 
who were to attack the town immediately after the 
bombing. A subsequent bomb plot found that 47y of the 
bombs fell within a mile of the town centre and 53% in 
the general town area, but despite the weight of air 
and artillery firepower the attack failed, for two 
reasons. 
The first was the resilience of the German garrison. 
Some 950 paratroops of First Parachute Division held 
Cassino on March 15th, supported by a battery of 5 
assault guns. The 2nd Battalion, in the Northern part 
of the town, caught the full weight of the unexpected 
bombing, and of some 300 men, at least 160 were killed 
and 4 assault guns buried under rubble. Some companies 
were reduced to only a few men and many small parties 
of troops were isolated by debris. Signal 
communications were cut. 22 Yet, as a result of 
sheltering in a large cave -during a pause between 
bomber waves, most of the reserve company survived, 
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while others took shelter in deep cellars and the 
bell-shaped pillboxes that had been sunk at various 
points in the town. These were of steel, several 
inches thick, and were intended to accomodate two men 
- as many as six crowded into them during the bombing 
and they seem to have offered adequate protection. A 
subsequent Allied Air Force appreciation noted that 
Bombs falling three to Your yards from a pill-box 
lifted it out of its position without seriously 
harming the men inside. 23 
Those German troops that survived the bombing were 
undoubtedly shaken, but such was the quality of the 
paratroops that they soon recovered and emerged from 
cover to engage the New Zealanders. More importantly, 
many of them had ample time to recover - and to dig 
themselves out from under the debris thrown down upon 
their shelters - before they were threatened by the 
New Zealanders' approach. 
This leads to the second, and most important, 
reason for the failure of the attack - that the Army 
had insisted upon an urban area being bombed. General 
Ira C. Eaker, Commander of the Allied air forces in 
the Mediterranean, had sanctioned the bombing 
reluctantly and doubted its usefulness in such 
terrain. He warned Freyberg that the resulting debris 
would obstruct his tanks but was assured that this was 
acceptable as German armour would also be obstructed 
and that bulldozers would be used to clear routes, 24an 
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indication that the soldiers had little conception of 
the scale of obstruction such bombing would cause. 
Instead of the planned advance rate of 100 yards in 
10 minutes, the attack of the 25th New Zealand 
Battalion barely managed 100 yards in an hour as the 
assault troops tried to advance over or around bomb 
craters and masses of debris. Their supporting tanks 
of 19th Armoured Regiment fared even worse. As Eaker 
predicted, they could not negotiate the huge piles of 
rubble, and attempts by their crews to use pick and 
shovel or to use tanks to ram the obstacles availed 
little. By evening the attack was far behind schedule. 
The infantry had broken into the town but, while two 
troops of tanks were caught up amid the ruins, the 
rest of the armour was jammed along the only two roads 
leading into the town from the North. This-congestion 
prevented engineers getting forward to clear rubble, 
and the single company that did reach the town could 
not use their unarmoured bulldozers because of close 
range German fire. The extent of the rubble was such 
that one Brigadier subsequently estimated that even 
without German resistance it would have taken 48 hours 
for bulldozers to clear a single route through the 
town. 25 Attempts by two further infantry battalions to 
overcome German resistance failed. 26 
Bombing Cassino had been counter-productive. The 
assault troops were impeded, their supporting armour 
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prevented from deploying, and the surviving German 
troops provided with a series of new, well-concealed 
and difficult to locate positions. The bombing may 
have enabled the New Zealanders to break into Cassino 
with fewer casualties than otherwise - the 41 
sustained by the 25th Battalion were not excessive for 
such an attack - but the obstruction it had caused 
prevented them from exploiting the single most 
important advantage that bombing could bring to the 
attack - the initial disruption of the German defence. 
Baker's doubts had been vindicated, and he afterwards 
asserted that heavy bombers should, 
.. never be employed in close support.. when there is an 
adequate tactical air force present for the task.. 27 
Cassino proved that bombing was effective in causing 
obstruction and, as Table II shows, the scale 
necessary to achieve a complete blockage of a 100-yard 
circle in various terrain, particularly in built-up 
areas, was not prohibitive. But obstruction threatened 
to be more disadvantageous to an attacker needing to 
make rapid progress than to the defender. Cassino 
inevitably became the byword of those senior airmen 
opposed to meeting Army demands for heavy bomber 
support, 28 but it is remarkable that after Cassino the 
soldiers still requested heavy bombing of urban areas 
in the path of their attacks. When such bombing was 
carried out it proved of little advantage. 




HEAVILY BUILT-UP AREAS 5 50 
LIGHTLY BUILT-UP AREAS (i, e, VILLAGES) 10 100 
OPEN SUBURBAN & LEVEL OPEN COUNTRY AREAS 40 400 
CLOSE COUNTRY AREAS (WOODS, HEDGEROWS etc. ) 10-15 100-150 
Operation CHARNWOOD, an attack by the British 3rd, 
59th, and Canadian 3rd Divisions supported by two 
armoured brigades, was intended to clear the city of 
Caen as far as the West bank of the river Orne and to 
seize the crossings. The first use of heavy bombers to 
support an offensive in Normandy, it exceeded the 
errors of Cassino. First, how the operation came to be 
mounted must be outlined. 
By mid-June 1944 there was much air force criticism 
of Mongomery and his failure to secure Caen and the 
Caen-Falaise airfield sites which the airmen had 
considered vital. Concern was voiced by both Coningham 
and Tedder at the Allied Air Commanders' Conference at 
Stanmore during June 14th-16th, and the former 
demanded that the Army press on with more urgency. 30 
Leigh-Mallory had already rejected Montgomery's 
proposal to drop the 1st Airborne Division near Caen 
to loosen German resistance but, anxious to assist the 
- 269 - 
Army, he flew to Montgomery's headquarters on June 
14th and suggested instead a bombardment of the German 
positions by heavy and medium bombers on a front of 
5,000 yards behind which the Army could advance. This 
proposal was accepted with enthusiasm, but a 
conference at General Dempsey's Second Army 
Headquarters at Bayeux to discuss the plan on the 
following day was broken up by the arrival of Tedder 
and Coningham, the latter furious that he had not been 
consulted. Moreover, neither strategic air force, 
whose representatives were present, favoured the 
operation. 31 The task was considered the responsibility 
of the tactical air forces, and Leigh-Mallory was only 
just dissuaded by his staff from resigning immediately 
in protest. While acknowledging that the Army had not 
prepared its case well, De Guingand later admitted his 
disappointment, 
1. for we were most anxious to try out the 
machinery. '32 
Three weeks later, with Second Army still held 
before Caen, Montgomery requested heavy bombing of the 
city' s Northern approaches and its suburbs in support 
of CHARNWOOD. Eisenhower was present at the Air 
Commanders' Conference on July 7th which agreed to the 
bombers being employed that evening. Tedder had not 
objected, though the AEAF historical record noted his 
disapproval: 
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ACM Tedder believed that the heavy bombers should 
not be used In the battle except in exceptional 
circumstances to prevent a crisis-not to prepare 
for an attack by our own troops. 
Tedder's fear was that agreeing to the Army's request 
.. would encourage the Army to ask on every occasion 
for heavy bomber support, and that the strategic 
bombers would thus be unduly diverted from their 
proper taslrs. 33 
It has been suggested that the decision to employ the 
bombers was as much political as military, born of the 
need finally to secure Caen. 34 Substance is given to 
this view by the fact that the bombing targets were 
the same as those proposed earlier but rejected by 
Coningham and Tedder not only on principle but because 
it was felt that there was little in the proposed 
bombing zone for them to hit. 35 
The German defence was centred on a belt of mutually 
supporting positions in several villages in an arc 3 
miles North and North Vest of Caen, held mostly by the 
extremely tough 12th SS Panzer Division. But when, on 
the evening of July 7th, 467 aircraft of Bomber 
Command delivered 2,276 tons of bombs these 
strongpoints were not targeted. Instead a rectangular 
bombing zone 4,000 yards wide and 1,500 yards deep, 
including the Northern part of the city and an open 
area to the North West, was hit. This was to minimise 
the risk of bombs falling on friendly troops, as none 
were to fall within 6,000 yards of the forward 
British positions, but meant that those strongpoints 
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immediately in the path of the attack were not touched 
and had to be neutralised by artillery. Moreover, a 
forecast of adverse weather at the time of the attack, 
4.20 am on July 8th, meant that the bombing occurred 
between 9.50 and 10.30 pm on the previous evening thus 
giving the German troops six hours in which to recover 
from the worst effects of demoralisation and 
disruption. 36 
Poor targeting and timing ensured that the bombing 
did little to assist the pace of the attack or reduce 
casualties, some British battalions losing 25% of 
their strength in the two days of fighting needed to 
break through the defended villages to the outskirts 
of Caen. On July 9th troops of 3rd British and 3rd 
Canadian Divisions met in the city, but armoured units 
attempting to rush the bridges were impeded by the 
huge masses of masonry thrown down by the bombs and 
against which even bulldozing proved ineffective. 
During a subsequent investigation, conducted by 
Professor Zuckerman and Air Commodore Kingston- 
XcCloughry, the staff of 3rd British Division stressed 
. 
that bomb craters and rubble had blocked the direct 
route into Caen and had impeded their advance. They 
questioned the decision to bomb the city and did not 
,. 
believe that the bombing had destroyed any German 
positions, as their troops had found no German dead or 
. 
destroyed equipment-37 Canadian and British infantry 
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officers told No. 2 ORS that the bombing had made Caen 
harder to take by denying access to armour while 
giving cover for German snipers and restricting the 
number of entrances that the Germans had to defend. 38 
It is not clear how many German troops in the city 
were killed by bombing. One prisoner stated that a 
headquarters had been destroyed, and others were found 
still stunned by vibratory shock two days later. But 
the ORS investigation suggested that German casualties 
had been relatively light. The urban area, occupied by 
the 31st Luftwaffe Field Regiment, had been struck by 
some 300 aircraft whose bombs fell to a density of 10- 
15 per acre in the suburbs and 5 per acre in the town. 
Here the ORS found the bodies of only three German 
troops, although more were thought to be buried under 
rubble, but no destroyed vehicles or equipment. The 
open area, struck by about 160 aircraft whose bombs 
fell to a density of 10 per acre, had been held by 
part of the 26th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment 
supported by 15 assault guns of 21st Panzer with about 
40 vehicles and some flak guns. Here were found the 
bodies of two German troops, one wrecked 88mm gun, and 
ten destroyed or damaged vehicles. 39 
The bombing certainly prevented those German troops 
in the urban area being supplied and reinforced, yet 
they resisted for longer than those units holding the 
approaches to Caen, mainly because the resulting 
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obstruction denied them a route of withdrawal - here 
too the bombing may have been counterproductive. This 
obstruction also prevented a rapid seizure of the Orne 
bridges (all of which were found to have been blown) 
and further advance into the city's Eastern suburbs. 
Uncoordinated with the ground assault, the CHARNWOOD 
bombing was futile and, as many French civilians were 
killed, tragic. It is best summed up by the Zuckerman- 
McCloughry report which warned that it was, 
.. idle to expect the best the air can provide by 
calling in heavy bombers as a frill to a ground 
plan already zs de. 40 
Closer air-ground coordination was seen when Bomber 
Command made its last raid of the war in close support 
of British troops. As in CHARNWOOD, the target was 
urban and obstruction caused similar problems for the 
assault troops. The bombing in support of Operation 
WIDGEON, the assault on the town of Wesel by First 
Commando Brigade during the crossing of the Rhine on 
March 24th 1945, saw perhaps the finest precision 
bombing carried out in close support by Bomber 
Command. Two raids were made on Wesel on March 23rd. 
In the first, between 5.31 and 5.41 pm, 77 Lancasters 
dropped 435.5 tons of bombs. In the second, closely 
coordinated with the Commando assault, 184 bombers 
dropped nearly 1,000 tons between 10.35 and 10.43 pm. 
This latter raid was intended to blast a way into the 
Northern part of the town for the Commandos, who were 
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waiting only 2,000 yards from the bombers' aiming 
point. 41 
Due to the proximity of the Commandos, meticulous 
precautions were applied by the bombers. No bombs were 
to fall after 10.45 pm and the Master Bomber was to 
permit bombing by reference to the marker previously 
laid by Pathfinders only when completely satisfied. No 
crews were to bomb unless they had positively 
identified the Target Indicators. Consequently the 
raid was very accurate, with no instance of short 
bombing. Soon afterwards the Commandos attacked. By 3 
an on March 24th they had penetrated into the town and 
by daylight the entire Brigade was established in 
Wesel. There was only one instance of determined 
resistance, when the German garrison commander and his 
staff, who had sheltered in cellars during the 
bombing, defended their headquarters. In this action 
the German commander was killed. In all, 330 German 
troops surrendered in Wesel, which was secured with 
only 44 Commando casualties. 42 
Yet it was not the bombing that had prevented a 
costly urban battle. Of the 3,000 German troops 
defending the Wesel area only 350 were in the town 
itself, mostly low-grade Volksturm of poor morale, and 
the number of prisoners suggests that few had been 
killed by the bombing. Few showed signs of bomb-shock, 
such as inability to co-ordinate limbs or uncontrolled 
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shaking, and many had sheltered in cellars. Most 
German troops in the area, for the most part better 
quality, were deployed outside the town, untouched by 
the bombing. Consequently, a British Army study later 
admitted that bombing '.. was not essential to the 
success of the operation. '43 Moreover, the obstruction 
made movement for the Commandos difficult and very 
slow, particularly at night. Officers reported that 
they lost their bearings as landmarks that they had 
been trained to recognise on maps and models no longer 
existed, and movement within the town had to be by 
compass. 44 It was the poor quality of the garrison that 
enabled the town to be taken quickly. Against 
determined troops bombing Wesel could have produced 
another Cassino. 
Fixed Defences & 'Fortress' Posit{ ons. 
Despite their limited effectiveness against pinpoint 
targets, heavy and medium bombers were consistently 
directed against them when employed against German 
defence systems or 'Fortress' positions, such as the 
Channel ports. Targets were mostly gun or - battery 
positions, but success was negligible. 
On the Mediterranean island of Pantelleria in June 
1943 6,400 tons of bombs were dropped upon a target 
area occupying only 8 square miles in 5,218 heavy, 
- 276 - 
medium and fighter-bomber sorties, but of some 130 
guns in the defences only 16 were subsequently found 
to have been destroyed or damaged. The German coastal 
batteries in the British assault area in Normandy were 
each targeted by 100 heavy bombers and at least 5,000 
tons of bombs were dropped on June 5th-6th 1944, but 
of 116 guns on seven beach sectors only 3 were later 
found to have been destroyed or damaged by bombs. At 
Le Havre much of the 9,631 tons dropped by Bomber 
Command in 1,846 sorties during September 1944 was 
directed at reported German battery positions, but 
subsequent investigation showed that of 76 German guns 
bombs had accounted for only eight. In the same month 
at Boulogne 710 tons were aimed at batteries, but 
bombs destroyed or damaged only 6 guns out of a total 
of 110. At Walcheren the German gun positions in the 
area assaulted by British Commandos were the target of 
some 5,500 bombs during October 1944, but of the 26 
guns only 2 were hit. 45 
To bomb such targets with any hope of achieving 
destruction was prohibitively expensive in terms of 
sorties and bomb tonnage. Pantelleria proved that 
attacks equivalent to 70-100 heavy bombers per battery 
could achieve a maximum reduction in firepower of only 
10-15% of guns in concrete casemates. Against guns in 
the open, the same scale of attack could only render 
25% of the guns out of action, some permanently and 
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some for periods of up to 6 hours. 46 At Boulogne, for 
840 bombs dropped by mediums, only 1 gun had been 
destroyed and two slightly damaged - yet No. 2 ORS 
subsequently admitted that the RAF had bombed, 
.. as accurately and effectively as they could be 
expected to and.. produced as much material damage as 
. might 
be expected. 
No battery had been put out of action at Boulogne by 
bombing, and it was calculated that to put half the 
guns in an open battery, regardless of size, out of 
action, 180 heavy bombers or, since they were more 
accurate, 150 mediums were needed. But to ensure 
destruction of all the guns, three or four times these 
numbers of aircraft would be required. 47 After the 
assault on Walcheren, it was calculated that 720 
heavy bombers delivering some 9,360 bombs would have 
been required to secure a 507. chance of destroying a 
casemated battery of 6 guns. 48 
This was due not only to inaccuracy, but also to the 
invulnerability of gun positions protected by concrete 
and steel to the bombs available in 1943-45. At Le 
Havre the weight of air attack had been equivalent to 
20-40 heavy bombers unloading 100-200 tons on each of 
12 batteries. But even direct hits had only slightly 
damaged the protection, up to 3 feet of reinforced 
concrete, of covered gun positions and a British 
I Bombing Analysis Unit later reported that nowhere had 
bombing hindered the normal working of the fortress. 49 
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On August 25th 1944 Bomber Command sent 316 aircraft 
to bomb 8 German coastal batteries in support of the 
US VIII Corps assault on the defended port of Brest, 
but it was later found that damage had been slight, 
with even the heaviest calibre bombs having little 
effect. The US Official History states of the Brest 
defences that, 
... they were not targets that could be demolished by 
air attacks - no case was later found of a concrete 
emplacement so destroyed.. 
and describes how a 12,000-lb RAF 'Tallboy' bomb had 
made a huge crater 200 yards from a German gun 
emplacement yet had failed to damage it. 50 
A British Army ORS study of close support bombing 
noted in 1945 of the Walcheren operation that the 
bombing of the German batteries was expected to 
destroy many of the guns, and somewhat bitterly 
pointed out that, 
.. the lessons of all the earlier operations .. bad 
not been learnt, in spite of the fact that the 
results of previous experience were available to 
those responsible for planning the operation-51 
The limitations of bombing when directed against 
widely spaced or well protected military targets was 
apparently never appreciated by the planners of such 
operations. By the time of Walcheren control of the 
strategic air forces had reverted to the Allied Chiefs 
of Staff, allowing the airmen to reassert their 
strategic targeting priorities, and there has been 
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much Army bitterness that consequently the Walcheren 
batteries did not receive a sufficient weight of 
bombs. Major-General Essame observes that in October 
1944 Bomber Command directed 21,930 sorties and some 
56,612 tons of bombs against strategic targets, 
whereas only 1,616 sorties and 9,728 tons were 
provided in Army support. Citing the effectiveness of 
the Bomber Command attacks on the Normandy defences on 
D-Day, he writes that, 
The air bombardment of Germany, on which the Chiefs 
of Bomber Command had set their hearts, could have 
been suspended for a few days to enable the 
Walcberen forts to be adequately dealt with without 
any appreciable lengthening of the war. 52 
Yet the bombing of the Normandy defences had been 
effective not because of the damage inflicted or the 
number of guns destroyed, but because the bombing had 
occurred shortly before the Allied assault. The German 
batteries had not been destroyed, but they had been 
prevented from firing at their full effectiveness; if 
bombs did not destroy guns they at least kept the 
German gunners in their shelters, severed 
communications, and disrupted fire control apparatus 
at this crucial time. In 1945 the British joint 
Technical Warfare Committee reported of the fire 
support for the Normandy landings that, 
.. bombing reduced the potential rate of fire of the 
coastal batteries.. while naval gunfire was the only 
means available for producing a further appreciable 
but temporary reduction in enemy fire. 53 
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But this was quite pointless unless innediately 
exploited by Allied ground action. In their 
investigation of the air support at Boulogne No. 2 ORS 
concluded that the only worthwhile object of bombing 
in periods before an assault was launched was the 
attempted destruction of German guns, as any damage to 
fortifications could be repaired before the assault 
while any short-lived morale effect upon the German 
garrison could not be exploited. 54 Given the inability 
of the air forces to destroy guns, well known to the 
ORS, this amounted to saying that bombing was only 
cost-effective when closely followed by ground action, 
and that bombs dropped in raids uncoordinated with 
such action were wasted. 
The operational evidence regarding destruction does 
indeed suggest that the only advantage bombing could 
have brought in support of operations against fixed 
defences was that of causing temporary disruption by 
drenching the target with bombs. The tragedy of 
Walcheren was not that the RAF failed to bomb the 
batteries sufficiently in the days before the assault, 
but that the one crucial raid, when they were to be 
bombed shortly before the British Commando assault on 
November ist 1944, was prevented by adverse weather. 
In the event the German batteries, with communications 
damaged in earlier raids repaired, came into action' 
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and sank or badly damaged 19 of the 27 naval craft 
supporting the landing and inflicted 458 casualties. 55 
In contrast, Operation WELLHIT, the assault on 
Boulogne by 3rd Canadian Infantry Division between 
September 17th-22nd 1944, indicated that heavy bombing 
could be effective against German defence works when 
closely coordinated with a ground assault. The bombing 
was an integral part of the assault plan which 
intended to exploit fully its morale and disruptive 
effect. Brigadier Rockingham, commanding 9th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade and tasked with the capture of the 
heavily defended Mont Lambert feature, was initially 
reluctant to have heavy bomber support. Concerned with 
the risk of 'short bombing', and that the Germans 
would have time to recover and man their weapons 
before his men had reached the objective, he suggested 
to General Simonds, commanding Canadian II Corps, that 
the approach could be made closer with just artillery 
support. Simonds responded by assigning to 9th Brigade 
an RAF Group Captain, who would be in contact with the 
bombers during the attack. It was also arranged for 
° the bombers, having dropped their loads, to fly over 
the German positions once again with their bomb doors 
open to ensure that the German troops remained in 
cover. Rockingham later recalled of the attack by 692 
heavy bombers which preceded the assault by his 
battalions that, 
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.. the system.. certainly worked, as did the trick of 
the dummy run. The Krauts stayed under cover.. we had 
very few casualties until our troops de-bussed. 56 
The time taken by the Canadian battalions to clear 
their objectives depended upon such factors as defence 
strength and the extent of minefields and other 
obstacles, while some of the casualties sustained by 
the attackers were caused by fire from areas adjacent 
to the objective. Nevertheless a quantitative 
indication of how the bombing contributed to the 
success of the assault is given by the experience of 
the attacking battalions. The St. Martin area was 
bombed and the Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry 
Highlanders secured its Southern part in less than 
half a day with about 4 casualties, while the Queen's 
Own Rifles secured the Northern part in a day without 
sustaining any. In contrast, the Regiment de la 
Chaudidre took 5 days and 58 casualties to secure Bon 
Secours and the North Shore Regiment 3 days and 54 
casualties to secure La Tresorerie; neither target had 
been bombed. 57 
The effectiveness of the air support at Boulogne was 
investigated by No. 2 ORS shortly after the assault. 
Those battalions that had received heavy bomber 
support were enthusiastic, particularly the Stormont, 
Dundas, and Glengarry Highlanders who had been able to 
take their first objectives within an hour of the 
bombing. The bombing had caused few German casualties, 





but it had kept the defenders in their shelters at the 
critical time. Some 9,500 German troops surrendered, 
and all those subsequently questioned by the ORS 
stated that they had sheltered from the bombs and had 
made no attempt to man their weapons until the 
aircraft had departed. Officer prisoners described how 
bombing had made control and cohesion very difficult, 
with telephone lines out and communication dependent 
upon wireless, and others told how bomb craters had 
enabled the Canadian troops to approach their 
positions unseen. While some prisoners stated that 
the Canadian artillery had prevented them from 
recovering from the effects of the bombing, the ORS 
emphasised that the disruptive and morale effect of 
bombing was only temporary, and had to be followed-up 
rapidly by the assault troops. They confirmed of the 
defenders that, 
Everybody in the bombed areas was severely shaken 
and those of poor morale became worse 
but also warned that, 
Those of better morale all said that the effect was 
only temporary and that they regained beart. 58 
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One limiting factor to the effectiveness of heavy and 
medium bombing of German defence localities in close 
support of attacks in open terrain was the paucity of 
targets offered by troops usually well dispersed. This 
meant that the number of German casualties and amount 
of equipment destroyed or damaged was unlikely to be 
decisive, and that sufficient troops and equipment 
were likely to survive to offer effective resistance. 
Heavy and medium bombers were first employed against 
such field positions in Italy in a defensive rather 
than offensive context. In February 1944 heavy, medium 
and fighter-bombers were committed to support Allied 
troops defending the Anzio beachhead against 
determined German counterattacks. On the 17th they 
flew 724 daylight sorties, delivering 833 tons of 
bombs upon German positions and troop concentrations 
in the Anzio - Nettuno battle area. 59 This effort, 
supplementing artillery and naval gunfire, was 
considered by the Allies to have been very effective, 
and the US Fifth Army later reported that the bombing, 
.. contributed greatly In keeping enemy attacking 
troops pinned to the ground, retarding movement, 
preventing full power of attack from being felt by 
front-line units and interfered with battle-field 
supply. During air attacks, enemy artillery did not 
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change positions and gun crews went into and stayed 
in dugouts. 60 





effect but, in fighting a defensive battle, Allied 
troops bad little opportunity to learn to what extent 
bombing had inflicted casualties and damage. In fact 
neither had been as great as observers believed. 
General Erich Ritter von Pohl, commanding all German 
anti-aircraft artillery in Southern Italy, witnessed 
the bombing of the German positions around Nettuno and 
later recalled that, 
The density of the hall of bombs on these positions, 
which.. in our opinion were most vulnerable, led us 
to expect the complete annihilation of the unit 
under attack. However, on entering such a position 
immediately after the bombardment, one would find 
that aside from a few exceptions, the guns, the 
machine guns and the observation instruments were 
intact and that even the effect on the men's morale 
wore off after the initial experience. 61 
By August 1944 the Allies had sufficient experience 
to be aware of this phenomenon. This is shown in an 
assessment by No. 2 ORS of one of the Normandy 
operations - TOTALISE. Launched on the night of 
7th/8th August 1944, TOTALISE was an attempt by II 
Canadian Corps to reach Falaise and was supported by 
642 RAF heavy bombers dropping 3,460 tons of bombs 
onto 5 German defence localities flanking the attack. 
Afterwards, using as examples the known German defence 
strength in two villages in the battle, 1o. 2 ORS 
outlined the level of casualties and destruction 
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likely to be caused by bombing. La Hogue was held by 
250 troops supported by 7 guns deployed at a density 
of some 125 troops and 3 guns per 1,000 yards square. 
The ORS calculated that, targeted in two raids each of 
100 heavy bombers, bombing would have caused about 30 
German casualties and destroyed one gun. Roquancourt 
was defended by some 700 troops supported by 26 guns 
deployed at a density of 175 troops and 7 guns per 
1,000 yards square. If targeted in four raids each by 
50 heavy bombers, the ORS reckoned on the bombs 
causing 45 casualties and destroying at most two 
guns. 62 
Another limiting factor was that bombing could only 
assist the initial break-in phase of an attack. German 
troops beyond the bombing zone remained unaffected and 
success depended upon how rapidly resistance in the 
bomb zone could be overcome before the arrival of 
German reserves to seal the break-in. Much depended 
upon maintaining the attack momentum, but experience 
proved that this could be eroded by relatively few 
troops, guns and tanks surviving in the bombed area to 
offer resistance. Appropriate bomb types were another 
problem; crater bombing could impede German movement 
but also jeopardise the advance of Allied troops, 
while fragmentation bombing risked the German 
reserves being insufficiently obstructed. 
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That heavy bombing could be negated by defence in 
depth was seen in Operation GOODWOOD, an attempted 
breakout from the Orne bridgehead in Normandy by three 
British armoured divisions along a 'tank run' blasted 
through German defences by saturation bombing. 
GOODWOOD was supported by the heaviest air stike yet 
provided in close support; 1,512 heavy bombers and 343 
mediums, 63 delivering a total of 6,000 one-thousand 
pound and 9,600 five-hundred pound bombs. 64 
Montgomery's request for maximum air support was 
supported by Eisenhower, and granted by the senior 
airmen, including Tedder and Coningham, on the 
assumption that this was to be the breakout from 
Normandy. That this did not occur caused much 
recrimination against Montgomery, and left not only 
the senior airmen but also Eisenhower feeling that 
they had been duped. 65 
Bomber Command had 942 aircraft deliver 5,000 tons 
of crater bombs on villages flanking the tank run, 
which were cleared by infantry, while 650 tons of 
instantaneous fused bombs, to avoid cratering, were 
released on Cagny, the most strongly held village in 
the tank run. The latter, some 1,500 yards wide and 
stretching for 4 miles South of the bridgehead beyond 
the Caen-Vimont railway to the Bourgebus ridge, was 
} the target of fragmentation bombing by mediums of the 
US 9th Bomber Command. These were to neutralise the 
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German anti-tank guns, as the British tanks were not 
supported by infantry and, towards the end of its 
length, the tank run lacked suitable terrain for fire- 
and-movement tactics. By this method advancing tanks 
were covered by others, usually hull-down behind a 
crest, providing fire support, but the last 4,000 
yards of the tank run lacked crest cover. South of the 
tank run 570 B-24s of the Eighth Air Force targeted 
the main German gun area with 1,429 tons of 
fragmentation bombs, while beyond the heavy and medium 
bombing zones RAF fighter-bombers attacked German 
reserves and artillery. 66 
The bombing occurred in three waves between 5.30 and 
8.30 am on July 18th 1944. Unexpected by the Germans, 
it inflicted considerable destruction. In the 
Colombelles suburb of Caen, flanking the tank-run, 
Bomber Command's 1,000-lb bombs struck German infantry 
and anti-tank gun positions, and large numbers of 
damaged 75mm guns and German dead were later found-67 
Here a regiment of the 16th Luftwaffe Division was 
overrun without serious resistance, with many of the 
prisoners taken suffering from bomb shock. When being 
escorted to PoW cages many had to stop and sit by the 
road to recover before they could walk in a straight 
line, and 70% of them remained stone deaf for 24 
hours. 68 Similarly dazed German troops were found by 
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the infantry clearing the villages flanking the tank 
run. 
At Cuillerville the Mk. IV tank battalion of 21st 
Panzer Division and Tiger tanks of the 503rd Heavy 
Tank Battalion were caught undispersed by the carpet 
of 500-lb and 1,000-lb bombs. They were part of a 
battle group commanded by Colonel von Luck, who later 
recalled that even some of the 56-ton Tigers were 
overturned by blast and that craters 30 feet wide made 
the area impassable-69 Later examination by an RAF 
Bombing Analysis Unit found 15 tanks, armoured cars, 
and many transport vehicles in various states of 
destruction, some half buried in bomb craters. The 11- 
acre orchard had received 145 bombs, about 13 per 
acre, which had caused multiple ground shocks, blast 
waves, and the movement of debris to the order of 
40,000 tons. 70 
British tank crews, who advanced at 7.45 am, later 
told No. 2 ORS that the bombing in the first part of 
the tank run had been effective: 
They said they were not checked by craters and were 
unanimous that the bombing had been of the greatest 
assistance in frigbtening and dazing the A/T [anti- 
tank] crews. 71 
German gunners were found still sheltering in slit 
t 
trenches and were killed by grenades, this was later 
confirmed by British infantry who found the bodies. 
This emphasis an the morale effect of the air attack 
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is important, as no evidence was found that German 
anti-tank guns had been destroyed by bombs. Only 3 
guns were found in the area, and all had been 
destroyed by tank shells. 72 
Yet the German defence was not sufficiently 
neutralised to allow a rapid advance. In Cagny, five 
88mm guns and several tanks survived to knock out 16 
British tanks and a regiment had to be left to screen 
them; further South the British armour also came under 
fire from anti-tank guns positioned in the villages 
targeted by mediums. Only one of these had totally 
escaped the bombing, but in each case destruction had 
been partial and sufficient guns survived to hold the 
British armour. German fire also came from nearby 
woods, and it was later calculated that the bombing, 
concentrated upon the villages, had insufficiently 
covered these strongpoints. 73 
It was 11 an before the first 3 miles of the tank 
run had been cleared, and its final stretch, where 
most of the British tank casualties occurred, was not 
reached until 10 hours after the bombing. By then the 
British armour was being held by anti-tank guns on the 
Bourgebus ridge and by German tanks that had moved up 
from beyond the bombing zone firing from hull-down 
positions on the crest and whose superior range 
enabled them to block every offensive move. British 
tank crews told the ORS that the last stretch of the 
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tank run should not have been bombed until they were 
ready to attack it, and advocated that bombing take 
place in a series of waves preceding an advance. In 
l 
1 fact the tactical air forces had offered to return in 
the afternoon to bomb the Bourgebus ridge, which at 
the extreme range of British artillery was an obvious 
air target, but the Staff of British Second Army 
refused on the grounds that by then their tanks should 
have reached it. 74 
This highlights the dilemma facing the planners of 
such operations. Staggered bombing may have been of 
more assistance to the attackers, but increased the 
risk of them penetrating into areas prior to a bomber 
strike and incurring casualties through short bombing, 
while to halt a successful advance in order to await a 
pre-arranged air strike risked the loss of valuable 
momentum. The solution was the provision of tactical 
air support by fighter-bombers able to respond 
immediately to requests for support as the battle 
progressed. In GOODWOOD the British tank crews were 
i denied this. They could not call down the RAF's 
rocket-firing Typhoons which were overhead because 
their only contact car had been knocked out. It is a 
reflection on the low priority accorded to this form 
of immediate support, and the small extent that it was 
considered likely to be needed after the bombing, that 
only one such communications link had been provided. 76 
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When GOODWOOD ended two days later only 7 miles had 
been gained, while British casualties totalled 4,011. 
Tank losses amounted to 493 or 36% of the total of 
1,369 available-76 Harris observed that he had dropped 
a thousand tons of bombs to advance the Army one mile, 
and that at that rate it would take him 600,000 tons 
to get them to Berlin. 77 Eisenhower was also heard to 
remark that the Allies could hardly expect to advance 
through France expending a thousand tons of bombs per 
mile. 78 Such remarks took little account of the depth 
of the German defence confronting GOODWOOD. This had 
been seriously underestimated by the Second Army 
staff, who believed that the depth of the German 
defence extended for only 4 miles, held by the 16th 
Luftwaffe Division and some 1,000 troops and 50 tanks 
of 21st Panzer, with the depleted 12th SS Panzer as 
the only reserve. 
Instead there were five belts of defences with a 
depth of 10 miles including villages strongly held by 
companies of infantry supported by anti-tank guns and 
tanks and a main gun line of 90 dual-purpose heavy 
anti-aircraft/anti-tank guns. Further fire support was 
provided by 194 field guns and 272 six-barrelled 
mortars, while in reserve were 45 Panther tanks of Ist 
SS Panzer Division-and two battle groups of 12th SS 
Panzer Division each with 40 tanks. 79 Without the 
bombing GOODWOOD could hardly have penetrated as far 
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as it did. But against a defence of such depth even 
the heaviest bombing could not be decisive, and 
GOODWOOD failed because it could be contained even 
after the initial break-in. 
In contrast, Operation COBRA succeeded in breaking 
out from the Normandy beachhead because of the lack of 
depth of the German defences opposite US forces in the 
St. L8 sector. COBRA was intended to breach the German 
defence line 5 miles West of St. L6 in an attack by 3 
infantry divisions of the US VII Corps on a front of 
6,000 yards preceded by saturation bombing of an area 
3,000 by 7,000 yards South of the Periers-St. L8 road. 
This air effort was to consist of 1,500 US heavy 
bombers delivering high-explosive and fragmentation 
bombs in three waves in three 15-minute periods, 
followed by a 30 minute attack by 396 mediums 
delivering 500-lb general purpose and 260-lb 
fragmentation bombs. In addition over 700 fighter- 
bombers in two waves, each wave attacking for about 20 
minutes, were to attack with high-explosive, 
fragmentation, napalm, and white phosphorous bombs. 80 
Of the 30,000 Germans in the attack sector only 
5,000 were combat troops and positioned near the 
front. Some 3,200 were of General Bayerlein's Panzer 
Lehr Division and attached parachute regiment, holding 
a front of about 3 miles in a series of 
tank/infantry/anti-tank gun strongpoints. Panzer Lehr, 
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depleted by previous fighting, had only some 40 
combat-ready tanks, and the depth of the defence did 
not exceed 4 miles. The only reserve was several 
infantry companies and a few tanks. 8) 
Despite poor air-ground co-ordination causing heavy 
casualties to US troops through short bombing, the air 
strike proved effective, particularly in the 
destruction wreaked upon German troops. This was 
because Panzer Lehr was caught unusually concentrated 
in the bombing zone. COBRA was set for 1 pm on July 
24th 1944 and an unexpected postponement came too late 
to prevent over 300 heavy bombers and three fighter- 
bomber groups dropping 685 tons of bombs. Only 15% of 
the bombs were on target, and some fell short causing 
casualties to US troops, but Panzer Lehr had 350 
casualties and lost 10 armoured vehicles in the 
bombing and subsequent fighting. Bayerlein, convinced 
that a major US attack had been repulsed, moved more 
troops and tanks into the forward area in anticipation 
of a renewed US offensive. Their positions almost 
exactly corresponded to the bombing zone when COBRA 
was renewed the following day. 82 
On July 25th 1,490 B-17s and B-24s delivered over 
3,370 tons of bombs, with over 50% falling on target. 
380 mediums and over 550 fighter-bombers also 
attacked. Some 3% of the bombs delivered by heavy 
bombers and some medium loads fell short, causing 
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disproportionately high losses among the concentrated 
US troops, but, according to Bayerlein, Panzer Lehr 
was decimated: 
... the bomb carpets unrolled In great rectangles. My 
flak had hardly opened its mouth, when the batteries 
received direct hits which knocked out half the guns 
and silenced the rest. After an hour r had no 
communication with anybody, even by radio. By noon 
nothing was visible but dust and smoke. My front- 
lines looked like the face of the moon and at least 
70 per cent of my troops were out of action - dead, 
wounded, crazed or numbed. All my forward tanks were 
knocked out, and the roads were practically 
impassable. 83 
Panzer Lehr had some 1,000 casualties on July 25th, 
Bayerlein later asserting that 50% of them were caused 
by bombing and 30% by the integrated US artillery 
fire. He also noted the effect of the bombing on the 
morale of his men, saying that many survivors soon 
surrendered to the US troops or abandoned their 
positions for the rear. Command and control broke down 
and communications became dependent upon motorcycle 
messengers whose journeys were disrupted by craters 
and roving fighter-bombers. 84 
Craters also slowed the progress of the US troops, 
but so also did stubborn pockets of German resistance. 
Bayerlein may have exaggerated the effects of the 
bombing, for his account apparently does less than 
justice to his men. The history of the US 30th 
Infantry Division, one of those spearheading the VII 
Corps attack, is even somewhat dismissive of what 
the bombing had achieved: 
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That portion of the bombardment that fell on the 
Germans shook some of them up and caused some 
damage. But... they had the advantage of shelters 
deep enough to withstand the uniformly heavy 
concentrations... When the assault troops approached 
they found the enemy doing business at the same old 
stand with the same old merchandise - dug-in tanks 
and infantry. 85 
That the short bombings may have soured the 
appreciation of the US troops for the heavy bomber 
support is understandable. Moreover, many had expected 
the weight of air attack to eliminate all resistance, 
which was unrealistic. 86 Nevertheless, American 
accounts confirm that July 25th was a day of hard 
fighting, by the end of which VII Corps had advanced 
less than 2 miles. 87 
Yet the back of the German defence was broken, and 
the limited progress of VII Corps could be exploited 
because beyond the Periers-St. L8 road there was no 
organised German defence zone, only a vacuum. With the 
US armour committed to the attack on July 26th, 
preceded by further medium bomber strikes and 
supported by fighter-bombers patrolling the main 
roads, an advance developed which within 3 days 
threatened to turn the left flank of the German forces 
in Normandy. 88 
Five days after COBRA Operation BLUECOAT, a thrust 
by British Second Army with the object of securing 
Vire and the 1,100-foot Mont Pincon, indicated that 
bombing, quickly exploited, was of tactical value in 
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assisting troops to secure limited objectives in open 
terrain. Opposing Second Army were three German 
infantry divisions, unsupported by tanks but well dug- 
in on the slopes and ridges of a terrain favouring 
defence. Bomber Command sent 692 aircraft to support 
the attack, launched on July 30th 1944, but cloud over 
the target permitted only 377 aircraft to bomb and 
only two of the six assigned target areas were 
covered. 89 The German positions facing the 43rd and 
50th British Infantry Divisions were not bombed and 
J 
neither progressed much beyond their start lines. 
The 15th Infantry Division attacked at 7 am, before 
the bombing, when two battalions without timed 
artillery support but accompanied by tanks secured the 
first objectives of Sept Vents and Lutain Wood within 
2 hours. Each battalion had about 80 casualties. The 
bombing occurred between 9 and 10 an and was followed 
by an attack on the high ground at Les Loges by 2nd 
Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders and tanks of 3rd Scots 
Guards, and on Hervieux village by 10th Highland Light 
Infantry and tanks of 4th Grenadier Guards. Each 
assault was preceded by a timed artillery programme 
and by midday both objectives were taken. But this 
time the casualties were at least 43% less. One of the 
objectives was not directly bombed but the casualties 
to the assault troops were only 35; the other 
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battalion whose objective had been directly bombed had 
only 20 casualties. 90 
In the afternoon the final objective, Point 309, was 
attacked. The inflexibility of pre-arranged bomber 
support caused the assault troops to wait some hours 
for an airstrike timed for between 4 and 5 pm. While 
waiting, 3rd Scots Guards lost 12 tanks to German 
self-propelled guns. Tank crews later interviewed by 
No. 2 ORS were critical of this imposed delay, but the 
bombing appears to have brought dividends. When the 
tanks of the Coldstream Guards and infantry of 2nd 
Glasgow Highlanders attacked they made such progress 
that the timed artillery support was cancelled as 
unnecessary. By 6 pm the tanks were on the objective, 
followed an hour later by the infantry, who had only 
35 casualties. British tank losses in support of 15th 
Division totalled 50, including 12 lost to mines and 
the 12 lost by 3rd Scots Guards while waiting for the 
bombers. Of the remaining 26 tank losses most were 
caused by German anti-tank guns firing from beyond the 
bombing zone for, as in GOODWOOD, tank crews found 
German anti-tank gunners still sheltering in their 
trenches after the bombing. A subsequent British Army 
study of the 15th Division's attack acknowledged that 
the casualties were low compared to similar attacks in 
Normandy. 91 
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Many heavy bomber support operations were marred by 
aircraft inadvertently releasing bombs over friendly 
troops. Such short bombings invariably caused heavy 
casualties as, unlike their enemy, dug-in and 
dispersed for defence, Allied troops were concentrated 
and often in the open waiting to attack. Table III 
shows the frequency of short bombings, and the 
resulting casualties. 
(92) 
61LLEU JOUNDED VEHICLES . ä! 1l1$. TANKS 
Cassino 15,3,44 Mediterranean Allied Strategic 96 200 
Air Force (MASAF) 
COBRA 24,7.44/25,7,44 8th USAAF 3 
US 9th Bomb Division 101 463 
TOTALISE 8,8,44 8th USAAF 86 286 83 7 
(Phase 11) 
TRACTABLE 14,8,44 RAF Bomber Command 112 376 265 30 2 
BUCKLAND 9,4,45 15th USAAF 40 120 
Apart from killed and wounded, many troops suffered 
concussion and shock. During COBRA General Hobbs' US 
30th Infantry Division, which suffered short bombings 
on both 24th and 25th July, reported 164 cases of such 
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'combat exhaustion. ' Morale could be severely affected 
and confidence in the air forces eroded. When the 30th 
Division was held by a German strongpoint on July 25th 
General Collins, commanding VII Corps, suggested a 
further medium bomber strike. Hobbs, unwilling to 
risk more short bombing, refused and warned 
Collins, ' If we have any more of the same then our 
troops are finished'. 93 For the rest of the war Hobbs 
was opposed to his Division receiving heavy bomber 
support. 94 During TOTALISE some Allied guns fired on 
the errant bombers, and troops were heard to cheer as 
hits were scored. 95 
Short bombings were the consequence of insufficient 
integration and coordination of air and ground 
planning. That there was a lack of adequate liaison, 
mutual understanding, or even sympathy, between air 
and ground staffs was seen during the planning for 
COBRA, when such a fundamental question as the 
bombers' approach to the target was subject to 
misunderstanding. At a conference to discuss the air 
support held on July 19th General Bradley, commanding 
US First Army, advocated a parallel approach and that 
his troops be withdrawn 800 yards. The airmen wanted a 
perpendicular approach because a lateral bomb run 
would lead the bombers over German flak. They also 
wanted the troops withdrawn 3,000 yards. Soldiers were 
understandably reluctant to relinquish hard-won 
-301- 
ground, and a compromise was reached whereby the 
troops would withdraw 1,200 yards while the heavy 
bombers and mediums were to bomb no closer to them 
than 1,450 yards. But no assurances were given as to 
the bombers' direction of approach. In fact the 
bombers made perpendicular approaches on both 24th and 
25th July, leading Bradley to accuse the air command 
of a 'serious breach of good faith in planning. '96 
Similar lack of commonality existed between the 
British Army and RAF Bomber Command. Charles 
Carrington, the Army's Liaison Officer at Bomber 
Command, refers to the RAF's insistence that the Army 
accept cratering on some operations as "a piece of Air 
Force insolence', 
It meant that, if the Bomber Chiefs were to be 
diverted from Industrial Bombing to help the Army... 
they need not go to the trouble of studying the 
problem and of reloading with an appropriate type of 
bomb, but would take off with their normal bombload, 
commonly 1000lb bombs with delayed-action fuses, 
designed for disrupting the foundations of solid 
masonry. '97 
Poor air-ground liaison also affected such 
fundamentals as the provision of adequate methods of 
air-ground identification and communication. Those 
employed for COBRA were based on experience with 
fighter-bombers or small numbers of mediums and 
consisted of marking the US front line with 
fluorescent panels, indicating German positions by 
artillery firing red smoke shells, and marking US 
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tanks and vehicles with cerise panels and repainting 
their white star markings - all totally inappropriate 
for high altitude heavy bombers. After the first 
bombings on July 25th the resulting dust and smoke 
obscured the bomber crews' view of the battle area, 
even of the prominent Periers-St. L8 road, while a 5- 
knot wind misplaced the red smoke rising from the 
targets. The most serious omission was that the US 
troops had no means of contacting the heavy bombers. 
Some tanks and vehicles had radios for contacting 
fighter-bombers, but no such VHF link with the heavy 
bombers was provided. 98 Unlike with artillery, the US 
troops had no means of correcting aim and when the 
leaders of three bomber formations began to bomb 
short, inducing following aircraft to do likewise, 
they were helpless to avert disaster. 
Canadian and Polish troops were similarly helpless 
when, during the second phase of TOTALISE, two 
formations of B-17s mistook their positions for the 
target and straddled them with nearly 1,000 90-1b 
fragmentation bombs - with devastating effect against 
troops caught in the open. 99 The only occasion when 
RAF Bomber Command caused heavy casualties by short 
bombing occured during Operation TRACTABLE when, on 
August 14th 1944,805 bombers were sent to support a 
further attack towards Falaise by Canadian II Corps. 
Pathfinders in the second wave failed to check their 
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timed run from the French coast accurately and mistook 
a wood 4 miles nearer the coast, or 1 minute's flying 
time, for the German strongpoint of Quesnay Wood. Some 
77. of the bombs fell on Canadian and Polish troops, 
who also had no means of contacting the bombers. The 
error was compounded by an occurrence which could have 
been prevented by elementary staff work. In 
desperation the troops fired yellow smoke, the 
standard method of indicating their positions to 
friendly tactical aircraft but the bomber crews, not 
of the tactical air forces, assumed the smoke to be 
the yellow Target Indicators generally employed by 
Bomber Command. 100 After TRACTABLE no special technique 
for close support bombing was developed by Bomber 
Command, but the provision of an air-to-ground 
communications link during WELLHIT and the standard of 
bombing during WIDGEON showed that the lesson had been 
learned. 
After COBRA, the Eighth Air Force developed an 
elaborate ground-to-air marker and communications 
system enabling heavy bombers to identify aiming 
points and the location of friendly troops with 
minimal risk of short bombing. This was successfully 
employed during Operation QUEEN, an offensive by the 
US First and Ninth Armies towards the Roer river on 
November 16th 1944. For QUEEN 1,204 heavy bombers 
dropped 4,120 tons of fragmentation bombs on the 
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fortified towns of Eschweiler and Langerwehe in the 
path of the US troops. Most of the bombers were 
equipped to receive signals from a vertical SCS-51 
localizer transmitter beacon placed a short distance 
behind the US front line, and from two marker beacons. 
The SCS-51 indicated to the bomber crews their exact 
position in relation to the front line and the bomb 
release point, while the marker beacons kept the 
bombers on course. A ground control station was set up 
in radio contact with the bomber stream, and the 
aircrews had been given detailed briefings. 
Extensive measures on the ground included a series 
of large panel markers indicating the approach to the 
front line and a line of low altitude. captive 
balloons, flown at 2,000 feet at 300 yard intervals, 
placed 4,000 yards behind the front line perpendicular 
to the bombers' approach. Four batteries of 90mm anti- 
aircraft guns placed 8,000 yards behind the front line 
fired a line of red smoke shells on the same line as 
and above the balloons, These were timed to give 8 
simultaneous bursts every 15 seconds at a height 2,000 
feet below the altitude of the bombers, the timings 
coordinated by direct telephone and radio link between 
an air controller and the batteries. 101 
Consequently no bombs fell on US troops during the 
approach to the target, and although the bombing was 
from 18,600-24,000 feet due to cloud over the target 
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and flak, all targets received a high proportion of 
hits. The unexpected bombing caused heavy casualties 
among some German units caught in the open as they 
were being relieved (the 1st Company of the 981st 
Infantry Regiment had 30% losses) and the US troops 
initially encountered only weak resistance. But by 
late afternoon the Germans had begun to recover and 
resistance stiffened. QUEEN failed to become a 
breakthrough, for three reasons. 
First was the depth of the German defence system; it 
took 3 days for the US troops to break through the 
outer defences and by then the effect of the initial 
air bombardment had been lost. Second. November gave 
limited hours of daylight for fighter-bombers to 
prolong the effect of air attack. Whereas COBRA on 
July 25th had 169 hours of daylight, QUEEN had only 7 
hours, and much of this was disrupted by poor weather 
with the result that only 349 sorties were. flown. But 
the third and most important reason was that, although 
the Americans had done much to solve the problem of 
short bombing, the memory of COBRA prevented complete 
confidence among the air and ground staffs in deciding 
how far the heavy bomber targets should be from the US 
" troops. Their caution ensured that the US troops were 
} unable to exploit fully the most important effect of 
the bombing. As a subsequent US study of QUEEN 
acknowledged, 
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.. with the satisfactory safety and accuracy aids 
devised, the heavy bombing effort could have been 
placed much closer to the front line, thus 
permitting the infantry to press home the advantage 
of the shock effect.. 102 
However, that the most elaborate precautions could 
minimise, but not eliminate, the risk of short bombing 
was shown during the opening phase of Operation 
BUCKLAND, the attack across the River Senio by the V 
British and II Polish Corps in April 1945 - the Eighth 
Army's role in the final Allied ground offensive in 
Italy. Heavy bomber support was provided by the 
Fifteenth Air Force, whose aircraft were also to 
support US troops as part of a general air operation 
code-named WOWSER. 
The safety precautions for WOWSER/BUCKLAND surpassed 
those for QUEEN. In addition to a series of large 
white ground markers placed along the bombers' route 
to the target area and indication lines of anti- 
aircraft shell bursts at pre-arranged heights, 
arrangements were made for a 'last-minute' 
cancellation of the bombing. In the American sector 
this took the form of a VHF forward radio control 
established at the headquarters of the Army's 
supporting Tactical Air Force (22nd TAC), while in the 
British sector a series of flak bursts forming the 
letter 'X' was to indicate that the heavy bombing had 
been cancelled. Moreover, a familiarisation programme 





the lead bombardiers and navigators of the heavy 
bomber groups were flown over the Allied troop 
positions and the route to the target area in 
reconnaissance aircraft, the experienced pilots of 
which pointed out the front line and target markers. 
Some 175 such flights, each of over one hour's 
duration, were flown. 103 
BUCKLAND commenced on the afternoon of April 9th, 
some 825 B-17's and B-24's carpeting German positions 
along the Senio with 1,692 tons of (mostly) 
fragmentation bombs. This was followed by fighter- 
bomber attacks on specific gun positions and command 
posts. The bombing was well concentrated and was, for 
the most part, followed up quickly on the ground, a 
subsequent report stating that, 
in many instances troops in the attack zones were so 
confused and demoralized by the attacks that they 
offered no resistance to advancing Allied forces and 
surrendered without a struggl e. 104 
However, not all the bombs landed among German 
positions. Through aircrew error one formation of 18 
heavy bombers unloaded over the concentration area of 
a Polish battalion, causing heavy casualties. Eighth 
Army later admitted that, 
.. if more attention 
bad been paid to ensuring that 
troops took cover during the heavy bomber attacks 
casualties would not have been so heavy 
but rightly added that this, 
,.. in no way excuses the Complete error in bombing 
which was made by the aircraft concerned. 1105 
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Close air support accounted for only a small 
fraction of the Allied heavy bomber effort. From D-Day 
to the end of the war in Europe RAF Bomber Command 
flew 182,549 operational sorties, of which less than 
10,000 sorties were provided in close support. Even if 
the total of sorties directed against targets other 
than in close support but which were related to the 
ground battle, such as attacks on communications, is 
included the total is still less than 24,000 
sorties. 106 During the same period the Eighth Air Force 
flew over 227,000 operational sorties of which less 
than 10,000 were in close support. 107 
iioreover, heavy bomber losses in close support 
operations were far from prohibitive. They encountered 
little or no air opposition, while the flak 
encountered was either effectively smothered by the 
bomb carpet or silenced by friendly artillery. Table 
IV outlines the number of Allied heavy bombers lost 
during the principal close support missions in North 
West Europe, and shows that for a total of some 14,826 
sorties losses amounted to only 53 aircraft, or 
0.35%. 108 
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This can be contrasted with the losses sustained on 
other mission types. Table V shows Bomber Command 
losses in raids upon communications (mostly railway) 
targets in France and synthetic oil plants in Germany 
during June 1944 alone, losses amounting to 210 
aircraft in 3,840 sorties, or 5.4%. Table VI shows 
Eighth Air Force losses in raids against strategic 
targets in Germany during June-July 1944. In addition 
to aircraft missing in action these include returned 
aircraft written-off through damage, losses being 276 
aircraft in 12,664 sorties, or 2.1%. 109 
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Communications 6-7/6/44 1,065 11 1,0 
" 7-8/6/44 337 28 8,3 
10-11/6/44 432 18 4.1 
" 12-13/6/44 671 23 3.4 
Oil 12-13/6/44 303 17 5,6 
Communications 15-16/6/44 224 11 4,9 
Oil 16-17/6/44 321 31 9,6 
011 21-22/6/44 139 37 26,6 
Communications 28-29/6/44 230 20 8,6 
' 
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' 29/6/44 1,150 19 1.6 
' 7/7/44 1,129 40 3,5 
' 11/7/44 1,176 25 2,1 
' 13/7/44 1,043 20 1,9 
' 16/7/44 1,087 16 1,4 
' 19/7/44 1,242 21 1,6 
20/7/44 1,172 20 1.7 
' 21/7/44 1,110 34 3,0 
29/7/44 1,130 18 1,5 
31/7/44 1,191 16 1,3 
Yet the important questions are to what extent the 
diversion of effort to close support hindered 
persistence with the strategic campaign, and whether 
this could be justified. 
Unlike, for example, the bombing of communications 
targets in France during the spring of 1944 as a 
prelude to OVERLORD, the relatively small heavy bomber 
effort accorded to close support in 1944-45 did not 
result in a significant reduction in the level of 
- 311 - 
attack upon strategic targets. Nevertheless, further 
escalation of close support missions, the trend of 
which was seen in Normandy before the breakout, posed 
a potentially serious threat to the effectiveness of 
the strategic offensive. This would have been hard to 
justify because, although hampered by disputes over 
targeting priorities, the bomber offensive ultimately 
proved to have decisive results. 
One result was that the bombing of oil targets, 
with particular emphasis upon those plants producing 
aviation fuel, brought the Luftwaffe to the point of 
collapse. In April 1944 German production of aviation 
fuel stood at 175,000 tons, by June it was reduced to 
55.000 tons, in July it was 35,000 tons, falling to 
16,000 tons in August and only 7,000 tons in 
September. The resulting fuel famine compelled the 
Luftwaffe to cease initial flying training, nearly all 
medium and heavy bomber units were disbanded, while 
aerial reconnaissance and army support were severely ((( 
curtailed. This, along with the need to concentrate 
air resources to defend the Reich, meant that the 
Luftwaffe virtually disappeared from the 
battlefronts. 110 The strategic offensive was thus a 
zaajor contributary factor to the air superiority 
enjoyed by the Allied tactical air forces. 
Xoreover, the Luftwaffe's fighter force, almost 
totally committed to defence against the daylight 
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bombing of Germany, was relentlessly destroyed through 
air combat attrition. A post-war RAF analysis of 
fighter losses in defensive operations examined the 
Luftwaffe's battle against the USAAF daylight 
offensive over Germany between November 1943, when 
long-range US fighters began to accompany the bombers 
deep into Germany, and August 1944. It observed that, 
The G. A. F. [German Air Force], at the beginning of 
the period, was numerically inferior to the attack 
and this Inferiority increased steadily throughout 
the period. The average exchange rate between 
defence and attack was about ten German fighters to 
eight U. S. A. F. aircraft, and this in the 
circumstances, worked very much to the detriment of 
the defence. The G. A. F. attempted to respond to the 
increased frequency of attack but only by decreasing 
the average size of the fighter force deployed for 
any given raid. In other words the defence was 
wasting away, and was probably a beaten force even 
before petrol shortage became an important factor-111 
Over a thousand German fighter pilots were lost 
between January and April 1944 alone, among them many 
irreplaceable experienced operational commanders. 112 
Such losses inevitably brought a decline in quality 
and fighting efficiency as inadequately trained pilots 
were committed to battle, which in turn invited heavy 
casualties. 113 
The effect of bombing 
capacity' to wage war 
strategists to determine 
subsequent research has 
With regard to industrl 
pointed out that, 
upon the German economy and 
was difficult for Allied 
accurately at the time, but 
confirmed that it was great. 
al output Richard Overy has 
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Bombing placed a ceiling on German war production 
wbicb was well below what Germany, with skilful and 
more urgent management of its resources, was capable 
of producing after 1943.114 
In late 1944 there began an increased emphasis upon 
the bombing of transportation targets within Germany. 
In October Tedder had argued that the primary Allied 
air objective should be German communications, this 
being, 
The one common factor in the whole German war 
effort, from the pol i teal control down to the supply 
of troops in the front line.. 115 
Tedder's plan was adopted by SHAEF and ratified by the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff on November 1st, the result 
being that communications targets were accorded second 
priority after oil. The effectiveness of the 
subsequent offensive upon German communications, 
particularly the German railway system, has been 
analysed by Alfred C. Mierzejewski, who states that, 
.. the repeated bombing of marsball ing yards, canals, 
and viaducts denied real resources to German 
industry and to the Wehrmacht. It prevented the 
distribution of coal, fatally disorganized the 
exchange of components, and compelled German 
industry to consume its reserves of botb. 116 
The attrition of the Luftwaffe, the destruction of 
German oil producing capacity, and the disruption of 
German industry and communications could only be 
achieved and maintained by a continuous bombing 
offensive. It was not enough to bomb such targets as 
factories, oil refineries and marshalling yards once; 
if they were to remain inoperative repeat attacks were 
1 
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necessary at intervals when the weather allowed. Thus 
the strategic air forces might be faced with the 
choice of assisting the armies or putting an oil 
refinery out of action for several weeks. In view of 
this, Army demands for heavy bomber support, and the 
level of such support that was provided, appears far 
more consequential than the number of sorties might 
suggest. While there was scope for a limited diversion 
of - heavy bomber effort to assist the armies without 
seriously compromising the bomber offensive, 
escalation could only have been at the expense of 
achieving strategic goals. 
Hence the bitter recriminations of the airmen when, 
in their opinion, the Army wasted or misused bomber 
support, and their concern at increasing Army demands 
for such support. In October 1944 the British Chief 
of the Air Staff, Air Chief Xarshal Portal, wrote to 
Tedder that, 
.. the constant application of heavy bomber power to 
the land battle, when it is not essential and when its 
only purpose is to save casualties, must eventually 
lead to the demoralisation of the Army.. 
Tedder agreed, and observed that the Army had indeed 
been 'drugged with bombs' 117 
The airmen were acutely aware of the need to 
maintain the pressure upon Germany, but the soldiers 
were primarily concerned with their need to overcome 
German defences at less cost, for which they were 
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willing to risk the drawbacks of employing the heavy 
bombers - even short bombing. The result was a bitter 
divergence of views, exacerbated by unfortunate 
timing. In 1944-45 Army demands for bomber support 
occured at the time when the strategic air offensive 
was at last starting to show positive results. Yet the 
soldiers were aware that, in both Italy and North-West 
Europe, but particularly the latter, infantry 
casualties were proving far heavier than had been 
anticipated, and for the British and Canadians reached 
crisis proportions due to the lack of replacements. 118 
The operational results of employing the strategic air 
weapon in a tactical role were mixed. No close support 
operation by heavy bombers was ever completely 
successful, being marred either by short bombing, 
insufficient casualties and damage being inflicted 
upon the Germans to be decisive, or by the consequent 
obstruction hindering the Allied troops. The reason 
was that, as the senior airmen knew, heavy bombers 
were poor battlefield attack aircraft. They lacked 
flexibility to respond to the changing patterns of the 
land battle. Unlike the tactical air forces, trained 
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to work in close liaison with ground forces, heavy 
bombers could not be called up at short notice by the 
forward troops to assist the progressive stages of an 
advance; Lancasters and B-17s could not fly cab-rank. 
Heavy bomber strikes from bases distant from the 
battlefront required detailed planning and staff work, 
crew briefing and aircraft preparation. Their 
intervention brought a rigidity to the battle area, 
with troops having to relinquish often hard-fought 
ground in order to observe bomblines much more 
extensive than those imposed by tactical aircraft. 
Consequently the heavy bomber contribution to 
offensive operations could only be made in the initial 
stage of a set-piece attack. 
The object of bombing was then to render German 
forces vulnerable to attack and incapable of resisting 
effectively by causing the maximum possible 
destruction, obstruction, and demoralisation. Bombing 
had the potential to inflict heavy casualties upon 
German troops and to destroy much of their equipment, 
but only when they were concentrated in the bombing 
zone. Such occurrences were rare. In open areas German 
forces were too well dispersed to offer profitable 
targets. The bomb pattern achieved in an attack by RAF 
" heavy bombers on any one target, regardless of the 
weight of attack, remained fairly constant, with nine- 
tenths or more of the bombs falling within a 1,000 
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yard radius. Against widely dispersed targets this was 
uneconomic. Some positions were overhit with others 
remaining untouched, while many bombs fell where there 
were no German positions at all. 119 
For the same reason pinpoint targets were very 
difficult to destroy by bombing and required a 
prohibitively high investment of sorties and bomb 
tonnage to offer a reasonable chance of destruction. 
This explains the small amount of equipment found 
destroyed and the relatively few German dead 
subsequently found by ORS investigations, though with 
regard to the latter there is reason to believe that 
the Gernnans removed their dead before the arrival of 
Allied troops when opportunity allowed. 
With the possible exception of Panzer Lehr during 
COBRA, the level of casualties and destruction caused 
by bombing was never enough to be in itself decisive - 
but with regard to COBRA the critical factor in the 
success of the operation was the lack of depth of the 
German defence. Bombing was more successful in 
causing obstruction. On June 30th 1944 266 aircraft of 
Bomber Command delivered 1,100 tons of bombs on a road 
junction at Villers-Bocage in Normandy through which 
tanks of the German 2nd and 9th Panzer Divisions would 
have to pass in order to counter-attack the Allied 
beachhead - the resulting obstruction ensured that no 
such attack took place. 120 This was an example of what 
- 318 - 
only heavy bombing could achieve, but in close support 
the causing of such obstruction also hindered the 
progress of Allied troops. Yet when, as in the 
GOODWOOD tank run, fragmentation bombs were employed 
in order to avoid this the amount of destruction 
inflicted upon the well dug-in German troops was less 
than could have been achieved with high-explosive 
crater bombs. This dilemma could never be 
satisfactorily solved, and the only workable method 
evolved was to use fragmentation bombs in the path of 
an attack while crater bombing was employed on German 
rear areas and on the flanks to obstruct German 
counter-attacks. 
The principal advantage of heavy and medium bombing 
in close support was that of rendering German troops 
and equipment temporarily incapable of functioning as 
a result of vibratory shock and also, temporarily, 
reducing the morale and will to fight of troops 
subjected to intense and prolonged bombardment. As 
Charles Carrington observed, 'The enemy were dazed and 
deafened ratber than trilled. '12) Bombing came with 
little warning, and to the effect of surprise was 
added the shock caused by the tremendous concentration 
of firepower that the bombers could deliver in a short 
time. Even if few troops were killed or wounded, many 
were left reeling from the effects of such 
bombardment, communications with headquarters were 
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often cut and, though few guns and tanks were actually 
destroyed, many were unmanned and buried under debris. 
In the period immediately after sustained heavy 
bombing the whole machinery of defence was disrupted 
and left vulnerable to attack. 
One example of the weight of high explosive that the 
bombers could deliver is seen by comparing the bomb 
tonnage and weight of artillery employed at the start 
of WELLHIT. In an initial fireplan lasting 85 minutes 
328 guns fired 19,324 shells, or 524 tons, whereas 690 
heavy bombers dropped 3,356 tons - the weight of 
artillery being less than 20% of the high explosive 
delivered by the bombers. 122 This was vital to the 
success of the operation, as the supporting artillery 
was insufficient to silence the German batteries which 
caused most of the 634 casualties sustained by 3rd 
Canadian Division during the assault. 123 Vithout the 
bombing the Canadian artillery would have been 
overcommitted. unable to both neutralise the German 
defences at the outset of the attack and engage in 
counter-battery fire, with Canadian casualties 
consequently heavier or the operation postponed. 
When its disruptive and morale effects could be 
rapidly exploited by the assault troops, as at 
Boulogne and during BLUECOAT, heavy bombing could save 
both time and casualties. The available artillery 
alone could not have smothered the German forward 
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defences to the extent necessary for operations on the 
scale of GOODWOOD or COBRA to be mounted, and tactical 
aircraft, while more appropriate than heavy bombers 
for rapid-response and progressive close air support, 
lacked sufficient bomb carrying and delivery 
capability. The value of fighter-bombers, and even 
mediums, lay in extending and prolonging the effects 
of bombardment initiated by the heavy bomber strike. 
Both GOODWOOD and QUEEN would have progressed further 
had tactical aircraft been able to intervene more 
effectively, while during COBRA the provision of 
continuous fighter-bomber cover for the US armour was 
a decisive factor in the subsequent success of the 
breakout. 
Yet a further commitment to close air support by the 
heavy bombers, beyond supporting the armies at the 
outset of a limited number of major operations, could 
not have been justified. It would have meant a 
reduction in the strategic offensive for which they 
had been developed and trained, and the wasting of a 
major asset, in that a strategic weapon would have 
been, as the airmen feared, frittered away in a 
tactical role when there already existed large 
tactical air forces. Results on the battlefield would 
not have justified such a step, while to abate the 
strategic offensive would have almost certainly 
permitted Germany to continue the war beyond May 1945. 
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A greater commitment to close support would have been 
equally inappropriate for medium bombers, for they 
enabled the tactical air forces to strike at targets 
beyond fighter-bomber range, and at battle area 
targets requiring a greater weight of attack. 
Yet, on occasion, heavy and medium bombers could 
provide an important increment to the firepower 
available to Allied troops. The problem in 1944-45 was 
that on such occasions their value was compromised by 
poor air-ground liaison. The drawbacks with such 
support were not inevitable. Operations BLUECOAT, 
WELLHIT, COBRA, and even GOODWOOD though it ultimately 
failed, proved that German defence effectiveness could 
be significantly, if temporarily, reduced while both 
WELLHIT and QUEEN proved that the risk of short 
bombing could be minimised. While it would have been 
unsound to devote valuable time and effort to train 
the heavy bomber forces for close support, a greater 
degree of liaison during the planning and execution of 
operations would have ensured both that the bombing 
was better exploited and that fewer Allied troops were 
killed by Allied bombs. That this did not occur until 
a late stage was the responsibility of both the senior 
airmen and soldiers - the former because the bomber 
support was only grudgingly provided, and the latter 
because they failed to comprehend and adjust to its 
inherent characteristics. 
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CHAPTER VII. 
FIGHTER-BOMBERS AND ARTILLERY: 
A CO PAR I SON OF EFFECTIVENESS. 
Introduction. 
The campaigns in Italy and North-West Europe in 1943- 
45 saw developments in air/ground communications and 
control resulting in an improved level of 
responsiveness and air/ground integration between the 
Allied armies and their supporting tactical air 
forces. Both campaigns also saw the results of 
similar, and parallel, improvements in communication 
and responsiveness within the ground forces' intrinsic 
close support arm - the artillery. The object of this 
chapter is to determine the relative merits of 
artillery and tactical aircraft in the close support 
role, and to address the question of why, when both 
the British and US artilleries had become proficient 
at rapidly concentrating firepower in the immediate 
support of infantry and armour, close air support was 
considered necessary. 
1 
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The most important advantage of artillery was that it 
could provide fire support in all weathers, day or 
night. In contrast, the fighter-bombers of 1944/45 
were unable to operate effectively at night, while 
their employment in daylight could be prevented or 
considerably reduced by adverse weather, even in 
summer. Normandy in June and July 1944 saw more cloud, 
wind and rain than at any time recorded since 1900 and 
on many days air missions could not be flown. For 
example, between June 26th and July 24th the US IX TAC 
was able to fly only 900 sorties in support of US 
First Army, it being calculated later that the weather 
had cancelled as much as 50% of the potential air 
support. 1 
In winter, with fewer daylight hours and the 
increased likelihood of poor flying weather, a 
reduction in available air support was inevitable. The 
experience of RAF Desert Air Force in Italy may be. 
taken as typical. In November 1944 there were nine 
days during which the weather permitted only 180 
sorties to be flown; in December there were at least 
10 days when operations were completely suspended or 
confined to weather reconnaissance sorties and a 
further eleven days when operations were restricted. 
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In January 1945 there were seven days when flying was 
impossible and a further three days confined to 
weather reconnaissance sorties. 2 
Artillery, moreover, could command a considerable 
area - including the zone within 7,000/8,000 yards of 
the line of contact where close air support was likely 
to be required. Shelford Bidwell has observed that the 
25-pounder gun/howitzer, the principal British and 
Commonwealth field gun of World War II with a fighting 
range of 11,000 yards and an arc of 900, when 
positioned 3,000 yards behind the front. line, could 
dominate 30 square miles of enemy territory. 3 The 
principal British and US artillery equipments of 
1943-45 are shown in Table 1.4 




ISH AND U. S. ARTILL 
IN YARDS / MILES_ 
ERY EQUIPMENTS. 
RATE OF FIRE 
25-pounder gun/howitzer 13,500 (7.6 miles) 4 rounds per minute 
5,5-inch gun/howitzer 16,200 (9,2 miles) 1 round per minute 
7,2-inch howitzer 16,900 (9,6 miles) I round per minute 
155-Ne gun 25,715 (14.6 miles) I round per minute 
155-mm howitzer 16,000 (9 miles) 2 rounds per minute. 
105-mm howitzer 12,500 (7,1 riles) 4 rounds per minute 
The ranges of these guns show to what extent artillery 
could dominate the battle area, and in the early 
stages of both campaigns it was an avowed principle of 
the Allied Tactical Air Forces not to engage targets 
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within artillery range. In 1944 the RAF Desert Air 
Force in Italy reported that 
When it is possible to put smoke onto a target by 
shell fire, it will usually be found that (the) 
request for air support against that particular 
target will be refused, the reason being that It 
will be considered to be an artillery target. 5 
This was also the view of the USAAF. A former US 
fighter-bomber pilot recalls of a spell of duty as a 
forward air controller in Italy that, 
One ground rule was that air strikes were not to 
replace artillery. Attempts had to have been made to 
take out targets by artillery, or reasons given why 
they couldn't, before we accepted and sent air 
strikes on them. 6 
Yet, for the air forces to refuse all targets within 
artillery range would have ruled out close support. 
That this did not happen was initially the result of 
necessity. A post-war US study of air support admitted 
that, 
.. the previous air force conception that fighter 
bomber aircraft should not be used on targets 
within the range of ground artillery should not be 
an inflexible rule. Early in .. NORMAIINDY It became 
apparent to staff officers In the combined air- 
ground operations centers that various factors 
affected this preconceived tenet, and that each 
request should be considered from all angles. .7 
One of these factors was whether enough guns were 
available to engage a target successfully. In 1944 RAF 
Desert Air Force acknowledged that, even if a target 
could be indicated by artillery, it would be attacked 
by fighter-bombers if insufficient guns could be 
brought to bear. 8 Linked to this was the question of 
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whether the terrain in the battle area allowed for 
suitable artillery deployment, an acute problem in the 
mountainous areas of Italy. 
There were occasions when it was imperative for 
fighter-bombers to act as a substitute for artillery. 
One such occurred in late June 1944, after storms 
swept the OMAHA and UTAH landing beaches in Normandy 
and disrupted the scheduled arrival of artillery units 
and ammunition. Fighter-bombers of the US 9th Air 
Force had to be employed in close support against what 
normally would have been regarded as artillery 
targets. This proved successful, and a subsequent US 
study acknowledged that, 
... a refusal of requests from corps and divisions 
for close air support against targets that were 
within artillery range could have had a serious 
effect on our efforts to consolidate the beachhead 
and capture the Port of CHERBOURG. 9 
Another reason why close support from fighter-bombers 
was sometimes essential was shortage of artillery 
ammunition. For example, the participation of the 
Desert Air Force fighter-bombers in Operation CYGNET 
in Italy in January 1945 (see above, Chapter IV) had 
been requested primarily because of the severe 
shortage of artillery ammunition in Eighth Army at 
that time which saw the 25-pounders restricted to only 
10 rounds per gun per day. 10 
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Close support, either by fighter-bombers or artillery, 
consisted of either pre-arranged airstrikes or 
artillery bombardments laid on as preparation for a 
planned attack, or of impromptu support provided in 
response to developments at the battlefront. The 
latter, to be of use to those requesting it, had to be 
provided quickly. Fighter-bombers, flying from landing 
grounds often considerable distances from the target 
area, could not normally provide such support as 
rapidly as artillery positioned at or near the 
battlefront. Such support was the primary task of 
artillery, and both British and US divisions possessed 
considerable organic artillery firepower. 
Each US infantry division had three battalions of 
field artillery, each with twelve 105mm howitzers, 
and one battalion of twelve 155mm medium howitzers. 
Its British counterpart had three regiments of field 
artillery, each of twenty-four 25-pounders subdivided 
into three batteries of eight guns which in turn were 
subdivided into troops of four guns. British and US 
armoured divisions were also equipped with self- 
propelled artillery (see Chapter IV above). 11 
By 1944 Allied gunners were able to concentrate the 
fire of these guns in response to support requests 
with remarkable speed. In the British and Commonwealth 
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forces this was due to the adoption of a fire control 
system which enabled support requests to be rapidly 
answered by the fire of massed guns, the principal 
factor being an efficient network of radio 
communication. Each troop and battery commander of a 
British artillery regiment was equipped to form an 
obervation post (OP) and, while remaining independent, 
batteries became affiliated to support particular 
battalions. This inculcated the battery commander and 
his OP officers with a strong committment to support 
'their' battalion, and they usually became regarded as 
as much a part of the battalion as its company 
commanders. 12 
By radio the Forward Observation Officers (FOO's1 
attached to the forward troops, those with armoured 
regiments riding in their own tanks, could call direct 
for fire support from, if required, every gun within 
range. Troops, batteries and regiments all operated on 
the same radio network, or 'net', and were controlled 
by a master OP working on a headquarters frequency 
able to 'step in' and directly order regiments to 
engage targets - functioning in much the same way. as 
the RAF's Forward Control Post in the broadly similar 
Air Support Signals Unit system. 
This method was pioneered by MaJor-General H. J. 
Parham when serving as Commander Royal Artillery (CRA) 
of the 38th Division in England in 1941. By dispensing 
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with the hitherto 'hierarchical' chain of command in 
dealing with support requests (i. e. from troop to 
battery to regiment to headquarters for approval and 
back) much time was saved. Moreover, Parham dispensed 
with the lengthy pursuit of extreme accuracy in 
artillery fire when dealing with such requests, 
realising that speed was of more importance. In a 
conventional fire control system the fire of a battery 
could be corrected quite rapidly by adjusting to left 
or right or longer or shorter by the battery's own 
sights, but in other batteries engaging the same 
target compensating corrections had to be calculated. 
In Parham's system this was obviated, a new type of 
fire order being introduced using compass points. 
Shelford Bidwell describes how guns could be ordered 
to shift their fire, say, to a point 400 yards North- 
East of where it was falling, abbreviated to 'Go X. E. 
400' - an order applicable to every battery without 
correction regardless of the position of the OF. The 
resulting spread of shot when engaging a target 
simultaneously with three or four regiments 
compensated for initial inaccuracy in spotting the 
target. 13 
The system became known by the letters of the 
phonetic alphabet employed; 'UNCLE' for 1U1 which was 
a call for support from the entire divisional 
artillery, and 'MIKE' for ' M' calling for the fire of 
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a regiment. It was not intended to replace more 
traditional methods, such as accurate survey which was 
vital in the preparation of fireplans for predicted 
fire, but it did provide a means of handling massed 
artillery as a single fire unit, able to switch fire 
rapidly from point to point by radio control in 
response to any emergency. Its simplicity enabled 
infantry and tank officers to understand and use it if 
their accompanying FOO became a casualty, and it could 
be extended to call on the guns not just of one 
division but also of other divisions, and of the 
separate groupings of field, medium, and heavy 
artillery of the Army Groups Royal Artillery (AGRA's) 
that were usually attached to Corps. And it was fast; 
divisional concentrations could usually be put down 
within 5 minutes of the radio alert of an 'Uncle 
Target'. 14 Even when further extended the system 
remained swift. The attack on the HITLER LINE in Italy 
by First Canadian Corps on May 23rd 1944 saw the first 
employment of the WILLIAM TARGET, calling on the guns 
of an entire army corps, and on one occasion a call 
for support was answered by 19 field, 9 medium, and 2 
heavy regiments engaging the target simultaneously 
with 668 guns - 3,506 rounds, or 92 tons of high 
explosive, being delivered within 33 minutes of the 
original request. 15 
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The system employed by the US artillery differed in 
that forward observation officers were precisely that; 
they observed, reported, but could not order fire. 
Decisions as to whether a target were engaged, the 
number of guns and scale of fire employed were taken 
by more senior officers at a fire direction centre 
behind the battlefront. This meant that decisions were 
based on much wider intelligence than provided by a 
single FOO in the front line caught up in his own 
particular battle, but the response time could be 
slower than in the British system. 16 However, against 
targets that had been previously registered the US 
artillery could respond very quickly, concentrating 
fire in a few minutes upon the receipt of the 
appropriate code word. 17 
By 1943-45 the effectiveness of both the British and 
US artilleries had been further increased by the 
provision of specially trained observers flying over 
the battlefront in light observation aircraft and in 
direct communication with the guns. Targets that would 
not have been observed from the ground could be 
rapidly engaged once spotted from the air. This is 
seen in an example from the fighting for the Anzio 
beachhead in Italy in February 1944. During a German 
counterattack on February 18th Captain William H. 
McKay, a US artillery observer flying over the battle 
area in an L-4 Cub observation aircraft, spotted over 
- 337 - 
2,000 German troops supported by tanks moving to 
exploit a breach made in the Allied line. He radioed 
this information to the artillery of the US 45th 
Division, and within 12 minutes the VI Corps Fire 
Control Centre had concentrated the fire of over 200 
guns - including some British - on the target, which 
shattered the German force; within the next 50 minutes 
McKay caused four further German attempts to be 
similarly broken up. 18 Such was the success of air 
observed fire that by this time many missions were 
directed in this way, for example the US First Armored 
Division's Air OPs were firing more than fifty per 
cent of all observed missions. 19 
In general, fighter-bombers having to fly to the 
battle area could not equal artillery response times, 
though it is true that the distance' from fighter- 
bomber airfields to the battlefront varied 
considerably as the campaigns progressed. In the early 
stages of the Normandy campaign, due to the 
shallowness of the beachead, Allied fighter-bombers 
occupied hastily constructed airfields very close to 
the front line; Desmond Scott recalls that when his 
Typhoon wing (No. 123) moved to Normandy in mid June 
1944 their airfield, near Caen, was only four miles 
from German positions and often under shellfire. 20 In 
such circumstances fighter-bombers were able to take 
off, attack their targets, and return in a matter of 
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minutes, and sometimes airfield personnel were able to 
watch the aircraft attacking the targets that were so 
close. 21 Frequently, however, fighter-bombers had to 
attack targets many miles from their airfields. In 
France during August-September 1944 the US Third Army 
was advancing Eastward from Normandy and also 
reducing German garrisons in Brittany. This required 
units of the supporting US XIX TAC to be widely 
deployed in order to be able to attack targets that 
were sometimes 500 miles apart. 22 
In Italy and North-West Europe in 1943-45 it was 
found that a request for air support from the forward 
troops took an average of about 75 minutes to fulfil, 
the time broken down as in Table II. This could be 
more or less, depending upon such variables as 
distance from the forward airfields to the battle 
area, and the availability of aircraft and their state 
of readiness. 23 
TARLF II_ TYPICAL AVFRAGF FIGHTFR- 
Forward army unit to Army/Air Joint HQ: 
Wing Headquarters to Army unit, arranging 
estimated time of arrival over target: 
Writing messages, pilot briefing, and 
consultations at Army/Air joint headquarters: 









Much depended upon how quickly a fighter-bomber 
squadron could become airborne after having been 
detailed to attack a target. In 1944 RAF Desert Air 
Force outlined the time breakdown for a squadron at 45 
minutes readiness, meaning that all aircraft could 
become airborne 45 minutes after receipt of the target 
by the Wing Operations Room, as follows: 
1) Target is received at Wing Operations Room from the Air Support Control and MORU, 
2) Wing Operations Roos alerts the Squadron Operations Room for briefing, whilst they are on 
route the Wing Commander, ALO's, and Intelligence Officer gather the necessary 
information for the briefing, 
3) Pilots are briefed, taking at least 15 minutes providing no further information is 
required from Air Support Control, 
4) Pilots proceed to dispersal and board their aircraft, arrange saps and flying gear, start 
up and move up to the assembly point on the runway, all this taking at least 10 minutes, 
5) The squadron takes off, forms up, and sets course for the target. As only one aircraft 
could usually take off at a time at least 12 minutes elapsed before course was set for 
the target, The squadron then had to reach the target, which could take anything up to in 
hour depending on the distance of the airfield to the battlefront, 24 
Moreover, after returning from a sortie a considerable 
time elapsed before a squadron of fighter-bombers 
could become airborne again in response to a further 
request. This was due to the time needed for 
refuelling aircraft and rearming them with ammunition 
and bombs, or 'turning around' a squadron as it was 
called. In 1944 the Desert Air Force found that it 
took 1* hours to 'turn around' a squadron of Kittyhawk 
IV's, the time divided as follows: 
Total time for refuelling squadron (approximately 10 minutes per aircraft) with the usual 
two petrol bowsers available: I to M hours, 
Total time to rears and bomb-up aircraft (approximately 15 minutes per aircraft) with two 
crews available working while the aircraft were also being refuelled: 11 hours, 
Time for taxying out to the assembly point and take-off: 12 minutes, 25 
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I 
The only method whereby fighter-bombers could 
respond to support requests in a space of time 
comparable to artillery was that of flying continuous 
patrols over the battle area on CABRANK (see Chapter 
IV above). Some indication of the responsivenes 
possible with CABRANK is shown by an incident during 
the Rhine crossing which occurred on March 26th 1945. 
The 154th Infantry Brigade of 51st (Highland) Division 
called up the FCP in their sector to report a German 
strongpoint in some houses that was delaying their 
advance. The Contact Car with the Brigade was 
authorised by the FCP to call down a section of 
Typhoons from CABRANK and immediately contacted and 
briefed the pilots. Within 3 minutes artillery had 
marked the target with smoke, and within 8 minutes of 
the original request the Typhoons had successfully 
attacked. 26 
This, however, should be regarded as exceptional. An 
average response time was more likely to have been 
similar to that recorded for an air support request 
made by the 9th Brigade of 3rd Canadian Infantry 
Division during the same operation. The Canadians 
called up the FCP controlling their sector giving a 
target of German tanks and asking for the estimated 
arrival of aircraft over the target. Once the RAF 
Squadron Leader at the FCP had checked aircraft 
availability and given an estimated time of arrival 






the Canadians were asked when coloured smoke could be 
fired to indicate the target. The Brigade replied that 
they could 'smoke it this minute if you are ready' 
whereupon the decision was made to assign the mission 
to aircraft on CABRANK in the battle area; briefing 
details and even an available air photograph of the 
target area were passed to the controller who then 
briefed the pilots. In an interesting link up between 
the artillery and air support communications systems, 
during the airstrike contact was maintained between 
the artillery and 9th Brigade by telephone and from 
9th Brigade to the FCP by radio-telephone, so that the 
fall of smoke could be immediately reported to the 
aircraft. Results of the airstrike were then passed to 
9th Brigade, the entire operation taking 18 minutes 
from the original request to reporting of results. 27 
CABRANK offered the immediate availability of 
fighter-bombers to engage targets, but for aircraft to 
achieve responsiveness on a par with artillery was 
hardly economic. Keeping aircraft continually over a 
given area of the battlefront was wasteful in both 
flying hours and petrol stocks, especially as fighter- 
bombers were frequently kept waiting in vain for 
targets and had to leave the CABRANK to attack an 
alternative target in the battle area for which the 
pilots had been briefed before take-off. Such 
alternative targets were no doubt important, but were 
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obviously not of the highest priority and it is 
questionable whether attacking them in any way 
compensated for the absorption of air effort involved. 
An artillery weapon, when not required, involved no 
such wastage. 
Moreover, the commitment of aircraft necessary to 
maintain a CABRANK inevitably resulted in a diminution 
of air effort at other sectors of the battlefront. For 
example, in Italy on November 7th 1944 the Desert Air 
Force flew no less than 309 sorties, most of them 
CABRANK, in support of the attack on Forli by the 
British 46th and 4th Infantry Divisions alone, while 
No. 83 Group's effort in flying 233 sorties on CABRANK 
in support of Guards Armoured Division during the 
first day of Operation MARKET GARDEN in Holland on 
September 17th 1944 had required the commitment of ten 
squadrons. 28 Even in the CABRANK sector the weight of 
air attack against targets was often diminished, 
because in order to maintain continuous patrols 
fighter-bombers were seldom able to operate in more 
than sections of four aircraft. 
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Having established that, at a high cost in air 
resources, fighter-bombers could be as responsive as 
artillery to requests for support, an obvious question 
is whether their attacks were as effective as 
artillery fire. There are two criteria of 
effectiveness; the destructive effect, referring to 
the level of destruction and casualties inflicted, and 
the morale effect. 
Against such typical close support targets as gun 
positions, strongpoints, and field works, the effects 
of fighter-bomber attack and artillery were remarkably 
similar. Pinpoint targets, such as individual gun 
positions, were not easily destroyed. This was largely 
a question of accuracy, as neither artillery nor the 
air delivered bombs and rockets of 1944-45 were 
precision weapons, while such targets proved quite 
resilient to near misses. The following shows the 
limited amount of destruction achieved by Typhoons 
against German gun positions in North-West Europe, 
during operations WELLHIT, the assault on Boulogne in 
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September 1944, and INFATUATE, the capture of 
Walcheren Island in November 1944: 29 
IARGEL NUNREF. QE. ROCKETS EIES 
4 Heavy 16 Medium ) 216 
Gun Emplacements ) (27 Typhoon loads) 
3 Heavy 34 Medium ) 104 
Gun Emplacements ) (13 Typhoon loads) 
4 Medium Gun 62 
Emplacements (8 Typhoons -1 with 6 R/Ps) 
4 Heavy Gun 47 
Emplacements (6 Typhoon loads) 
NUMRER QE STRIKES UL IARGEL L (E STRIKES 




Similarly, during Operation UNDERGO, the assault on 
Calais in September 1944, it was subsequently 
discovered that no damage to weapons had been achieved 
in twelve separate Typhoon attacks on six gun 
positions, involving the expenditure of 375 rockets-30 
This level of destruction improved little as the 
capaign progressed. ORS 2nd TAF investigated a number 
of German gun positions attacked by Typhoons in 
response to requests from the forward British troops 
in Germany in April 1945; they found that only 3 guns 
had been damaged out of 64 attacked in twelve 
positions. 31 
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Against similar targets artillery apparently had 
only slightly more destructive effect. Table IV shows 
the density of artillery fire and damage caused by 
British and Canadian medium guns when engaging a 
battery of German 88mm guns during operations to clear 
the Channel Ports in September 1944. On this occasion 
it was discovered that even if a medium shell landed 
in the gunpit, the chance of putting the gun out of 
action was small-32 
TABLE 111. EFFECTS OF COUNTER-BATTERY FIRE IN NORTH-VEST EUROPE. 
TARGET NUMBER OF NUMBER OF NUMBER OF ROUNDS IN A CIRCLE 
GERMAN GUNS GERMAN GUNS OF DIAMETER 300 YARDS 
KNOCKED OUT 
I5x 8822 1 3,600 
II 6x 88i. 2 5,700 
DENSITY OF ROUNDS IN 
lbs PER SQUARE YARD 
. 051 
. 081 
Much the sane level of destruction was found in Italy 
when the British Army's No. 1 ORS examined the effects 
of counter-battery fire on German field gun and 
'nebelwerfer' multiple-barrel mortar positions. They 
found that of 44 guns and nebelwerfers in 22 positions 
only 8 (18%) were damaged. 33 
The lethality of artillery and air attack was also 
variable. Against fleldworks the effectiveness of 
rockets and bombs was questionable. In 1945, after 
- 346 - 
analysing operational data from the fighting in 
Germany, ORS 2nd TAF noted that, 
.. open positions consisting of trenches and fox- 
holes suffered little or no damage from this type 
of attack. 34 
Bombs needed direct hits to destroy such positions, 
while the anti-personnel value of rockets was limited 
against troops in fieldworks. In 1945 the joint 
No. 2 ORS/ORS 2nd TAF investigation of Typhoon 
effectiveness admitted that the 60-lb semi armour 
piercing (SAP) rocket, with which Typhoons were 
equipped, could, 
.. only be seriously lethal if it happens to catch 
men inside a building which it penetrates; against 
troops In the open it penetrates too far into the 
ground to be dangerous. 35 
In the same report the ORS noted that they found only 
one instance of significant personnel casualties 
being inflicted by rockets. This occurred during the 
assault on Calais (Operation UNDERGO) where a Canadian 
Medical Officer reported that he had attended to 70 
German casualties, 12 of whom (17%) were thought to 
have been rocket victims. 36 In fact it was found that 
only strafing attacks had been successful in 
inflicting significant casualties upon troops in 
fieldworks, the higher degree of accuracy possible and 
the larger number of rounds fired offering an 
increased chance of rounds penetrating trenches and 
foxholes and finding a mark. 37 
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The level of personnel casualties inflicted by 
artillery was also variable, but most evidence 
suggests that relatively few casualties would be 
caused by even heavy bombardment to troops occupying 
well protected positions. This can be seen in an 
example of German artillery engaging Allied troops 
which was considered to be of sufficient interest for 
the US Army to record it. On the night of 2nd October 
1944 some 200 US troops occupying deep and well 
protected foxhole positions were subject to a 
bombardment by German mortars and artillery in 
preparation for an attack by German assault engineers 
and infantry. Between 2,000-3,000 high-explosive 
rounds were fired and covered the US positions in an 
area 1,500 by 1,000 yards, yet the US casualties 
caused by this and the subsequent fighting amounted to 
only 8 men, or 4%. 38 
But troops less well protected or in the open could 
expect heavy casualties from artillery. In early 1944 
No. 1 ORS of the British Army reckoned that if enemy 
troops occupied only slit trenches, and were subject 
to a rate of fire of one 25-pounder shell per 42 
square yards for a period of some 4 hours, then about 
17% casualties would result. If the more lethal 
airburst shells were employed, then 30% casualties 
could be expected. 39 An example from the Italian 
campaign seems to confirm this. On September 19th 1944 
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a regiment of British 25-pounders fired 432 rounds in 
an hour on each of two German hill top positions in 
the GOTHIC LINE near Casaglia. The fire was observed 
from an OP and was seen to cover an area 300 by 300 
yards, later ground examination showed that one shell 
had burst every 6 yards. Early the following day 
British troops captured 6 prisoners from the position 
who stated that their company had sustained 23 
casualties during the shelling and had afterwards 
withdrawn, taking their casualties with them. The 
German troops had occupied slit trenches only 1-2 feet 
deep, and some had been in the open, and many of their 
casualties had been from splinters- caused by 
airbursts. 40 
Such artillery bombardments, of some duration, are 
not really comparable with fighter-bomber attack. 
Unlike fighter-bomber pilots, artillery gunners had 
the opportunity to correct aim and bring their targets 
under prolonged fire. 41 However, if a rapid 
concentrat$. on had to be. put down quickly in response 
to a request for fire, pinpoint accuracy would not be 
possible. Similarly, when conducting counter-battery 
fire against enemy gun positions with the intention of 
silencing them, the object was to saturate the target 
with fire. In this respect, the effectiveness of both 
artillery and fighter-bomber attack depended not so 
much on the target being destroyed, but neutralized - 
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in other words the morale effect could be more 
important than the destructive effect. 
Early in 1944 the British Army attempted to analyse 
the morale effect of artillery fire. The following 
quotation from a report by No. 1 ORS suggests that 
opinion varied as to whether a sudden, short, but 
heavy bombardment would have a more pronounced effect 
than one of longer duration: 
Psychologists consider that IS men are exposed to 
sufficient strain for a sufficient length of time 
they will be brought to a state of moral collapse 
such that for a considerable period they will be 
unable to fight effectively.... The essence of the 
kind of collapse intended is that it takes a 
considerable time to recover from it. Men may be 
petrified with fright by a short, intense 
bombardment and yet recover In a minute or two after 
the shelling ceases. But according to the 
psychologists... a much less frightening experience 
(though still above a certain minimum of strain), if 
continuous and prolonged, will ultimately produce a 
breakdown from which recovery will be a matter of 
hours. 42 
Whether a morale effect was achieved at all depended 
upon a number of variables. One was the nature of the 
defences protecting the target troops; they had to 
feel vulnerable. A British Army report on artillery 
fire in 1944 noted that, 
It has been established... that if men are In such 
strong defences that casualties can not be 
inflicted they are not likely to be demoralised by 
any bombardment, however long sustained, and such 
bombardments are a waste of ammunition. 43 
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Another variable was the quality of the troops under 
bombardment. Troops of poor morale, especially of low 
grade formations, or who were inexperienced, might be 
more susceptible to demoralisation. In contrast, 
troops of high quality often proved remarkably 
resilient, obvious examples being the German paratroop 
defenders of Cassino and the SS troops containing the 
British and Canadian troops around Caen - both of whom 
offered determined resistance to Allied attacks even 
after saturation bombing by heavy bombers and the 
heaviest artillery bombardments. 
Some weapons caused a greater level of 
demoralisation than others. By the end of 1944 Allied 
gunners were employing the radar proximity fuse 
(originally developed for anti-aircraft use) which had 
a greater lethality than conventional shells. This was 
first employed by US forces during the fighting in the 
Ardennes in December 1944 and proved so deadly, 
especially against troops caught in the open, that 
General Patton was moved to write that, 
The new shell with the funny fuze is devastating. 
The other night we caught a German battalion, which 
was trying to get across the Sauer River, with a 
battalion concentration and killed by actual count 
702. I think that when all armies get this, we will 
have to devise some new method of warfare. 
By the end of 1944 ground based rocket systems for 
saturation fire were also being employed in North-West 
Europe. British 21st Army Group had submitted a 
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requirement for a weapon capable of delivering a very 
large weight of shell in a short period of time, 
resulting in twelve 'Rocket Projectors 3-inch Mark 
I', enough to equip one battery of two troops each of 
six projectors, being sent to First Canadian Army. 
Known as 'Land Mattress', they were a development of 
the Royal Navy's 'Sea Mattress' rocket system used to 
provide area concentrations in support of seaborne 
landings. Each wheel-mounted projector had 30 barrels 
arranged in 5 banks of 6. Fired electrically by remote 
cable control, Land Mattress could fire either single 
rounds or a 'ripple' and had a maximum rate of fire of 
30 rounds in 7; 4 seconds, the time between salvoes 
being some 10 minutes. 
Land Mattress could quickly saturate an area with 
fire; it was calculated that one salvo from a regiment 
of 36 projectors in 7iä seconds could neutralise an 
area of 350,000 square yards, whereas an equivalent 
salvo from medium artillery required sixty regiments 
of 5.5-inch guns. Moreover, the destructive effect of 
the rockets, each equivalent to a 100-1b shell, was 
great due to their large high-explosive content, while 
the noise of the rockets in flight and their 
detonation had a pronounced demoralising effect on the 
enemy. German prisoners stated that they considered 
Land Mattress far superior to their own Nebelwerfer 
rocket projector, and that it was greatly feared. The 
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rockets also had a heartening effect on friendly 
infantry, particularly as experience during attacks 
proved that they were able to advance safely within 
500 yards of their impact, thereby giving the enemy 
little time to recover. Land Mattress had two major 
drawbacks, however; a slow rate of fire compared to 
orthodox artillery and the amount of time needed to 
assemble ammunition - it took a detachment of 9 men 
some 1/ hours to unload, unbox, assemble and replace 
30 rounds carried in a 3-ton lorry and this could not 
be reduced by dumping as the rockets were affected by 
moisture. First Canadian Army remained the sole 
user. 45 
One problem regarding the morale effect of such 
special ground based weapons was that their particular 
properties could go unnoticed amidst the general 
unpleasantness of a bombardment when they were 
employed with conventional artillery, as was usually 
necessary. This was discovered after the heavy 
preliminary artillery concentrations at the outset of 
VERITABLE, the operation to clear between the rivers 
Maas and Rhine by First Canadian Army in February 
1945, to which both radar proximity shells and Land 
Mattress had contributed. Subsequent interrogation of 
prisoners revealed that the Germans had been 





artillery observer who had monitored the bombardment 
from an OP in the Reichswald. 46 
In contrast, fear engendered by air-to-ground 
weapons tended to be more pronounced. One would expect 
that fear of a weapon would be linked to its 
lethality, and a British prisoner of war 
interrogation report from Normandy confirmed that 
German troops feared strafing above all and that the 
terror effect of this form of attack varied in inverse 
proportion to the altitude from which it was 
delivered, strafing from low level being particularly 
feared. 47 The Americans similarly discovered the 
demoralising effect of strafing. The US XIX Corps 
reported an occasion when its light armoured units 
were trying to take a wooded hill strongly defended by 
anti-tank guns and machine guns; supporting fighter- 
bombers bombed the position but German resistance 
remained such that the US tanks still could not 
advance: 
The squadron was asked to come down again and 
strafe the positions after wbicb the position was 
taken. FW's said the bombing was not so bad, but 
when the 'Jabos' strafed them they lost all will to 
fight and tended to make the men scatter for 
protection regardless of orders. , )Many were found 
biding below the ground and they didn't offer much 
resistance. Nany were killed at their guns and in 
their foxholes by the strafing. 48 
Similarly, during the fighting in the Colmar Pocket in 
January 1945, the advance of the US 3rd Infantry 
Division was held at a canal by German troops firing 
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across it from a wood. All available fighter-bombers 
of XII TAC were called up and strafed the wood for 30 
minutes after which 
.. what was left of the enemy came to the bank of the 
canal wi tb bands up. 49 
American fighter-bombers were also equipped with 
what was probably the most terrifying air-to-ground 
weapon of all; napalm. Apart from the fearsome nature 
of the weapon, its morale effect was enhanced by the 
fact that it could cause considerable damage and 
casualties, especially when employed in conjunction 
with more conventional bombs or even artillery fire. 
Napalm was used extensively by the US Ninth Air Force 
in North-West Europe, and in early 1945 its ORS 
described how napalm considerably reduced German 
defence effectiveness: 
... beavy artillery and/or GP [general purpose] 
bombing destroys or damages buildings, 
communication facilities, prepared defences; 
consequently, the enemy must utilize masses of 
rubble and smashed houses as.. defense positions. 
Napalm... upon the devastated area renders these 
temporary emplacements untenable, causes fires to 
take hold in the wreckage, and drives the enemy 
into the open.... The enemy troops who are not 
evacuated have, In a majority of cases, taken 
refuge in cellars, and are subject to assault 
without being able to offer effective resistance. 50 
When attacking German positions in woods, us 
commanders preferred supporting fighter-bombers to be 
equipped with napalm rather than with conventional 
fragmentation bombs. This was because on the arrival 
of the fighter-bombers German troops always took cover 
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in their slit trenches which normally afforded them 
good protection, whereas napalm caused casualties and 
generated unbearable heat which forced the Germans out 
of these positions. 
While targets such as dense, wet woods, stone and 
concrete buildings, and concrete and steel pillboxes 
proved resistant to napalm's destructive effect, their 
occupants were not immune to fear of the weapon. After 
the assault on the SIEGFRIED LINE in October 1944 the 
US 117th Infantry Regiment reported that, although 
little damage was done to pillboxes by either general 
purpose or napalm bombs, the napalm, 
.. bad a tremendous psychological and physical 
effect upon the enemy troops occupying the defenses 
outside the pill-boxes. These outer defenses were 
given up because of the napalm attack forcing the 
enemy troops Into the pill-boxes. This.. enabled our 
attacking troops to get to the rear of these 
fort]ficatons, utilize pole charges and seize the 
pill-boxes... P/W's stated that napalm did not 
bother them while they were in p112-boxes; however, 
the demoralizing effect was great and fear of 
further attack by "fire bombs" persuaded them to 
av in their pill-boxes. 51 
Yet a weapon did not need to have a high lethality 
in order to have a pronounced morale effect, as the 
German attitude to rocket fire proved. For their joint 
investigation of Typhoon effectiveness No. 2 ORS and 
ORS 2nd TAF questioned about 100 German prisoners, and 
found that '.. all who had been attacked by rockets 
expressed their dread of the weapon. 0 In view of the 
limited destructive effect of the rockets against 
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defence positions the ORS were somewhat at a loss as 
to why this should be so, and concluded that it was 
.. quite definite that it is the nature of the 
attack that upsets the Germans and not the physical 
damage which it causes. None of the prisoners had 
seen any damage or casualties caused by the attacks 
which had so scared them. 52 
Three reasons were suggested to account for this fear 
of rockets. One was that exaggerated tales of the 
effects of rocket attack had spread among German 
troops; another was the noise generated by a diving 
Typhoon, and the third was the unnerving sight of the 
approaching rockets. 53 
With regard to close support of attacks by infantry 
and armour, it was vital to know what scale of effort 
was likely to be required to neutralize the target and 
for how long the German defenders were likely to be 
affected. In both North-West Europe and Italy 
experience showed that the morale effect of 
bombardment, either by air or artillery, was of short 
duration and that if it was to be exploited it was 
imperative to attack immediately or as soon as 
possible after the airstrike or artillery bombardment. 
But operational data from these campaigns also 
indicates that air attack was able to achieve such a 
morale effect quicker than artillery, and that it was 
likely to be of longer duration. 
Much depended on the quality, motivation, and level 
of immunity from physical danger of the German troops 
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on the receiving end of any bombardment, but, as one 
example, an Unteroffizier (Sergeant) of the German 
578th Grenadier Regiment, taken prisoner at I1 Casone 
in Italy on September 30th 1944, told his British 
captors that artillery concentrations were terrifying 
while they lasted but had no such effect by about 
three minutes after they had ceased. He also stated 
that German troops manned their defence positions and 
weapons as soon as the shelling was over as they knew 
the British infantry would be attacking. 54 
This can be contrasted with what could be achieved 
by fighter-bombers. The American experience with 
napalm related above suggests a morale effect of much 
longer duration, while the joint RAF/British Army ORS 
investigation of Typhoon effectiveness calculated, on 
the basis of combat experience, that, 
.. if.. three flights of 
4 (Typhoons) attack a 
position at intervals of 15 minutes, there is 
probably a period of 10 to 20 minutes afterwards 
during which enemy are in no condition to offer 
stiff resistance to attack by ground forces. 5$ 
A typical example was cited which had occurred on 
October 13th 1944 during the heavy and prolonged 
fighting for Overloon in Holland. That morning a 
battalion of British infantry of the 3rd Division 
attacked a German held wood some 300 yards from their 
own woodland positions. This was unsuccessful and they 
were driven back across the open ground with some 
casualties. Air support was then requested and a 
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Typhoon strike made on the German positions at 2 pm. 
The battalion immediately advanced and took the 
position, this time without opposition, its commanding 
officer reporting afterwards that not only had the 
rockets, 
.. successfully unnerved the enemy.. they had also put 
new vigour into bis own men who were somewhat 
disconsolate after the casualties-of the morning. 56 
This is but one of a number of recorded examples 
which indicated that, apart from having a morale 
effect of longer duration, air attack could also cause 
a sudden change in the determination of German troops 
to resist at all. For example, the US 90th Infantry 
Division recorded of its attack on Lightenborn in 
Germany in 1945 that 
German troops surrendered after short skirmishes 
only after 2 air attacks on positions... while before 
they defended the objective for 24 hours with bitter 
resistance. 
The US 9th Infantry Division recorded simply that, 
Every time we have an air mission the rate of 
surrender goes up. '57 
The most striking examples of this occurred when 
fighter-bombers precipitated the surrender of German 
positions without the need to attack. During the 
assault on the Crozon Peninsula in Brittany by the US 
8th Infantry Division a German strongpoint refused to 
surrender, but on the approach of fighter-bombers 
white flags immediately went up. Similarly, later in 
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Germany, the US VII Corps reported how the town of 
Nastatten capitulated after being only 'buzzed' by 
fighter-bombers-58 Similar experiences were recorded 
by British and Canadian forces. On November 1st 1944 
the 8th (Canadian) Reconnaissance Regiment demanded 
the surrender of a German strongpoint on the island of 
North Beveland, which was refused. Air support was 
requested from 2nd TAF's No. 84 Group which, while 
committed at that time to the Walcheren operation, 
agreed to send a squadron of Typhoons over the island 
as a show of strength. The Commander of the 8th Recce 
Regiment warned the Germans that his supporting 
aircraft would make one pass without firing, but that 
afterwards they would attack. The 18 Typhoons appeared 
on schedule, flying low across the island, and as soon 
as they had passed over the first Germans came out to 
surrender - the 8th Recce Regiment taking 450 
prisoners in all. 59 
Apart from the morale effect, there were also more 
practical reasons why Allied troops came to prefer 
close air support to that of artillery. One was that 
fighter-bombers could deliver in a shorter space of 
time a very heavy weight of firepower, which in itself 
must have been a contributory factor to the enhanced 
morale effect. A squadron of 15 Typhoons, each with 
eight 60-lb rockets, could deliver 7,200-lb - or 3.6 
short tons - of high explosive on a target. This was 
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the equivalent of a regiment of 25-pounder guns firing 
at 3 rounds per gun per minute for four minutes and 
would have been delivered in approximately the same 
time. However, in a similar space of time the same 
number of Typhoons, each with two 1,000-lb bombs, 
could deliver up to 15 short tons - to achieve this a 
regiment of 16 British 5.5in medium guns, each firing 
at the rate of one 100-lb shell per minute, would have 
had to fire for some 20 minutes. 
It is true that the fire of many artillery regiments 
could be concentrated on a particular target and in 
both campaigns TOT C'Time on Target') fire, the 
bringing to bear of all guns within range to fire on a 
single target simultaneously, became a frequent 
practice. 60 
However, this type of fire was less useful than 
fighter-bomber strikes because artillery bombardments 
did not permit the assault troops to approach as near 
to their objective, so as_to take maximum advantage of 
the neutralisation or morale effect before those enemy 
troops not killed or wounded recovered from the shock 
of bombardment. A post-war US study discussed the 
merits of artillery and fighter-bomber attacks in 
close support and observed that, 
.. best results were obtained from fighter 
bombers 
In their close support role when the... attack was 
concentrated on key points of resistance within 
very close range. Range dispersion of our 'heavy 
artillery capable of firing as equivalent weight of 
projectile, i. e., the 240 mm howitzer or the 8" gun 
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or howitzer would not permit fire this close, even 
if this artillery or the ammunition therefore were 
always available. On the contrary, effective 
bombing with 500 1 b. GP or 260 1 b. fragmentation 
bombs was conducted by fighter bombers against 
close-in enemy positions sometimes within 300 to 
500 yards of our own -forward elements. Moreover, it 
was felt by many commanders that the terrific 
destructive effect on personnel, materiel, and 
morale of a fighter bomber attack concentrated on 
close-in enemy positions was worth more than any 
artillery preparation, if the air attack was 
followed immediately by a determined infantry 
attack. 61 
To what extent infantry became accustomed to 
exploiting fighter-bomber support was demonstrated to 
the RAF by Canadian troops in Northern France in 1944. 
Two pilots from No. 84 Group were attached to a 
battalion in order to see close air support from the 
ground. They were taken to a viewpoint 150 yards from 
an isolated German pillbox which an infantry company 
was about to assault after a planned airstrike by 
Typhoons. Having seen the target, they asked the 
company commander when they were to move back to watch 
the strike go in, knowing that the danger zone 
extended far beyond their present position. They were 
surprised when told that the strike was expected in 5 
minutes and that there they would stay. The Typhoons 
arrived on schedule, their rockets hit the target 
area, and the infantry immediately attacked and took 
the position without loss. The incident did not 
conform to current theory either in the attack 
position of the infantry or the effectivess of the 
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rockets, but the company commander had witnessed 
previous airstrikes and was more confident of the 
result than the RAF pilots, who had failed to 
appreciate that experienced infantry preferred the 
risk of casualties from their own aircraft to the 
greater danger of lengthening the time and distance of 
the assault. 62 
In much the same way attacking infantry were 
prepared to 'lean on' an artillery barrage, a belt of 
fire moving across enemy positions, by following very 
closely upon the bursting shells in order to arrive on 
the objective before the Germans had time to recover. 
A textbook example of British artillery successfully 
neutralizing a German defence position occurred during 
Operation CLIPPER, the attack on the Geilenkirchen 
salient by 43rd (Wessex) Division in Germany. On 
November 18th 1944 the 5th Dorsets attacked the 
village of Bauchen, held by some 200 German troops 
positioned in open trenches around the village, and 
cleared it at the cost of only 7 casualties, while 
taking 180 prisoners. A subsequent ORS report on the 
attack observed that the Germans, 
.. offered not the slightest resistance, and (were) 
described by the attacking troops as looking 
'absolutely yellow coloured. ' P. W. Interrogated 
later were clearly very shaken physically and said 
they had felt quite overwhelmed with a sense of 
helplessness In the face of immense superlority. 63 
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But such effective neutralisation by artillery 
generally took much longer to achieve than that by 
fighter-bombers. The fire support for the Dorsets had 
consisted of 10 minutes artillery fire followed by 
fire from mortars, 20mm and 40mm guns, and tanks 
lasting for 3 hours and finally by a further 
bombardment of artillery lasting just over 30 minutes 
- or 184% tons of high explosive delivered over 4 
hours. This had not inflicted heavy casualties, 
German losses amounting to between 10-15%, while so 
closely had the Dorsets 'leaned on' the final barrage 
that 4 of their 7 casualties had been caused by their 
own artillery-65 That artillery was unlikely to achieve 
effective neutralization without such prolonged and 
heavy fire was indicated by other attacks during the 
same operation. The objectives of the 7th Somerset 
Light Infantry, 1st Worcester, and 5th Duke of 
Cornwall's Light Infantry were the villages of 
Heiderheide, Rischden, and Hochheid respectively. All 
three objectives were bombarded for only 20-40 
minutes, and the artillery fire was not followed up 
quickly - the 7th Somerset Light Infantry being 30 
minutes behind their concentrations. Although the 
objectives were taken, the difference in the level of 
fire support and the speed of the follow-up between 
these attacks and that at Bauchem is reflected in the 
casualties on both sides. This time German casualties 
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were estimated to have been only 5%, while those of 
the British were reported as being '.. several times 
greater in each battalion than at Bauchem.. '65 
To achieve effective neutralization artillery 
bombardments required a lavish outlay of ammunition. 
As preparation for the opening of Operation VERITABLE 
on February 8th 1945, the area assaulted by twelve 
British and Canadian battalions with tank support had 
been bombarded by field, medium, and heavy artillery 
from 0500 hrs to 0920 hrs, while at the same time the 
German forward defences were the target of a 
'Pepperpot' - harassing fire from every available tank 
gun, mortar, anti-tank gun, anti-aircraft gun and 
medium machine-gun. At 0920 hrs a barrage was started 
by field and medium artillery and lasted for 6 hours. 
In all 1,050 artillery pieces fired some 91,330 shells 
(1,596 tons) in the bombardment and 160,388 shells 
(2,793 tons) for the barrage. Yet, of the total of 
between 2,250 and 2,700 German troops of the 84th 
Infantry Division holding the front in extensive field 
defences, a subsequent British Army ORS investigation 
estimated that less than 60 had become casualties to 
shellfire. Even the neutralization had been patchy, 
the ORS adding that, 
.. when the fire support was followed up closely, the 
enemy surrendered at once. But the effect... was 
transitory. Three battalions got well behind the 
shelling for one reason or another and found the 
enemy recovering and beginning to resist. 66 
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The price of failing to exploit the temporary 
neutralization was high, while 1,115 Germans were 
taken prisoner, many of them reported as being quite 
shaken by the bombardment, British and Canadian 
casualties amounted to 349 (459 if those caused by 
mines are added). Similar use of artillery on a lavish 
scale persisted throughout the course of VERITABLE, 
but some felt this to be counter-productive. The 
commanding officer of 1st Gordon Highlanders 
complained on February 26th that artillery fire was 
excessive, causing too much mud and destruction, and 
that it warned the enemy of impending attack; he 
called for shorter fireplans with the infantry closer 
behind. 67 
This was the crux of the problem of artillery in 
close support. Not only were barrages expensive in 
ammunition, they also demanded precise timing which 
could often be a matter of considerable difficulty, a 
post war British study of wartime artillery tactics 
noting that experience proved that'.. tbe rate of 
advance as planned was seldom achieved in practice. '68 
Mostly the problem was that the barrage advanced too 
fast, leaving the infantry behind. This is what 
occurred on one occasion at Cassino, when a barrage 
advancing- at 100 yards in six minutes began to leave 
the infantry behind from the start. Similarly, during 
the attack on Caumont in Normandy, British tanks had 
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to push on far ahead of the infantry they were 
supporting in order to even reach and cross the start 
line for the attack before the effects of the barrage 
had worn off. Occasionally the barrage could instead 
be too slow. After an attack during the fighting at 
Overloon in Holland British infantry complained that 
the barrage, fired by three divisional artilleries and 
moving at a rate of 100 yards in 5 minutes, had 
actually delayed their advance. 69 
One solution to this problem, which proved successful 
in both Italy and North-West Europe, was to extend the 
barrage by employing waves of fighter-bombers to 
provide what amounted to a moving belt of fire support 
in the path of an attack. With artillery indicating 
the target area, the fighter-bombers were able to give 
the closest possible support to infantry and armour, 
while retaining sufficient elasticity, lacking in pre- 
timed artillery barrages, to conform with the ground 
situation at any time during the progress of an 
attack. 
The first such example occurred in Tunisia in March 
1943. During the battle to break through the MARETH 
LINE, the New Zealand Corps of British Eighth Army 
were confronted by a valley stretching Northwards 
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between two ranges of hills leading to the village of 
El Hamma. The Italian infantry defending this 6,000 
yards bottleneck had been reinforced by the German 
164th and 21st Panzer Divisions with anti-tank guns 
and minefields, so that a formidable obstacle blocked 
the route to Gabes. On learning of the problem, Air 
Vice-Marshal Broadhurst, then commanding Western 
Desert Air Force, conceived the idea of exploiting 
the Allied air superiority by using all available air 
units in a concentrated attack upon this narrow front 
with the object of paralysing the defences for long 
enough to allow the New Zealand infantry, followed by 
armour, to break through. Broadhurst's plan was 
welcomed with enthusiasm by Eighth Army, but not so by 
Broadhurst's immediate superior, Air Marshal Sir 
Arthur Coningham, commanding Allied North-West African 
Tactical Air Force, who had no wish to accustom 
soldiers to having such air resources subordinated to 
their operations and who was also concerned about 
losses likely to be incurred by aircraft attacking at 
the very low level suggested by Broadhurst. However, 
because such use of aircraft could be justified in 
view of the small threat by then posed by the depleted 
Axis air forces, the Desert Air Force plan went 
ahead. 70 
At 3.30 pm on March 26th three formations of 
light/medium bombers struck the Axis positions from 
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low level, pattern bombing with the aim of creating 
disorganisation and severing telephone communications. 
They were followed immediately by the first relay of 
fighter-bombers, bombing and strafing from low level, 
the target area indicated by artillery firing red and 
blue smoke while the New Zealanders burned yellow 
smoke to indicate their own positions. A strength of 
two and a half squadrons of fighter-bombers was 
maintained in the battle area, fresh relays arriving 
every 15 minutes, the pilots bombing specific targets 
and then strafing gun positions. For the first time 
they were receiving radio instructions during their 
attacks from an RAF officer observing the battle from 
an OP with the forward troops. At 4 pm the infantry 
attacked, under the cover of a barrage moving at the 
rate of 100 feet a minute and the main object of which 
was to define a bomb-line for the fighter-bombers 
which were continually bombing and strafing in front 
of the line of bursting shells. This 'air blitz', as 
it was termed, lasted for 2% hours and a total of 412 
sorties were flown for the loss of 11 aircraft. The 
operation was successful, the infantry and armour 
having broken through and advanced 6,000 yards by dusk 
with only light losses. 71 
The next occasion when Desert Air Force fighter- 
bombers were similarly employed occurred in Northern 
- 369 - 
® ^, 
Italy. By November 11th 1944 the British V Corps had 
cleared Forli and advanced to line of the River 
Montone, though further progress was held by German 
positions on the East bank occupied by troops of the 
278th Infantry Division supported by tanks and self- 
propelled guns. The terrain in the area was well 
suited to defence, being low lying ground, too soft to 
allow armour to deploy off the roads, and dotted with 
numerous farms and houses which had been turned into 
strongpoints. The V Corps decided to clear these 
positions employing the 12th Brigade of 4th Infantry 
Division, but also requested close air support from 
Desert Air Force and, in particular, a solution to the 
problem of safe bombing over a fluid bombline. The RAF 
response was 'Timothy'. 
On November 12th the 4th Brigade attacked in three 
phases of approximately 1,000 yards advance. First 
artillery laid a coloured smoke bombline as instructed 
by the ROVER control 300 yards ahead of the forward 
troops. At *7.30 an, 8.30 am, and 9.30 am fighter- 
bombers, in flights of 12 aircraft arriving every ten 
minutes, bombed and strafed everthing in sight to a 
depth of 1,000 yards parallel to, and 1,000 yards 
either side of, the brigade axis of advance. After a 
few minutes the intensive 'blitz' was lifted and the 
infantry advanced. By the end of the day the 12th 
Brigade had advanced over 2,000 yards and taken 106 
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prisoners at the cost of 13 casualties. 72 On the 
following day, after a further six 'Timothy' attacks 
by 12 squadrons, including rocket firing US P-47 
Thunderbolts, German resistance collapsed, the 
enthusiastic commander of 12th Brigade reporting that 
his casualties were the lightest for such an operation 
in his experience. Eighth Army was equally 
enthusiastic, describing "Timothy" as '.. the greatest 
step forward In air/ground cooperation since the 
innovation of the Rover controls. `73 
Meanwhile, similar attacks had been carried out in 
North-West Europe, where they were, referred to as 
'Winkle'. On October Ist 1944 No. 84 Group RAF noted of 
'Winkle', only recently introduced, that, 
This type of operation involves the employment of 
aircraft in a very close support rote, where the 
forward line of our own troops is identified by a 
line of white smoke extending for 1,000 yards, 2,000 
yards, or 3,000 yards. This line of smoke clearly 
defines the area beyond which pilots are free to 
attack. Normally such an operation is laid on in 
connection with a ground offensive, with the object 
of destroying and disrupting the enemy's defences 
and reducing morale, in order to facilitate an 
Immediate advance. On the one or two occasions when 
this method of support has been employed, success 
has been evident... In difficult country where it is 
not possible, or where it is very difficult, for 
ground O. P. s to locate exactly the position of 
mortars and defended posts, it is usually a somewhat 
haphazard procedure to attempt to indicate pinpoint 
targets by the use of red smoke. "WINKLE" is 
considered to be the better method in these 
circumstances, even though it may entail a certain 
waste of effort. 74 
On October 20th 1944 Typhoons of No. 84 Group carried 
out a particularly successful 'Winkle' on the 
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immediate front of the Canadian 2nd Infantry and 4th 
Armoured Divisions. This was in support of Operation 
SUITCASE, the attack towards Esschen as part of the 
advance to clear South Beveland in Holland. Some 59 
sorties were flown by rocket-Typhoons and Typhoon 
bombers during the day, the Operations Record Book of 
No. 263 Squadron recording that, 
Bombing was good, nearly all . falling on selected 
targets by the road side. A message was received 
later from Army H. Q. to say the attack was very 
successful as many enemy strongpoints . had been wiped 
out, and they had been able to advance to within one 
mile of Esschen. 75 
Further approbation was received from 10th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade, whose troops reported finding the 
bodies of 42 German troops killed during the 'WINKLE' 
on their front alone. 76 
By the end of the year a further variation had been 
introduced in Italy. On December 14th 1944 the First 
Canadian Division, advancing towards the River Senio, 
encountered stiff German oppostion in the area of the 
Naviglio Canal. A request was made to Desert Air Force 
for a 'Timothy', but weather conditions precluded 
bombing. Rather than leave the Canadians unsupported, 
Desert Air Force suggested a 'Timothy' without bombs, 
a strafing attack by three squadrons. In the afternoon 
infantry of the Westminster Regiment supported by 
tanks of Lord Strathcona's Horse attacked Northwards 
along the canal road, just ahead of them Spitfires 
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strafed the German positions on both side of the canal 
- this support being so close that spent cartridge 
cases from the Spitfires' guns fell among the 
Canadians. By evening the German positions had been 
cleared at the cost of 4 Canadians killed and 16 
wounded, over 100 German prisoners being taken. 
Strafing 'Timothies' were afterwards referred to as 
'Pigs' . 77 
The advantage of 'Timothies' and 'Winkles' was that 
the fighter-bombers could neutralize German positions 
to greater depth than the single belt of fire of an 
artillery barrage, and added the more pronounced 
morale effect of air attack. They also permitted 
greater flexibility in the advance. Even when, as a 
result of unexpected opposition, the advance did not 
conform to plan the fighter-bomber pilots could still 
directly support the infantry. The air attacks on 12th 
November in Italy were timed to coincide with the 
infantry advance, but in subsequent operations 
fighter-bombers attacked with equal success at pre- 
arranged intervals, irrespective of the line reached 
by the forward troops, the smoke safety line being 
put down to conform with the ground battle at any 
given time. The' smoke line could also be put down 
diagonally to the axis of advance, and pilots were 
briefed for this eventuality. Moreover, particularly 
-373- 
troublesome strongpoints could be singled out for 
attack in the usual way through the FCP. 78 
As with CABRANK, such operations could be expensive 
of air effort. At least 260 sorties were flown in 
close support of 12th Brigade in Italy on November 
12th & 13th 1944, albeit with only one aircraft being 
lost. Moreover, mass air attacks on generally defined 
areas instead of specific targets necessarily involved 
a certain waste of effort, with much of the bombing 
and strafing being directed at areas unoccupied by 
German troops. As employment of 'Timothies' became 
extensive, their advantages became negated by misuse. 
In 1945 Eighth Army reported of 'Timothy' that it was 
intended as air support for offensive operations, but 
that, 
... .. it was... NOT al ways used as such, and there was a 
tendency for It to degenerate into a mere 'area 
blit2'. 79 
Partly as a result of excessive caution and partly 
because in some formations the mechanics of 'Timothy' 
were insufficiently understood, the artillery smoke 
line was often put down between 500/800 yards ahead of 
the leading British troops. This was too far, and 
meant that the fighter-bombers did not attack the 
forward German positions, but instead, as German 
prisoners affirmed, bombed and strafed targets some 
400 yards to the rear of the German front line. After 
reviewing a number of cases, First Canadian Corps 
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advocated that the smoke bombline be put down no 
further than 300 yards from the forward troops. 80 
Most close support strikes involved some form of 
artillery participation. Usually this took the passive 
form of indicating targets or the bombline to the 
aircraft but, when possible, guns had the more active 
role of assisting the aircraft by suppressing known 
German flak positions, airburst shells being effective 
in inducing flak gunners to remain in cover. Attaching 
an artillery FOO to the staff of an FCP also proved 
profitable, for this officer was on hand to engage a 
target rejected as unsuitable for air attack and, for 
those targets accepted for airstrike, could arrange 
smoke indication more rapidly. This led to combining 
programmes of air attack and artillery bombardment, 
such as shelling a target area a few minutes after an 
airstrike with the intention of catching the German 
troops Just as they were emerging from cover. 81 
As time went on, a method of more direct 
artillery/fighter bomber cooperation evolved and, as 
with many air support innovations, it first appeared 
in Italy. At the height of the battle for Rimini in 
September 1944 it was found that the two FCP's working 
on the Eighth Army front (ROVER DAVID & ROVER PADDY) 
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could not cope with the number of targets submitted by 
Divisions and Brigades. Moreover, as many of these 
targets were German gun and mortar positions, it 
became imperative to ensure as far as possible that 
those attacked by fighter-bombers were those actually 
engaging the British troops. In effect, an improved 
method of passing accurate counter-battery data to the 
fighter-bomber pilots was necessary, requiring 
specialised artillery involvment. 
The solution was the creation of an FCP entirely 
concerned with air attack on enemy guns - ROVER FRANK 
- situated at an AGRA headquarters where artillery 
counter-battery officers worked together with an RAF 
air controller. The AGRA furnished the FCP with a 
regularly updated list of active German battery 
positions, and when aircraft were given a target of 
German guns they were to check in with ROVER FRANK, 
who confirmed that those particular guns were still 
active. If. -they were, then the airstrike went ahead, 
but if not ROVER FRANK directed the strike upon an 
active battery. ROVER FRANK went into operation on 
September 18th, directing a series of airstrikes at 15 
minute intervals which succeeded in reducing 
considerably the volume of fire from eleven German 
batteries firing on Canadian troops from the Trebbio- 
Marecchia valley-82 
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Fighter-bomber attack on German batteries proved 
effective, by suppressing German fire even if the guns 
themselves were not destroyed. Mediterranean Allied 
Air Forces ORS reported that, 
During and after fighter-bomber attacks on enemy gun 
positions, the shelling activity of these guns is 
reduced; ei tber because material damage has been 
caused, or firing has ceased during the attack, or 
because the battery attacked has moved to avoid 
further attack. 33 
Precisely how effective such attacks were was 
discovered by an intensive ORS analysis of fighter- 
bomber support for British V Corps operations in Italy 
between October and December 1944. From this data, 
particularly regarding the level of casualties 
inflicted by German shellfire and by comparing the 
volume of this fire on days when fighter-bombers 
attacked the German guns with days when air support 
was reduced or unavailable, it was found that ten 
fighter-bomber attacks, amounting to some 50 sorties, 
directed against German gun positions during a day 
approximately halved their activity. When 100 fighter- 
bomber attacks, equivalent to some 500 sorties, were 
carried out 60-90 fewer British troops were killed 
and some 200-300 fewer wounded by German shellfire. 
The cost to the RAF of these 500 sorties, calculated 
under the operational conditions of the time, would 
have amounted to 2.6 pilots killed or missing, 0.3 
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pilots injured, and 4.5 aircraft lost in a total of 
some 600 flying hours. 84 
The saving of nearly 400 army casualties seems a 
fair return for such losses, but the necessary 
commitment of air effort, amounting to over one sortie 
per army casualty saved, was high. As with all the 
close air support methods discussed above, such 
commitment of air resources was possible only as a 
result of the Allied air forces possessing complete 
air superiority and having available large numbers of 
tactical aircraft. This aside, the figures suggest 
that German batteries were seriously disrupted by air 
attack. 
In fact, there is evidence to suggest that air 
attack was considerably more effective than artillery 
counter-battery (CB) fire. In a comparison analogous 
to that between airstrikes and artillery 
concentrations in close support of attacks, it can be 
seen that neutralization achieved by artillery 
against German guns tended to be of shorter duration 
than that achieved by fighter-bombers. For example, 
after the capture of Boulogne in September 1944 an 
investigation by No. 2 ORS observed of artillery CB 
that, 
Discussion with Infantry and Artillery personnel 
served to confirm once more ... that while an 
accurate concentration on a well located battery 
invariably silenced it for the duration of the 
concentration, the effect seldom lasted for any 
1 engtb of time afterwards.. 85 
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That this was realised at the time and acted upon is 
reflected in the setting up of ROVER FRANK in Italy, 
which was itself a reflection of the number of close 
support requests with German gun and mortar positions 
as their target. Indeed, one artillery specialist has 
recently observed of the campaigns in 1944-45 that 
aircraft came to assume the greater responsibility for 
counter-battery work, adopting the role carried out by 
heavy artillery in World War I and leaving field 
artillery to concentrate on the close-in battle. 86 
This chapter appears to have highlighted a paradox. 
The Allied armies were well equipped with artillery 
which was able to provide fire support rapidly in 
response to requests from forward troops. They were 
also supported by fighter-bombers of the tactical air 
forces which normally could not respond to support 
requests with anything like the same speed without a 
considerable commitment of air resources to the battle 
area, and whose attacks offered little significant 
advantage over artillery in terms of destruction. Yet 
fighter-bomber attack appears to have been 
significantly more effective than artillery in terms 
-379- 
of neutralization, and the above examples from both 
Italy and North-West Europe indicate that against 
close support targets neutralization, albeit 
temporary, was just as important as destruction, 
indeed more so in view of the small likelihood of the 
latter being achieved. 87 
Fighter-bomber attack frequently proved to have a 
greater morale effect than that of artillery and, 
moreover, could cause this demoralization of the enemy 
more rapidly. This in turn was also likely to be of 
longer duration than that caused by artillery 
bombardment. The reason was partly the shock effect of 
the weight of firepower that fighter-bombers could 
deliver in a comparatively short space of time. In 
addition, the Allied ORS investigations suggest that, 
in general terms, being subjected to air attack was 
genuinely more frightening for troops than being 
subjected to artillery bombardment and induced a 
greater feeling of helplessness. 
In this respect fighter-bomber close air support was 
invaluable for Allied troops about to attack German 
positions, but only if the assault troops were so 
placed as to take maximum advantage of the shock 
effect by attacking as soon after the airstrike as 
possible. While the shock 'effect of air attack may 
have been of longer duration than that caused by 
artillery, it was, as the ORS calculated, unlikely to 
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last beyond 20 minutes. Depending upon such variables 
as the nature and weight of air attack and the quality 
of the German troops and their level of protection, it 
could be considerably less. Very often it was not 
possible for the assault troops to take immediate 
advantage of airstrikes, even had it been planned that 
they should do so. A study of the message logs of 
British Army formations reveals numerous occasions 
when there was a considerable lapse of time between a 
requested airstrike and an attack going in. 
The reason was what the Nineteenth Century military 
philosopher Carl' von Clausewitz termed the 'friction' 
of war, the propensity of the unforseen to intervene 
to upset plans. 88 Battalions waiting to attack could be 
delayed by the fact that another battalion detailed to 
clear the area of their start line encountered 
unexpectedly heavy resistance. Armour support could be 
delayed in moving up due to road congestion or the 
presence of mines. Orders and timings could be changed 
at short notice due to circumstances beyond the 
knowledge and control of units detailed to attack; all 
these could occur with too little notice to alter air 
support timings, or even after the airstrike had been 
made. Occasionally the airstrike could go in at a time 
other than originally intended due to the threat of 
adverse weather closing in, yet it proved impossible 
for the army to speed up its own preparations. 
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Occasionally the fighter-bombers could inadvertently 
attack the wrong target. Often, particularly during 
major operations, there was no attempt to exploit the 
morale effect of many of the air attacks, fighter- 
bombers being directed to engage German positions in 
general 'softening-up' attacks not closely coordinated 
with specific ground assaults. 
Under such conditions the value of close air 
support, that of neutralization, was wasted. The 
soldiers learnt how important it was to exploit 
airstrikes rapidly, yet they could hardly be expected 
to desist from requesting air support on occasions 
when it was known that such exploitation was neither 
possible nor intended. In 1943-45 Allied troops became 
accustomed to a lavish scale of air support, and the 
fact that it could be requested meant that it would 
be. During their joint investigation of Typhoons in 
1945, ORS 2nd TAF and No. 2 ORS observed that British 
and Canadian troops had become so dependent upon 
Typhoons that, 
. when, for reasons not always obvious to the front 
line troops, a request for close support Typhoons 
has to be turned down, a feeling of dissatisfaction 
is apt to arise. 89 
When close air support was not exploited on the 
battlefield the fighter-bombers may have been more 
profitably employed against targets beyond the 
battlefront. This is the subject of Chapter VIII. 
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THE COST EFFECTIVENESS OF CLOSE AIR SUPPORTL 
A COMPARISON WITH ARMED RECONNAISSANCE 
The object of this chapter is to provide a comparative 
analysis of the single most important alternative 
ground attack mission to close air support. The 
alternative mission, rivalling close air support in 
terms of the committment of Allied fighter-bomber 
effort in 1943-45, was armed reconnaissance. There are 
two dimensions to the following discussion, cost and 
effectiveness, and the chapter seeks to reveal which 
of the two mission types incurred the heaviest losses 
in aircraft and pilots, and to determine precisely 
what the Allied fighter-bombers achieved when directed 
against ground targets other than in the close air 
support role. 
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In 1944 RAF Desert Air Force in Italy described armed 
reconnaissance (usually abbreviated to armed recce in 
contemporary documents) thus: 
Pilots are given a general area, usually well behind 
the enemy lines, In which to find and attack with 
bombs and machine-gun fire, any target of tactical 
value. They use their own discretion and initiative 
as to the targets they select for attack. These 
targets include... N. T. I motor transport], bridges, 
camps and barracks, trains, defence works, 
airfields, ships or barges and fuel dumps.. I 
This was a highly offensive use of tactical air power, 
but that there was an element of reconnaissance 
involved was confirmed by RAF 2nd TAF which reported 
of armed reconnaissance in 1945 that 
.. fighter aircraft are sent out to 
look for ground 
targets and attack them. At the same time, pilots 
bring back any possible information about the enemy 
ground situation. 2 
While the impact of close air support was felt at the 
battlefront, that of armed reconnaissance was felt 
'sometimes far behind it, as fighter-bombers brought 
the German rear areas and lines of communications 
under attack. This was in fact interdiction, even when 
not part of a deliberate interdiction campaign, and 
was in effect a continual air offensive demanding a 
consistently large commitment of sorties. 
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In North-West Europe, more sorties were flown on 
armed reconnaissance than on close support by the 
Allied tactical air forces. Table I gives a breakdown 
of the total sorties flown by RAF 2nd TAF during the 
campaign according to mission type: 
TABLE I. SORTIES BY RAF 2nd T_A. F_ 1914-45 
Percentages of total missions for month given in brackets, 
MONTH MEDIUM/LIGHT FIGHTER ESCORT FIGHTER-BOMBER ARMED RECCE TOTAL 
BOMBING f PATROLS PREARRANGED & RECCE SORTIES 
IMMEDIATE SUPPORT 
June'44 3,117 (8,21) 18,062 (47,61) 7,652 (20,1%) 5,277 (13,9%) 3,810 (10%) 37,918 
July'44 3,304 (101) 14,528 (44,21) 6,484 (19,7%) 5,527 (16,8%) 3,025 (9.2%) 32,868 
Aug, '44 3,990 (11,9%) 7,325 (221) 3,850 (11,51) 14,169 (42,6%) 3,918 (11.7%) 33,252 
Sept, '44 2,543 (11.6%) 6,289 (28,8%) 3,724 (17%) 6,851 (31,3%) 2,428 (11.1%) 21,835 
Oct. '44 1,615 (6,7%) 5,659 (23,5%) 5,530 (232) 8,544 (35,5%) 2,688 (11,1%) 24,036 
Nov, '44 1,759 (10,7%) 3,525 (21,5%) 5,027 (30,6%) 3,830 (23,3%) 2,237 (13,6%) 16,378 
Dec, '44 1,907 (12,9%) 5,036 (34,1%) 2,490 (16,8%) 3,362 (22.8%) 1,950 (13,2%) 14,745 
Jan, '45 1,800 (15,4%) 2,538 (21,7%) 2,032 (17,4%) 3,995 (34,2%) 1,293 (11%) 11,658 
Feb, '45 2,998 (15,42) 2,178 (11,21) 6,160 (31,7%) 5,988 (30,8%) 2,104 (10,8%) 19,428 
March'45 4,071 (15.7%) 9,259 (35,7%) 4,961 (19.1%) 4,683 (18%) 2,901 (11,2%) 25,875 
April'45 2,957 (10,3%) 6,558 (22,8%) 5,065 (17,6%) 11,183 (391) 2,883 (101) 28,646 
TOTALS; 30,061 (11,22) 80,957 (30,3%) 52,975 (19,8%) 73,406 (27,31) 29,237 (10,9%) 266,639 
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Although the sorties by all types of aircraft are 
included for comparison, the three relevant columns 
are those concerning fighter/fighter-bomber aircraft, 
as neither light and medium bombers nor specific 
reconnaissance aircraft flew armed reconnaissance. 
From these three columns it can be calculated that, 
during the eleven month campaign, some 10% more 
sorties were flown on armed reconnaissance than on 
close support. 3 
A predominance of armed reconnaissance sorties can 
also be seen in the operations of the US tactical air 
forces in this theatre. Between October 1943 and May 
1945 fighters of the US Ninth Air Force flew 73,123 
armed reconnaissance sorties while those committed to 
'dive bombing' and 'rocket projecting and bombing', 
which embraced close support, amounted to a combined 
total of 55,983 sorties -a striking similarity to the 
corresponding 2nd TAF totals. 14 Close support 
apparently took second place to armed reconnaissance 
in the operations of the 1st US (Provisional) TAF 
between November 1944 and May 1945. In this period the 
P-47 Thunderbolt squadrons of this formation flew 
14,479 armed reconnaissance sorties, as opposed to 
5,563 sorties listed as 'ground support'. S 
Armed reconnaissance also accounted for a high 
percentage of sorties during the campaigns in Sicily 
and Italy. However, with regard to the Mediterranean 
- 392 - 
theatre it is difficult to determine precisely the 
balance between close air support and armed 
reconnaissance because Mediterranean Allied Air Force 
<MAAF) did not employ these terms. This problem has 
been pointed out by American historian Alan Wilt, who 
observes that during the campaign in Sicily tactical 
sorties by fighters were either listed as 'offensive 
sweeps' or 'ground attacks'. Thus between July 9th and 
August 17th 1943 some 4,000 Allied fighters flew 
45,173 sorties of which 13,309 were listed in these 
categories, Alan Wilt observing that, 
.. from what Is known from memoirs and other sources, 
most of the sweeps and attacks reflected 
interdiction missions and not close air support. 
During the period of the offensive on Rome (Operation 
DIADEM) from May 12th to June 22nd 1944, MAAF 
categorised fighter tactical operations as either 
'fighter-bomber' or 'strafing and sweep' missions. Of 
the 32,291 such sorties flown during this period, 
Professor Wilt estimates that about half were directed 
against interdiction targets, with the other half, or 
24% of the DIADEM total, being in close air support. 6 
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The attrition rate of pilots and aircraft among 
fighter-bomber squadrons engaged in attacking ground 
targets during 1943-45 was high. Bill Colgan, a former 
P-47 Thunderbolt pilot who served with the US 79th 
Fighter Group in Italy, wrote of the period May-June 
1944 that, 
If the damage inflicted upon the enemy had been 
great, never before had our squadron and one other 
In the Group suffered such losses.. The loss rate in 
May was such that if it continued over a period of 
months, the entire pilot force in these squadrons 
would have to be replaced about every three to four 
months. 7 
Similarly, a Typhoon pilot who served with the RAF in 
North-West Europe recalled of the Autumn of 1944 that, 
The average survival rate for a rocket-7ypboon pilot 
since mass missions at low level were introduced is 
around 17 ops. After that, he lives on borrowed 
time. Veterans stand a better chance of living than 
the younger ones, whose average number of ops before 
'buying It' Is no more than five. 8 
In fact the hazardous nature of low-level attack was 
acknowledged by the RAF in December 1944, when the 
tour of duty for such pilots was reduced from the 
normal fighter pilot tour of 200 operational sorties 
to 80 -a reduction of no less than 60%. 9 
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The scourge of Allied fighter-bombers was flak. From 
the point of view of the Allied tactical air forces, 
the most unwelcome consequence of the German armies 
having to adapt to operating in the face of Allied air 
superiority was the great increase by 1943-44 in the 
amount of light automatic anti-aircraft firepower 
possessed by German formations. An infantry division 
was typically equipped with at least eighty-four 20mm 
light anti-aircraft guns, while a panzer division of 
the type encountered in Normandy was equipped at full 
strength with up to 21 self-propelled, 55 towed, and 
32 lorry or half-track mounted anti-aircraft guns - 
mostly of 20mm and 37mm calibre with a high rate of 
fire. In both cases this was in addition to hundreds 
of lighter calibre machine guns and small-arms that 
could engage low flying aircraft. 10 Table II lists the 
principal German flak guns and their characteristics. 
TARIF II. GERMAN LIGHT ANTI-AIRCRAFT ARTILLERY (11) 
TYPE MAXIMUM ELEVATION RATE OF FIRE MAXIMUM VERTICAL RANGE 
(DEGREES) (rds/. in) (FEET) 
20n Flak 30 90 280 7,000 
10eß Flak 38 90 450 7,000 
20eß Flakvierling 100 1800 2 7,000 
3038 Flak 103 80 400 15,400 
Was Flak 18 85 160 15,700 
31. E Flak 36 85 160 15,700 
37. e Flak 43 90 . 
250 15,700 
31. E Flakzvilling 90 S00 St 15,700 
3 four-barrelled St two-barrelled 
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Fighter-bomber pilots thus had to contend with a 
highly dangerous low-attack environment. This is 
emphasised by the former Typhoon pilot quoted above, 
who states with regard to Normandy that, 
.. the Germans had undisputed 
flak supremacy. It was 
estimated to be about 20,000 batteries of anti- 
aircraft guns, ranging from 105,88,40,37 to 20mm, 
and not counting the numerous heavy machine gun 
sites. Hence, the odds in favour of the enemy stood 
at 4 to 1 against the number of Allied aircraft. 
When concentrated on some key points of the 
battlefront, the odds easily reached 20 or 30 to 1 
in favour of the defenders: this explains why up to 
95 per cent of our losses in attacks on ground 
targets were the result of flak defences against a 
mere 5 per cent attributed to Luftwaffe 
intervention. 12 
While aircraft such as the Typhoon and Thunderbolt 
were rugged, they could not normally be expected to 
survive a direct flak hit, especially of the 37mm 
variety. As Bill Colgan points out, 
While we had seen automatic flak listed from 15mm to 
37mm, some of us still talked in terms of 20mm to 
40mm sizes. Any of them could easily do a figbter- 
bomber in with a good bit. 13 
The likelihood of 
particularly when 
particular target, 
fire through which 
press home their 
recalled that, 
receiving such a hit was high, 
flak was concentrated to defend a 
as gunners could lay a curtain of 
the aircraft had to fly in order to 
attacks. A former Typhoon pilot 
.. the Germans would put up a carpet of 
20 and 40mm 
stuff. Little white puffs you could get out and walk 
on. Round about 3-4,000 feet this was and one had to 
dive tbrougb it- 14 
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The lethality of light flak was confirmed by ORS 2nd 
TAF during an investigation into squadron damage 
reports in July 1945. This concluded that, 
.. practically all the damage sustained on 
operations due to enemy action was caused by light 
flak. 15 
Further proof came in another post-war investigation, 
which discovered that many of the fighters posted as 
missing on operations were likely to have been light 
flak victims. On repatriation to the UK fighter pilots 
who had been prisoners of war were interviewed by ORS 
personnel as to the cause of their aircraft loss. This 
included pilots who had not been engaged in ground 
attack, and covered the entire 1940-45 period. From a 
total of 1,002 cases, of which 672 (67%) occurred in 
the period 1943-45, a sample of 770 were selected for 
analysis. Of these, 369 (47.9%) had been light flak 
victims (most of which were in the 1943-45 period), 
335 (43.5%) had been air combat victims, while the 
remaining 66 (8.5%) were attributed to 'unknown 
flak'. 16 
There is conclusive evidence that armed reconnaissance 
was more dangerous than close air support. In 1945 ORS 
2nd TAF compared the close support and armed 
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reconnaissance operations of Nos. 83 and 84 Groups 
between January and April 1945. The results for the 
period January 22nd to March 21st are shown in Table 
III, while the figures for April are shown in Table 
IV, (though in this case comparing armed 
reconnaissance with close air support and fighter 
patrol duties put together). 17 
TABLE III, ARMED RECCE & CLOSE SUPPORT MISSIONS OF NOS, 83 A 84 GROUPS, JANUARY MARCH 194$ 
No, 83 GROUP No. 84 GROUP TOTALS 
Sorties In Period: 9,825 9,221 19,046 
Casualties: 110 52 162 
Sorties Per Battle Casualty: 89,3 177,3 117,6 
SORTIES PER BATTLE CASUALTY: - 
TYPHOONS: Armed Recce 76,8 126,2 
---- Close support 143,2 248,3 
SPITFIRES; Armed Recce 94.2 135 
-------- Close support 181.4 193.1 
TEMPESTS: Armed Recce 57.1 36 
--------- Close Support 2.7 - 
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TABLE IV, ARMED RECCE, CLOSE SUPPORT & FIGHTER PATROL MISSIONS OF RAF 2nd T, A, F  APRIL 1915 
--- - ----- - ----- - 
No. 83 GROUP No, 84 GROUP 
Spitfire Typhoon Tempest Total Spitfire Typhoon Tempest Total 
Armed Recce Sorties 3,153 1,350 940 5,443 3,461 976 865 5,302 
Close Support & 
Fighter Sorties 4,560 2,304 529 7,393 1,847 1,505 135 3,489 
AIRCRAFT DESTROYED/ 
PILOTS LOST: - 
Armed Recce Missions 35/24 
Close Support & 
Fighter Patrols 14/10 
27/26 21/19 83/69 34/29 22/20 12/11 68/60 
12/11 7/6 33/27 9/6 11/10 2/2 22/18 
These figures represent a period in the campaign when, 
operating over German soil, pilots found flak highly 
concentrated. Squadrons flying armed reconnaissance, 
searching for targets, often paid a heavy price. Pierre 
Clostermann, a Frenchman serving in the RAF, led a Tempest 
wing of Wo. 83 Group at this time which was employed mainly 
on armed reconnaissance. He later recalled that, 
Germany seemed Just lousy with flair. It was everywhere, 
even In the most unexpected places. You sometimes bit 
upon a peaceful country lane with a few lorries 
trundling along, you made your approach and wboofl the 
sky was full of 20mm tracer. 
German road convoys now had to stick to roundabout 
routes, wbicb had been carefully worked out in advance 
and were covered for the whole of their length by light- 
flak batteries. The game was no longer worth the candle 
- there was no point in stupidly risking a Tempest for 
the fun of merely pulverizing one Wehrmacht lorry- 18 
German airfields were also armed reconnaissance targets, 
but by this time the remaining German operational fighters 
were harrying Allied troops from heavily camouflaged 
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secondary airstrips. These were protected by up to a 
battalion of light flak guns, often enabling the German 
aircraft to take off and land under a curtain of 
protective fire. Attempts to bomb and strafe these 
airfields could be extremely costly, and Clostermann 
records leading such an attack on the airfield at Schwerin 
in April 1945 which resulted in six of the eight attacking 
Tempests being shot down. 19 Not surprisingly, awareness of 
flak came to dominate the lives of pilots engaged on such 
missions, and Clostermann recalls that, 
Flak was looming ever larger on my pilots' mental 
horizon. You could sense bow it obsessed them In every 
conversation, at meals, at the bar, during briefings. To 
be convinced you had only to watch bow sharply those who 
came back from a trip were questioned as to bow dense 
the flab was, and where the posts were, by those who 
were about to set off. The word was on everybody's lips, 
all the time. 20 
That it was armed reconnaissance, and attacks on 
, 
specific targets beyond the battlefront, rather than close 
air support that exposed pilots to the fiercest flak 
concentrations is reflected in the losses outlined in the 
above tables. An indication of the level of casualties 
sustained on close support strikes during this same period 
is shown in Table VII, which lists a number of operations 
by British and Canadian troops to capture defended towns 
or villages and the air support provided. 21 




E V. CLOSE AIR SUPPORT OPE 
BRITISH ARMY FORMATION 
RATIONS, APRIL 1945_ 
LEVEL OF AIR SUPPORT 
- ----- 
AIR LOSSES 
2/4/45 Nijmegen Island 49 (Vest Riding) Div, 
----- - 
31 Typhoon sorties none 
8/4/45 Voltlage 52 (Lowland) Div, 4 Typhoon sorties none 
1014145 Deventer 3 (Cdn) Inf. Div, 27 Typhoon sorties none 
11/4/45 Rethem 53 (Velsh) Div, 22 Typhoon sorties none 
12/4/45 Arnhem 49 (Vest Riding) Div, 131 Typhoon 3 
Spitbomber sorties none 
12/4/45 Friesoythe 4 (Cdn) Arad, Div, 32 Typhoon sorties I Typhoon lost 
pilot baled out 
co 
13/4/45 Altenvahlingen 53 (Velsh) Div, 4 Typhoon sorties none 
14/4/45 Vlnsen 11 Arid, Div, 12 Typhoon sorties none 
17/4/45 Eitze 53 (Velsh) Div. 8 Typhoon sorties none 
24-25/4/45 Bremen 3 Inf, Div, 25 Typhoon sorties none 
The principal reason for the difference in casualties is 
that, as the above quotes indicate, flak was concentrated 
to defend such typical armed reconnaissance targets as 
airfields, headquarters, supply dumps, and vital points in 
the communications network-. In the front line, except in 
support of heavily defended key positions, flak was 
likely to be far less concentrated and flying against such 
close support targets as small defended posts, pillboxes, 
and gun positions which were often well dispersed, there 
was considerably less. Moreover, during close support 
strikes friendly artillery was often on hand to suppress 
flak. Armed reconnaissance pilots were denied this help, 
though strikes against heavily defended targets could be 
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supported by additional aircraft - often rocket Typhoons - 
specifically tasked with flak suppression. 
These anti-flak Typhoons usually operated in pairs, one 
pair drawing German fire while another pair spotted for 
gun flashes and dived to attack. Guns opening fire on the 
second pair were then rocketed by a third pair of Typhoons 
orbiting the area. This was in itself very hazardous, for 
while flak gunners were often shy of artillery fire they 
were rarely afraid of air attack. A former Typhoon pilot 
recalls of such attacks that, 
The German gunners were generally very courageous; 
they'd continue Siring at you as you were coming 
straight down at them. You Jrnew you were going to get 
them and they knew it too, but they'd beep on firing. 
There is no doubt that the standard of the opposition 
was very high. 22 
In fact the high quality of German flak gunners was 
acknowledged at the time by No. 2 ORS, who observed after 
the capture of Calais (Operation UNDERGO> in September 
1944 that the morale of the Luftwaffe flak gunners was the 
highest among the entire garrison. 23 
Apart from the anti-flak aircraft being themselves at 
risk, and their presence representing a greater demand on 
air resources, they were not always effective even when 
employed in large numbers. This was seen especially during 
the crossing of the Rhine in March 1945, when both Nos. 83 
and 84 Groups maintained strong anti-flak patrols by 
Typhoons equipped with rockets and anti-personnel cluster 
bombs in the area of the Allied airborne landing. 
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Subsequent investigation by No.. 2 ORS discovered that not 
only had very few of the flak guns been destroyed - which 
was no surprise as by then' the problem of accuracy was 
well known - but also that there had been no appreciable 
slackening of the flak fire during the airborne drop. This 
was considered to be because there were not enough 
Typhoons available to maintain the constant attacks deemed 
necessary to effect neutralization, and the fact that they 
obviously could not operate during the drop itself. 24 
An important question with regard to the above data is 
whether the comparative close air support and armed 
reconnaissance casualties from early 1945 are 
representative of the campaign in North-West Europe as a 
whole. While there is no ORS data similar to that of 1945 
for earlier in the campaign, the available evidence does 
suggest that armed reconnaissance was consistently more 
costly. Table VI is based on the Daily Intelligence 
Summaries produced by No. 83 Group of 2nd TAF for the 
period August 1944 until February 1945 and which detail 
each day's operations in terms of sorties per mission type 
and also battle casualties. Although it is not specified 
on what type of operation each casualty was sustained, 
these statistics show that the number of aircraft 
casualties in a given number of sorties was greatest 




TABLE VI, No, 83 GROUP (RAF 2nd TAF) ARMED RECCE & CLOSE SUPPORT EFFORT AUGUST 1944-FEBRUARY 1945 
IMMEDIATE I PREARRANGED ARMED RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT SORTIES PER 
SUPPORT SORTIES SORTIES CASUALTIES2 CASUALTY 
August 1944 4,538 8,516 103 126.7 
September 1944 1,471 2,344 51 75.5 
October 1944 3,026 1,861 34 143,7 
November 1944 2,285 1,315 36 100.0 
n... -ý... fall 4G7 9 99R 6A t4 UCLUBLO91- 1.7940 F., . 1- 
January 1945 639 3,709 55 79,0 
February 1945 2,231 4,152 70 91.1 
2 Computed on aircraft destroyed or damaged, not on pilots. Does not include casualties sustained in 
combat with enemy aircaft or those not due to enemy action, The majority of the above casualties 
were listed as caused by flak, 
The same trend can be discerned in US tactical air 
operations during the campaign. Table VII shows the number 
of sorties by mission type each month between November 
1944 and April 1945 for the P-47 squadrons of the US let 
(Provisional) TAF, while Table VIII gives their losses for 
"each month. This shows-that. 
during the two months when 
the most armed reconnaissance sorties were flown, March 
and April 1945, the number of aircraft lost to flak and to 
'unknown causes' (presumably on deep armed reconnaissance 
missions beyond the German front line) was considerably 
greater. 26 
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TABLE VII. P-47 SORTIES, Ist US (PROVISIONAL) TAF NOVEMBER 1944-APRIL 1915 
- ------ - ------ - ------ - ----- 
DIVE BOMBING ARMED RECCE GROUND SUPPORT FIGHTER SWEEPS ESCORT MISCELLANEOUS* 
-- - -- --- --- - ------ - ------ - ------ - ----- - ----- -- ----- 
Nov '44 1,905 250 415 20 520 15 
Dec '44 2,345 2,030 311 54 400 120 
Jan '45 2,211 673 1,291 153 222 29 
Feb 145 4,656 1,191 674 117 468 39 
Mar '45 5,185 4,436 1,586 516 653 496 
Apr '45 3,127 5,575 958 388 1,064 843 
* Refers to leaflet dropping, weather reconnaissance, and patrols. 
TABLE VIII. LOSSES OF P-47s OF US Ist (PROVISIONAL) TAF NOVEMBER 1944-APRIL 1915 
LOSSES DUE TO: FLAK FLAK I ENEMY ENEMY AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT UNKNOWN TOTALS 
AIRCRAFT 
Noveeber 1944 61607 20 
December 1944 90 11 5 19 44 
January 1945 80 12 18 29 
February 1945 11 103 20 35 
March 1945 33 01 10 25 69 
April 1945 33 079 22 71 
A more detailed picture can be obtained by a study of 
losses at squadron level. Table IX shows the losses 
sustained throughout the campaign in North-West Europe by 
No. 609 (West Riding) Squadron. This Typhoon fighter-bomber 
-unit served throughout the campaign in No. 84 Group of RAF 
2nd TAF, being employed almost entirely in the ground 
attack role. Only losses sustained as a result of enemy 
action have been included, and all such losses, with one 
possible exception, were caused by flak. Aircraft that 
sustained flak damage but which were able to return to 
base have not been included. Armed reconnaissance and 
attacks beyond the battlefront against specific targets 
(such as headquarters, radar sites, and bridges) have been 
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compared with close air support. The experience of 609 
Squadron confirms that attacks beyond the battlefront were 
more dangerous, with seventeen of the twenty-four aircraft 
and pilots lost, or 70%, being sustained on such 
operations. A sorties per battle casualty ratio shows 
170.2 sorties per close support casualty and 102.1 sorties 
per armed reconnaissance/deep penetration casualty: 
TABLE IL LOSSES SUSTAINED ON OPERATIONS BY No-609 (TYPHOON) SQUADRON, JUNE 1911 - MAY 1915 
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT ARMED RECCE AND ATTACKS 
(Most strikes under VCP/FCP control) ON TARGETS BEYOND BATTLEFRONT 
SORTIES LOSSES SORTIES LOSSES 
June 1944 50 - 231 3 
July 1944 183 3 66 2 
Aug, 1944 80 1 366 5 
Sep. 1944 63 - 211 1 
Oct. 1944 247 - 57 - 
Nov, 1944 117 - 147 1 
Dec, 1944 8- 169 1 
Jan, 1945 4- 56 
Feb, 1945 152 2 71 1 
Mar. 1945 79 - 180 
Apr. 1945 209 1 140 2 
May 1945 -- 23 - 
TOTALS: 1,192 7 1,737 17 
TOTAL SORTIES: 2,929 TOTAL LOSSES (AIRCRAFT AND PILOTS): 24 S 
2 Includes four pilots that subsequently returned to the Squadron after baling out or force-landing 
in Allied territory. 
Of the total of twenty-four pilots lost, thirteen (54%) 
had carried out less than twenty operations by the time 
that they were shot down. Seven pilots (29%> had carried 
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out over thirty operations, and of these only three pilots 
(12%) had carried out over fifty operations. This tends to 
confirm Charles Demoulin's assertion, quoted above, that 
the less experienced pilots were most at risk. 27 
All the above evidence suggests that the further fighter- 
bombers operated beyond the battlefront, the higher their 
losses were likely to be. Confirmation of this was 
provided by ORS 2nd TAF in 1945 during an investigation 
into armed reconnaissance. While not directly relevant to 
a comparison with close air support, the results are worth 
noting because they proved that armed reconnaissance 
itself could be more dangerous depending on how deep 
behind the German lines the aircraft patrolled. In 
February 1945 No. 83 Group's armed reconnaissance effort 
was seen to be conveniently divided into two sections, 
deep and shallow penetration, the areas being separated by 
a line some 60 miles behind the German lines running 
through Hamm, Munster, Rheine, Almelo, and Zwolle. This 
provided an ideal opportunity for comparison, and the ORS 
findings are summarised in Table X. While the table does 
not indicate a significant increase in the risk from flak 
to pilots flying deep penetration missions, it is likely 
that the higher number of losses due to 'unknown cause' in 











SSANCE EFFORT FEBRUARY 1915 




----- - ----- -- 
Deep 
----- - ----- 
Shallow Deep Shallow 
-- ----- 
No, of Sorties 2,210 1,878 100 100 48 75.1 
LOSSES 
Total 46 25 2.1 1.3 -- 
Due to enemy a/c 5 0 0,2 0-- 
Due to Flak 15 11 0.7 0.6 -- 
Not due to enemy 
action 11 9 0,5 0,5 -- 
Unknown Cause 15 5 0.7 0.3 -- 
At the time the justification for such deep penetration 
missions was considered to be that pilots were presented 
with more targets and, judging by their claims, inflicted 
more damage. This is shown in Table XI: 
TABLE XI. No Bl GR 








ANCE CLAIMS FEBRUARY 19AS- 
PER 100 SORTIES 
Deep Shallow 
100 100 




Enemy aircraft # 32: 3: 33 17: 0: 8 1,4; 0,1; 1,5 0,90: 0,4 0,7: 0,1: 0,7 0,7: 0: 0,3 
Locomotives: f 124: 598 37: 105 5,6: 27.1 2.0: 5.6 2.7: 13,0 1,6: 4,2 
Trucks f 198: 1140 215: 534 9,0: 51,6 11,5: 28,4 4,1: 24,6 8,6: 21,5 
Motor Transport f 135: 505 120: 321 6,1; 22,9 6,4: 17,1 2,9: 10,9 4,8: 12,8 
Tugs 3 Barges f 15: 120 14: 41 0.7: 5,4 0,8: 2,2 0,3: 2,6 0,6: 1,6 
Rail Cuts 12 19 015 1,0 0,3 0,8 
3 Figures indicate destroyed: probably destroyed: damag ed 
f Figures indicate destroyed: daaaged 
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Nevertheless, the findings of this investigation resulted 
in 2nd TAF curtailing the number of deep penetration 
missions, and increasing, the number of aircraft when such 
missions were flown. 28 
Having established that armed reconnaissance accounted 
for more sorties than close air support, and that it 
was the more dangerous ground attack mission, the 
object of this section is to consider the extent to 
which it assisted the Allied armies. There is no 
scope here for a detailed case by case analysis of 
armed reconnaissance such has been offered with regard 
to close air support, and which the subject merits. 
Rather, the following is intended to outline what 
armed reconnaissance -achieved by drawing a parallel 
with close air support. 
Close air support was, in each instance, firepower 
applied at the decisive time and place in order to 
enable friendly troops to achieve set objectives - to 
a 
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take a village, clear a wood, or repel a counter- 
attack. Like artillery, it was used as and when 
necessary to achieve short-term ends. As the previous 
chapters show, its success usually depended upon its 
effects being rapidly exploited on the ground. 
In contrast, armed reconnaissance was continuous, 
for only by the exertion of constant pressure could it 
bring results. Its objectives, and its effects, were 
usually of a longer term nature. 
Armed reconnaissance by fighter-bombers was but one 
aspect of air interdiction, as a post-war US study 
observed: 
All types of aircraft have played a part in 
interdiction: reconnaissance planes tbrougb 
surveillance and bomb damage assessment; fighter 
bombers on armed reconnaissance patrols, mediums and 
heavies by obstruction of the arteries of movement 
and destruction of the things to be moved. 29 
When the object of armed reconnaissance was, as part 
of a concerted air offensive, completely to cut off 
the German front line forces from reinforcement and 
supply, it was unsuccessful. A good case study to 
illustrate this is Operation STRANGLE, a deliberate 
interdiction campaign waged over two months by the 
Allied tactical, strategic, and coastal air forces in 
an attempt to paralyse the supply and transportation 
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system in Northern and Central Italy in the Spring of 
1944. STRANGLE was intended to compel the withdrawal 
of the German armies from Central Italy in the period 
while the Allied armies were preparing a major 
offensive (DIADEM), and commenced on March 15th. Over 
50,000 sorties were flown and 26,000 tons of bombs 
delivered. 30 Yet, despite the destruction and 
disruption of many Italian road, rail and port 
facilities, the German armies continued to receive 
sufficient supplies - in fact those of ammunition and 
fuel actually increased in the period. 31 
When it was realised that STRANGLE would not compel 
the Germans to withdraw before DIADEX was launched, it 
was decided to continue the air campaign during the 
offensive. Fighter-bombers had mainly been employed in 
attacking road transport, and for this new stage the 
interdiction belt was placed closer to the German 
front lines where, it was thought, they could engage 
such transport more effectively. The object remained 
supply denial, with the intention of creating 
shortages among German front-line units while they 
were under pressure from Allied ground action. This 
too failed in its object, mainly because the previous 
STRANGLE effort had been conducted at a time when the 
German forces were not heavily engaged - they had 
therefore been able to accumulate sufficient stocks of 
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ammunition and fuel in the forward area so that 
shortages never became critical. 
STRANGLE proved the necessity of closely integrating 
any interdiction attempt with ground operations, but 
interdiction proved a very demanding goal to achieve. 
For STRANGLE Allied planners estimated that the level 
of supplies needed by the German armies in Italy 
amounted to no more than some 7% of the uninterdicted 
throughput capacity of the railways, thus setting 
themselves the target of reducing more than 937. of 
this capability. In fact they had overestimated German 
supply requirements, and it has been reckoned since 
that successful interdiction would have required the 
rail system to be reduced to no more than 1 or 2% of 
its uninterdicted throughput. 32 
It is questionable whether the fighter-bombers of 
1943-45 were capable of consistently destroying 
enough transport vehicles, railway locomotives and 
rolling stock, or of effecting enough road and rail 
cuts, to make the Germans feel the bite of 
interdiction in the tactical area. 33 The limitations 
of fighter-bomber weapons and accuracy have been 
discussed in Chapter III. With regard to attacks on 
road transport, the data from the ORS investigations 
in Normandy (discussed in Chapter V), confirms that 
fighter-bomber weapons were lethal to softekin 
vehicles. However, maintaining a continual armed 
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reconnaissance meant that there were long periods when 
targets were relatively few, when the battlefront was 
static, and other less frequent periods when targets 
were prolific. It is interesting to compare claims 
made by pilots flying armed reconnaissance during 
these varying periods. Table XII shows the armed 
reconnaissance sorties and claims for MET (Mechanised 
Enemy Transport) made by fighter-bombers of 2nd TAF's 
83 Group in what may be described as a typical 
fortnight during the fighting in Normandy: 
TARIF III_ ARMED RECONNAISSANCE AND MET CLAIMS BY No. 83 GROUP 
DATE CLOSE SUPPORT SORTIES ARMED RECCE SORTIES CLAIMS DURING ARMED RECCE SORTIES 
MET DESTROYED NET DAMAGED 
30/6/44 18 152 19 41 
1/7142 28 81 3 17 
2/7/44 72 113 30 16 
3/7/44 117 133 25 25 
4/7144 111 138 6 12 
5/7/44 107 224 22 25 
6/7/44 55 218 35 50 
7/7/44 72 256 18 16 
8/7/44 223 320 25 69 
9/7/44 120 206 none recorded 
1017/44 67 162 11 16 
1117/44 132 148 1 6 
12/7/44 72 336 44 33 
13/7/44 144 118 none recorded 
14/7/44 40 136 6 12 
15/7/44 Be 110 11 8 
16/7/44 53 63 10 20 
TOTALS: 1,614 2,819 266 366 
The number of close support sorties flown in the same 
period has been included for comparison. The table shows 
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that 2,819 armed reconnaissance sorties resulted in 632 
motor vehicles claimed destroyed or damaged, which 
averages out as some four sorties per vehicle claim. 34 
With regard to air effort this appears as an expensive 
trade off. 
Fighter-bomber pilots of 1943-45 ultimately depended 
upon the visual sighting of targets - there could be no 
guarantee of finding them and many armed reconnaissance 
patrols in such a period would have seen little or no 
German movement at all. Only when the German army was on 
the move, either during an offensive (the mounting of 
which interdiction was intended to make impossible) or 
during a retreat, could the fighter-bomber pilots expect 
to find targets on a large scale. This is shown in Table 
XIII, detailing the sorties and claims made by 2nd TAF 
fighter-bombers flying armed reconnaissance in a four day 
period during the German offensive through the Ardennes 
in December 1944. In this example the figures show a 
ratio of only one sortie per vehicle claim. 35 
TABLE XIII. SORTIES I CLAIMS BY 2nd TAF FIGHTER-BOMBERS, 23rd - 26th DECEMBER 1944 
DATE ARMED RECCE SORTIES 
_ ___ _" 
MET CLAIMED DESTROYED 
_ý_N 
MET CLAIMED DAMAGED 
MM 
23/11/44 39 13 
ýM. N_M.... 
27 
24/12/U 86 14 15 
25/12/44 176 40 117 
26/12/U 185 65 121 
TOTALS 486 132 280 
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Table XIV reveals the same trend in slightly more 
detail. By focusing on particularly intensive periods 
of armed reconnaissance by No. 609 Squadron, the table 
shows the difference the German retreat from the 
Falaise area in August 1944 had on the ability of the 
Typhoon pilots to find targets: 
TARLEXIV 
. 
No. 609 SQUADRON ARM D RECON NAISSANCE AI MS JUNE - SE PTEMBER 1944 (36) 
NUMBER OF: CLAIMS 
Missions Sorties Tanks/AFVs Tanks/AFVs MET MET 
Destroyed Damaged Destroyed Damaged 
June 1944 8 64 
g~-M ll 
16 8 
July 1944 8 62 - - 1 5 Aug, 1944 28 201 16 3 34 57 
Sep, 1944 16 132 - - 7 8 
TOTALS; 60 459 22 14 58 78 
The above tables indicate that, with regard to road 
movement, effective interdiction, if it demanded the 
prevention of all or very nearly all supplies reaching 
the battlefront, would have been very difficult to 
impose. 
Given that interdiction efforts such as STRANGLE were 
not sufficient in themselves to compel a German 
withdrawal, then the value of a continual armed 
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reconnaissance during periods when the battlefront was 
relatively static, with no large-scale German 
movement, becomes questionable. Table XII, which shows 
that in that fortnight during the Normandy campaign 
there was only one day on which close support support 
sorties exceeded those of armed reconnaissance, begs 
the question of to what extent the constant 
patrolling of the German rear areas offered an 
effective means of assisting Allied troops. 
The answer is that armed reconnaissance did not need 
to consistently destroy large numbers of German 
vehicles in the tactical area in order to reduce the 
ability of the German armies to fight effectively. As 
with close air support, neutralization was often more 
important than destruction. Armed reconnaissance 
rendered all German movement in and around the battle 
area potentially vulnerable to air attack. In his 1972 
study of STRANGLE, F. M. Sallagar suggested that while 
the air offensive failed in its interdiction 
objectives, it nevertheless achieved the '.. reduction 
and occasional paralysis' of German freedom of 
movement in the combat area, with field commanders 
unable to move units to strengthen threatened sectors 
or to seal off Allied breakthroughs without penalty. 37 
There is much evidence to support this view. Both in 
Italy and in North-West Europe German movement in and 
beyond the tactical area was severely disrupted by air 
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attack or the threat of it. In May 1944 the 
headquarters of Field Marshall Kesselring, commanding 
German forces in Italy, reported that, 
It is .i mpossi bl e, in the face of such air 
superiority, for command to make any computation of 
the time element in movements. 38 
Later, General von Vietinghoff, who succeeded 
Kesselring in March 1945, stated of Allied fighter- 
bombers that they 
.. hindered essential movement, tanks could not move, 
their very presence over the battlefield paralysed 
movement. 39 
German forces in North-West Europe experienced similar 
difficulties, from the very outset of the fighting in 
Normandy. On June 10th 1944 Field Marshal Rommel, 
commanding Army Group B, while driving towards the 
battlefront, had to jump out of his car and dive for 
cover no less than 30 times. 40 It is not surprising 
that on the same day he echoed those German commanders 
in Italy by complaining that the Allies had, 
.. total command of the air over the battle area up 
to a point some 60 miles behind the front. During 
the day, practically our entire ý traffic - on roads, 
tracks and in open country - is pinned down by 
powerful fighter-bomber and bomber formations, with 
the result that the movement of our troops on the 
battlefield is almost completely paralysed. 41 
The extent to which the threat of air attack 
affected German freedom of movement is seen in a PoW 
interrogation report that was being studied by 2nd TAF 
planners in May 1944 based on information from Poles 
and Alsatians captured while serving in German units. 
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This revealed that, when air attack was likely, German 
motorized units moved only at night whenever possible, 
with movement taking place by companies at half-hour 
intervals and with distances between individual 
vehicles - sometimes as much as 50 metres - rigidly 
maintained. Units marching on foot in daylight posted 
air sentries to front and rear, and marched with an 
average distance of 500 metres between companies, and 
sometimes with a distance of 20 metres between each 
man. Halts, such as for meals, were made dispersed 
under cover whenever possible. 42 
Failure to observe these elaborate precautions 
invited disaster, but in the initial stages of the 
campaigns in Italy and North-West Europe German troops 
were unprepared for an enemy air force that would 
seek to attack them as they moved towards the 
battlefront. For example, the history of the 29th 
Panzer Grenadier Division records of its deployment 
against the Allied landings at Salerno in September 
1943 that, 
Even tbougb we already knew from Sicily what Allied 
air supremacy meant, the strafing we underwent at 
this ti. me... put all our previous experience in the 
shade. It was an achievement If one small vehicle 
made one short journey, darting from cover to cover, 
and completed it unscathed. 43 
In Normandy, a staff officer of 17th SS Panzer 
-Grenadier Division 
described how his division learnt 
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the same lesson soon after the Allied landings: 
Our motorized columns were coiling along the road 
towards the invasion beaches. Then something 
happened that left us in a daze. Spurts of fire 
flicked along the column and splashes of dust 
staccatoed the road. Everyone was piling out of the 
vehicles and scuttling for the neighbouring fields. 
Several vehicles were already in flames. The attack 
ceased as suddenly as it had crashed upon us fifteen 
minutes before. The men started to drift back to the 
column again, pale and shaky... This had been our 
first experience of the Jabos [fighter-bombers]. The 
march column was now completely disrupted and every 
man was on his own to pull out of this blazing 
column as best he coul d. 44 
German formations soon learnt not to present such 
targets to the air, but inexperienced formations 
arriving in Normandy later in the campaign 
occasionally fell victim to such attacks. On July 9th 
1944 a regiment of parachute infantry was moving 
forward to reinforce Bayerlein's Panzer Lehr Division. 
Their march discipline was poor and, when near Les 
Champs de Losque, they were pounced upon by ten 
fighter-bombers which bombed and strafed them for five 
minutes - leaving over 200 killed and wounded out of 
1,500 men. According to Bayerlein the survivors had 
been so shaken by this experience that he could never 
afterwards regard the unit as reliable. 45 
Only severe weather brought respite from air attack 
in daylight, and the Germans were compelled to move 
mainly at night. A post-war US study suggests that the 
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ability to move unmolested at night largely redressed 
the balance: 
There was one deficiency in tactical air action that 
was evident tbrougbout the campaign in Europe. That 
was the dearth of night fighter and night intruder 
operations. When weather permitted, the two night 
fighter squadrons turned in a good performance, but 
there was never enough. From the early days in 
NORMANDY when reports from PWs, French civilians and 
our patrols showed that the enemy formed bis columns 
at last light preparatory to moving throughout the 
night, through the ARDENNES Counter Offensive phase, 
during the early stages of the BENAGEN Bridgehead 
over the RHINE, and to the end, it was apparent that 
a lack of night air activity allowed the enemy the 
freedom of movement wbicb be had lost by day and 
permitted him to redispose and resupply his forces 
with little danger of interference. 46 
While it is true that the Allies had few night-fighter 
aircraft available in North-West Europe, it is 
questionable whether an increase in their numbers 
would have had any appreciable effect on German 
movement. Radar with the ability to detect road and 
rail movement did not then exist, and attempts to 
operate by the light of flares dropped by accompanying 
bomber aircraft had only limited success. 47 In terms 
of interdiction, night movement ensured that at least 
a certain level of supplies reached the battlefront. 48 
Yet, in operational terms, night movement was a very 
poor substitute for total mobility, particularly in 
summer with few hours of darkness. For example, 
Bayerlein recalled that in Normandy it took 38 hours 
to get his Panzer Lehr Division to the battlefront, a 
-420- 
journey which would have required no more than 12 
hours had daylight movement been possible. 49 
Granted that armed reconnaissance patrols severely 
disrupted German tactical movement, one might still 
argue that this was not of great importance if the 
German formations, albeit with difficulty and perhaps 
losses, could still reach their destinations in time 
to achieve their purpose, for example to reinforce a 
portion of the battlefront. It is certainly true that 
there were occasions when the Germans had time on 
their side, that formations arriving at their' 
destinations after long and difficult journeys 
nevertheless had time to reorganise without being 
under great pressure from Allied ground action. But 
there were also occasions when time was absolutely 
crucial to the Germans, such as when an offensive was 
to be mounted or an' Allied breakthrough sealed off, 
and when daylight movement had to be hazarded. Then 
armed reconnaissance could not only take a fearful 
toll of the German formations but also ensure that 
they arrived in no state to fight effectively. 
Such was the experience of the Hermann Göring 
Division in Italy, which was employed against the 
Anzio beachhead at the end of May 1944. but whose 
journey to the battlefront from the Leghorn area 
between May 23rd-27th was disrupted by air attack. Its 
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commander, General von Greffenberg, reported that his 
1 
division had been subject to, 
.. practically unceasing 
losses were considerable. 
intended concentration 
tanks. 50 
low level attacks.. the 
The Division reached the 
area.. with only eleven 
More tanks arrived piecemeal, but of the division's 
original 60 only 18 reached the battlefront. Given the 
limited accuracy of Allied air-to-ground weapons (see 
Chapter V), it is likely that few of these tanks were 
lost as a result of direct rocket or bomb hits, but 
rather due to the wear and tear of making long detours 
on poor roads on their tracks, the difficulties of 
repairing damaged tanks on the march, and shortages of 
spare parts and fuel due to their supporting softskin 
vehicles being continually shot up from the air. This 
also explains the fact that, of the 18 tanks that did 
get to Anzio, only about 8 or 10 of them were fit for 
action at any one time and they had little effect on 
the outcome of the battle. 51 
Similarly, in Normandy, on the night of August ist 
1944, the 9th SS Panzer Division began to move across 
the River Orne from the Caen sector in order to 
counter the thrust of British VIII Corps towards 
Flers. Daylight movement was imperative, and on the 
afternoon of the 2nd the main body of the division was 
found by 83 Group fighter-bombers along the roads 
between Tbury-Harcourt and Conde. They flew 271 
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sorties in the area and claimed the destruction of 10 
tanks and 50 MET and the damaging of 13 tanks and 76 
MET. 52 Even allowing for overclaiming, the losses 
inflicted on 9th SS were considerable. Moreover, the 
division could not go into action as a cohesive body 
but as a series of small battlegroups; by August 4th 
it was fighting on the defensive. 53 
Also in early August, in preparation for the German 
counter attack at Mortain (see Chapter V), the 1st SS 
Panzer Division began to move on August 3rd from the 
Caen area to opposite the US forces near Avranches. 
This also demanded daylight movement and Allied 
fighter-bombers turned the march into a nightmare, 
harrying the division relentlessly to the extent that 
one source states that losses amounted to 30% of 
strength. 54 Long delay was also caused, especially when 
a fighter-bomber, shot down by the Division's flak, 
crashed onto the lead tank as the column was moving 
along a narrow defile, blocking the road. It took 
several hours for the tanks to extricate themselves 
and find an alternative route, and only scattered 
elements arrived in time to start the. offensive on 
August 7th - armed reconnaissance thus having been 
responsible for a significant reduction in the tank 
strength available for the offensive's initial 
thrust. 55 
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Extensive armed reconnaissance patrols throughout 
the course of the offensive also resulted in heavy 
losses among the transport vehicles feeding the tanks, 
and very little fuel reached the armoured spearheads. 
On August 11th an ULTRA intercept of a message from 
47th Panzer Corps headquarters, directing the 
operation, revealed that the Germans were critically 
short of fuel. On the following day a further 
intercepted message reported that 30 tanks of Panzer 
Lehr were immobilised for lack of it. 56 Similarly, 
during the Ardennes offensive, losses to motor 
transport as a result of fighter-bomber attack were 
decisive in denying both supply and mobility to the 
German armoured spearheads. One consequence of this 
was described by Bayerlein, who recalled that he had 
to abandon 53 tanks of his Panzer Lehr Division by the 
roadside during the withdrawal from the Ardennes 
salient in January 1945, mainly because of losses to 
the lorries bringing forward his fuel and spare 
parts. 57 
Such were the penalties of attempting to fight a 
mobile war in the face of an enemy's air superiority. 
The roads beyond the German forward positions were 
usually devoid of movement in daylight. This was 
continual neutralization. While armed reconnaissance 
sorties did not always find targets, and could not 
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totally prevent German supply and reinforcement, they 
perpetuated the threat of air attack. There is no 
means of computing how much German movement did not 
take place, or how many operations were not attempted, 
as a result. 
While the evidence presented in this chapter confirms 
that ground attack was costly, it also shows quite 
conclusively that the heaviest aircraft and pilot 
losses were not sustained on close air support 
missions but on armed reconnaissance or as a result of 
attacks upon specific targets beyond the battlefront. 
This should not be surprising, for the targets 
vulnerable to armed reconnaissance, such as supply 
dumps, airfields, arteries of communication leading to 
and from the battlefront, and concentrations of troops 
and armour in reserve, were vital and could be 
expected to have priority in flak defences. In 
contrast, many close support strikes were against 
relatively small front line targets. Even allowing for. 
the massive German investment in automatic flak by 
1943-45 it was still impossible for every pillbox, 
small gun position, or slit trench to be so protected. 










In effect, the nost dangerous flak concentrations were 
not at the battlefront, but behind it. 
This is not to suggest that German troops in the 
forward area were totally denuded of flak cover, but 
an important factor - perhaps not given sufficient 
attention in previous discussion of this subject - is 
that when aircraft were engaging targets at the line 
of contact friendly artillery could play a vital role 
in neutralizing any known flak positions that were in 
range. Allied gunners were adept in the art of 
counter-battery fire, and by 1943-45 could bring 
targets under fire very rapidly (see Chapter VII 
above); those German flak positions that gave away 
their position by engaging aircraft could expect swift 
concentrations of airburst shelling. 
The fact that Allied fighter-bombers flaw 
considerably more armed reconnaissance sorties than 
close air support missions begs the question as to how 
the relative priorities were accorded. There was not a 
pronounced allocations tension between the two mission 
types in either Italy or North-West Europe, mainly 
because the Allied tactical air forces in 1943-45 had 
at their disposal large numbers of fighter-bombers and 
pilots, and a steady flow of replacements for both. 
This enabled a sizeable allocation of air effort to 
armed reconnaissance and close support at any one 
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time. For example, on June 11th 1944 RAF Desert Air 
Force (DAF) in Italy reported that, 
The policy for the employment of our fighters and 
Fighter-bombers remains the same... i/e, attacks on 
road movement, certain rail and road bridges and 
having A/C available for close support.. 58 
The extent of armed reconnaissance varied according to 
the situation at the battlefront but was greatest 
during those periods when there was relatively little 
intensive ground fighting. Operations such as STRANGLE 
were mounted while Allied troops were preparing for a 
major offensive, but whenever circumstances forced a 
lull in the ground battle armed reconnaissance was 
reasserted. One example occurred in Italy during 
January 1945, when Desert Air Force reported, 
The most noticeable feature of our activities has 
been the switching of the major part of our effort 
from the direct support of the Eighth Army in the 
battle area, to the interdiction of the enemy's 
communications... With the present stalemate on the 
battle front, brought about by atrocious ground 
conditions, It became obvious our forces could be 
better employed el sewbere. 59 
The level of armed reconnaissance also rose when, 
after an Allied ground offensive, a breakthrough had 
been achieved and German forces were compelled to 
withdraw - as in Normandy during August 1944. This 
enabled the fighter-bombers to take advantage of the 
increased number of targets, there being in any case 
by then a reduction in the number of close support 
requests. 
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This is not to suggest that when conducting armed 
reconnaissance the tactical air forces were waging a 
totally separate campaign, unrelated to the 
requirements of the Allied armies. In fact armed 
reconnaissance was acknowledged by the soldiers to be 
an extremely valuable form of air support, and many 
such missions were carried out at their request. For 
example, on June 14th 1944, during a period when the 
battlefront in Italy was static, the Advanced 
Headquarters of Desert Air Force noted that, 
.. there is no change in the Arxiy"s requests for 
armed recces behind the battle area, there being 
very few calls for support by forward troops. 60 
Ground offensives saw a considerable rise in the 
number of close support sorties to meet army demands, 
a situation that often lasted for periods of several 
days. Yet, despite the amount of close support 
required on any given day, the armed reconnaissance 
offensive, albeit on a reduced scale, was never 
compromised to the extent that the threat of air 
attack in the German rear areas became less viable. 
This was true of tactical air operations in both Italy 
and North-West Europe, but the daily Operations Record 
Book of RAF Desert Air Force in Italy provides some 
interesting examples from the period of the assault on 
the formidable German GOTHIC LINE during August- 
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', September 1944. On August 26th Desert Air Force 
reported, 
A maximum effort was put up today and a total of 664 
sorties were flown in support of the Fifth and 
Eighth Armies. By far the largest effort was against 
targets in and around the GOTHIC defences.. 
but the DAF report also added that, 
Continuous armed recces were flown tbrougbout the 
day covering the enemy's lines of communication but 
little movement was observed. 
Similarly, on September 1st 1944, Desert Air Force 
reported a further heavy commitment to close support: 
A maximum effort was achieved today, a total of 690 
sorties being flown. By far the greater number were 
in close support of the 8tb Army who were attacking 
and advancing through the GOTHIC Line defences in 
the PESARO area. 
Nevertheless, the daily report adds that, 
Apart from the close support work, armed recces of 
roads and rails behind the battle area were flown 
tbrougbout the day to deny the enemy much-needed 
reinforcements. 
The same situation prevailed on the following day, 
September 2nd: 
Almost our entire effort was once again concentrated 
upon the enemy immediately in front of the 8th Army 
who are advancing through the GOTHIC Line. Fighter 
bombers attacked gun positions, strong points, troop 
and tank concentrations, and flew constant armed 
recces over roads and rails in the enemy's rear. 61 
That a significant scale of armed reconnaissance 
could be conducted at a time when army demands for a 
heavy scale of close support were also being met was 
due primarily to the air resources at the disposal of 
the tactical air forces. There was also, to some 
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extent, a merging of roles. Much of the close support 
for such offensive operations was provided on CABRANK, 
and aircraft detailed for this task, if no close 
support target was given, often had armed 
reconnaissance of a specified area as a prearranged 
alternative mission. Moreover, VCPs or FCPs 
controlling the CABRANK aircraft, if there were no 
targets at the battlefront requiring immediate 
attention, would " frequently request an armed 
reconnaissance of the area immediately behind it. In 
this way many armed reconnaissance missions were 
directed from the battlefront. 
It would be incorrect to suggest that, whatever the 
situation at the battlefront, close support requests 
were in general denied in order to maintain the armed 
reconnaissance offensive, despite the overall higher 
number of sorties for the latter. Very often the 
opposite was true, as shown by the procedure in use by 
the Allies in 1944-45 of diverting aircraft proceeding 
on armed reconnaissance to respond to unforsean 
requests for close support. The frequency of this 
procedure is confirmed by the fact that among many U3 
army formations it became the preferred method of 
obtaining close support precisely when and where 
needed as opposed to relying on prearranged missions 
(see Chapter II above). Close air support and armed 
reconnaissance were in effect complementary aspects of 
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the same highly flexible tactical air offensive. This 
was most evident during mobile operations, when RAF 
fighter-bombers on CABRANK, and their American 
counterparts flying Armored Column Cover, often 
provided a combination of close air support and armed 
reconnaissance by patrolling considerable distances 
ahead of the armoured spearheads when close-in targets 
were lacking. 62 
While the strength of the Allied tactical air forces 
averted a serious allocations tension between close 
support and armed reconnaissance, the potential for 
such a tension existed. There were occasions, albeit 
relatively few, in both campaigns when it was 
necessary for the tactical air forces to 
simultaneously provide a major close support effort 
and also prevent large-scale German movement to the 
battle area. This was especially true when Allied 
troops were fighting on the defensive. Such was the 
case in Italy during the defence of the Salerno and 
Anzio beachheads against German counterattack in 
September 1943 and March 1944 respectively, and in 
North-West Europe during the German counterattack at 
Mortain and the Ardennes offensive. These operations 
demanded maximum efforts by the Allied tactical air 
forces which, despite their resources, were stretched 




Such emergencies were often of short duration, 
demanding only a few hours or a day of intensive 
effort which could be provided by working pilots and 
ground crews to the limit to achieve the necessary 
sorties - an example being the crisis on the first day 
of the Mortain counterattack, which was net by an 
afternoon of concentrated effort by ßo. 83 Group of 2nd 
TAF and the US IX TAC. Such operations, necessitating 
a reduction of air effort in other sectors of the 
battlefront, could not be sustained for more than 
very limited periods, and the tactical air forces 
could not cope with crises of longer duration without 
reinforcement. For example, the extent of Allied 
tactical air operations, both at and beyond the 
battlefront, during the German Ardennes offensive was 
made possible only by the involvement of 2nd TAF, the 
reshuffling of US fighter-bomber units in order to 
reinforce those TACs supporting the US armies directly 
engaged, and the temporary posting to the Continent of 
two Groups of the Eighth Air Force's Mustang fighters 
to reinforce the IX and XXIX TACs of Ninth Air 
Force. 63 
The ability of the tactical air forces to draw upon 
resources of air-superiority fighters was an important 
factor in maintaining fighter-bomber strength. This 
was shown in August 1944, when the Allied landings in 
Southern France (Operation DRAGOON) resulted in the 
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armies in Italy losing the support of the US XII TAC, 
while RAF Desert Air Force became responsible for the 
whole of the Italian front shortly before the 
launching of a major offensive against the GOTHIC 
LINE. Desert Air Force was reinforced, but the almost 
total lack of German air opposition meant that the 
loss of XII TAC was also offset by several fighter 
squadrons having been converted to fighter-bombing - 
among them four squadrons of Spitfires of No. 244 Wing 
which had been gaining experience in the role since 
the end of June. 64 
The Allied tactical air forces were also able to 
concentrate fighter-bomber strength in sectors of the 
battlefront demanding intensive effort, by temporarily 
assigning units to the area from quieter sectors. For 
example, in early 1945 Desert Air Force was 
anticipating demands for a heavy scale of close air 
support from Eighth Army, which was preparing to take 
the offensive. All fighter-bomber squadrons were 
expected to be fully occupied and, for Desert Air 
Force to maintain its operations, it was thought that 
reinforcement would be necessary. A Desert Air Force 
study noted that, 
This can be provided for by temporary transfer of 
fighter-bomber aircraft from 22nd T. A. C., provided 
that 5tb Army is not on the offensive at the same 
time. 
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It was even suggested that such a step might provide a 
surfeit of resources, for the same study added that, 
If it so happens that 5th Army do not undertake 
major offensives at the same time, then the total of 
D. A. F. plus 22nd T. A. C. Is almost certainly too 
great. 65 
In 1943-45 the Allied armies enjoyed a lavish scale 
of air support both at and beyond the battlefront. An 
indication of how their operations would have been 
curtailed had they been denied the support of powerful 
tactical air forces is shown by an incident which 
occurred in Italy. In December 1943 four US fighter 
groups of Northwest African Tactical Air Force (NATAF) 
were about to exchange their P-40s for P-47 
Thunderbolts. Headquarters Mediterranean Allied Air 
Forces (MAAF) decided that. after conversion, they 
would be transferred to the 15th (Strategic) Air Force 
for fighter escort duty. Air Marshal Coningham. than 
commanding NATAF, warned of the consequences of such a 
step: 
Experience In the afediterranean theatre has proved 
conclusively that the fighter bomber, owing to its 
versatility, hitting power, and powers of self- 
defence, is the most important single factor wbicb 
consistently contributes to success on land.. 
... without fighter bombers it would be Japossibi" 
to provide the necessary support for an advance.. 
The fighter bomber force in T. A. F. has long 
experience and is bigbly specialised. The present 
standard is due to continuity and the Inculcation 
of a fighter-bomber mentality born of more than two 
years offensive trial and error with armies. lt I. 
a difficult task which has to "grow" on a unit... 
... to talre these units away 
from their specialised 
offensive role and convert them into a defensive 
escort to long range bombers is unthinkable. 
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Coningham also warned that the Allied armies would 
become more vulnerable to a strong German 
counterattack directed upon either Foggia or Naples. 
This was because, 
The preventive factor is the air war on enemy supply 
and communications, and the killing element in every 
enemy attack is the fighter bomber. This is especially 
the case in Italy where the weight of the attack 
depends upon roads. 66 
The strength of Coningham's argument was that, if MAAF 
held to its decision, the result would have been to 
reduce the overall fighter strength of NATAF by 60%, 
thereby reducing the number of fighter-bombers 
supporting Eighth and Fifth Armies by 66% and 50% 
respectively. Largely due to Coningham's intervention, 
the decision was not implemented. Had it been, a 
serious allocations tension between armed 
reconnaissance and close air support would have been 
inevitable, with NATAF unable to maintain sufficient 
armed reconnaissance patrols to disrupt German 
tactical mobility, while lacking the resources to 
provide more than a limited close support effort. 
With regard to the effectiveness of the two mission 
types, it can be seen. that in each case the effects - 
neutralization and delay - were temporary. The 
inevitability of adverse flying weather on some days 
and the inability to operate at night ensured that 
armed reconnaissance could never completely sever the 
German forward troops from reinforcement and supply. 
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Its effect on German tactical nobility, however, was 
undeniably very great and sometimes decisive; it was 
for this reason that in 1945 ORS 2nd TAF concluded 
that armed reconnaissance was: 
the most important of all tactical air force work, 
because of the restrictions it imposes on enemy 
movement. 67 
Yet in order to have this effect armed reconnaissance 
had to be continuous, not just to engage targets but 
to make credible the continual threat of air attack 
which paralysed the German army. 
This was an advantage over close air support, for an 
armed reconnaissance mission contributed to this 
psychological effect even if the pilots found no 
targets - it could thus be argued that such a mission 
was not wasted, and that even for the aircraft to be 
seen over the German rear areas had some effect. This 
was not true of close air support to the same extent. 
While the presence of Allied fighter-bombers over the 
battle area undoubtedly curtailed German fighting 
efficiency by preventing movement and inducing 
} 
artillery and mortar crews to desist from firing, this 
was of limited assistance to Allied ground units about 
to attack German troops already occupying fighting 
positions. In this situation, as the above chapters 
indicate, each close support strike that Sailed to 
destroy or neutralize such positions, or which, having 
done so, was not exploited on the ground, was wasted. 
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The thesis began by posing two fundamental questions: 
whether the employment of aircraft in the close 
support role provided sufficient advantage at the 
battlefront to justify the necessary expenditure of 
effort, and whether air support proved to be of more 
value when directed at targets beyond the battlefront. 
Before answering these questions, and in order to 
conclude the thesis satisfactorily, it is useful to 
review the evidence presented in the preceeding 
chapters. 
Contemporary operational research (OR) material is the 
single most important data source consulted. In fact, 
had no attempt been made at the time to determine the 
effectiveness of weapons and what particular 
operations had achieved, it is hard to see how any 
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worthwhile historical analysis of close air support 
could be possible. 
Contemporary army records vary considerably in the 
extent to which the value of air support was 
acknowledged. Some battalion and regimental war 
diaries, such as that of the Irish Guards during 
operation GARDEN, are quite effusive. Others, such as 
those of the battalions which took part in the first 
TIMOTHY operation in Italy, actually make little 
mention of the air support. The reason for this is 
that compilers of war diaries varied in a number of 
ways; in temperament, in what they considered 
important to record of their battalion's activities, 
and also in the amount of time available to them to 
write up. Moreover, in some operations the air support 
may not have been so obvious to the troops being 
supported as in others. 
Turning to the air force records, what is the 
historian to judge of the effectiveness of an 
airstrike on reading the bald statement that all bombs 
or rockets fell in the target area, or that the target 
was well covered with strikes? What inference is to be 
drawn from the fact that in one afternoon in Normandy, 
during the German armoured counterattack at Mortain, 
Allied fighter-bombers claimed the destruction and 
damage of more German tanks than the latter actually 
possessed for the attack? 
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These questions would be impossible to answer 
satisfactorily were it not for operational research 
material. With regard to the destructive effect of 
weapons, their accuracy, and the identification of 
their morale effect the ORS investigations are beyond 
price. Yet OR material has its limitations. As the 
experience of No. 2 ORS and ORS 2nd TAF shows, there 
were too few ORS members and too little time for a 
fully comprehensive and quantitative study of close 
air support to be made. Battlefield examinations, 
sometimes instigated without clear directives from 
higher authority, were more a process of trial and 
error than systematic study - not least because the 
ORS did not know what evidence to look for until they 
found it. Rather these investigations, and the more 
general reports, offer a series of qualitative 
examples by which other such operations may be 
measured. - They provide an idea of in what way air 
attacks could be effective. 
But, given the lack of time and resources for 
quantitative study, are the OR data contained in a 
collection of qualitative examples reliable? The 
answer to this question is, broadly, yes. The 
attribution of damage and destruction to air weapons 
as a result of battlefield examinations can be 
regarded as accurate - for example the evidence 
indicating whether a tank had been knocked out by an 
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air or ground weapon was usually conclusive. From 
such evidence of weapons effectiveness, added to what 
was known of weapons accuracy, a fair idea could be 
I 
given of what these weapons were likely to achieve in 
terms of destruction. 
Beyond this point caution has to be exercised. It 
would be a rash historian or analyst who suggested 
that, because air-to-ground weapons were found to have 
had a certain destructive effect on one or even a few 
occasions, they would have the same effect on all such 
similar occasions. The morale effect of weapons was 
even more variable. There was simply not enough OR 
work done on air support to enable the OR scientist 
then, or the historian now, to state more than that 
under a given set of circumstances certain weapons and 
methods of attack had the potential to achieve a 
certain result. 
The risk of unreliability lies not so much in the OR 
material itself, but in the conclusions that the 
unwary may draw from it. For example, because they 
found few German dead during their investigations of 
heavy bombing operations, No. 2 ORS concluded that such 
bombing did not cause many casualties to German troops 
in defensive positions. Evidence from German sources 
(such as from GOODWOOD and Cassino) certainly confirms 
that heavy bombing did not cause such casualties as 
to completely obliterate a defence, but it also 
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confirms that more were killed than were subsequently 
found by the ORS. Moreover, the ORS discounted the 
fact that when possible the Germans removed their dead 
to prevent their discovery by Allied troops. 
The impact of OR at the time was slight, and in 
retrospect this is not surprising. To begin with, 
there was little worthwhile experience of utilising 
ORS, and little idea of what they should be asked to 
do. This was found by No. 2 ORS soon after arriving in 
Normandy, and the section began much of its work, 
including that on heavy bombing, on its own 
initiative. The fact that they were given such a free 
hand suggests that they were tolerated, perhaps even 
indulged - until they produced an unpalatable report, 
such as No. 14 questioning the effectiveness of heavy 
bombing, for which they were censured, or when their 
reports caused embarrassing inter-service conflict 
such as over fighter-bomber claims. 
It is questionable whether-there was much likelihood 
of the discoveries made by the ORS with regard to air 
support resulting in a change of operational methods. 
First, as the history of No. 2 ORS observes, there was 
no mechanism for ensuring that OR data was read or 
acted upon. Second, it is by no means certain that 
this would have been appropriate. For example, the 
ORS convincingly pointed out that heavy and medium 
bombing of gun batteries and German 'Fortress' 
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positions destroyed few, if any, guns and did little 
damage to fortifications, and that such bombing was 
really only of use immediately before an assault when 
its morale effect could be exploited. But what was the 
alternative when, as at Boulogne, artillery resources 
were limited? It was unthinkable to leave such 
formidable German positions unmolested in the period 
while an assault was prepared, and the soldiers could 
never be convinced of the futility of bombing, as the 
enduring resentment at the lack of bomber support in 
some operations, such as Walcheren, shows. 
This gap between theory and practice was the 
greatest obstacle to OR data being of practical use at 
the time. Experienced British and Canadian battalion 
commanders, their company officers and men, did not 
need an ORS scientist to tell them that the sooner 
they advanced after a Typhoon attack the more shaken 
and demoralised would they find the enemy - in fact it 
was only by talking with such men that the ORS 
formulated their ideas. It was another matter, 
however, for ORS reports pointing out the limitations 
of air-ground weapons, outlining their morale effects 
and the wastefulness of airstrikes uncoordinated with 
ground action, and advocating a rapid follow-up of 
airstrikes, to have much impact at Corps and Division 
level. Even if such reports reached that level and 
were read, it was simply not possible in all cases to 
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ensure that airstrikes were immediately exploited. 
Battles are not conducive to such stage-management or 
to rigid timetables, and much that was unforseen could 
occur to prevent an attack going in exactly on 
schedule. Moreover, as the ORS admitted, the morale 
effect of air attack was a matter of a very few 
minutes at most. 
When circumstances allowed, airstrikes were rapidly 
exploited. But operational planning could not be 
predicated solely on the likely morale effect of 
weapons, and there was much Army and RAF opposition to 
suggestions that weapons be developed with a 
pronounced morale effect at the expense of destructive 
capability. Nor could there be any question of the 
army ceasing to demand air attacks on known enemy 
positions when air support was available simply on the 
grounds that they were not yet ready to attack them. 
In short, tried and trusted methods were unlikely to 
be forsaken 
_by 
fighting formations on the basis of OR 
reports, even had they been aware of them, and much of 
the OR data from 1944-45 is of more practical use to 
the historian now than it was to the soldiers and 
airmen then. 
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The Allied air support systems were remarkable 
achievements. The RAF and British Army, and later the 
US Army and USAAF, entered the war completely unversed 
in close air support, lacking worthwhile experience, 
equipment and doctrine. Yet by 1944 the British and 
Americans each had in operation a joint army/air force 
machinery providing for the swift handling of air 
support requests and the command and control of 
aircraft extending from airfield to battlefront. 
Nevertheless, while the British and Americans each 
created a workable air support machinery, neither 
attained the highest level of potential efficiency. 
For air support to work the armies and air forces had 
to be very closely coordinated, and to achieve this 
only at the operational level, and not always then, 
was not enough. 
Opposition, or at least lack of commitment, to the 
principle of close air support on the part of the RAP 
and USAAF was a major contributory factor, but so too 
was an almost complete lack of understanding of the 
nature of air support. on the part of the US and 
British Armies. While junior air and ground commanders 
learnt by experience, at staff level this situation 
prevailed until the end of the war. This meant that 
the extra effort necessary to make the system work to 
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full efficiency was never forthcoming. For example, it 
is remarkable that training in close support for the 
Allied troops and air forces preparing for OVERLORD 
was minimal, with very few joint exercises, and that 
those commanders with Mediterranean experience, such 
as Montgomery and Coningham, were unable or unwilling 
to correct the deficiency. The success of air support 
in North-West Europe ultimately depended upon the 
innovation and imagination of those air commanders at 
a lower level, such as Broadhurst of 83 Group and 
Quesada of IX TAC, who had learnt air support in the 
Mediterranean, and who were prepared to support the 
army despite censure from their superiors. 
The test of battle inevitably exposed weaknesses in 
both the US and British systems, but many of the 
problems, particularly those that cost lives such as 
poor bombline discipline and air-ground recognition 
procedure, could have been. minimised by adequate 
training. It was only too obvious in Normandy, just as 
it had been in Sicily and early in Italy, that air and 
ground forces were unfamiliar with each other. In each 
case examining and finding solutions to the problems. 
with close air support that were likely to be 
encountered had been accorded little priority. 
The air support systems depended upon an extensive 
communications network and the rapid accumulation, 
processing, and dissemination of data and of 
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instructions based upon it. Both the British and US 
systems had problems with this. At the time much of 
the fault was considered to be due to individuals - 
for example in the US system the army Ground Liaison 
Officers (GLOB) attached to air squadrons were 
criticised by some army formations for not keeping the 
air units sufficiently informed of the ground battle 
situation. Yet, while variations in individual 
performance could adversely affect efficiency at all 
levels, in 1943-45 the real problem lay in the breaks 
in the data flow, where a man at a desk, be he an air 
force or army officer at a joint control centre, an 
air force headquarters, or at a fighter-bomber 
airfield, had to sift through and act upon a 
continuing mass of data from the battlefront. Delays 
here were inevitable, as was the fact that by the time 
ALOs or GLOs at the airfields briefed the fighter- 
bomber pilots their information was to some extent out 
of date. 
The fighter-bomber squadrons were the cutting edge of 
the Allied tactical air forces, but despite the 
immense effort and manpower both within the air 
support systems and the air forces needed to maintain 
these squadrons, to direct them to battlefront, and to 
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control them once there, they were in fact blunt 
instruments. 
The fighter-bomber of 1943-45 was certainly flexible 
and versatile, able to be directed against a wide 
range of targets, but what it actually achieved when 
it reached them was a different matter altogether. 
This was due to the limitations of the air-to-ground 
weapons with which it was equipped, principally their 
inaccuracy. Rockets and free-fall bombs, even when 
delivered by experienced pilots, could not be depended 
upon to hit their target, be it a gun position, a 
tank, a building, or even a bridge. With regard to 
close air support, when many of the targets could be 
expected to be small and camouflaged, this was a 
significant drawback. Precision attacks, if not 
completely beyond the capabilities of fighter-bombers 
of the time, were at best very difficult to achieve, 
and the main value of the fighter-bomber was its 
ability to bring to. the battlefront a considerable 
weight of firepower with which to saturate a target 
area. 
This ability was particularly important when fighter- 
bombers had to act as a substitute for artillery by 
flying close air support for armoured thrusts and 
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airborne operations, this being the only means of 
providing fire support in such operations. 
With regard to the former, close air support offered 
two important advantages over conventional artillery 
support. One was that the fighter-bombers could keep 
pace with the advance, and the other was that they 
could engage targets that were very close to the 
advancing tanks. Yet it is apparent that it was the 
morale effect of air attack, rather than the 
destruction caused or number of casualties inflicted, 
that was decisive in overcoming German resistance. 
Although the Typhoon attacks in support of GARDEN 
undoubtedly caused some casualties among the German 
{ 
troops, the war diary of the Irish Guards clearly 
describes how it was the resulting shock and 
demoralization that caused the German defence to 
ti 
collapse. This was confirmed by the fact that the 
Typhoons proved equally effective in inducing German 
troops to surrender by making dummy attacks, after 
their rockets and cannon ammunition had been expended. 
Similarly, after CYGNET, the subsequent Royal Armoured 
Corps report noted how the fighter-bomber attacks on 
German defended buildings caused a 'temporary 
disorganisation' which enabled the British tanks and 
infantry to close in and clear them with few 
casualties. 
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The problem with such neutralization, as opposed to 
outright destruction of the enemy, was that it only 
lasted while aircraft were overhead. Once they had 
departed, the effect soon wore off. Both on the first 
day of GARDEN and throughout CYGNET the air support 
was continuous, but the lack of progress made on 
subsequent days during GARDEN when the Typhoons were 
unavailable revealed to what extent the Germans were 
prepared to fight stubbornly. With Armored Column 
Cover there were numerous occasions when, after 
fighter-bombers had neutralized German positions to 
enable the US armour to bypass them, the occupants of 
these positions had subsequently recovered to offer 
resistance to the following US infantry. 
All this suggests that, particularly when armour was 
advancing in terrain favouring defence, or was 
confined to roads, success depended upon the provision 
of close air support. But to maintain a CABRANK or 
Armored Column Cover demanded the commitment of 
considerable air effort. The Allies were fortunate in 
that air superiority had been secured, and that large 
numbers of fighter-bombers were available. This 
notwithstanding, such commitment could not be, 
sustained for more than limited periods. 
Turning to airborne operations, there were obviously 
problems with regard to providing close support to 
troops operating beyond the established front line, 
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particularly that of pilots correctly identifying 
friend from foe on the ground and the paramount need 
to maintain communications. Given that close air 
support was the only means of augmenting the firepower 
of lightly armed airborne troops when beyond the 
protection of friendly artillery, it is remarkable 
that the Allied airborne forces were so poorly served 
until nearly the end of the war. 
Both the US and British airborne troops in Normandy 
were denied much potential air support, not because 
the aircraft were unavailable but because the means of 
contacting them were lacking. Even as late as 
September 1944, the British 1st Airborne Division went 
to Arnhem unversed in the close air support procedure 
that had been in use with British troops on the 
Continent since D-Day, and lacking adequate means to 
contact tactical aircraft. The subject had been given 
very little thought and accorded no priority, a 
situation that was not corrected until early 1945. 
However, while it was inexcusable that little 
consideration had been given to close air support of 
the Allied airborne forces, the case can be 
overstated. It would have been inappropriate for 
airborne troops to be utterly dependent upon such 
support. Had 1st Airborne Division gone to Arnhem 
superbly equipped and trained for the utilization of 
close air support, this would have been of little use 
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had adverse weather kept the fighter-bombers grounded. 
Moreover, it is hard to see how the Typhoons could 
have intervened in the confused fighting at Arnhem 
without great risk to friendly troops. When they did 
appear, towards the end of the battle, their attacks 
proved to be of limited practical use and certainly 
not of a decisive battle-winning nature. Once again it 
was a case of fighter-bombers causing neutralization 
instead of destruction. The presence of the Typhoons 
kept the German troops in cover, but little advantage 
of this could be taken under the prevailing 
circumstances and ultimately the Typhoons provided 
the airborne troops with only a temporary respite from 
German fire. 
Regarding fighter-bomber effectiveness against armour, 
the underlying theme remains the morale effect of air 
attack. The ORS ground surveys at la Baleine, 
Mortain, the Falaise Pocket, and in the Ardennes prove 
that fighter-bombers, despite the claims of their 
pilots, did not destroy many German tanks. This was 
not because their, weapons lacked destructive 
capability, but because they could not be relied upon 
to hit the target. What is also apparent, however, 
particularly with regard to la Baleine and Mortain, 
is 
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that air attack could disrupt concentrations of 
armour and cause widespread panic and demoralization 
among tank crews. 
At Mortain both American and German accounts of the 
battle acknowledge that the intervention of the 
fighter-bombers, particularly the rocket-Typhoons, was 
decisive. Given the evidence from the ORS ground 
surveys of the battle area, which seems conclusive, 
this could only have been as a result of the air 
attacks disrupting the attack and causing panic - 
hence the number of German tanks subsequently found 
abandoned. Thus the reputation of the Typhoon as an 
effective 'tank killer' was really based upon the 
quite terrifying effect of salvoes of the 3-inch 
rocket and the fact that, despite its lack of pinpoint 
accuracy, the weapon could nevertheless be placed with 
more accuracy than free-fall bombs, thereby enabling 
the Typhoons to engage German armour which was very' 
close to the positions of Allied troops. 
Turning aside from tanks specifically, there is more 
reason to believe that fighter-bombers wrought great. 
destruction among German soft-skin transport. This was 
mainly by strafing, for cannon and machine gun fire 
was far more accurate than bombing or rocket fire, and 
had a high lethality against soft-skin and even 
lightly armoured vehicles. Moreover, bombs or rockets 
did not need to actually strike such vehicles to 
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destroy or seriously damage them, for they were 
vulnerable, as tanks were not, to the blast and 
shrapnel caused by a near-miss. It was by attacking 
such targets that fighter-bombers were really most 
effective against armour concentrations, for if the 
fighter-bombers could not easily destroy the tanks 
they could certainly reduce the softskin vehicles 
keeping them supplied with fuel and ammunition. 
In short, with regard to close air support, the 
effectiveness of fighter-bomber attack against armour 
on the battlefield ultimately depended upon the 
disruption and morale effect. With regard to attacking 
armour that was not closely engaged with Allied 
troops, such as in the armed reconnaissance role, 
effectiveness depended upon disruption but also upon 
the destruction of those vehicles keeping the tanks 
supplied. 
The success of heavy and medium bombers in the close 
support role also depended upon the disruption and 
demoralization caused by bombing, and the extent to 
which this could be exploited, rather than the amount 
of destruction or casualties inflicted. 
Against pinpoint targets, such as individual gun and 
battery positions, heavy and medium bombing was too 
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inaccurate to be relied upon to score the requisite 
number of direct hits, while defended positions 
constructed of concrete and steel often proved 
impervious to the heaviest calibre bombs. Bombing in 
support of offensive operations in open country 
usually found the German defenders too well dispersed 
for the number of casualties and losses in equipment 
inflicted upon them to be decisive, while bombing of 
urban areas proved almost wholly counter-productive 
and a positive hindrance to the troops it was intended 
to assist. 
What, then, could such bombing achieve? The answer 
to this question can only be that bombing amounted to 
the saturation of German defence positions with a 
tremendous weight of fire that, while it did not 
necessarily cause great destruction or massive 
casualties, did cause widespread disruption, shock and 
demoralization and left the machinery of defence 
temporarily unable to function and vulnerable. If 
this could be exploited at once by Allied troops, then 
significant gains could be made at less cost. 
However, this was not always sufficient to secure 
success. GOODVOOD, for example, failed not only 
because sufficient German forces survived in the 
bombed areas to offer resistance which slowed the 
British advance, but also because the German defence 
zone was of such depth that the initial heavy bomber 
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strike was insufficient to- blast a way through it. The 
entire operation was mounted on the basis of faulty 
intelligence and it is questionable whether a 
breakthrough could ever have been achieved. In 
contrast the bombing that initiated COBRA, while it 
did not completely eliminate German resistance or 
obviate hard fighting by the US troops, did make a 
breakthrough possible because the German defence that 
had been initially disrupted lacked depth and could 
not be restored. 
The decision to bomb urban areas. in the path of 
Allied troops, especially after the experience of 
Cassino, is difficult to comprehend. The resulting 
obstruction prevented the assault troops from taking 
advantage of the disruption of the defence, while the 
German troops were presented with a series of new and 
well concealed positions. Some of the operations in 
open terrain also reveal a lack of awareness on the 
part of the soldiers of what bombing could be expected 
to achieve. 
The reason was that the soldiers were anxious to 
make progress while saving casualties, but did not 
understand sufficiently the implications of heavy 
bombing in varying terrain. They were unwilling to 
heed the warnings -Of the senior airmen, and therefore 
exposed themselves, when operations failed, to the not 
unjustified charge that the strategic bomber forces 
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were being used not to secure decisive result but 
simply to save army casualties. With hindsight the 
saving of soldiers' lives does not seem so 
reprehensible a justification, but in fact the senior 
airmen had some cause to oppose any diversion of the 
strategic bomber offensive against Germany. In 1944-45 
this offensive, for which the Allied heavy bomber 
forces had been created, was at long last beginning to 
show positive results - most notably in the targeting 
of Germany's synthetic oil plants and the attrition of 
the Luftwaffe. 
It is ironic that this should have occurred only 
after the Allied armies had landed in France, an event 
which both Harris and Spaatz had intended to make 
unnecessary through bombing. Demands from the soldiers 
for heavy bomber close support thus began to occur at 
the worst possible time for the airmen - when their 
strategic offensive, which had already been disrupted 
by the pre D-Day bombing programme in support of 
OVERLORD, was beginning to show results, and when they 
had to meet yet another, even more urgent, demand for 
the bombing of German flying bomb sites. 
This, coupled with the fact that the airmen were 
doctrinally opposed to close air support, meant that 
such support was provided reluctantly. Hence the 
bitter recrimination, such as after CHARNWOOD and 





have been wasted. Their determination that the 
strategic air forces should not be at the disposal of 
the army ensured that little was done until late in 
both the Italian and North-West European campaigns to 
educate the soldiers as to the nature of heavy 
bombing, or to solve the likely command and control 
problems which cost so many lives in the short 
bombings. 
Yet, while a more positive attitude towards close 
air support on the part of the senior airmen might 
have seen some of the command and control difficulties 
avoided, and thereby some of the short bombing 
tragedies prevented, they were fundamentally right in 
their contention that the heavy bombers were unsuited 
to the role. In fact, it is hard to see, given the 
nature of bombing and in what way it could be 
effective, how any of the heavy bomber operations 
could have been more successful than they were, or 
how further such employment could have been justified. 
The COBRA bombing was vindicated by the success of 
the operation, while the GOODWOOD bombing was 
condemned by the operation's failure. Yet the bombing 
for GOODWOOD was no less effective in what it actually 
achieved than that for COBRA, while the latter 
operation could hardly have succeeded had the US 
forces been confronted with a German defence as 
formidable as that which had defeated GOODWOOD. Even 
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operation QUEEN, for which the US Army and Eighth Air 
Force working together eliminated the risk of short 
bombing, ultimately failed due to the depth of the 
German defence. The employment of heavy and medium 
bombers in close support proved to be of value only in 
the initial stages of set piece attacks, and for the 
gaining of limited objectives. If rapidly exploited, 
such bombing could enable Allied troops to break into 
German defence localities at reduced cost, but it 
could not ensure a breakthrough any more than could 
the massive artillery bombardments of World War I to 
which it was analogous. In short, the answer to 
defence in depth could only have been more, and yet 
more, bombs. 
Fighter-Bombers Compared with Artillery. 
When comparing the effectiveness of fighter-bombers 
and artillery in close support, it would seem that 
close air support could only be justified on the 
grounds of the pronounced morale effect of air attack. 
Artillery was on hand, to provide support day and 
night, in all weathers. Fighter-bombers could only be 
called upon during daylight, and then were at the 
mercy of the weather, making the provision of close 
air support highly questionable. Moreover, the Allied 
artilleries by 1943-45 were adept at providing fire 
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support very rapidly, and had attained a 
responsiveness that could be matched by aircraft only 
by the expensive provision of standing patrols in the 
battle area. With regard to destructive effect and 
lethality, air weapons were little more effective, if 
at all, than artillery fire against troops with a 
reasonable level of protection. Against troops 
unfortunate enough to be caught in the open, both air 
attack and artillery fire could be very lethal. But in 
the battle area German troops were rarely caught at 
such a disadvantage in daylight and, being on hand and 
well within range, it was usually artillery that was 
best placed to take advantage of such occurrences. 
Yet, fighter-bombers offered several advantages 
over artillery. One was that their attacks enabled 
Allied troops to approach closer to the objective than 
could normally be possible during an artillery 
bombardment. Another was that air attack could achieve 
the neutralization of an enemy position more quickly, 
with the effects being of longer duration, than could 
be achieved by artillery. Both these considerations 
were vital, for experience in European operations 
proved that it was not how many Germans a supporting 
bombardment killed or wounded that was critical, but 
how quickly they could be rendered incapable of 
fighting, through shock or panic, and how long this 
state was likely to last. In attacks by Allied troops 
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upon German positions it was time that cost lives, the 
time, a matter of a few vital minutes, during which 
the German defenders could recover from the effects of 
bombardment and emerge from cover to man their 
positions. Fighter-bombers saved time. 
The TIMOTHY and WINKLE methods of co-ordinating 
airstrikes to support the various stages of an advance 
exploited these advantages. on a wider scale. They 
provided deeper and more flexible fire support 
throughout the course of an attack than an artillery 
barrage alone, as not just the German forward defence 
localities to be assaulted but also those positions 
and gun areas immediately beyond were subject to air 
attack and the consequent disruption. Neutralization 
was therefore more extensive, and was renewed at 
intervals. 
Were these advantages enough to justify the 
commitment of aircraft to the ground battle area to 
support armies generally well equipped with artillery? 
Many of the airstrikes carried out in close support 
against German positions negated the advantages of 
fighter-bomber attack because they were not co- 
ordinated with attacks by Allied troops. Except in 
situations where artillery, was lacking or its 
ammunition was in short supply, the air support 
offered no appreciable advantage and was wasted. Yet, 
because close air support, when rapidly exploited, 
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could enable German positions to be overcome rapidly 
with fewer casualties the answer to the above question 
is that there were occasions when such support was not 
only Justified but vital. 
Whether this contribution could be made without 
compromising the effectiveness of those air operations 
conducted beyond the battlefront leads to the wider 
question of cost effectiveness, and inevitably to a 
comparison with the role rivalling close air support 
in terms of commitment of air effort: armed 
reconnaissance. 
North-West Europe and Italy in 1944/45, and 
particularly the former, constituted the most flak- 
intensive environment confronting Allied fighter- 
bomber pilots during the war. Losses in aircraft and 
pilots among squadrons engaged in ground attack were 
high. Yet, despite the preconceived tenet held by both 
the RAF and USAAF that close air support was the most 
costly of tactical operations (see Chapter II above), 
statistical evidence from North-West Europe proves 
that close air support was significantly less 
dangerous than armed reconnaissance. In effect, the 
data suggests that the further beyond the battlefront 
that fighter-bombers operated, the higher their 
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losses. Armed reconnaissance itself varied in the 
losses sustained, deep penetration missions proving 
more costly than those conducted closer to the 
battlefront. 
Not only was armed reconnaissance more expensive 
than close support in terms of losses, it was also 
more expensive in terms of air effort, with 
significantly more fighter-bomber sorties being 
commited to this mission type. The question remains 
whether the cost of armed reconnaissance in both 
respects was justified by the results achieved. 
With regard to both close air support and armed 
reconnaissance these results were temporary in nature 
in that it was neutralization rather than destruction 
that was ultimately more important. Armed 
reconnaissance was a continual daylight air offensive 
over the German rear areas but, as interdiction 
operations such as STRANGLE proved, it was unrealistic 
for fighter-bombers to be expected to prevent all 
German road, rail and river movement and to out off 
the German forward troops from all reinforcement and 
supply. However, their disruptive effect on German 
movement, due to the ever-present threat of air attack 
as much as the actuality of such attack, was great. 
This was continual neutralization, and the air effort 
involved was commensurate-with what was achieved. So 
too were the losses. Supply traffic, ammunition and 
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fuel dumps, airfields, troop concentration areas, and 
those units compelled to move by daylight were of 
vital importance and heavily defended by flak - it was 
unthinkable that they should not be brought under 
attack, but they could not be attacked without 
penalty. 
Close air support losses were also commensurate with 
the nature of the targets. Nothing was more important 
than the next enemy pillbox, trench, or defended house 
to those Allied troops whose task it was to assault 
it. They were similarly important to the German troops 
defending them, but their priority for anti-aircraft 
protection was low and the vast majority of such 
targets were undefended by flak. Moreover, flak 
positions in the battle area could be suppressed by 
Allied artillery. 
In the wider perspective armed reconnaissance 
targets appear undeniably more important than those of 
close support. Yet in the 1943-45 period there is 
little evidence of a serious tension in determining 
the allocation of air units to either role, though 
certain trends are apparent. When the battlefront was 
static and the Allied armies not engaged in large- 
scale offensive operations the amount of close air 
support requests was relatively small, allowing a 
considerable commitment to armed reconnaissance. Once 
offensive operations were under way, particularly in 
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the initial stages, the amount of close support 
increased, but never to the extent as to make armed 
reconnaissance impossible and thereby to lessen the 
threat of air attack in the German rear areas. Once a 
breakthrough had been achieved, or the battlefront had 
stabilised, the priority of armed reconnaissance was 
reasserted. 
In fact close support and armed reconnaissance were 
complimentary aspects of the same tactical air 
offensive, which remained highly flexible. The air 
support systems allowed for the diversion of aircraft 
from armed reconnaissance missions to answer unforseen 
requests for close support, and in the US system this 
became the favoured method of responding to such 
demands. Similarly, during large-scale close support 
operations involving CABRANI{ or Armored Column Cover, 
aircraft were frequently directed to armed 
reconnaissance when close-in targets were lacking. In 
fact, even during set-piece offensive operations as 
opposed to rapid armoured advances, the FCP and VCP 
controllers with the forward troops were responsible 
for directing a high proportion of the armed 
reconnaissance missions carried out in the areas 
immediately behind the German front line positions. 
In effect, it was quite normal for fighter-bomber 
pilots assigned to close air support to actually find 
themselves flying armed reconnaissance, and for pilots 
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setting out on an armed reconnaissance mission to be 
diverted to close air support. It would be a mistake 
to consider that the fighter-bomber squadrons assigned 
to either mission type were somehow waging separate 
campaigns, for they were not. A study of the major 
ground offensive operations reveals that, in addition 
to the squadrons assigned to close support, those 
assigned to armed reconnaissance were also indirectly 
supporting the operation, as well as maintaining the 
attack upon the German rear areas, by flying armed 
reconnaissance over the roads leading to the battle 
area. 
In Italy and North-West Europe during 1943-45 which 
of these roles was the most vital was found to 
depend, in practice, not upon preconceived dogma but 
upon the prevailing circumstances in the battle area. 
It is true that the disruption of German tactical 
mobility and of supply and . communications could only 
be achieved by air attack whereas, in theory at least, 
the soldiers should have been able to achieve their 
objectives without close air support. But experience 
proved otherwise, that there was an unforseen 
requirement for close air support not only in 
emergency situations, such as at Mortain, but also to 
exploit the particular advantages that supporting 
aircraft could bring. 
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The Allied experience of utilising close air support 
in Europe during 1943-45 leads to several significant 
observations in answer to the question of what 
advantage close air support provided at the 
battlefront, and thereby avoiding the equivocal 
conclusion warned of in the introduction to the 
thesis. The question of effectiveness can be examined 
under the following headings: 
Aircraft could not normally respond rapidly to 
requests for close air support. With regard to close 
support by heavy and medium bombers, the question of 
responsiveness does not arise as they could only be 
employed according to a rigid timetable, for example 
at the outset of a major attack. With regard to 
fighter-bombers, at the very least time had to be 
allowed for the request to be. passed from the forward 
troops through the air support control system to the 
airfield, where further. time was needed for a rapid 
briefing of pilots. Still more time was taken by the 
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aircraft in taking-off, forming-up when airborne, and 
proceeding to the battlefront. 
Under these conditions, even with a squadron whose 
aircraft and pilots were at readiness, the forward 
troops would have been extremely fortunate to see 
their supporting aircraft arrive within an hour of the 
original request. This was clearly unsatisfactory, as 
far as the troops were concerned, for dealing with 
German strongpoints and pockets of resistance that 
were encountered during the course of an advance. In 
order to save time and casualties such positions had 
to be dealt with rapidly, and in most circumstances 
artillery, providing it was available, was the more 
effective solution. In 1943-45 the British and US 
artilleries possessed fire control systems whose 
responsiveness could not normally be equalled by 
aircraft. 
There were two methods whereby the Allied air 
support systems could respond faster than by relying 
upon squadrons at airfield readiness. One was to 
contact aircraft that were already airborne in or near 
the battle area, divert them from their mission and 
direct them to respond to the request. Normally such 
aircraft, providing they happened to be available, 
were proceeding on armed reconnaissance patrols. 
However, time would be needed for them to change 
course and proceed to the particular sector of the 
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battlefront, where on arrival they would report to the 
ground controller at the FCP or contact car. The 
pilots would then have to be briefed before they could 
attack the target. There were two drawbacks to this 
method. One was the obvious disruption to air force 
planning, in that in order to respond to the close 
support request the assigned mission had to be 
dropped. The other relates to the quality of the 
resulting air support. Pilots diverted in this way 
were unlikely to be as familiar with the sector of the 
battlefront, the ground situation, and the relative 
positions of enemy and friendly troops as those of 
squadrons originally assigned to close support tasks 
and who had been given a more detailed briefing. 
The second, and most important, method of responding 
rapidly to close support requests was to maintain 
standing patrols, of aircraft in the battle area. 
Examples of this are CABRANK and, for mobile 
operations, Armored Column Cover. In this case the 
pilots would have been well briefed for operating in 
the battle area and made familiar with the ground 
situation and the positions of enemy and friendly 
troops. They could also respond on a par with 
artillery, as they could be directed onto targets as 
they arose. For fighter-bombers to achieve this level 
of responsiveness, however, demanded such a commitment 
of air resources that the Allied tactical air forces 
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in 1943-45, despite their possession of large numbers 
of aircraft and pilots, could not sustain such efforts 
for more than limited periods. 
Moreover, such operations were inefficient, and 
involved a certain amount of waste. Maintaining 
constant patrols in a single area meant that many of 
them were not required for close support targets. In 
effect, supply exceeded demand and pilots were 
frequently directed to attack pre-briefed alternative 
targets or to carry out armed reconnaissance patrols 
in the area immediately behind the German positions. 
Such patrols may have reduced German defence 
effectiveness by discouraging movement and inducing 
gun positions to remain inactive. But it can also be 
argued that very few worthwhile targets were to be 
found immediately behind the German positions during a 
battle, particularly at a time when German troops knew 
the sky to be full of Allied aircraft, and that the 
aircraft could have been more profitably employed, in 
either the close support or armed reconnaissance role, 
in other sectors which had been denuded of both types 
of air effort. 
Yet there was no realistic alternative. Viable close 
air support demanded a rapid response to support 
requests, and this could only be achieved if the 
pilots were kept overhead waiting for targets. In 
1943-45 the Allied tactical air forces were able to 
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attain a high degree of responsiveness in close air 
support only as a result of the considerable air 
resources at their disposal, and at the ultimate 
expense of cost effectiveness. 
A problem with regard to close air support never 
solved in the period 1943-45 was that of destructive 
capability. It was extremely difficult for Allied 
aircraft to destroy the targets that they were called 
upon to engage at the battlefront. 
The bomb patterns of heavy and medium bombers were 
intended to saturate wide target areas. Yet it was 
consistently found that such bombing was uneven, with 
some areas overhit and others relatively untouched. 
This simply meant that when bombing German defence 
localities and gun areas in the field, some positions 
would be destroyed and others not. In fact the number 
of men and amount of equipment that could survive 
saturation bombing appear to have been a constant 
surprise to both Germans and Allies alike. This was 
not a question of accuracy. alone. Dispersion did much 
to negate the effectiveness of the bomb patterns, but 
it was also found that troops well dug-in had little 
to fear from near misses. The destructive effect of a 
high-explosive bomb extended little beyond its crater, 
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while fragmentation bombing, lethal to unprotected 
troops, was considerably less effective against those 
that were. Heavily fortified positions of concrete and 
steel, such as encountered during the operations to 
clear the Channel ports, were impervious to even the 
heaviest calibre bombs. Bombing urban areas caused 
much devastation, but here too sufficient German 
troops could be expected to survive to mount a 
formidable defence. 
Fighter-bomber effectiveness was compromised by the 
fact that the bombs and rockets of 1943-45 were so 
inaccurate that, when directed against precision 
targets, they were almost certain to miss them. Yet 
most close support targets in the battle area were 
precision targets because they were small. They were 
also usually well camouflaged, in order to hide them 
from the air and from observation by Allied troops. 
Such targets included dug-in tanks, -gun and mortar 
positions, strongpoints and machine-gun nests. The 
heavy and medium bomber crews never expected to see 
such targets; they were intended to saturate the areas 
known to contain them and usually bombed from too high 
an altitude to distinguish anything but the most 
prominent landmarks. In contrast, the fighter-bomber 
pilot was expected to tackle such targets 
individually, yet he too rarely saw them. More often 
than not, diving at speed with only a few seconds to 
- 475 - 
aim and release his bombs or rockets, and confronted 
with a battle area obscured by smoke, the pilot saw 
only the coloured smoke fired by friendly artillery 
that was intended to indicate his target. This, taken 
in conjunction with the inaccuracy of air-to-ground 
weapons, meant that very few such targets were 
actually hit. 
But if they were not hit they would not be 
destroyed, as near-misses by bombs and rockets against 
dug-in troops and equipment, or tanks, were of little 
value. Only strafing appears to have had the 
potential to inflict significant casualties, providing 
a large number of fighter-bombers were strafing an 
area containing a high concentration of troops lacking 
overhead protection. In effect, close air support 
could never be relied upon to achieve the outright 
destruction of targets, and attempts to ensure even a 
reasonable chance of such destruction demanded an 
inordinate scale of air attack by all aircraft types. 
The most important theme underpinning the observations 
made throughout the thesis is morale effect. The 
battlefield effectiveness, of close air support 
depended upon the fact that air attack had the 
potential to neutralize targets more effectively than 
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Allied ground weapons. This really amounts to saying 
that air attack was more terrifying, and that the 
German troops subjected to it were likely to remain in 
a state of shock, and incapable of fighting 
effectively, for longer than those subjected to ground 
based fire support. The evidence is persuasive. 
With regard to fighter-bomber attacks, accounts from 
British and US troops and ORS investigations all 
affirm that it was this temporary morale effect of air 
attack, rather than any destruction and casualties 
caused, that was decisive. There was also the very 
important practical consideration that fighter-bomber 
strikes could permit assault troops to approach closer 
to their objective than possible with supporting 
artillery fire, enabling them to take maximum 
advantage of the morale effect. For mobile and 
airborne operations close air support was the only 
means of supplementing the limited firepower of Allied 
units, and its success was crucial. But here too air 
support proved highly effective in the temporary 
neutralization of targets, rather than in their 
destruction. 
The situation was slightly different regarding heavy 
and medium bomber operations, in that more destruction 
and casualties were likely to be caused than by 
fighter-bomber strikes due to the weight and scale of 
attack involved. Nevertheless, this was never in 
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itself decisive, and the progress made by Allied 
troops at the outset of such operations was due 
primarily to the morale effect of bombing. Many German 
troops subjected to carpet bombing survived, but they 
were often found to be suffering from vibratory shock, 
deafness and complete disorientation. Equipment may 
not have been destroyed, but in the period immediately 
following a bomber strike many of the tanks and guns 
were rendered temporarily unworkable by being toppled 
into craters or buried under dirt and debris. The 
problem was that the nature of such bombing often 
prevented Allied troops from exploiting this effect. 
Crater bombs ploughed up German defence localities in 
the field, but they also slowed the progress of Allied 
troops, particularly armour. Bombing defended urban 
areas completely disrupted the German defences, but 
caused such obstruction that- Allied troops could not 
reach their objectives. In both cases, by the time the 
Allied troops had negotiated the obstruction caused by 
bombing, those Germans that had not become casualties 
or prisoners had recovered. 
Given that battlefield effectiveness depended for 
the most part on neutralization rather than 
destruction, was this sufficient justification for 
employing aircraft in the close air support role? The 
answer is yes, but with several qualifications. The 
greatest justification is success, and when fighter- 
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bombers enabled Allied troops to secure their 
objectives more rapidly and with fewer casualties than 
would have been possible with ground based fire 
support then their employment was justified. So too 
were attacks upon German gun and battery positions 
which, though they destroyed few guns, significantly 
reduced German fire on the Allied assault troops. 
Yet the success of close air support for Allied 
attacks depended upon the air support being rapidly 
exploited on the ground, and in very many instances 
this was not done. When such exploitation was 
attempted but not achieved for reasons beyond the 
control of Allied troops, one may say that the air 
support was wasted but that its employment was 
nevertheless justified. However, a very large 
proportion of close air support strikes were directed 
at German front line targets, within range of friendly 
artillery, but were not closely integrated with 
ground operations. Such attacks amounted to an 
unjustified waste of effort. 
Turning to heavy and medium bomber operations, few 
proved to be justified by success. The bombing of 
heavily protected gun batteries, such as at Valcheren, 
or concrete and steel fortifications, such as at Le 
Havre and Boulogne, when such raids were not 
integrated with an assault, proved to be a waste of 
bombs. Similarly, the bombing of urban areas, even 
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immediately prior to an assault, proved counter- 
productive. After the experience of Cassino in March 
1944 further such employment of the heavy and medium 
bomber forces seems inexcusable. 
In field operations, heavy and medium bombing 
enabled Allied troops to overcome German defence 
localities in the initial stages of a major attack. 
But, when Allied troops were confronted with a German 
defence in depth, such bombing could not be decisive 
by ensuring a breakthrough. It was therefore not 
justified by results, though as this could not be 
forseen*at the time one might argue that the attempts 
were justified. Each of the joint heavy and medium 
close support bombing operations was intended to be 
decisive, and the bombing that initiated Operation 
COBRA finally was because it made possible the 
breakout from Normandy. Yet, in terms of what the 
bombing actually achieved it had not been markedly 
more successful than that for GOODWOOD a week 
previously. It is therefore unacceptable to condemn 
the employment of the bomber forces for the latter 
operation simply because it ultimately failed, while 
at the same time acknowledging the contribution of the 
former to Allied success. 
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TTT_ AN UNWARRANTED DIVERSION OF EFFORT ? 
To the question of whether air support proved to be 
of more value when directed against targets beyond the 
battlefront, the answer must be that, in general, it 
did. 
The question is most relevant to fighter-bombers, 
which were certainly more likely to be able to destroy 
the targets found beyond the battlefront than those in 
the immediate battle area. German motor transport was 
extremely vulnerable to fighter-bomber weapons, as 
were fuel and ammunition dumps. Concentrated attacks 
upon buildings used as headquarters were likely to 
achieve sufficient hits to make them untenable. That 
such targets could be destroyed by fighter-bombers is 
not in itself a justification for stating that attacks 
on them were of more value than close support. 
However, such targets were in fact of vital 
importance. -to the 
Germans, and this is reflected in 
the losses in aircraft and pilots sustained by the 
Allied tactical air forces in attacking them. 
Moreover, armed reconnaissance and attacks upon 
specific targets beyond the front line maintained a 
continual threat of air attack that reduced German 
fighting ability, with tactical mobility and supply 
being impossible in daylight without severe penalty. 
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Attaining this dominance over the German rear areas 
was undoubtedly vital, but it must be observed that 
there were occasions when close air support was 
necessary - for example in an emergency situation such 
as Mortain. In 1943-45 the Allies were fortunate in 
that, having achieved air superiority, they possessed 
sufficient aircraft and pilots to provide both a high 
level of close air support and also maintain a 
continuous armed reconnaissance offensive. While 
priorities varied according to circumstances in the 
battle area, the Allied armies were never denied the 
support of one mission type at the total expense of 
the other. The German armies in Italy and North-West 
Europe were under the continual threat of air attack 
both at and beyond the battlefront. Had circumstances 
been different, however, with fewer Allied air 
resources and a formidable Luftwaffe to be countered, 
then adherence by the Allied tactical air forces to 
their doctrine of according first priority to 
attaining air superiority and second priority to 
attacking ground targets beyond the battle area would 
have been justified - as it had already been by 
results in North Africa. Despite the advantages that 
it could bring to the battlefield, close air support. 
on the scale enjoyed by the Allied armies in 1943-45 
would have been impossible, and rightly so. 
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Turning to heavy and medium bombers, the latter must 
be considered as tactical, rather than strategic, 
weapons. Mediums were rarely employed in close support 
except in conjunction with the heavy bombers. They 
were mainly employed to bring under attack such German 
communications and supply targets that were beyond 
fighter-bomber range, and thus represented the deep 
strike capability of the tactical air forces. They 
were also employed, with some effect, to disrupt 
German troop concentrations and gun areas beyond the 
battlefront and which demanded a heavier scale of 
bombing than possible by fighter-bombers. Extensive 
use of the medium bomber squadrons in the close air 
support role, when large numbers of fighter-bombers 
were available, would have resulted in many vital 
targets beyond the battlefront being neglected. 
Moreover, lacking the flexibility and responsiveness 
of fighter-bombers, and their ability to attack 
targets in very close proximity to friendly troops, 
the mediums could have brought little advantage to the 
close support role, for which they were unsuited. 
With regard to the heavy bomber forces, there can be 
little doubt that the strategic role for which they 
were created, that of disrupting Germany's economic 
and industrial base, was of more vital importance than 
close air support. The thesis has attempted to show 
what heavy bombing could achieve on the battlefield, 
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and has concluded that ultimately it was of limited 
effectiveness. It can be argued that use of the heavy 
bombers was justified on a very few occasions, namely 
to assist Allied troops at the outset of a major 
offensive. The problem was that, particularly in 
Normandy, employment of the heavy bombers escalated as 
such operations failed in their objectives. This 
placed the senior airmen in a dilemma. They were 
prepared to sanction a limited diversion of the 
strategic forces to support the army if the result was 
to be decisive - such as to achieve the breakout from 
Normandy. Yet when such operations failed they were 
obliged to sanction further diversion. 
Given that the extent of close air support by the 
heavy bomber forces in 1944-45 was small, it might be 
argued that this limited effort did not in any way 
compromise the effectiveness of the strategic 
offensive. Yet the same bomber effort accorded to 
operations such as GOODWOOD and COBRA might have been 
used to render an oil plant inoperable for several 
weeks, or to render a railway marshalling yard 
unusable for days with consequent disruption to the 
German transportation network. The opportunity to 
attack strategic ' targets depended upon suitable 
weather, and the effectiveness of the offensive 
depended upon regular repeat attacks. Seen in this 
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light the effort devoted to close air support seems 
far less inconsequential, and harder to justify. 
Another argument might be that the strategic 
offensive was compromised by the Allied air forces 
failing to determine targeting priorites, for example 
whether to direct the offensive against the German oil 
industry or transportation targets, and that its 
overall effectiveness was therefore questionable. It 
is beyond the scope of the thesis to determine which 
strategic target was the most appropriate for the 
heavy bombers, but suffice to say that such an 
argument is not sufficient grounds, given their 
battlefield effectiveness, for stating that further 
close support would have been desirable or justified. 
To sum up, Allied close air support in 1943-45 did 
undoubtedly provide certain advantages that could be 
exploited by Allied troops. But they were highly 
variable, and were to a great extent incidental and 
made apparent only as a result of the Allied air 
forces possessing large numbers of aircraft for 
employment in the close support role. Had this 
situation not prevailed, these advantages would not 
have been in themselves sufficient to justify a 
diminution of either the tactical air offensive 
against German movement and supply behind the 
battlefront, or the strategic offensive against 
Germany's war effort. 
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